

The Governing Manual

Centre for Administrative Service

Table of Contents

Right-click and select 'Update Field' to generate the Table of Contents.

Right-click the table above and select “Update Field” to generate page numbers.

Preface

The centre of government secures the resources and relationships required to govern. The government commands its apparatus but depends on actors beyond it for revenue, talent, information, institutional cooperation, and political consent. The operational craft by which these dependencies are managed is the subject of the doctrine that follows.

The Administrative State Manual covers the administrative function: the execution of policy, the management of programmes, the conduct of administration. The Administrative State Manual assumes the conditions for administration. The work of establishing and maintaining those conditions falls to the centre.

The doctrine is organized in seven parts. Part I establishes the foundations. Part II treats the dependency operations. Part III treats the actor management operations. Part IV treats networks, coalitions, opposition, and adversaries. Part V treats the centre's craft. Part VI treats the personal craft. Part VII treats comparative practice.

Corrections and proposed revisions should be submitted through the standard review process.

Chapter 1 — The Centre of Government

Part I: Foundations — The operational craft by which the centre of government secures the resources and relationships required to govern.

1.1 The Work of the Centre

The centre of government secures the resources and relationships required to govern. The government commands its apparatus — the civil service, the military, the police, the treasury — but the resources that make governing possible are held by actors the government does not command. Revenue is held by taxpayers and businesses. Investment is held by the private sector. Talent is held by the professions and the labour market. Information is held by the media, the academy, and civil society. Consent is held by the public. The centre manages the relationships through which these resources are acquired.

The work of the centre is political before it is administrative. The tax code is partly a technical instrument and partly a negotiated settlement with the economic interests that pay the tax. The budget is partly a fiscal document and partly a coalition management instrument. The regulatory regime is partly a legal framework and partly a bargain with the regulated. The appointment of officials is partly a merit decision and partly the cultivation of constituencies. The centre manages the political dimension of these instruments, up to the point where the formal administrative process takes over.

Historical practice illustrates the function across centuries and traditions. Louis XIV's removal of the high nobility from their provincial power bases and their reassembly at Versailles converted a turbulent aristocracy into a court-dependent elite whose access to office, distinction, and royal favour flowed through the centre; the management of Versailles was the management of the relationships on which the monarchy's revenue, military manpower, and political consent depended. The Meiji oligarchs, drawing on a small group of Satsuma and Chōshū notables, constructed a modern state from a feudal order by concentrating the relationships with the former domains, the new industrialists, the imperial army, and the reorganised civil service in the hands of a tightly knit leadership. Bismarck's management of the Prussian state — the alliance of iron and rye, the subordination of the federal princes, the management of the Reichstag through engineered crises — secured the resources the new German Empire required against actors the centre did not command. Lee Kuan Yew's management of Singapore, sustained across four decades, held the relationship with the trades unions, the civil service, the foreign investors, and the neighbouring states in a single coordinated apparatus. In each case the centre's work was the management of dependencies; the apparatus of government was the instrument, not the work itself.

The function holds in smaller states and in different traditions. The Venetian Republic, across a millennium, sustained its capacity to govern through the management of a merchant elite whose access to trade, office, and distinction flowed through the institutions of the centre — the Great Council, the Senate, the Council of Ten — and the Republic's longevity turned on the quality of that management more than on the size of its territory. De Gaulle's construction of the Fifth

Republic, in the wake of the Fourth Republic's paralysis, located the centre in a presidency equipped with the authority to manage the dependencies the Fourth Republic had been unable to hold — the relationship with the army, with Algeria, with the parties, and with the external allies — and the durability of the regime the general constructed turned on that placement. The British management of the Crown-cabinet relationship across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries located the centre in the cabinet and the prime minister's office, sustained by conventions that converted the royal prerogative into an instrument of cabinet government and held the dependencies of revenue, talent, and consent in the relationships the cabinet cultivated.

The craft lies in the distinction between command and dependency. The government that confuses the two attempts to govern by command alone, and finds that the resources on which it depends — revenue, talent, information, consent — are withheld by actors it cannot compel. The government that holds the distinction clearly manages the dependencies through relationships, and finds that the resources flow into the apparatus the government commands. The distinction is the foundation of the centre's work, and its management is the operational craft by which the conditions for governing are secured.

1.2 The Principals at the Centre

The centre comprises the council of state, the first minister's office, and the officials who manage the government's dependencies. These principals carry responsibility for the government's relationships with the actors on whom it depends. They direct, commission, and authorise the work that secures the conditions for governing. The operational craft at this level is the substance of the doctrine.

The principals at the centre face decisions that the administrative function does not address: whether to cultivate a relationship or let it lapse, whether to build a coalition or go alone, whether to concede on a point to preserve a relationship or to hold firm and risk it. These are political judgments, made under uncertainty, with incomplete information, and with consequences that extend beyond the immediate decision. The work is conducted in confidence, sustained over years, and judged by results that appear in the flow of resources and the steadiness of relationships rather than in the visible record of policy. The distinction between this work and the work of administration is one of role, not of rank: a principal at the centre may hold any rank, and an administrator at a line ministry may hold a senior one. The distinction is in the work — whether the work is securing conditions or executing within them.

Historical practice illustrates the function. The Venetian Republic concentrated the management of its dependencies in the Doge, the Signoria, the Council of Ten, and the Great Council; the principals who sat in these bodies carried the relationships with the merchant elite, the naval commanders, the territorial administrators of the Stato da Màr, and the foreign ambassadors on which the Republic's survival depended, and the design of the institutions ensured that the relationships were held collectively and rotated regularly to prevent any single principal from monopolising them. The Habsburg centre comprised the monarch, the court chancellery, the conference of ministers, and the common ministers' council; the principals who held these offices managed the relationships with the kingdoms, the principalities, and the crownlands of a multi-

national empire, and the survival of the empire across centuries turned on the quality of their work. De Gaulle's construction of the Fifth Republic concentrated the management of the dependencies in the presidency, the council of ministers, and the officials around them; the principals who held these positions carried the relationships with the grands corps, the political parties, the trade unions, and the external allies on which the Republic's capacity to govern depended. The forms differ; the function is the same: the principals at the centre carry the relationships that secure the conditions for governing.

The craft at this level is the cultivation of judgment. The principal who treats each decision as isolated will be managed by the cumulative effect of decisions the principal did not see as related; the principal who treats each decision as part of a pattern will manage the pattern. The relationships, the meetings, the negotiations, the briefings, the transitions, and the crises are not episodes but elements of a sustained practice, and the principal who conducts them as a practice secures the conditions for governing across years. The work is the management of the pattern across years; the craft is its identification and adjustment as the conditions of governing change.

1.3 The Political and the Administrative

The administrative function assumes that the conditions for administration are in place — that the revenue is flowing, that the talent is recruited, that the consent is maintained, that the cooperation is secured. The work of establishing and maintaining those conditions is the work of the centre. Where the conditions are present, the administrative function proceeds on its own; where they are absent, the administrative function fails — not because the administrative craft is wrong, but because the conditions the craft presumes are missing. The centre's work is to ensure the conditions are present.

The boundary between the political and the administrative is the boundary between the centre's work and the work that follows. The centre manages the politics of revenue up to the point where the budget formulation process begins. The centre manages the cultivation of talent up to the point where the formal recruitment process begins. The centre manages the relationship with the media up to the point where formal communications begin. The centre manages the coalition up to the point where the legislative or regulatory process begins. At each boundary, the administrative function takes over. The boundary is not always clean; the centre that draws it well keeps the political work from contaminating the administrative, and the administrative work from exhausting the political.

Historical practice illustrates the management of the boundary. The British constitutional tradition, developed across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, formalised the distinction between the political principals who carry the relationships and the permanent civil servants who execute within them; the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms, the Haldane model, and the Armstrong memorandum each drew the line at a different point, but the principle was constant: the political work was conducted by ministers and their immediate advisers, the administrative work by permanent officials, and the boundary managed through convention rather than through statute. The Meiji oligarchs drew the boundary differently: the *genrō* — the small group of founding figures — conducted the political work of managing the dependencies, while the reorganised civil service, the

imperial bureaucracy, and the cabinet conducted the administrative work; the boundary held for the oligarchs' lifetimes and was renegotiated in the 1920s and 1930s as the political work shifted to party cabinets and, later, to the military. Lee Kuan Yew's management of Singapore held the boundary through a doctrine of clean lines: the political leadership set the direction, the administrative leadership executed it, and the boundary was policed by the prime minister's office through the establishment of the administrative service as a distinct cadre with its own esprit and discipline. The craft in each case was the maintenance of the boundary, not its abolition.

The boundary is contested in every governing system. The political principal who crosses into administration loses the time and attention the political work requires; the administrator who crosses into politics loses the impartiality the administrative work requires. The centre's discipline is the maintenance of the boundary on its own side: the political work conducted at the centre, the administrative work delegated beyond it, and the relationships at the boundary managed so that the one does not absorb the other. The discipline is the centre's own; no one else enforces it, and the centre that loses the discipline loses the capacity to govern.

1.4 The Scope of the Centre's Work

The work covers four dimensions. The first is the five resource dependencies: financial, human, informational, institutional, and political. The second is the actor landscape: economic elites, bureaucratic elites, social elites, external elites, the branches of government, and the head of state and the court. The third is the network and coalition dimension: actors do not operate in isolation, and the centre must map and manage the networks and coalitions that shape its access to resources. The fourth is the operational craft: the meeting, the negotiation, the briefing, the transition, the crisis, the personal relationship.

The five resource dependencies define what the centre must secure. The financial dependency is the dependence on taxpayers, investors, and financiers for the revenue, investment, and financing required to operate. The human dependency is the dependence on the professions, the labour market, and the universities for the talent required to staff the apparatus. The informational dependency is the dependence on the media, the academy, and civil society for the information and the public discourse that shape what the government knows and what the public believes. The institutional dependency is the dependence on the branches of government, the sub-national authorities, and the external institutions whose cooperation the government requires. The political dependency is the dependence on the public, the parties, and the constituencies whose consent sustains the government in office. Each dependency is a relationship, not a transaction; each is sustained over years, not addressed in episodes.

The actor landscape defines whom the centre must manage. The economic elites hold the investment and the employment on which the economy depends. The bureaucratic elites hold the capacity of the apparatus the government commands. The social elites hold the legitimacy and the cultural authority that shape public reception. The external elites — the foreign governments, the international institutions, the multinational corporations — hold the cooperation the government requires beyond its borders. The branches of government hold the constitutional position that defines the government's authority. The head of state and the court hold the symbolic unity of the

state and the formal locus of executive authority. The centre's management of each actor is the management of a relationship sustained over time, with attention to the actor's interests, constituencies, and dynamics.

Historical practice illustrates the scope at scale. The Habsburg centre managed the dependencies of a multi-national empire across centuries — the financial dependency managed through the compromises with the Hungarian and Austrian diets, the human dependency managed through the cultivation of the imperial bureaucracy and the officer corps, the institutional dependency managed through the common ministries and the delegations, the political dependency managed through the cultivation of the dynastic, military, and ecclesiastical elites that held the empire together across its many nations. De Gaulle's construction of the Fifth Republic defined the scope of the centre's work in a system that vested the presidency with the strategic direction of the state — the financial dependency managed through the planning apparatus and the relationship with the grands corps, the institutional dependency managed through the constitutional architecture of the dual executive, the political dependency managed through the cultivation of the parties and the bypassing of the parties when the parties obstructed. Lee Kuan Yew's management of Singapore defined the scope of the centre's work in a small, open, and vulnerable state — the financial dependency managed through the relationship with foreign investors and the multinationals, the human dependency managed through the scholarship system and the administrative service, the informational dependency managed through the regulation of the media and the cultivation of a register of official seriousness, the political dependency managed through the institutional incorporation of the trades unions and the community organisations. The scope is the same in each case; the means are adjusted to the conditions.

1.5 The Structure of the Work

The centre's work is structured around the dependencies it secures and the actors it manages. The dependencies — financial, human, informational, institutional, and political — define the operational fields in which the centre works. The actors — economic elites, bureaucratic elites, social elites, external elites, the branches, and the head of state and the court — define the relationships through which the dependencies are secured. The networks and coalitions that connect the actors define the terrain on which the centre operates. The operational craft — the meeting, the negotiation, the briefing, the transition, the crisis, the personal relationship — defines the instruments through which the work is conducted. The structure is the arrangement of these elements into a coherent practice.

The dependencies are addressed in sequence: financial, because the resources to govern must be secured before the apparatus can be staffed; human, because the apparatus requires the talent to operate; informational, because the apparatus requires the information to decide; institutional, because the apparatus requires the cooperation of the institutions it cannot command; and political, because the consent that sustains the apparatus in office must be cultivated and renewed. The sequence is not strict — the dependencies are managed simultaneously — but the priority is real: a centre that loses the financial dependency loses the capacity to address the others, and a centre that loses the political dependency loses the capacity to remain in office. The dependencies are

addressed in this order in practice, and the centre that addresses them in this order secures the conditions for governing.

The actors are managed across the dependencies, not within them. The same economic elite that holds the financial dependency holds part of the informational dependency through its ownership of media and part of the political dependency through its financing of parties. The same bureaucratic elite that holds the human dependency holds part of the institutional dependency through its administration of the apparatus. The centre's management of an actor is therefore a management of the actor's position across the dependencies, not a management of the actor within a single field. The craft is the cultivation of the relationship with each actor across the full range of the actor's relevance to the centre's work, sustained over years and across changes of leadership on both sides.

Historical practice illustrates the structure. The French monarchy under Louis XIV organised its work around the dependencies — the financial dependency managed through the intendants and the *fermiers généraux*, the human dependency managed through the sale of offices and the cultivation of the magistracy, the institutional dependency managed through the provincial estates and the parlements, the political dependency managed through the court at Versailles and the cultivation of the high aristocracy — and the structure of the work held the monarchy in place for a century and a half. The Meiji oligarchs organised their work around the dependencies — the financial dependency managed through the relationship with the *zaibatsu* and the new industrialists, the human dependency managed through the imperial universities and the reorganised civil service, the institutional dependency managed through the constitution and the imperial diet, the political dependency managed through the cultivation of the rural notables and the prefectural assemblies — and the structure of the work carried Japan from feudal order to modern great power in two generations. The British centre, across the long evolution of the constitutional monarchy, organised its work around the dependencies — the financial dependency managed through the Treasury and the Bank of England, the human dependency managed through the civil service commissions and the universities, the institutional dependency managed through the cabinet and the parliamentary parties, the political dependency managed through the relationship with the press and the constituencies — and the structure of the work held the system in place across the changes of party, monarch, and century. The forms differ; the structure is the same.

1.6 Chapter Summary

The centre of government secures the resources and relationships required to govern. The government commands its apparatus but depends on actors beyond it for revenue, talent, information, institutional cooperation, and political consent. The work of securing these dependencies is political before it is administrative, and the principals at the centre — the council, the first minister's office, and the officials who manage the dependencies — conduct the work in confidence, sustained over years, and judged by the flow of resources and the steadiness of relationships.

The boundary between the political and the administrative is the boundary between the centre's work and the work that follows. The centre manages the politics of revenue up to the point

where the budget formulation begins, the cultivation of talent up to the point where the recruitment process begins, the relationship with the media up to the point where formal communications begin, the coalition up to the point where the legislative process begins. At each boundary the administrative function takes over. The discipline of maintaining the boundary is the centre's own.

The scope of the work covers the five resource dependencies — financial, human, informational, institutional, and political — and the actor landscape of economic, bureaucratic, social, and external elites, the branches, and the head of state and the court. The structure of the work addresses the dependencies in sequence, the actors across the dependencies, and the craft through the meeting, the negotiation, the briefing, the transition, the crisis, and the personal relationship. Historical practice — the French monarchy at Versailles, the Venetian Republic's Great Council, Bismarck's Prussia, the Meiji oligarchs' Japan, de Gaulle's Fifth Republic, Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, the British Crown-cabinet relationship, the Habsburg multi-national empire — illustrates the function across centuries and traditions. The forms differ; the function is the same: the centre manages the dependencies on which the capacity to govern depends, and the quality of the management determines the durability of the regime.

Chapter 2 — The Government's Dependencies

The government does not command the resources it needs to govern. It must acquire them from actors it does not directly command.

2.1 What a Dependency Is

A resource dependency is a relationship in which the government requires a resource held by an actor it does not directly command and must acquire that resource through the management of the relationship. The resource may be material, informational, or relational. What makes the arrangement a dependency is that the government cannot simply direct the actor to provide the resource; acquisition requires the actor's willingness, and the cultivation of that willingness is the work. The relationship, not the resource in isolation, is the unit of management.

A command relationship obtains within the government's own apparatus. A minister directs a department, a department directs an agency, an agency directs its field offices, and resources move by direction. A dependency relationship obtains beyond that apparatus. Revenue is collected from taxpayers and businesses whose compliance cannot be assumed; expertise is held by professionals whose cooperation cannot be compelled; legitimacy is conferred by publics whose consent cannot be decreed. The boundary between command and dependency is the boundary of the government's own machinery.

The Meiji oligarchs, on the restoration of imperial rule in 1868, confronted a state that commanded almost nothing of what governing required. The revenue base was a feudal land tax whose yield was diminishing; the expertise to draft a code, build a navy, or negotiate a treaty was held by foreigners and a handful of Dutch-learning scholars; the institutional capacity to act on national policy was dispersed among two hundred domains. The oligarchs' first work was to identify, domain by domain and resource by resource, what the new government needed and who held it. Lee Kuan Yew in 1965 faced a similar inventory at a smaller scale: a city-state dependent on Malaysia for its water, on Britain for its security and a third of its output, on foreign investment for its industrial base, and on a thin talent pool. The mapping preceded the management; the inventory was the first act of state.

The management of dependencies falls to the centre of government. Line ministries manage operational relationships with suppliers, contractors, and regulated parties within their domains. The centre manages the strategic relationships on which the government's capacity to govern depends: the major economic actors, the senior personnel of the state, the leading institutions of public discourse, and the actors who confer or withdraw legitimacy. The centre's scope begins where the line ministries' transactional posture toward suppliers and regulated parties ends. A centre that drifts toward operational management loses the strategic relationships on which governing depends.

A dependency is a standing relationship. The relationship persists, the resource remains required, and the actor remains external to the government's apparatus. The work is continuous: the relationship is cultivated, the resource is secured, the conditions of access are reviewed, and the

relationship is recalibrated as circumstances change. Where a dependency is treated as a difficulty to be resolved, complacency follows when the relationship is quiet and alarm follows when it is not. The discipline of continuous management distinguishes the centre's approach from a posture of crisis response that activates only when access fails.

2.2 The Five Resource Dependencies

The government's dependencies cluster into five categories: financial, human, informational, institutional, and political. Each corresponds to a class of resource the government cannot generate internally and must secure externally. Each is a relationship, maintained with the actors who control the resource, rather than a reserve held in stock. The government maintains the relationships through which revenue, talent, intelligence, implementation, and consent flow; it does not hold the resources themselves.

The financial dependency comprises revenue from taxation and resource rents, investment from domestic and foreign capital, and external financing from markets and official lenders. The actors are the taxpayers and resource holders whose compliance funds the budget; the investors whose capital sustains the productive base; and the bondholders, rating agencies, and official lenders whose continued confidence permits borrowing. The French monarchy's management of the farmers-general illustrates the structure. From the seventeenth century to the revolution, the crown drew its revenue through syndicates of financiers who advanced the tax and collected it at a profit; the crown could not collect the tax itself, and the terms on which the farmers-general advanced it set the effective fiscal capacity of the state. The controller-general's craft was the management of the relationship: the renegotiation of the lease, the surveillance of the syndicates, the cultivation of competition among them, and the periodic purge that demonstrated the crown's residual authority. The dependence reappears wherever government finances itself through relationships it cannot command.

The human dependency comprises elite talent, technical expertise, and loyal service across the civil service, the security forces, the professions, and the senior appointments of the state. The actors are the professionals and the institutions that credential them, the universities that train the next cohort, the officer corps whose discipline the government relies on, and the senior personnel on whom the apparatus runs. Bismarck's management of the Prussian military's dependence on the crown illustrates the structure. The officer corps owed its commissions to the king and its budget to the Landtag, and Bismarck's craft was to keep both dependencies aligned with the crown: he cultivated the senior officers through the monarch, withheld from the Landtag the operational decisions that would have forced the corps to choose between paymaster and commander, and used the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870 to bind the corps through victory. The army remained a dependency because the relationships through which its resources flowed were managed continuously; the constitutional position was secondary.

The informational dependency comprises intelligence on threats and opportunities, data on the state of the country, and the framing of public discourse through which the government's actions are interpreted. The actors are the intelligence services, the statistical office, and the editors, broadcasters, academic institutions, and major platforms whose framing shapes how the public

receives the government's actions. The Meiji oligarchs recognized the informational dependency early: the government sent missions abroad to gather the institutional and technical knowledge Japan needed, established a statistics bureau to produce the figures on which policy would rest, and cultivated the press through the *genrō*'s personal relationships with the newspaper proprietors. The informational relationship is managed; the figures and the framing can be withdrawn, distorted, or contested by the actors who control them.

The institutional dependency comprises the implementation capacity through which policy becomes action, the cooperation of subnational governments, and the coordination of the branches. The actors are the line administration, the governors and mayors whose cooperation is required for any programme touching the territory, and the legislature, the judiciary, and the audit institutions whose procedures must run their course for the government's decisions to take effect. Venetian practice illustrates the structure. The Republic's *terraferma* dependencies were administered by rectors sent from Venice for fixed terms, supervised by the Senate, audited by the *Avogaria di Comun*, and bound to the centre by the personal careers of their officials; loyalty was maintained through a lattice of oversight, promotion, and the credible expectation that good service brought advancement in Venice. The institutional dependency runs through the lattice, not through the decree.

The political dependency comprises consent, coalition, and legitimacy. Consent is the public's acceptance of the government's authority to govern. Coalition is the assembly and maintenance of the supporting alignment in parliament, in the regions, and among the elites whose backing the government requires. Legitimacy is the deeper recognition that the government's exercise of power is rightful. The three are related but distinct, and the management of each is the centre's continuous work. De Gaulle's constitution of the Fifth Republic was designed around the distinction: the president derived legitimacy directly from the electorate, the government derived its coalition from the assembly, and the management of both was concentrated at the *Élysée*. The periodic crises of the Fifth Republic have followed the failure to manage one of the three.

2.3 The Actor Landscape

Five categories of external actor, together with the branches of government and the head of state and the court, constitute the landscape within which the government must work. Each controls resources the government requires, and each requires a distinct approach. The mapping of the landscape is the foundation on which the centre's operational work proceeds. The categories are analytical; in practice, individuals and institutions often span more than one.

The economic elites comprise business leaders, financiers, executives of state-owned enterprises, and the heads of professional bodies and trade associations. They control the tax base, the allocation of investment, and the implementation capacity of the private sector. The bureaucratic elites comprise the senior civil service, the officer corps of the military, the leadership of the police, and the senior judiciary. They control the implementation capacity of the state, the application of lawful force, and the authoritative interpretation of the law. The Venetian Senate mapped its economic and bureaucratic elites with precision: the merchant houses whose fleets carried the Republic's trade, the *arsenalotti* whose shipyard was the state's largest industrial

enterprise, the condottieri whose contracts supplied the field armies, and the rectors who governed the dependencies. The mapping was the basis on which the Senate allocated offices, set terms of trade, and chose between war and negotiation. A government that does not know which merchants, officers, and officials hold the resources on which it depends cannot manage the dependencies through which those resources flow.

The social elites comprise the academy, the media, religious institutions, and the major cultural institutions. They shape public discourse, train the next generation of administrative and professional personnel, and confer or withhold cultural legitimacy. The external elites comprise foreign governments, multinationals, and international institutions. They control external financing, market access, security cooperation, and the international framework within which the government operates. The Meiji oligarchs treated the foreign powers as the principal external dependency of the new state: the unequal treaties imposed on Japan constrained its tariff autonomy and its legal jurisdiction, and the oligarchs' diplomacy aimed, over three decades, at the renegotiation that would restore both. They treated the domestic social elites — the former samurai, the great landowners, the Buddhist and Shinto establishments — as dependencies to be co-opted: pensions absorbed the samurai, peerages absorbed the landowners, and state patronage absorbed the religious institutions. The mapping was the precondition for the constitution of 1889 and the alliance structure that followed.

The branches of government and the head of state and the court are also actors whose resources and cooperation the government requires. The legislature supplies legal authority and the budget; the judiciary supplies the authoritative interpretation of the law; the head of state supplies symbolic authority and, in many systems, reserve powers. These actors are inside the constitutional order but outside the government's apparatus. They are managed as dependencies, approached analytically and on the same footing as any other actor on the landscape. De Gaulle's management of the Fifth Republic illustrates the approach: the parties were treated as actors whose coalition support the government required; the military was treated as an actor whose loyalty the state commanded but whose allegiances had to be rebuilt after Algeria; the unions were treated as actors whose industrial cooperation the government needed; the colonies were treated as dependencies whose retention or release was a strategic choice. The Élysée managed each relationship on its own terms, without privileging any actor in the analysis.

The landscape is not static. The categories shift in their composition, their internal hierarchies, and their alignment with one another. A business elite that dominates a sector in one decade may be displaced by new entrants in the next; an officer corps that is loyal in one period may be politicised in another; a media elite that is deferential in one government may be oppositional in the next. The centre maintains the landscape map as a living document, revised continuously as the composition and the alignment of the actors shift. The mapping is the precondition for engagement; engagement without the mapping is improvisation.

2.4 The Network and Coalition Dimension

Actors do not operate in isolation. They form networks of common interest, professional affiliation, family and educational tie, commercial partnership, and shared ideological commitment.

They also form coalitions: more deliberate alignments through which multiple actors pursue common objectives. The government's access to any single resource is shaped by the networks and coalitions that mediate it. A map of individual actors, however accurate, is incomplete unless it also records the ties that connect them.

Networks matter because they transmit influence, information, and pressure across actors who appear, on a static map, to be separate. A change in the position of one major business leader may shift the position of an industry association, a professional body, and a think tank funded through the same network. A change in the editorial line of one major paper may shift the coverage of outlets that take their cue from it. The government that maps only individual actors misses the channels through which influence flows and the points at which a single intervention can move multiple actors at once. The Venetian Republic's intelligence system was built on this premise: the Senate's ambassadors reported not only the positions of foreign courts but the kinship, debt, and commercial ties through which a Venetian noble, a German banker, and an Ottoman official might be bound together. The network was the unit of intelligence; the individual was a node.

Coalitions matter because they change the dynamic of access. A coalition of economic and media actors can shape public discourse on a fiscal question in ways that no single member could achieve alone. A coalition of regional governors and sectoral ministries can shift the implementation of a national programme in ways that bilateral engagement with each separately cannot reverse. The government that engages such actors one by one may find that bilateral assurances are overturned by coalition pressure it never directly observed. Bismarck's management of the Prussian coalition that delivered the wars of unification illustrates the structure. The crown, the army, the liberal nationalists, the particularist states, and the great powers were each separate actors, bound to others through ties Bismarck cultivated or exploited. The coalition for each war was assembled deliberately, used to its purpose, and dissolved before its tensions could turn against the crown. Coalition management is the active work of assembly, use, and dissolution.

De Gaulle's management of the coalition for Algerian independence illustrates the work in its most demanding form. The coalition stretched from the parties of the Republic, through the military commanders whose obedience the government required, to the settler organisations whose opposition the government expected, and the foreign powers whose pressure the government courted. The Élysée managed each member through distinct channels: the parties through the prime minister and the assembly, the military through the chief of defence and the personal authority of the president, the settlers through the préfets, the foreign powers through the Quai d'Orsay. The alignment held long enough to deliver the Évian Accords; the coalition was then dissolved, and the irreconcilables were isolated.

Network and coalition mapping is a standing activity of the centre, conducted alongside the maintenance of the stakeholder map. The output is an assessment of how resources, influence, and opposition flow through the landscape, not a directory of names. The centre's principals use the assessment to anticipate alignment shifts, identify points of leverage, and design engagements that account for the network in which each actor sits. The assessment is updated continuously, because the networks themselves shift continuously. A centre that maps networks only when a crisis forces the question discovers the alignments under pressure, which is the worst moment to do so.

2.5 The Personal Relationship as Substrate

The management of dependencies is conducted through personal relationships. The centre's principals — the head of government, the senior ministers, the cabinet secretary, the principal advisers — cultivate and maintain relationships with the principals of the actors on whom the government depends. The chief executive of a major firm, the chief of defence staff, the senior judge, the editor of a leading paper, the head of a religious institution: each is a person, and the relationship is held between persons. The formal office confers authority; the personal relationship confers access, trust, and the benefit of the doubt in moments of strain.

The personal dimension is the substrate on which the formal machinery operates. Formal communications, structured engagements, and recorded agreements are necessary, and they are insufficient on their own. An actor whose principal has no relationship with the centre's principals will respond to formal communications according to the minimum the formal channel requires. An actor whose principal has a cultivated relationship will respond with the discretion, the timing, and the flexibility that the situation demands. The French monarchy's relationship with the farmers-general was conducted through the controller-general's personal acquaintance with the syndics of the farm, the periodic dinners at Versailles that gathered the financiers and the ministers, and the private correspondence that ran alongside the formal lease. The lease set the legal terms; the personal relationships set the operational ones.

Cultivation is the deliberate work of building the relationship over time, before the moment of need. It comprises the regular meeting, the standing channel, the careful exchange of views on matters of mutual concern, and the disciplined observance of obligations incurred. Maintenance is the work of sustaining the relationship through changes of personnel, changes of government, and changes of circumstance. A relationship cultivated only in crisis reduces to a request, and a request made in crisis is received as a request rather than as a call on a relationship. Lee Kuan Yew's cultivation of the relationships through which Singapore's dependencies were managed illustrates the discipline. The water agreements with Malaysia were sustained through personal channels between the prime ministers and the senior officials, maintained across changes of leadership on both sides. The investment relationships with the multinationals were cultivated through individual meetings between the prime minister and the chief executives and sustained by the Economic Development Board's attention to the grievances of individual firms. The relationships held under strain because they had been built before the strain.

Comparative practice varies in the form the substrate takes. The French system, through the préfet and the grands corps, embeds personal relationship cultivation into the formal architecture of the state: the préfet is the centre's personal representative in the department, and the grands corps supply the network of senior officials whose careers span the public and private sectors. The Singapore system does so through the integrated structure of the administrative and political leadership at the centre, where the same individuals move between administrative and political roles over the course of a career. Bismarck's Prussia embedded the substrate in the court: the monarch's relationship with the senior officers, the chancellor's relationship with the party leaders, and the diplomatic corps' relationships with the foreign cabinets were the channels through which the dependencies ran. The forms vary; the requirement is constant.

The discipline of the personal substrate is the discipline of treating the relationship as an end in itself, sustained for the value it carries in the long arc of government. A relationship maintained only for what it can produce is recognised as such by the other party and degrades accordingly. A relationship maintained because both parties recognise its value, and the obligations it imposes, is the relationship that holds when the formal machinery fails. The centre that allows its personal relationships to lapse in quiet periods discovers, in crisis, that the relationships it assumed were available are no longer so.

2.6 Chapter Summary

A resource dependency is a relationship in which the government requires a resource held by an actor it does not directly command. The dependencies are managed continuously: the relationship persists, the resource remains required, and the actor remains external to the government's apparatus. The management of dependencies is the centre's responsibility and proceeds through the cultivation, maintenance, and recalibration of relationships with the actors who control the resources the government requires. The Meiji inventory of 1868 and the Singapore inventory of 1965 both began with the mapping of dependencies; the practice is the same in any state that intends to govern.

The dependencies cluster into five categories: financial, human, informational, institutional, and political. Each is a relationship maintained with the actors who control the resource, sustained through continuous engagement. The five are managed together because each affects the others: a strain in the financial dependency may unsettle the human as talent departs for safer jurisdictions, and a strain in the political may unsettle the institutional as the line administration hesitates. The French monarchy's farmers-general illustrate the financial; Bismarck's management of the Prussian officer corps illustrates the human and the institutional; the Meiji cultivation of the press and the universities illustrates the informational; de Gaulle's constitution of the Fifth Republic illustrates the political. The cases are comparative; the structure is general.

The landscape comprises economic elites, bureaucratic elites, social elites, external elites, the branches of government, and the head of state and the court. Each controls resources the government requires, and each is approached analytically and on the same footing. Actors form networks and coalitions that shape the flow of resources, influence, and opposition; the mapping of these is as important as the mapping of individual actors. The Venetian Senate's intelligence, the Meiji mapping of the foreign powers and the domestic establishments, and de Gaulle's management of the parties, the military, the unions, and the colonies each illustrate the discipline of treating the landscape as a system to be mapped and managed actively.

The management of dependencies is conducted through personal relationships between the centre's principals and the principals of the actors on whom the government depends. The personal dimension is the substrate of the operational craft. Cultivation occurs before the moment of need; maintenance sustains the relationship through change. The French préfet, the Singapore integrated leadership, and the Bismarckian court each embed the substrate in distinct institutional forms. A government that allows the personal substrate to lapse discovers, under strain, that the formal machinery it commands is not sufficient to govern.

Chapter 3 — The Centre of Government

The centre of government is the locus of the operational craft by which dependencies are managed.

3.1 What the Centre Is

The centre of government is the locus where the government's dependencies are managed and where the operational craft of governing is practiced. The centre comprises the council of state, the first minister's office, and the officials who manage the government's relationships with the actors on whom the government depends. The centre is distinct from the line ministries, which execute policy within their sectors. The centre does not deliver services or build infrastructure; it secures the conditions under which services are delivered and infrastructure is built. The work of the centre is to keep the government's relationships with its dependencies in repair, so that the line ministries can act on conditions the centre has established.

The centre is constituted as a cluster of offices that sit close to the first minister and the council and that exist to manage dependencies on the government's behalf. The cabinet office, the prime minister's office, the secretary-general of the government, the head of the civil service, the council secretariat, and the national security advisor are typical members of this cluster. Their jurisdictions overlap deliberately. The overlap ensures that every dependency is covered and that the first minister receives advice through more than one channel. The cluster is not a hierarchy; it is a set of offices that share proximity to the first minister and that exercise concurrent authority over the government's relationships.

The institutional form of the cluster varies across jurisdictions and across time, but the function is constant. The British Cabinet Office grew out of the Committee of Imperial Defence, established in 1902 to coordinate military, naval, and colonial policy across departments that had previously reported separately to the cabinet. The Committee's secretariat, originally a handful of clerks, became the Cabinet Secretariat in 1916, and the Cabinet Secretary became the principal operating officer of the centre. The Committee of Imperial Defence is the institutional ancestor of every modern cabinet office: a small staff, sitting close to the first minister, charged with the preparation of decisions that span sectoral boundaries. Bismarck's Reichskanzlei performed the same function in a different constitutional setting, operating as the personal instrument of the chancellor rather than as a council secretariat. Bismarck kept the chancellery deliberately small and directed it himself, on the principle that the chancellor's authority flowed through the chancellery rather than around it.

The cluster is small by design. The centre must be small enough to coordinate at the speed of political events, which is faster than the speed of administrative business. A centre that grows to the size of a ministry acquires the coordination problems of a ministry and ceases to function as a centre. The mature jurisdictions keep their centres lean. The British Cabinet Office, the Singapore Prime Minister's Office, the French Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement, and the Indonesian coordinating ministries each employ a few hundred officials at most. The Singapore Prime Minister's Office integrates the centre's functions in a single complex, housing the prime minister's

staff, the cabinet secretariat, the national security coordination office, and the civil service leadership in close physical proximity. The integration is deliberate: physical distance between the offices of the centre becomes operational distance in the management of dependencies. The work that exceeds the centre's capacity is delegated outward to the line ministries, not absorbed inward into the centre.

The centre is also a perspective. From the centre, the government is visible as a whole, with its dependencies and their interdependencies in view. From a line ministry, the government is visible as a sector, with the centre as a remote and intermittent presence. The centre's perspective is what allows dependencies to be managed in their connections rather than in isolation. A financial dependency that affects a political dependency, or an informational dependency that affects an institutional one, is visible from the centre in a way it cannot be from any single ministry. The Venetian Republic institutionalised this perspective in the Collegio, the standing committee of the doge and six savi that prepared business for the Senate and the Council of Ten. The Collegio did not administer; it surveyed the Republic's dependencies — diplomatic, naval, fiscal, ecclesiastical — and prepared the decisions the larger councils would take. The Republic's longevity rested in part on a centre that was small, permanent, and constitutionally positioned to see the whole.

3.2 The Functions of the Centre

The centre's principal function is the management of the government's dependencies. The government depends on financial, human, informational, institutional, and political resources, and each dependency generates a set of relationships that the centre maintains on the government's behalf. Closely linked is the coordination of the government's relationships across ministries and across branches, which ensures that no single ministry captures a relationship that belongs to the government and that relationships spanning sectors are managed at the centre. Coordination here is the active management of dependencies, not the circulation of papers or the scheduling of meetings. The work is continuous and accounts for the bulk of the centre's daily attention.

A second function is the preparation of the government's strategic decisions. Strategic decisions are prepared before they reach the council, so that the council can decide rather than deliberate from an unprepared position. The centre assembles the options, tests them against the dependency map, and presents the council with a basis for choice. The first minister and the council require the centre to do the operational work that makes strategic choice possible. A council that receives unprepared problems loses its capacity to decide. The French Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement performs this function for the Council of Ministers: it prepares the agenda, circulates the draft texts, ensures that conflicting positions are surfaced before the council meets, and records the decisions in a form that binds the ministries. The Venetian Collegio performed the same function for the Senate, condensing dispatches, framing the questions, and presenting the council with a narrow set of options. The craft is the same in Paris and in Venice across five centuries.

A third function is the management of transitions and crises. Transitions and crises place every dependency under stress simultaneously, and only the centre has the vantage point to manage them together. The transition between governments requires the centre to brief an incoming first minister

on the dependencies, the relationships, and the operational state of the government. A crisis of confidence requires the centre to coordinate the government's response across every dependency at once. The Habsburg *Gemeinsames Ministerium*, established in 1867 to coordinate the common affairs of the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the empire, existed precisely because crises in a multi-national state crossed every sectoral boundary at once. A monetary question, a military question, and a nationality question arrived at the centre as one problem. The *Gemeinsames Ministerium* prepared the common position the two governments could act on, and it managed the dependencies — financial, military, diplomatic — that the common affairs required.

A fourth function is the cultivation of the relationships required to govern. Relationships must be built over time and maintained in quiet periods so that they hold under stress. The centre cultivates relationships with economic, bureaucratic, social, and external elites, and with the principals of the branches and the head of state. The relationships the centre manages are with individual actors and with the networks and coalitions in which those actors are embedded. The Meiji oligarchs institutionalised this cultivation in the *genrō*, the informal council of elder statesmen who advised the emperor, brokered cabinets, and managed the relationships between the court, the military, the political parties, and the great *zaibatsu*. The *genrō* held no constitutional office; their authority rested on personal standing and on the relationships built during the Restoration. The persistence of the *genrō* into the 1920s demonstrated the centre's function as the cultivator of relationships that constitutional office alone could not secure.

The functions of the centre are not sequential. They run concurrently and reinforce one another. The preparation of a strategic decision draws on the centre's cultivated relationships; the management of a crisis draws on the centre's intelligence of dependencies; the briefing of an incoming first minister draws on the centre's continuity of judgment. The Venetian Council of Ten, sitting alongside the *Collegio*, combined intelligence, security, and judicial functions with the management of the Republic's most sensitive relationships. The Council's small membership, its secrecy, and its direct access to the doge gave the Republic a centre that could act on intelligence the larger councils could not see. The integration of functions in a small body is the operational signature of an effective centre, observed across mature jurisdictions and across centuries.

3.3 The Centre's Territorial Reach

The centre's territorial reach is the extension of the centre's authority and relationships into the regions and localities of the state. A government that governs only from the capital governs only the capital, and the capital is rarely where the government's dependencies are most contested. The line ministries have territorial arms, but those arms execute sectoral policy and report through sectoral channels. They do not manage the centre's relationships with regional and local elites. The centre's territorial reach is a separate function, performed by representatives who carry the centre's authority into the regions and who report the regions back to the centre.

The French prefectural system, established by Napoleon in 1800, is the canonical institutional form. A prefect (*préfet*) sits in each department, appointed by the head of state on the advice of the interior minister, and represents the central state across every sector. The prefect coordinates central services in the department, ensures that national policy is implemented locally, manages the

centre's relationships with local mayors and economic actors, and reports the political and administrative state of the department to the centre. The prefect is not a sectoral official; the prefect carries the centre's authority across sectors. The system's survival across two centuries, five regimes, and a major decentralisation in the 1980s testifies to the depth of the function. The centre that cannot place a trusted representative in each department loses its independent intelligence of the territory and becomes dependent on sectoral channels that filter out the political dimension.

The Habsburg monarchy faced the territorial-reach problem at the scale of a multi-national empire. The *Gemeinsames Ministerium* in Vienna coordinated the common affairs of Austria-Hungary, but the empire's dependencies extended into Bohemia, Galicia, the South Slav lands, and the military frontier. The centre managed territorial reach through a combination of statutory bodies — the diets of the crownlands, the imperial council, the Hungarian diet after 1867 — and through the personal relationships the emperor and his ministers maintained with the great magnates, the church hierarchies, and the military commanders in each land. The Habsburg centre never achieved the clean prefectural form; territorial reach was brokered rather than commanded. The brokering was itself a centre function, performed through audiences, correspondence, and the careful distribution of offices. The Habsburg case shows that the function of territorial reach persists even where the institutional form varies by region.

Territorial representation takes institutional forms that vary across mature jurisdictions. The Indonesian system combines provincial governors, who are elected, with coordinating officials appointed from the centre, producing a dual channel for territorial management. The British system has used government regional offices and, at times, elected mayors with whom the centre maintains direct relationships. The Singapore system, governing a city-state, integrates territorial reach into the centre itself; the absence of intermediate tiers is a constitutional fact, not a defect. The forms differ; the function is the same. The centre that cannot reach into the territory cannot manage its dependencies there. Regional elites — governors, mayors, business leaders, religious figures, security commanders — operate dependencies the centre must understand and influence. A centre confined to the capital receives its intelligence through sectoral channels that report what the sector wants the centre to hear. Territorial representation provides a channel that reports what the centre needs to know.

3.4 The Time-Neutral Perspective

The centre operates across changes of office-holder, treating each office as a role with defined dependencies. The first minister changes; the head of state changes; the principals of the centre change. The operational craft of the centre applies regardless of the individual who holds any particular office. The craft of the centre holds across these changes because it is built on the dependencies of the office, which persist across occupants. The dependencies are properties of the role, and the role outlasts every individual who fills it.

The operational consequences of this approach are significant. The centre maintains continuity of relationships, continuity of intelligence, and continuity of judgment across transitions. The officials of the centre — the secretary of the cabinet, the head of the civil service, the principal private secretaries — are the carriers of this continuity. Their tenure typically spans multiple first

ministers, and their craft is to serve each with the same directness. A centre that reorients itself to the preferences of each new first minister loses the institutional memory on which the first minister depends. The British Cabinet Secretary has served every prime minister since 1916 in the same role, and the office has accumulated a body of operational judgment no individual prime minister could reassemble. Bismarck's Reichskanzlei exhibited the opposite pattern: the chancellery was the personal instrument of the chancellor, and when Bismarck fell in 1890, the institution that had managed the empire's dependencies for two decades was dismantled by his successor within a few years. The contrast illustrates the cost of a centre attached to the office-holder rather than to the office.

The head of state is treated as an actor with dependencies, not as an office above analysis. The head of state has interests, relationships, and constraints, and the centre manages the government's relationship with the head of state accordingly. The same analytical register applies to the council, the court, and the principals of the centre itself. No actor is exempt from the operational craft of dependency management, and no actor receives deference that obstructs the work of the centre. The Venetian Republic applied this register to the doge with unusual rigour. The doge was elected for life, but the centre's instruments — the Collegio, the Council of Ten, the *avogaria di comun* — watched the doge, limited his private correspondence, and managed his relationships with foreign powers. The doge was the head of state; the doge was also a dependency to be managed.

The centre's craft applies to any office-holder in any mature jurisdiction. The techniques of dependency management, relationship cultivation, and decision preparation are not tied to a particular personality or a particular phase of a political cycle. The Meiji *genrō*, although they held no constitutional office, transmitted the craft of the centre across four decades and through the reigns of two emperors. Their continuity rested on personal standing, but the craft they exercised was institutional: the brokering of cabinets, the management of the court, the cultivation of the parties, the maintenance of the military's confidence. The Venetian Republic's centre persisted across more than a thousand years and more than a hundred doges, supported by an apparatus of councils, committees, and permanent officials whose craft was transmitted from one generation to the next. The continuity of the craft is what allows a change of first minister or head of state to pass without disrupting the management of the government's dependencies.

3.5 The Centre and the Branches

The centre coordinates the government's relationships across the branches. Each branch is an actor with its own interests, its own dynamics, and its own dependencies on the government. Each branch is also a partner in the government's operations, performing functions the government cannot perform alone. The management of inter-branch relationships is a continuous responsibility of the centre. The relationships with each branch run through formal channels and through the personal relationships the centre maintains with the principals of each branch.

The branches have their own constitutional positions, their own leadership, and their own constituencies. The centre's task is to manage the dependencies that cross the branches, leaving the conduct of branch functions to the branches themselves. This requires a clear understanding of what each branch controls, what each branch needs from the government, and what the government

needs from each branch. The centre that confuses coordination with direction loses the cooperation of the branches it needs. Inter-branch work is relationship management rather than command. The centre that treats a branch as a subordinate has misread its own constitutional position; the centre that treats a branch as a co-equal has read the position correctly and can do business with it.

The comparative practice varies. The British system manages the relationship with the legislature through the whips and the leader of the house, both operating from the centre. The French system manages the relationship with the legislature through the *Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement* and the minister for relations with parliament. The Indonesian coordinating ministries manage inter-branch relationships in the context of a presidential system with coalition dynamics. The Singapore system manages a unicameral legislature through the Prime Minister's Office and the leader of the house. The Venetian Republic managed its relationship with the Senate, the Great Council, and the Council of Ten through the *Collegio*, which prepared business for each body and through which the doge's government transacted its daily relations with the councils. The forms differ; the operational craft is the same.

The centre's work with the branches is the work of managing dependencies within the constitutional positions the branches occupy. The constitutional position of each branch is settled by instruments above the centre's authority. The centre operates within those positions and secures the cooperation the government requires. The relationships with the branches are cultivated in the same way as the relationships with economic, bureaucratic, social, and external elites: over time, in person, and with attention to the dependencies that run in both directions. The Meiji centre managed the imperial army and navy as branches with their own constitutional position — answerable directly to the emperor rather than to the cabinet — and the *genrō*'s craft was to keep the services in coordination with the cabinet without subordinating them. The arrangement held while the *genrō* lived; its failure after their deaths illustrates the cost of a centre that loses the personal relationships on which inter-branch coordination depends.

3.6 Chapter Summary

The centre of government is the locus where the government's dependencies are managed and where the operational craft of governing is practiced. The centre comprises the council of state, the first minister's office, and the officials who manage the government's relationships with the actors on whom the government depends. The centre is distinct from the line ministries, which execute policy within their sectors. The centre does not execute; it secures the conditions for execution.

The centre's functions are the management of dependencies, the coordination of relationships, the preparation of strategic decisions, the management of transitions and crises, and the cultivation of the relationships required to govern. The British Cabinet Office, descended from the Committee of Imperial Defence, prepares the council's decisions and coordinates the government's response to crisis. The French *Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement* prepares the Council of Ministers and manages the centre's relationship with the legislature. The Habsburg *Gemeinsames Ministerium* coordinated the common affairs of a multi-national empire across every sectoral boundary at once, and the Venetian *Collegio* prepared the decisions of the Senate and the Council of Ten across five centuries.

The centre extends its reach into the territory through representatives who manage the centre's relationships with regional and local elites. The French prefectural system is the canonical form, but the function persists across institutional variants: the Habsburg brokering through diets and magnates, the Indonesian dual channel of elected governors and central coordinators, the British regional offices and elected mayors. The centre operates across changes of office-holder, treating the head of state, the first minister, and the principals as roles with defined dependencies. The Venetian Republic applied this register to the doge with rigour; the British Cabinet Secretary has applied it to every prime minister since 1916; Bismarck's Reichskanzlei demonstrated the cost of attaching the centre to the office-holder rather than to the office.

The centre coordinates the government's relationships across the branches, each of which is both an actor and a partner. The comparative practice confirms the pattern across mature jurisdictions and across centuries. The British Cabinet Office, the Singapore Prime Minister's Office, the French Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement, the Indonesian coordinating ministries, and the Venetian Collegio each embody the centre in different institutional configurations, with the same cluster of functions and the same need for territorial reach. The Meiji genrō and the Habsburg Gemeinsames Ministerium illustrate the centre's persistence in configurations that fit no modern template. The configurations reflect constitutional traditions and political histories. The functions reflect the dependencies that any government must manage.

Chapter 4 — Financial Dependency Operations

Part II: Dependency Operations — The operational craft by which the centre manages each category of resource dependency.

4.1 What Financial Dependency Is

The government's financial dependency is its dependence on actors it does not command for the revenue, investment, and financing required to operate. The government commands the fiscal apparatus — the treasury, the revenue authority, the budget office, the debt management office — but the resources that flow through that apparatus originate with actors the government does not command. The economic actors whose activity generates the revenue, the investors whose capital commitments drive growth, and the financiers whose funds cover the deficit are the actors on whom the government depends. The government taxes, attracts, and borrows from these actors; it does not produce the resources itself. The dependency is the condition the centre's financial operations address.

The dependency is structural rather than incidental. A government that is dependent on revenue from a small number of large taxpayers, on investment from a small number of large investors, or on financing from a small number of large lenders is exposed to the decisions of those actors. A change in the tax planning of a major firm, a change in the investment plans of a major investor, or a change in the lending posture of a major creditor can move the fiscal position more than any domestic policy adjustment. The exposure is the more severe the narrower the base, the more concentrated the investor community, and the more reliant the government on external financing. The recognition of this exposure is the starting point for the centre's financial dependency operations.

The centre manages the relationships through which these resources are secured. The technical instruments of fiscal management — the budget, the tax code, the debt management strategy — are the formal expressions of decisions already shaped by these relationships. The work of the centre precedes the formal instruments: the cultivation of the revenue relationship with the major taxpayers, the cultivation of the investment climate with the investor community, and the cultivation of the confidence of the external financiers. This work is conducted through the treasury, the revenue authority, the investment promotion agency, and the debt management office, coordinated by the centre. The relationships are continuous; the formal instruments are periodic.

The structural character of the dependency is visible across the long record of statecraft. The Venetian Republic managed, over four centuries, a financial dependency on its noble merchant houses, whose capital sustained the state's debt and whose trade generated the customs revenue; the camera administered the formal instruments, but the relationships with the great houses were managed by the doge, the Senate, and the Council of Ten, and the survival of the Republic rested on the maintenance of those relationships. Colbert managed the financial dependencies of Louis XIV's France through a fiscal apparatus — the *fermes générales*, the *intendants*, the *manufactures royales* — that was itself dependent on private financiers who advanced the Crown's revenue and

on merchant communities whose activity generated the base. The continuity of the dependency across republican, monarchical, and modern constitutional forms confirms its structural character: no form of government removes the condition the centre's financial operations address.

4.2 The Politics of Revenue

Revenue is the financial relationship between the government and the economic actors whose activity generates the tax base. The revenue authority administers the regime, but the regime's yield depends on the health of the activity and on the willingness of the actors to comply. The technical apparatus of tax administration — registration, assessment, collection, audit — operates on a base the government does not control and on a population whose compliance the government cannot compel in full. The politics of revenue is the management of the relationship with that population, with attention to the actors whose contribution is material to the fiscal position. The relationship is sustained, not transacted, and it is sustained across budget cycles.

The maintenance of the revenue base depends on the health of the economic activity that generates it. The centre's interest in the macroeconomic conditions, in the regulatory environment, and in the sectoral composition of the economy is in part an interest in the conditions that sustain the base. A revenue regime that extracts aggressively in the short term degrades the base on which it depends; a regime that is too accommodating erodes the yield. The calibration is a continuous operational concern, and it draws the centre into relationships with the major taxpayers that go beyond the formal tax assessment. The British Treasury's engagement with the City of London is the archetypal case, sustained across three centuries: from the founding of the Bank of England in 1694, through the consolidation of the funded national debt in the eighteenth century, through the dominance of the merchant banks in the nineteenth, through the post-Big Bang securities industry in the late twentieth, the City's contribution to revenue has been material, the City's mobility has been real, and the relationship has been maintained through structured consultation that gives the City visibility into the direction of policy without conceding the prerogative to set it. The French treasury's engagement with the Paris financial sector operates on comparable principles, with the sector's contribution to revenue integrated with the government's broader interest in Paris as a financial centre.

The compliance of the major taxpayers is the second leg of the relationship. Compliance is in part a function of the revenue authority's enforcement capacity, and in part a function of the taxpayers' perception that the regime is fair, predictable, and administered competently. The centre's interest is in the perception as well as in the substance. The principal taxpayers are known to the revenue authority and, through it, to the centre. The relationship with them is maintained through periodic consultation on the direction of revenue policy, through structured engagement on the practical administration of the regime, and through the centre's attention to the issues the taxpayers raise, as an informed management of a dependency the government cannot remove.

The comparative record deepens the principle. Colbert's management of Louis XIV's revenue depended on the *fermiers généraux* — private financiers who advanced funds to the Crown and collected the indirect taxes under contract — and on the *intendants* who reported from the provinces on the health of the activity that generated the base; the relationship with the financiers

was sustained through personal audience, through the profitable renewal of the farms, and through the centre's protection of their position when collection proved contentious. Bismarck's management of the Prussian and imperial revenue base rested on a coalition of iron and rye — the Ruhr industrialists and the Junker estates — whose interests the tariff of 1879 reconciled, and whose continued political support the centre maintained through the sustained consultation that the tariff embodied. The instruments differed; the operational principle is the same: the major taxpayers are known, their activity is monitored, and the relationship is sustained across the cycle.

4.3 The Politics of Investment

Investment, domestic and foreign, is a resource the government must attract. The investment climate is a function of the government's policies — the regulatory framework, the tax treatment, the infrastructure, the macroeconomic stability — and of the relationships the centre maintains with the investor community. The technical instruments of investment promotion — the investment law, the incentives schedule, the one-stop shop — operate within a climate the centre shapes through its conduct. The work of attracting investment is in substantial part the work of maintaining the relationships through which investor confidence is formed and sustained. The instruments are the visible surface; the relationships are the substance.

The relationships with the investor community are managed through the investment promotion agency and through the centre's direct engagement with the principal investors. Singapore's Economic Development Board is the model case: a single agency, staffed at senior levels, with the authority to negotiate with investors on the government's behalf, and with the centre's backing to make commitments across the relevant policy domains. The EDB's effectiveness rests on the relationships its officers maintain with the principal investors, on the credibility of the commitments it makes, and on the centre's consistent support of those commitments across the planning, infrastructure, and labour policy domains. The model is adapted to local conditions across mature jurisdictions, with the common element of a dedicated capability that the centre backs. Adaptation alters the form; it does not alter the principle.

The centre manages the relationships at the level where investment decisions are made. Investment decisions are taken by individual firms, but the climate in which they are taken is shaped by the investor community's collective assessment of the government's reliability, the policy direction, and the operational conditions. The centre maintains that assessment through its conduct: through the consistency of policy across the relevant ministries, through the predictability of regulatory decisions, and through the personal engagement of senior officials with the principal investors. The relationship is the cultivation of a confidence that, once lost, is difficult to recover, sustained over time rather than transacted for any single investment. The centre's interest is in the long-term maintenance of the climate and in the direction of investment flows toward the sectors the government prioritises.

The comparative record illustrates the investment relationship across different conditions. The Meiji oligarchs managed the investment dependency of the new Japanese state by building government model factories in textiles, mining, and shipbuilding, then selling them at favourable terms to selected private hands — the houses that became Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and

Yasuda — with the explicit purpose of creating domestic industrial capacity the state could not build alone; the relationship was sustained through the centre's direction of credit, licences, and subsidies, and the houses' growth was the instrument of the government's industrial ambition. Bismarck's management of the Ruhr industrialists and the Prussian banking houses followed a comparable logic: the state backed the railway programme and the tariff structure that made heavy industry profitable, the banking houses supplied the capital, and the industrialists supplied the capacity, and the centre's function was the brokering of a coalition whose interests the state protected and whose investment the state directed. The instruments differ; the centre's craft — the cultivation and direction of the investment relationship — is the same.

4.4 Domestic-Foreign Investor Coalitions

Domestic and foreign investors in a sector often form coalitions that shape the investment climate in ways neither group shapes it alone. The coalition may be a joint venture between a domestic firm and a foreign partner, an industry association that represents both, or an informal alignment of interests around a shared policy position. The coalition's influence on the climate is typically greater than the sum of its parts, because the domestic partner brings political access and the foreign partner brings capital and technology. The centre that engages with the foreign investors alone, or with the domestic investors alone, misses the structure that shapes the climate in the sector. The coalition is the unit of analysis, and the centre that treats it as a set of individual relationships misreads the terrain.

The centre must map these coalitions and manage the relationships with them as networks. The mapping identifies the principal investors in each priority sector, the linkages between them, the policy positions they advance collectively, and the points at which their interests diverge. The mapping is maintained by the investment promotion agency and the relevant sectoral ministries, and it is consolidated at the centre. The management of the relationships follows the mapping: the centre engages the coalition through its principal nodes, addresses the collective positions through structured consultation, and tracks the points of divergence for separate treatment. The treatment of the coalition as a network, rather than as a set of individual relationships, is the operational craft this dimension requires.

The dynamics of a domestic-foreign coalition differ from the dynamics of either group alone. The domestic partners have political access the foreign partners lack; the foreign partners have capital and technology the domestic partners may lack; and the coalition's ask is typically a package that addresses both groups' interests. The centre's engagement must address the package, because the package is what holds the coalition together. A policy adjustment that satisfies the foreign partners but not the domestic partners may fracture the coalition and degrade the climate in the sector. The centre's interest is in the stability of the coalition where the coalition's investment plans are aligned with the government's priorities, and in the managed evolution of the coalition where they are not.

The comparative record confirms the pattern. The Meiji oligarchs managed the foreign technology dependency through the oyatoi gaikokujin — foreign experts engaged on fixed contracts with explicit knowledge-transfer conditions, placed alongside the domestic houses that

absorbed the technology and built the industries; the foreign expert without the domestic house was a cost without transfer, and the domestic house without the foreign expert was capacity without technique, and the centre's craft was the management of the pairing. De Gaulle's management of the French financial sector in the early Fifth Republic confronted a comparable structure: the Paris banks, the international bond markets, and the multilateral institutions formed a coalition whose collective confidence determined the franc's stability, and a centre that engaged any one element in isolation misread the terrain. The coalition is the unit of analysis in each case, and the centre's engagement follows the structure rather than the parts.

4.5 The Politics of External Financing

External financing is the resource the government secures from multilateral institutions, bilateral lenders, and capital-market investors to fund the deficit. The relationships with these financiers are managed by the centre, through the treasury and the debt management office, with the centre's direct engagement on the relationships that are material to the fiscal position. The technical instruments of debt management — the borrowing strategy, the issuance calendar, the credit-rating engagement — operate within a confidence the centre maintains through its conduct. The financiers' confidence rests on the government's fiscal management and on its commitment to its obligations, and the centre's work is the cultivation of that confidence. The instruments are calibrated; the confidence is cultivated.

The multilateral institutions and the bilateral lenders are managed through relationships that are both financial and political. The financial relationship is the loan agreement, with its conditions and its reporting requirements. The political relationship is the engagement with the institution's leadership and with the bilateral lender's government, which shapes the institution's posture toward the government beyond any single loan. The centre maintains the political relationship through structured dialogue, through the personal engagement of senior officials, and through the government's consistent discharge of its obligations under existing agreements. The political relationship is the more durable of the two, and it is the relationship through which the financial terms are ultimately shaped, with the result that a government that meets its obligations and engages the institution's leadership consistently borrows on better terms than one that does not.

The capital-market investors are managed through the government's credit-rating engagement, its issuance strategy, and its investor relations function. The investor relations function is the disciplined presentation of the government's fiscal position, its borrowing programme, and its policy direction to the analysts and portfolio managers whose assessments shape the government's cost of borrowing. The function is conducted by the debt management office, with the centre's coordination on the political and policy signals the government sends. France's engagement with the international bond markets, conducted through Agence France Trésor with the centre's close coordination, illustrates the discipline: a single voice on the government's fiscal position, a consistent message across the relevant ministries, and a structured programme of engagement with the principal investors. The discipline is the operational craft; its maintenance across the government falls to the centre.

The comparative record illustrates the discipline across conditions. De Gaulle's management of the franc in the early Fifth Republic rested on the centre's direct engagement with the Banque de France, the Paris banks, and the international holders of French debt: the 1958 devaluation and the 1960 introduction of the new franc were accompanied by a sustained presentation of the government's fiscal position to the markets, and the centre's coordination of the message across the treasury, the central bank, and the relevant ministries was the instrument by which confidence was restored. The Meiji oligarchs managed the foreign debt dependency with restraint — borrowing abroad for the railway programme and for the 1877 Satsuma Rebellion indemnity, but refusing the foreign-control clauses that weaker states accepted, and structuring the loans to preserve the government's discretion over fiscal policy. The Venetian Republic managed its debt dependency through the *prestiti* — forced loans on the noble houses, traded on a secondary market, administered by the camera — over four centuries, with the centre's authority sustained by the consistency of the discharge. The instruments differ; the discipline is the same.

4.6 Where the Centre's Work Ends

The centre manages the politics of money up to the boundary where formal fiscal processes begin. The budget, the tax code, and the debt management strategy are technical instruments governed by the formal fiscal framework — the budget formulation cycle, the revenue authority's assessment procedures, the debt management office's issuance calendar. These instruments have their own doctrine, their own controls, and their own integrity. The centre's work shapes the conditions under which the instruments operate; the instruments themselves follow their own procedures, and the centre that intrudes into the procedures compromises the integrity on which the fiscal position depends.

The boundary is the boundary between the relationship and the instrument. The centre manages the relationships with the revenue base, the investor community, and the external financiers. The formal fiscal processes translate the outcomes of those relationships into the budget, the tax code, and the borrowing programme. A centre that intrudes into the formal processes compromises their integrity; a centre that neglects the relationships forfeits the capacity to shape the conditions under which the formal processes operate.

The relationships continue across the budget cycle and the debt management cycle. The principal taxpayers continue to be the principal taxpayers; the principal investors continue to be the principal investors; the principal financiers continue to be the principal financiers. The continuity of the relationships is the asset the centre maintains, cultivated through the cycle, not only at the moments of formal decision. The cycles have their own doctrine; the relationships have their own craft, sustained across the cycles and through the changes of office-holder that the centre is built to survive.

The boundary is visible in the comparative record. Colbert's management of the *fermes générales* stopped at the boundary of the formal collection contract: the centre managed the relationship with the financiers, negotiated the terms of the farm, and intervened when collection proved politically untenable, but the daily administration of the collection was the financiers' business, governed by the contract. The Venetian Republic separated the mint's technical

operations — the assaying, the striking, the alloy standards — from the Senate's management of the relationships with the merchant houses whose bullion fed the mint and whose trade the ducat supported; the mint's integrity was protected by its separation from the relationship, and the relationship was protected by its separation from the mint. The boundary is operational in each case, and its maintenance is the centre's discipline.

4.7 Chapter Summary

The government's financial dependency is its dependence on actors it does not command for the revenue, investment, and financing required to operate. The government commands the fiscal apparatus, but the resources that flow through it originate with the economic actors, the investors, and the financiers on whom the government depends. The dependency is structural, and the centre manages the relationships through which the resources are secured. The work precedes the formal fiscal instruments and shapes the conditions under which those instruments operate. The relationships are continuous; the instruments are periodic.

The politics of revenue is the management of the relationship with the major taxpayers, with attention to the health of the activity that generates the base and to the compliance of the actors on whom the yield depends. The politics of investment is the management of the relationships with the investor community, with attention to the climate the centre shapes and to the domestic-foreign coalitions through which investors organise. The politics of external financing is the management of the relationships with the multilateral institutions, the bilateral lenders, and the capital-market investors, with attention to the confidence on which the government's access to financing rests. The three together constitute the centre's financial dependency operations, conducted up to the point where the formal fiscal processes begin.

The comparative record confirms the continuity of the craft. Colbert's management of the fermiers and the manufactures, the British Treasury's three-century engagement with the City of London, the Meiji oligarchs' management of the zaibatsu houses and the foreign debt, Bismarck's management of the Ruhr industrialists and the Prussian banking houses, de Gaulle's management of the franc and the Paris financial sector, and the Venetian Republic's management of the mint and the prestiti are instances of the same operational craft, adapted to the conditions of each state and each period. The instruments change; the dependency persists; the centre's function is the management of the relationships through which the resources are secured.

Chapter 5 — Human Dependency Operations

The government's dependence on elite talent: the cultivation, recruitment, and retention of the people the government needs to govern.

5.1 What Human Dependency Is

The government's human dependency is its dependence on talent, expertise, and loyalty that it does not command and must cultivate. The government commands the civil service apparatus, the statutory bodies, the security forces, and the agencies of implementation. It depends, however, on the individuals whose abilities and commitment make that apparatus effective: the senior official whose judgement steers a ministry through a contested reform, the technical specialist whose knowledge is the difference between a sound and an unsound infrastructure decision, the negotiator whose relationships with foreign counterparts open doors that formal channels cannot. The apparatus is the government's own. The people who make the apparatus work are cultivated and retained; they are not commanded into being. The dependency is the condition the centre's human operations address.

Human dependency operates at two levels. At the level of routine administration, the government requires a workforce of competent officials occupying defined positions and executing defined functions, and this level is managed through the civil service framework. At the level of strategic capability, the government requires individuals whose talent, judgement, and standing cannot be obtained through routine recruitment or retained through routine compensation, and this level is the centre's responsibility. The two levels are interdependent: a civil service that is competent at the routine level but lacks strategic capability will execute policy competently and fail at the questions that matter most, while a centre that cultivates strategic capability without attending to the routine apparatus will find its decisions implemented poorly or not at all.

Mature jurisdictions have long treated the governing class itself as a managed resource. The Venetian Republic managed its patriciate as the governing class through hereditary enrollment, mandatory service in the councils and the magistracies, structured progression through the offices of state, and a discipline that excluded from active office those whose conduct threatened the public credit. The patriciate was the pool; the management of the patriciate was the work. The Republic did not recruit its doges, its senators, its ambassadors, or its proveditori from outside the patriciate; it cultivated them within it, and the survival of the Republic over centuries rested on the disciplined management of that pool. The Venetian pattern is the historical extreme; the principle is general. A government that treats its governing class as an unmanaged aggregate will be governed by the aggregate's accidents; a government that treats it as a managed resource will be governed by the centre's design.

The management of human dependency is a continuous function of the centre. It begins before formal recruitment, continues through the tenure of service, and extends beyond departure through the relationships that former officials retain. It is conducted through personal relationships, professional networks, and institutional partnerships that the centre maintains over years and

decades. The function is exercised by a small number of officials at the centre who hold the responsibility for talent across the jurisdiction, and the quality of their work is one of the principal determinants of the government's capacity to govern.

5.2 Elite Talent Cultivation

The cultivation of elite talent begins before formal recruitment. The centre identifies individuals with the potential to serve in senior positions, develops relationships with them over years, and creates the conditions that make public service attractive. The identification begins in the academy, in the professions, in the senior ranks of the private sector, and in the technical agencies where specialist expertise accumulates. It is conducted through sustained contact rather than through periodic recruitment campaigns, and the relationships established in this phase determine the pool from which senior appointments can later be made.

The pools from which elite talent is drawn are the professions, the academy, the private sector, the technical agencies, and the senior civil service itself. Each pool has its own dynamics, its own patterns of advancement, and its own conditions for engagement. The professions advance through peer recognition and reputation; the academy through scholarly achievement and institutional standing; the private sector through commercial success and leadership; the technical agencies through accumulated expertise; and the civil service through the formal hierarchy. The centre maintains relationships with each pool, understanding its dynamics and its leadership, and the relationships are continuous rather than transactional.

The historic instruments of cultivation are the *grands corps* and the great schools. France's *grands corps* — the Conseil d'État, the Cour des comptes, the Inspection des finances, the diplomatic service, the prefectural corps — each draw a cohort from the École nationale d'administration (now the Institut national du service public) each year, train them within the corps, and rotate them through the senior positions of the state over a career. The school is the entry; the corps is the cultivation; the cohort is the retention. The system has survived regimes because it cultivates a governing elite whose loyalty is to the state rather than to any particular government. Prussia under Bismarck cultivated its officialdom through the law faculties, the Referendariat apprenticeship, the assessor examination, and a tracked progression through the administrative districts that produced the Landrat and the Oberpräsident; the official's career was determined from the beginning of legal study, and the state's interest in the cultivation was explicit.

The Asian cases follow the same principle in different forms. Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew built the scholarship system in the early years of independence: identification of high-potential students before tertiary education, funded study at leading universities abroad, bonded tenure that placed scholars in tracked postings across ministries from the outset, and the Administrative Service as the apex corps into which the tracked postings fed. The Meiji oligarchs sent the Iwakura Mission abroad in 1871 to study Western institutions, retained the brightest of the returning students for the senior offices of the new state, and built the imperial universities as the domestic training ground for the officials the missions no longer produced. In each case, cultivation begins early, the centre manages the trajectory, and the relationship is sustained through the career. A government that recruits its senior officials from the open market at the moment of need will find

candidates whose availability reflects their own career timing rather than the government's requirements; a government that cultivates over the long arc finds candidates who are present at the moment of need, who have been prepared for the responsibilities they will hold, and whose commitment reflects the relationship sustained across the years.

5.3 The Pre-Formalization Phase

The pre-formalization phase covers everything before the formal application: the identification of talent, the cultivation of interest, the assessment of fit, and the creation of the conditions for recruitment. The phase is managed by the centre because the formal recruitment process, once begun, is constrained by the personnel framework: position descriptions must be published, eligibility criteria must be met, competitive procedures must be observed, and the candidate pool is limited to those who apply. The centre's craft is in making the right person available at the right time, so that when a position opens, the candidate the centre wants is the candidate who applies.

The identification of talent is conducted through sustained contact rather than through periodic outreach. The officials responsible for the cultivation function maintain relationships with the institutions where talent accumulates: the senior faculties of the universities, the leadership of the professional bodies, the partners of the major firms, and the directors of the technical agencies. The relationships are personal and continuous; the officials know the individuals who are advancing, the individuals considering a change of direction, and the individuals whose expertise the centre will need in the coming years. The intelligence gathered through these relationships is the basis for the cultivation strategy, and it cannot be obtained through formal means.

The reconstruction of the French administrative elite after the Fourth Republic illustrates the pre-formalization phase at scale. The Fourth Republic's political instability had degraded the senior administration; the political class had colonised appointments, and the senior corps had lost authority. De Gaulle's reconstruction, enacted through the ordinances of 1945 and the establishment of the *École nationale d'administration*, was the formal instrument; the pre-formalization work that made the formal instrument effective was the identification, by a small group around de Gaulle and Michel Debré, of the senior officials who would lead the reconstruction, the cultivation of their willingness to serve, and the placement of them in the positions from which the new system would be built. The ordinances did not produce the elite; they formalised the elite that the pre-formalization work had assembled. The Meiji oligarchs' use of the foreign study missions operated on the same principle: the missions were the formal instrument, but the identification of the students to send, the cultivation of the relationships with the foreign institutions that would receive them, and the placement of the returning students in the offices of the new state were the pre-formalization work that determined which individuals would become the senior officials of the Meiji state.

The assessment of fit is conducted through sustained conversation rather than through formal interview. The centre assesses an individual's judgement, standing in the field, capacity for the kind of work the centre requires, and willingness to serve under the conditions the centre offers. The assessment is conducted over months and years, through professional contact, advisory engagements, consultative processes, and the kind of conversation in which judgement reveals

itself. The assessment is also reciprocal: the individual assesses the centre, the principals, and the conditions of service, and the centre's task is to make that assessment favourable. The creation of the conditions for recruitment is the final step, and it may include the shaping of a position, the timing of a vacancy, the resolution of personal obstacles, and the cultivation of the institutional support the appointment will require.

5.4 Loyalty and Retention

The retention of elite talent is a relationship management problem. The government competes with the private sector and the professions for the individuals it needs, and the terms of competition include compensation, working conditions, professional standing, and the intrinsic satisfaction of the work. The government's compensation cannot match the private sector's at the upper levels, and the centre's retention strategy therefore depends on the non-monetary terms of service. These terms are sustained through the quality of the work, the standing of the position, the relationship with the principal, and the recognition of service.

The relationship with the principal is the central retention instrument at the senior level. Senior officials serve at the pleasure of their principals and work, in practice, in direct contact with them. The quality of that contact — the principal's seriousness, the official's access, the candour of the exchange, the principal's willingness to defend the official against political pressure — is the most important single determinant of whether the official stays. A senior official who is well used will accept compensation below market and conditions below preference; a senior official who is poorly used will leave for less. The centre must therefore ensure that principals understand the retention function they exercise through their daily conduct.

The historical record illustrates the instruments. Bismarck's cultivation of the Prussian officialdom operated through the standing the state accorded its officials — the title, the uniform, the precedence, the security of tenure against political interference — and through the personal engagement of the monarch and the chancellor with the senior officials whose work was material to the state. The combination of standing and engagement retained officials whose market value, even in the nineteenth century, exceeded their state salaries. The French *grands corps* retain their members through the same combination at higher density: the corps identity, the career-long progression through the senior positions, the standing within the state and within French society, and the explicit understanding that the corps will defend its members against political pressure produce a loyalty that compensation alone would not secure. The Venetian Republic retained its patriciate through the standing of patrician status itself, through the requirement that service was the condition of standing, and through the disciplined exclusion of those who failed the standard; the retention and the discipline were inseparable. In each case, the relationship with the principal, the standing of the position, and the recognition of service are the instruments, and compensation is the background against which they operate.

Recognition of service operates through both formal and informal channels. Formal recognition — honours, advancement, public acknowledgment of contribution — signals to the official and to the field that service is valued. Informal recognition — the principal's confidence, the centre's trust, the standing that comes from being heard in the rooms where decisions are made

— is more important than the formal kind and is harder to provide. Departure at the natural end of a tenure is a normal event, and former officials carry their expertise, their relationships, and their standing into the professions, the academy, and the boards where they next serve. A former senior official who retains goodwill toward the centre is an asset; one who departs with grievances is a liability, and the centre manages departures with the same care it manages arrivals.

5.5 The Relationship with the Professions

The professions — law, medicine, engineering, the academy, the clergy, and the senior ranks of finance, accountancy, and architecture — are the pools from which the government draws specialised talent, and they are also actors in the governing system in their own right. The centre maintains relationships with the professional bodies that govern these fields, understanding their dynamics, their leadership, and the conditions under which their members will engage with the government. The management of these relationships is a continuous function, and the officials responsible for it hold the relationships over years and across leadership changes in both the profession and the centre.

The professional bodies are themselves actors in the governing system. The bar association, the medical college, the engineering institution, and the academy's senior faculties set the standards that govern their members' practice, and they speak on matters of public policy that touch their fields. Their leadership is consulted on legislation, on regulatory design, and on major appointments within their domains. The centre's relationship with each body is therefore both a recruitment relationship and a policy relationship, and the two are managed together. A centre that treats the professions only as recruitment pools will find its policy work obstructed; a centre that treats them only as policy interlocutors will find its recruitment pipeline weak.

The British Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of the 1850s established the principle that the senior civil service should be recruited by open competitive examination from the universities and the professions, and the Administrative Class that resulted drew its members from the Oxford and Cambridge faculties, the Bar, and the senior ranks of the other professions. The relationship between the Administrative Class and the professions was managed as an ecosystem: officials moved between the civil service and the professions, the professions were consulted on legislation and appointments within their domains, and the standing of the civil service was sustained by the standing of the pools from which it drew. The reform's principle — that the centre cultivates the relationship with the professions as a continuous function — survived the dismantling of the Administrative Class itself in the late twentieth century; the relationship persists even where the formal class does not. France's Conseil d'État draws its auditeurs and conseillers from the top of the École nationale d'administration's annual ranking, returns a portion to the bar and the academy after their service, and maintains the bar, the academy, and the Conseil as a single field from which the senior legal officers of the state are drawn. Singapore's legal service is similarly integrated with the senior bar and the judiciary: the movement between private practice, the bench, and the government legal service is managed as a single ecosystem, with the centre holding the relationships that make the movement possible.

The pattern across mature jurisdictions is consistent. The professions are integrated into the governing system rather than external to it, and the centre's relationships make the integration work. The integration is sustained through the movement of individuals across the boundary, through the centre's consultation of the professional bodies on policy within their domains, and through the recognition the centre accords the standing the professions confer. A centre that sustains the integration cultivates a pipeline that the market alone would not produce; a centre that neglects it forfeits the pipeline and finds the professions ranged against it on the policies that matter most.

5.6 Where the Centre's Work Ends

The centre manages the cultivation and retention of elite talent up to the boundary where formal personnel processes begin. The formal personnel framework — classification, recruitment procedures, compensation scales, performance management, separation — is governed by the personnel regulations and the civil service rules. The centre's work is the management of the relationships and the preparation of the ground; the framework's function is the formalisation.

The boundary is operational rather than analytical. The pre-formalization phase runs up to the formal application, at which point the personnel framework takes over and governs the appointment process. The retention function continues through the tenure of service, but the formal instruments of retention — advancement, compensation, performance management — are governed by the framework. The relationships with the professions are continuous, but the formal instruments of professional engagement — advisory appointments, statutory consultations, secondment arrangements — are governed by the framework.

The discipline of the boundary protects both the centre and the framework. A centre that intrudes into the formal processes compromises their integrity: the competitive procedure becomes a fiction, the published criteria become a mask, and the framework's authority over the routine workforce is eroded by the centre's exception. A centre that neglects the pre-formalization work forfeits the capacity to shape the pool from which the formal processes draw: the right candidate is not available, the right relationship has not been cultivated, and the formal process produces an appointment the centre did not want and cannot easily correct. The boundary is held by the centre's restraint on one side and by the centre's engagement on the other.

The relationships continue across the personnel cycles. The high-potential individuals identified in one cycle become the senior officials of the next; the senior officials of one cycle become the former officials whose relationships with the centre persist into the professions, the academy, and the boards. The continuity of the relationships is the asset the centre maintains, cultivated across the cycles, not only at the moments of formal decision. The cycles have their own doctrine, governed by the personnel regulations; the relationships have their own craft, governed by the centre.

5.7 Chapter Summary

The government's human dependency is its dependence on talent, expertise, and loyalty that it does not command and must cultivate. The government commands the apparatus and depends on the individuals whose abilities and commitment make it effective. Elite talent cultivation begins before formal recruitment and is conducted through sustained contact with the professions, the academy, the private sector, and the technical agencies. The conditions that succeed are the quality of the work, the standing of the position, the relationship with the principal, and the recognition of service. The historic instruments — the Venetian patriciate managed as the governing class, the French *grands corps* and the *École nationale d'administration*, the Prussian officialdom cultivated under Bismarck, Singapore's scholarship system and the Administrative Service, the Meiji oligarchs' use of the imperial universities and the foreign study missions — illustrate the cultivation function as a sustained, centre-managed trajectory, and de Gaulle's reconstruction of the French administrative elite after the Fourth Republic illustrates the pre-formalization work that precedes the formal instrument.

The pre-formalization phase covers the identification, cultivation, assessment, and creation of conditions before the formal application opens the personnel framework's procedures. Retention is a relationship management problem in which the relationship with the principal and the recognition of service are the central instruments, and departure is managed as a continuation of the relationship rather than its termination. The relationships with the professions are continuous and are managed both as recruitment pipelines and as policy relationships; the British Northcote-Trevelyan reforms and the Administrative Class, the French *Conseil d'État*, and the Singapore legal service illustrate the integration of the professions into the governing system as a single field. The centre's work runs up to the point where formal personnel processes begin; the formal framework is governed by the personnel regulations and the civil service rules.

Chapter 6 — Informational Dependency Operations

The government's dependence on information, intelligence, and public discourse: the operational craft by which the centre manages the relationships that shape what it knows and what the public believes.

6.1 What Informational Dependency Is

The government's informational dependency is its dependence on information, intelligence, and public discourse that it does not command and must cultivate. The government commands the intelligence apparatus, the statistical agencies, and the communications offices that produce its formal information flow. It depends, however, on the relationships through which information reaches those apparatuses from outside the government, and on the broader public discourse in which the government's positions are received, contested, or refused. The apparatus is the government's; the information that flows through it, and the public conversation that frames its reception, are not.

Informational dependency operates at four levels. The first is intelligence from the field: reporting from stations, posts, and operational contacts that arrives through formal channels but depends on relationships maintained outside them. The second is expertise from the academy and the professions: the technical, scientific, and historical knowledge on which sound policy depends. The third is data from the private sector: commercial data, financial flows, infrastructural telemetry, and platform data that the government cannot itself generate. The fourth is public discourse: the conversation in the press, the academy, civil society, and the public at large in which the government's position is heard, interpreted, and either accepted or resisted.

The management of informational dependency is a continuous function of the centre. It is conducted through relationships with media owners, editors, and senior correspondents; with academic leaders, advisory bodies, and the faculties that train the next generation of officials; with the leaders of civil society organisations that mediate between the government and the public; and with the structures, formal and informal, through which public discourse takes shape. The function is exercised by senior officials who hold these relationships over years, who understand the difference between the formal flow of information and the relationships on which the formal flow depends, and who manage the difference with care. The quality of their work is one of the principal determinants of what the government knows and of the standing in which the public hears what the government says.

6.2 The Relationship with the Media

The media operates as a political relationship with the centre, beyond its formal function as a channel for government communications. The government's communications offices produce statements, briefings, and releases that travel through the media to the public, but the form in which they arrive, the framing they receive, and the credibility they carry are determined by relationships

the government does not command. The centre manages the relationship with media owners, editors, and senior correspondents as a continuous function, distinct from the daily work of the press office. The owners set the editorial line; the editors set the framing; the senior correspondents set the tone of coverage; and the centre's relationships at each level shape what the government's statements become when they reach the public.

The cultivation of access is the centre's principal instrument. Senior officials offer exclusive briefings, off-the-record conversations, and early sight of policy to editors and correspondents whose coverage the centre wishes to shape. The access is offered in exchange for engagement; the centre does not purchase coverage, and the correspondents and editors who receive it come to depend on it for the quality of their work over years. The management of exposure is the other side of the same instrument: the centre manages which officials speak to which outlets, which stories are given to which correspondents, and which lines of inquiry are encouraged or discouraged. The cumulative effect of these choices, exercised over years, shapes the landscape of coverage.

Historical practice illustrates the function at scale. Bismarck's management of the German press relied on a network of editors cultivated through subsidy, access, and personal confidence, used to plant stories, frame debates, and damage opponents. The Venetian Republic's Council of Ten managed information through a more concentrated apparatus: surveillance, secret denunciation, and the regulation of printing, sustained over centuries as instruments of state. The British approach to the BBC, formalised in the twentieth century, worked through institutional independence governed by a charter and a licence fee, with the relationship managed at the level of the chairmanship, the director-general, and the political editors, and editorial independence preserved through the arrangement. In each case, the centre managed the relationship and left the content to the institutions it had cultivated.

The craft is in the calibration of distance. A centre too close to the media loses the credibility that makes coverage credible; a centre too distant loses the access that makes coverage informed. The relationship is managed at the level of the principals and the senior officials around them, not at the level of the press office, because the exchanges that matter are the ones conducted in confidence over time. The press office handles the daily traffic; the centre handles the relationships on which the daily traffic depends.

6.3 The Relationship with the Academy

The academy is a source of expertise, of legitimation, and of the next generation of officials. The government depends on the academy for the technical, scientific, and historical knowledge that policy requires, for the credentialling of the professionals who serve in the senior ranks, and for the legitimation that expert consensus confers on contested decisions. The centre's relationships with the academy are therefore continuous and multiple: advisory relationships with senior academics, funding relationships with research institutions, and the personal engagement of senior officials with the academic leadership of the jurisdiction. Each relationship is sustained over years and across changes of leadership on both sides.

The cultivation of academic relationships runs through advisory roles, funded research, and the personal engagement of the principals. Advisory roles bring senior academics into the centre's

work on terms that make their expertise available without requiring their conversion into officials. Funded research steers the academy's attention toward the questions the centre needs answered, on terms set jointly with the academic leadership. The personal engagement of senior officials with vice-chancellors, deans, and senior figures in the faculties sustains the relationships through which advice is offered informally and through which appointments are made. The three instruments work together; the centre that uses only one will find the field thin.

Historical practice illustrates the cultivation of the academy. The Habsburg monarchy managed the universities as instruments of state cohesion, cultivating the senior faculties, regulating appointments in fields touching public order, and managing the relationship between the imperial centre and the academic institutions across the territory. The French monarchy's management of the academy, formalised in the seventeenth century and continued through the republics, worked through the academies, the *grands établissements*, and the consultative bodies that linked the senior faculties to the ministries. The Meiji oligarchs, in their consolidation of the modern Japanese state, cultivated the universities as the seedbeds of the new official class and managed intellectual discourse through the imperial universities and the advisory councils around them. In each case, the academy was integrated into the governing system through these relationships.

The management of the academy is the management of a field that produces both expertise and dissent. The same institutions that produce the expertise the government needs produce the scholars who challenge the government's positions, and the centre's relationships must hold both. A centre that cultivates only supportive voices loses access to the best expertise; a centre that cultivates only critical voices loses the legitimation that expert consensus provides. The craft is in the maintenance of the field as a field, with the centre present in it without dominating it.

6.4 The Relationship with Civil Society

Civil society organisations are intermediaries between the government and the public. Trades unions, professional associations, charitable bodies, religious organisations, community associations, and advocacy groups stand between the formal apparatus of the state and the diffuse life of the population. They aggregate interests, articulate grievances, deliver services the government does not, and confer or withdraw legitimacy on the government's actions. The centre's relationship with each is managed as a political relationship sustained over years, and the officials responsible for it hold the relationships across changes of leadership on both sides.

The centre's management of civil society operates through three related instruments: consultation, incorporation, and the management of opposition. Consultation brings civil society leaders into the policy process early enough to shape the outcome, on terms that make the consultation substantive. Incorporation brings the most consequential organisations into the formal machinery of governance through advisory councils, statutory consultations, and the delegation of public functions to bodies the centre does not command but on which it depends. The management of opposition addresses the organisations that emerge as centres of resistance to the government's programme; the centre's instrument is the management of the field, in which dissent is engaged, contained, and where possible absorbed into the policy process.

Historical practice illustrates the management of civil society. The Meiji oligarchs cultivated the rural notables, the prefectural assemblies, and the new professional bodies as intermediaries through which the modernising state reached a population whose loyalties were still being formed. De Gaulle's management of French civil society worked through the consultative bodies, the *grands corps*, and the institutional partnerships that drew the principal interest organisations into the work of the Fifth Republic. Lee Kuan Yew's management of Singapore's civil society worked through the institutional incorporation of the trades union movement, the professional bodies, and the community organisations, with the relationships managed at the centre and sustained over decades. In each case, civil society was integrated into the governing system through relationships sustained at the centre.

The craft is in the calibration of incorporation. A centre that incorporates too much loses the plurality that makes civil society a source of information and legitimacy; a centre that incorporates too little loses the channels through which policy reaches the population. The relationships are managed at the level of the principals and the senior officials around them, because the exchanges that matter are the ones conducted in confidence over time. The centre that treats civil society as an audience to be addressed will find its policy obstructed; the centre that treats it as a field to be cultivated will find its policy carried.

6.5 The Management of Public Discourse

Public discourse is the medium in which consent is formed or withdrawn. The government's positions are heard in the press, in the academy, in civil society, and in the public conversation that runs through all three; the reception of those positions, and the consent or resistance they gather, is determined in the discourse. The government's communications shape that discourse; they do not determine its reception. The centre's engagement with public discourse is the cultivation of the conditions under which the government's position can be heard and understood. The centre manages the conditions; the discourse runs on its own.

The conditions the centre cultivates are the conditions of credibility. A government whose senior officials are heard as informed, whose positions are consistent over time, whose errors are acknowledged, and whose engagement with critics is substantive will find its positions heard with more credit than a government that fails on any of these counts. The work of cultivating these conditions is continuous, and it is conducted through the relationships with the media, the academy, and civil society that the centre maintains. The cumulative effect of those relationships, exercised over years, is the standing in which the government's positions are received.

Historical practice illustrates the function. De Gaulle's management of French public discourse worked through the cultivation of a register in which the state spoke and was heard: press conferences managed as instruments of state, addresses crafted for the medium of television, and the cultivation of a relationship with the public that bypassed the intermediaries when the intermediaries obstructed. Lee Kuan Yew's management of Singapore's public discourse worked through the regulation of the media, the cultivation of a register of official seriousness, and the systematic engagement with the critics whose engagement was worth answering. The American management of the press corps, formalised in the twentieth century, worked through the daily

briefing, the press pool, and the cultivation of senior correspondents whose relationship with the institution was sustained over careers. In each case, the centre cultivated the conditions of reception and left the content to the discourse.

The craft is in the management of the field as a field. The government speaks into a discourse shaped by many speakers, and the centre's task is to ensure that the government's voice is heard as one voice among many, with the standing that makes it credible, the consistency that makes it intelligible, and the engagement that makes it present. The voice cannot be manufactured by communications alone; it must be backed by the relationships, the seriousness, and the record that make it worth hearing. The centre that confuses the management of the conditions with the management of the content will produce communications that are received as such, and the discourse will move on without them.

6.6 Chapter Summary

The government's informational dependency is its dependence on information, intelligence, and public discourse that it does not command and must cultivate. The government commands the apparatus and depends on the relationships through which information reaches it and on the discourse in which its positions are received. The dependency operates at four levels: intelligence from the field, expertise from the academy, data from the private sector, and public discourse. The centre manages the relationships at each level as a continuous function, distinct from the work of the formal apparatus.

The media is a political relationship managed through the cultivation of access and the management of exposure, conducted at the level of the principals and sustained over years. The academy is a source of expertise, legitimation, and the next generation of officials, managed through advisory roles, funded research, and personal engagement with academic leadership. Civil society organisations are intermediaries managed through consultation, incorporation, and the management of opposition. Public discourse is the medium in which consent is formed, and the centre's instrument is the cultivation of the conditions of credibility.

Historical practice illustrates the function across jurisdictions and centuries. Bismarck's press network, the Venetian Council of Ten, and the British management of the BBC illustrate the management of the media relationship at different scales of concentration. The Habsburg monarchy's universities, the French academies, and the Meiji imperial universities illustrate the integration of the academy into the governing system. The Meiji oligarchs, de Gaulle, and Lee Kuan Yew illustrate the management of civil society and public discourse through the cultivation of relationships and conditions sustained at the centre. The craft in each case is the management of the field as a field, with the centre present in it without dominating it.

Chapter 7 — Institutional Dependency Operations

The government's dependence on its own institutions and on the cooperation of actors across the constitutional order: the operational craft by which the centre manages the implementation chain and the institutional relationships.

7.1 What Institutional Dependency Is

Institutional dependency is the government's dependence on its own apparatus to execute its decisions and on the cooperation of institutions it does not directly command. The government controls the ministries, agencies, and statutory bodies that constitute the state, but it depends on those bodies to implement policy faithfully and competently. It controls the appointments at the apex of state-owned enterprises, but it depends on those enterprises to deliver services and revenue. It shares the constitutional order with the branches, and it depends on those branches to enact, interpret, and legitimise its work.

The paradox at the centre of institutional dependency is that the government commands its institutions and yet depends on their effective operation. Command runs downward through hierarchy; dependence runs upward through the requirement that what is commanded actually gets done. A ministry can be directed, but it cannot be made competent by direction. A statutory board can be chaired by the centre's appointee, but the appointment does not by itself make the board effective. The apparatus is the government's in form; the work the apparatus does is the government's only in fact, and the fact depends on conditions the centre must cultivate.

The centre's responsibility is for the health of the implementation chain as a whole. That responsibility is exercised not by intervening in every operation but by maintaining the conditions under which the chain functions: competent staffing, clear direction, aligned incentives, and the relationships that make hierarchy work. The Venetian Republic managed its administrative apparatus through a small patrician class that rotated through the offices of state, sustaining a common doctrine of service and a continuous oversight of performance across the institutions of the Republic. The Venetian apparatus held for centuries because the centre invested in the conditions that made command effective. The centre's craft is the same in every setting: to make the apparatus the government's instrument by ensuring that the apparatus itself functions.

The centre's responsibility for institutional health is continuous regardless of who holds the senior offices. The implementation chain does not reset with a change of government; it inherits the conditions the previous government left behind. An apparatus whose competence has decayed, whose loyalty has been compromised, or whose alignment has drifted cannot be restored quickly, and a new government that arrives to find the chain weakened must repair it before its own policy can be executed. The historical record shows the same pattern across regimes: the centre that attends to the apparatus across the long term governs, and the centre that neglects the apparatus for the political crisis of the day finds, when the crisis passes, that it no longer has the means to govern.

7.2 The Implementation Chain

The implementation chain is the sequence of actors and decisions that connects the centre's policy to the field-level execution where the policy meets the public. The chain begins with the cabinet decision, runs through the ministry's operational directive, the department's work plan, the regional office's allocation, and ends with the frontline officer's action. Each link is a point at which interpretation, discretion, and resistance can alter the policy. The centre's dependence on the chain is total: a policy that is decided but not implemented is no policy at all.

Each link in the chain carries its own dependencies. The ministry's directorate depends on the centre's clarity of direction; the regional office depends on the directorate's understanding of local conditions; the frontline officer depends on the regional office's support and supervision. The dependencies are not only vertical but horizontal: coordination with other ministries, with sub-national authorities, with the actors who deliver the service. The centre manages the chain by understanding these dependencies and addressing them, not by commanding each link in sequence. Command of the chain reaches only the link immediately below; the centre's influence on the rest is exercised through the cultivation of the officials who hold the chain together.

The chain is managed through the cultivation of competence, loyalty, and alignment throughout the apparatus, not through command alone. Bismarck constructed the Prussian state machinery by binding senior officials to the crown through personal loyalty, professional standing, and the discipline of the corps, and the machinery executed because the officials were his instruments in fact and not merely in form. The British management of the Indian Civil Service rested on a small, carefully selected cadre whose loyalty was secured through shared identity, professional pride, and the confidence that the service would defend its members when they acted within doctrine. The French monarchy's intendants managed the provinces through a combination of royal authority and personal capacity; the intendant was the king's man, but he governed through the relationships he cultivated and the competence he displayed. The chain held in each case because the centre invested in the human and institutional conditions that made command effective.

7.3 State-Owned Enterprises

State-owned enterprises are semi-autonomous actors whose cooperation the government requires and whose performance affects the government's position. They deliver services the government has committed to provide, they manage assets the government holds in trust, and they generate or absorb revenue that affects the government's fiscal position. They are governed by boards the centre appoints but staffed by workforces the centre does not command. They operate in markets, regulated environments, and political settings that require management skill the civil service does not always possess.

The centre manages the SOE relationship through appointments, direction, and the balance between operational autonomy and strategic alignment. Appointments are the centre's principal instrument: the chair, the chief executive, and the board determine the enterprise's direction and the centre's capacity to influence it. Direction is given through the shareholder mandate, the statement of corporate intent, and the strategic plan the board approves. The balance between autonomy and alignment is the central difficulty: too much autonomy and the enterprise drifts from the

government's purposes; too much direction and the enterprise loses the operational capacity that justified its creation.

Lee Kuan Yew's management of Singapore's statutory boards illustrates the craft in its developed form. The Housing and Development Board, the Economic Development Board, and the Public Utilities Board were given operational autonomy, professional leadership, and clear mandates, with the centre's intervention exercised through the appointment of capable chairmen and chief executives, the setting of strategic direction, and the discipline of performance scrutiny. The Habsburg monarchy's management of its multi-national bureaucracy illustrates the recurring difficulty: a centre that must balance strategic alignment against the regional and ethnic constituencies whose cooperation the apparatus requires. The centre's task is to preserve strategic alignment through the appointment of leadership, the clarity of the mandate, and the sustained scrutiny of performance, while preserving the operational autonomy that makes the enterprise effective.

The state-owned enterprise is also a political actor. Its workforce is a constituency, its customers are a public, and its performance is a measure of the government's competence in the eyes of the citizen. The centre manages the political dimension of the SOE relationship alongside the operational: the timing of tariff changes, the handling of industrial disputes, and the public communication of performance all fall within the centre's responsibility. An SOE failure is therefore both an operational failure and a political exposure, and the centre manages the two together. The enterprise that delivers reliably builds the government's standing, and the enterprise that fails erodes it; the centre's strategic interest in the SOE follows from this connection.

7.4 Inter-Branch Coordination

Inter-branch coordination is the management of the relationships between the branches of the constitutional order whose cooperation the government requires to govern. The executive proposes legislation the legislature enacts; the executive implements laws the judiciary interprets; the executive administers programmes the audit institutions scrutinise. None of the branches can be commanded; each has its own authority, its own doctrine, and its own constituency. The government depends on the working relationships between the branches, and the centre manages those relationships through cultivation rather than direction.

The centre's management of inter-branch relationships is coordination without command. The instruments are the preparation of legislation with the leaders of the legislature, the briefing of the judiciary on matters of mutual concern, the cooperation with audit institutions on the design of accountability frameworks, and the cultivation of working relationships between the officials who staff each branch. These instruments are exercised through personal contact, professional respect, and the recognition that the branches are independent actors whose cooperation is given, not extracted. The relationships are sustained through routine contact and tested in crisis, and a centre that has not maintained them in routine will not have them when crisis arrives.

De Gaulle's management of the French prefectural corps illustrates the discipline required. The prefect was the state's representative in the department, coordinating the field services of every ministry and maintaining the relationship with local authorities, the judiciary, and the elected

officials. The system worked because the centre invested in the selection and development of the prefects, sustained their authority, and respected the constitutional boundaries within which they operated. The Meiji oligarchs' construction of the Japanese civil service followed the same logic: a single, centrally appointed cadre held the relationships with the Diet, the judiciary, and the prefectural governors, and the centre's coordination of the branches rested on the corps' discipline and authority. Inter-branch coordination succeeds when the centre invests in the officials who hold the relationships and sustains the constitutional doctrine within which they work.

The officials who hold the inter-branch relationships are themselves a network. The cabinet secretary, the clerk of the legislature, the chief justice's principal secretary, and the auditor-general's staff form a working community that sustains the constitutional order between crises. The centre cultivates this community through the selection of its members, the quality of the contact between them, and the doctrine they share. Where the community is strong, the branches coordinate under pressure; where it is weak, each branch retreats into its own doctrine and the coordination fails. The centre's investment in this community is invisible in routine and decisive in crisis.

7.5 The Management of Institutional Failure

Institutional failure is the breakdown of an institution the government depends on: the implementation chain that seizes, the state-owned enterprise that defaults, the branch that obstructs, the agency whose competence collapses. The failure is operational; the consequences are political. The centre's response is therefore twofold: the management of the political consequences of the failure and the repair of the institution that has failed. A centre that addresses one without the other either repairs the institution and loses the political ground or manages the politics and leaves the institution to fail again.

The diagnosis of failure precedes the response. The centre must establish what has failed, why it has failed, and the scope of the consequences: whether the failure is local or systemic, whether the cause is human, institutional, or environmental, whether the consequences are containable or escalating. The political management of failure runs in parallel: the centre communicates the diagnosis to the public, the legislature, and the affected actors; it accepts responsibility where the failure is the government's and assigns responsibility where it is institutional; and it maintains the confidence that the failure will be addressed. Where the diagnosis is contested or the response delayed, the political cost compounds, and the centre's discipline is to establish the facts, accept the consequence, and act.

The repair of the institution follows the diagnosis. The repair may be the removal of the individuals whose conduct caused the failure, the restructuring of the institution that allowed the failure, the restatement of the doctrine that guided it, or the injection of resources and capability that the failure revealed to be absent. The repair is conducted under political pressure and within the constraints of the institutional framework: the centre cannot rewrite the constitutional order because an agency failed, but it must restore the institution to working order. De Gaulle's response to the institutional crisis of 1958 illustrates the extreme case: the constitution was restructured, the prefectural corps was reconstituted, and the relationships between the branches were re-established.

The general case is less dramatic: the failure is diagnosed, the political consequences are managed, and the institution is repaired through the centre's sustained attention.

The management of institutional failure is one of the principal tests of the centre. A government that has governed competently in routine will be measured in history by its handling of the failure that arrives without warning, and the centre's discipline in diagnosis, communication, and repair determines whether the failure becomes a crisis or a contained event. The institutions the centre has cultivated over years are the instruments of its response: the competent ministry, the aligned SOE, and the cooperating branch are the resources on which the centre draws. The failure that arrives at a centre that has not cultivated these resources is the worst case, and the centre that has neglected the implementation chain will find, in the moment of failure, that it has nothing to fall back on. The discipline of failure is therefore continuous with the discipline of routine, and the centre that governs well in ordinary times is the centre best placed to govern when the ordinary fails.

7.6 Chapter Summary

Institutional dependency is the government's dependence on its own apparatus to execute and on the cooperation of institutions it does not directly command. The paradox of command and dependence runs through the implementation chain, the management of state-owned enterprises, the coordination of the branches, and the response to institutional failure. The centre's responsibility is for the health of the implementation chain as a whole, exercised through the cultivation of competence, loyalty, and alignment rather than through command alone. The historical record — the Venetian Republic's apparatus, Bismarck's Prussian machinery, the British Indian Civil Service, the French intendants and prefects, the Meiji civil service, Singapore's statutory boards — illustrates a single doctrine: the chain holds when the centre invests in the human and institutional conditions that make command effective.

State-owned enterprises are managed through appointments, direction, and the balance between operational autonomy and strategic alignment. Inter-branch coordination is conducted through coordination without command, sustained by the officials who hold the relationships and the constitutional doctrine within which they work. The management of institutional failure is twofold: the diagnosis and political management of the consequences, and the repair of the institution under political pressure. The centre's craft across all of these operations is the same: to make the apparatus the government's instrument by ensuring that the apparatus itself functions.

Chapter 8 — Political Dependency Operations

The government's dependence on consent, coalition, and legitimacy: the operational craft by which the centre manages the political conditions for governing.

8.1 What Political Dependency Is

The government's political dependency is its dependence on the consent of the governed, on the coalition that supports it, and on the legitimacy that underpins its authority. The government commands the apparatus of state — the civil service, the security forces, the treasury, the courts — but the political conditions that make the apparatus effective are not commanded. They are cultivated, maintained, and, when neglected, eroded. A government that holds the apparatus but has lost the political conditions governs in form and not in fact. The dependency is the gap between formal authority and effective authority, and the centre's task is to keep that gap closed.

The political dependency is the deepest of the dependencies because it conditions the others. The financial dependency is sustained by the consent of the taxpayers and the confidence of the investors. The human dependency is sustained by the willingness of the talent to serve, and the informational dependency by the credibility the government enjoys in public discourse. The institutional dependency is sustained by the cooperation of the branches and the administration. When the political dependency fails, the conditions under which the others are managed fail with it, and the apparatus runs without the traction that makes its operations effective.

Consent is not given once and held as a standing asset. It is continuously maintained or continuously eroded, and the work of maintenance is a daily function of the centre. The Venetian Republic understood this condition with particular clarity: the doge was hedged by councils, by term limits, and by the requirement of continuous affirmation, and the patriciate whose consent sustained the regime was managed as a standing body whose alignment was renewed through ceremony, through office, and through the steady distribution of honour. The arrangements were specific to Venice; the principle that consent is renewed through continuous management rather than secured once is general.

8.2 The Management of Consent

Consent is a continuous relationship between the government and the public, maintained through the government's performance, its communication, and its responsiveness. The performance leg is the substance: the government delivers the security, the order, the public goods, and the economic conditions the public expects, and the public's acceptance of the government's authority rests on the perceived adequacy of the delivery. The communication leg is the explanation: the government sets out its decisions, its reasons, and its expectations, in language the public recognises as honest. The responsiveness leg is the adjustment: the government takes in the public's reaction, distinguishes the signal from the noise, and adjusts its course where adjustment is

warranted. Propaganda is the substitution of communication for performance, and it does not maintain consent; it discredits the communication and accelerates the erosion.

The centre's responsibility for consent runs through every operational domain. The budget is in part a consent instrument: it shows the public what the government taxes for and what it spends on, and the alignment between the two is read as evidence of seriousness or of waste. The handling of a crisis is in part a consent instrument: the public watches whether the government names the problem, takes responsibility, and corrects course. Lee Kuan Yew's management of consent in Singapore rested on these foundations — a public housing programme that gave the majority a stake in the country's success, an anti-corruption regime that gave the government's word its weight, and a communications discipline that gave the public a clear account of the government's reasoning.

The institutional mechanisms by which consent is tested vary across jurisdictions. The British system institutionalises consent through the confidence convention: the government governs only so long as it holds the confidence of the House of Commons, and the loss of confidence on a major vote triggers either a change of government or a dissolution. The convention is the operational mechanism by which consent is continuously tested, but the testing is decided on the smaller indicators before it reaches the formal vote. Consent is withdrawn before it is formally withdrawn at the ballot box: the tone of public discourse, the willingness of middling officials to defend the government in conversation, the readiness of professional bodies to associate with the government's programme, the patience of the business community with the government's requests. The centre that waits for the formal vote to learn that consent has eroded has waited too long, because the erosion that shows in the vote is the end of a process that began years before.

8.3 The Building and Maintenance of Coalitions

The coalition that supports the government is the assembly of actors whose combined backing sustains the government in office and in operation. The coalition typically includes economic actors whose investment and tax compliance the government requires, bureaucratic elites whose implementation carries the government's decisions into effect, social elites whose standing confers or withdraws cultural legitimacy, and a portion of the public whose active support or at least acquiescence the government needs. The coalition is rarely identical with the government's electoral base, and it is rarely identical with its formal alliance structure. It is the working alignment that makes the government effective, and its composition shifts with the issue, the sector, and the season.

The centre's management of the coalition begins with the identification of its members. The identification is not a one-time exercise, because the coalition for one decision is not the coalition for the next. The centre maintains a current map of the actors whose support is material, the interests that animate them, the price of their support, and the issues on which their support cannot be held. The map is built through the relationships the centre's principals maintain with the principals of each actor, through the intelligence the territorial representatives and the sectoral ministries supply, and through the disciplined observation of public and private positions.

The management of the coalition is the management of expectations and the resolution of conflicts within it. The members of the coalition have interests that overlap on some questions and diverge on others, and the centre's task is to align the overlapping interests and to manage the divergent ones before they fracture the coalition. Louis XIV's management of the French nobility through Versailles is the classical illustration of coalition management by absorption: the great families were drawn to court, occupied with ceremony, office, and pension, and denied the provincial base from which they might have become independent political actors. Bismarck's coalition management through the 1870s illustrates management by alternation: he held together conservatives, national liberals, and particular interests by drawing on each in turn, by isolating the issue of the moment, and by conceding on the points where concession preserved the alignment while holding the line where concession would have fractured it. Both techniques failed when the coalition's interests diverged beyond what management could contain, and the failure is itself instructive: a coalition held together by management rather than by common interest has a finite life, and the centre's task is to extend that life and to recognise its limit.

8.4 Legitimacy and Its Sources

Legitimacy is the belief, held by the public and by the elites, that the government has the right to govern. The belief is distinct from consent, which is the acceptance of the government's authority at a given moment, and from coalition, which is the active support of the actors who back the government. Legitimacy is the deeper recognition that the government's exercise of power is rightful, that the institutions through which it governs are appropriate, and that the procedures by which it took office are the proper ones. A government with legitimacy can weather failures of performance that would bring down a government without it. A government without legitimacy can govern only through constant effort and is exposed to collapse on the first serious failure.

The sources of legitimacy are performance, procedure, tradition, and charisma. Performance legitimacy rests on the government's delivery of the outcomes the public expects: security, prosperity, order, justice. Procedure legitimacy rests on the regularity and the integrity of the processes by which the government took office and by which it makes decisions: elections, parliamentary assent, judicial review, consultation. Tradition legitimacy rests on the continuity of the institutions and the practices the public has known and on the government's place within that continuity. Charismatic legitimacy rests on the personal authority of the leader and on the public's belief in the leader's exceptional qualities, in the direct relationship between the leader and the public that bypasses the institutions; the four sources are not exclusive, and most governments draw on more than one, with the mix shifting over time.

The centre's responsibility is the maintenance of the sources on which the government's legitimacy rests and the recognition of the sources that are weakening. Performance legitimacy is maintained through steady delivery and through the avoidance of the conspicuous failures that dominate the public memory. Procedure legitimacy is maintained through observance of the processes that confer authority on the government's decisions and through restraint when the processes are inconvenient. Tradition legitimacy is maintained through visible respect for the institutions and practices the government inherited and through careful handling of the symbols

that carry the public's attachment. The Meiji oligarchs understood the maintenance problem with particular clarity: they drew on tradition legitimacy through the restoration of imperial authority, on procedure legitimacy through the drafting of the constitution and the establishment of the Diet, and on performance legitimacy through the rapid modernisation that delivered military victory and economic transformation — the combination was managed deliberately, and the management is the lesson.

8.5 The Management of Legitimacy Crises

A legitimacy crisis is the moment at which one or more of the sources of legitimacy is questioned in a way that threatens the government's right to govern. Performance legitimacy is questioned when the government fails conspicuously on a core function: a war lost, a famine unmanaged, a financial collapse unchecked. Procedure legitimacy is questioned when the government's arrival in office or its decision-making is shown to have violated the processes that confer authority: a contested election, a constitutional shortcut, a corruption exposed. Tradition legitimacy is questioned when the public rejects the institutions and practices it had inherited and looks for new foundations: a dynasty discredited, a settlement overturned, a settlement's symbols stripped of meaning. Charismatic legitimacy is questioned when the leader's qualities cease to command belief: through age, through failure, through the contrast between the public's expectation and the leader's conduct.

The diagnosis of the crisis is the first task. The centre must identify which source of legitimacy has been damaged, the depth of the damage, and the actors who are exploiting it. A performance failure that has not yet been read as a procedural failure can be addressed through performance correction and through the communication of the correction; a procedural failure that has not yet been read as a tradition failure can be addressed through procedural repair and through the visible observance of the processes that were bypassed. The misdiagnosis of the crisis — treating a tradition crisis as a performance crisis, or a charismatic crisis as a procedural one — produces responses that do not address the source of the damage and that often deepen it. The Habsburg monarchy's management of the consent of the nationalities illustrates the cost: the monarchy treated what was in part a tradition crisis — the refusal of the nationalities to accept the dynasty's narrative of itself — as a procedural and administrative problem, and the administrative concessions it made did not address the source of the damage and arrived too late to alter the trajectory.

The management of the political consequences is the second task, and the reconstruction of legitimacy is the third. The centre must hold the coalition together while the legitimacy is being repaired, must prevent the crisis from spreading from the damaged source to the others, and must maintain the government's capacity to act while the repair is in progress. De Gaulle's management of the legitimisation of the Fifth Republic is the classical illustration of reconstruction: he diagnosed the crisis of the Fourth Republic as a procedural and tradition crisis — the public's loss of faith in the parliamentary regime and in the settlement of 1946 — and he reconstructed legitimacy through a new constitutional settlement that restored procedure legitimacy, through the appeal to tradition legitimacy that the office of the presidency carried, and through the charismatic authority he

personally commanded. The reconstruction built the new on foundations the public could accept rather than restoring the old. The lesson is general: a legitimacy crisis is resolved through the rebuilding of the sources that have failed, not through the defence of the sources that have not.

8.6 Chapter Summary

The government's political dependency is its dependence on consent, coalition, and legitimacy — the political conditions that make the apparatus of state effective. Consent is the continuous relationship between the government and the public, maintained through performance, communication, and responsiveness, and withdrawn through smaller indicators before it is withdrawn at the ballot box. The coalition is the working alignment of economic, bureaucratic, social, and public actors whose combined support sustains the government, managed through identification, expectation management, and conflict resolution. Legitimacy is the deeper belief that the government has the right to govern, drawn from performance, procedure, tradition, and charisma, and maintained through the centre's sustained attention to each source. The political dependency conditions the others, and its failure carries the others with it.

The management of legitimacy crises is the centre's most demanding political task. The diagnosis identifies which source has been damaged and the depth of the damage; the management holds the coalition while the repair proceeds; the reconstruction rebuilds the sources that have failed rather than defending those that have not. The comparative record — Venice on consent, the British confidence convention on its institutionalisation, Bismarck on coalition, the Meiji oligarchs on the deliberate assembly of legitimacy, de Gaulle on reconstruction — illustrates the principles in their concrete forms. The forms are specific to their circumstances; the principles are the operational craft by which the centre manages the political conditions for governing.

Chapter 9 — Managing Economic Elites

Part III: Actor Management Operations — The operational craft by which the centre manages the relationships with the actors whose resources and cooperation the government needs.

9.1 Who the Economic Elites Are

The economic elites are the actors whose control of productive resources makes their cooperation material to the government's purposes. They comprise the heads of the principal firms, the leadership of the financial institutions, the executives of the state-owned enterprises, the office-holders of the professional bodies, and the directors of the trade associations. Each commands a base the government does not command: capital, employment, sectoral expertise, organisational capacity, or the legitimacy that comes from speaking for a constituency. They hold their positions through ownership, through appointment, or through election by their peers, and the basis of their standing shapes the terms on which the centre must engage them. They are private actors, or semi-public actors, whose resources and standing make them counterparties to the government in the conduct of economic policy.

Three characteristics mark them as a category. They control resources the government needs: the firms that pay the revenue, the banks that finance the deficit, the state-owned enterprises that operate the strategic assets, the professions that supply the technical capability, and the associations that aggregate sectoral interests. They have constituencies the government must consider: workers, depositors, shareholders, members, and the broader publics whose welfare is tied to their decisions. They have alternatives the government cannot ignore: the firm can invest elsewhere, the bank can lend elsewhere, the executive can take their expertise to another jurisdiction, and the association can mobilise its members against a policy. The combination of these three characteristics distinguishes the economic elite from other constituencies and sets the terms on which the centre must engage them.

The composition of the economic elite varies across jurisdictions and across time, but the structure of the category is constant. Colbert's management of the French mercantile elites under Louis XIV organised the manufacturers and the great trading houses under the manufactures system, drawing them into the project of state power through privileges, monopolies, and direct engagement with the controller-general. The Venetian Republic governed through its merchant aristocracy, integrating the leading houses into the state's commercial and naval policy as a matter of constitutional design. The Dutch Republic managed its merchant regents and the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie as the principal economic actors of the United Provinces, with the state's fiscal and naval fortunes tied directly to their commercial success. In each case the centre identified the actors whose resources were material, managed the relationships continuously, and structured the engagement to align the actors' conduct with the state's purposes.

9.2 The Relationship with Business Leaders

The relationship with business leaders is the management of the principal firms' cooperation in the conditions the government needs to sustain. The firms generate the employment, the investment, and the revenue that constitute the government's economic position, and their leadership takes the decisions on expansion, contraction, relocation, and innovation that move that position. The relationship is conducted through regular engagement, the exchange of information, and the management of expectations on both sides. The centre does not command the firms; it cultivates the conditions under which the firms' decisions align with the government's purposes. The instrument is the relationship, sustained across the policy cycle, not the directive issued in the moment.

Business leaders hold a position distinct from subordination. Their cooperation is voluntary, their firms are theirs, and their accountability runs to shareholders, boards, and workforces rather than to the centre. The recognition of this is the starting point of sound engagement. A centre that treats business leaders as subordinates encounters compliance in form and resistance in substance; a centre that treats them as partners secures alignment where the interests converge and manages the divergence where they do not. The partnership is asymmetric, because the government holds powers the firms do not, but it remains a partnership in the sense that the government's purposes are achieved through the firms' voluntary decisions rather than against them.

The cultivation of the relationship runs through structured channels and personal engagement. The structured channels include the regular consultations between the centre and the principal firms' leadership, the advisory bodies on which the business leaders sit, and the formal exchanges that accompany major policy decisions. The personal engagement runs through the direct contact between the principal officials and the principal business leaders, maintained through the cycle and not only at the moments of decision. Bismarck's management of the Ruhr industrialists illustrates the form: the iron and steel magnates were engaged as counterparts to the Reich's tariff, railway, and social-policy programmes, with the relationship sustained through direct access to the chancellor and the recognition that their investment decisions were material to the state's strategic position. Meiji Japan's oligarchs managed the zaibatsu through engagement of a comparable kind: the founders of Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda were cultivated as instruments of state-led industrialisation, with state direction, subsidies, and access to capital exchanged for the firms' commitment to the sectors the government prioritised, and with the relationship in each case personal, sustained, and explicitly reciprocal, producing an alignment that was the operational foundation of the state's economic project.

9.3 The Relationship with the Financial Sector

The financial sector is a distinct category of economic elite. It comprises the banks, the investment funds, the insurers, the pension managers, and the institutions that intermediate between savers and borrowers, allocate capital, and price risk. Its leadership commands resources that are material to the government's fiscal position in a way that no other private constituency's resources are: the banks hold the deposits that constitute the payment system, the funds hold the government's bonds, and the insurers and pension managers hold the long-duration assets on which

the government's financing programme depends. The financial sector's confidence underpins the government's fiscal position. The loss of that confidence has consequences no policy adjustment can quickly reverse.

The dependency runs in both directions. The banks depend on the central bank for liquidity and on the government for the regulatory framework within which they operate; the funds depend on the government for the legal protections that govern their mandates; the insurers depend on the supervisory regime that authorises their activity. The reciprocal dependency gives the centre leverage, but the leverage is constrained by the more fundamental dependency on confidence. A government that uses its leverage aggressively against the financial sector may find its fiscal position impaired in the very act of exercising it. The management of the relationship is the calibration of the leverage against the confidence, with the centre's eye on the second-order effects on the fiscal position.

The relationship is managed through the central bank, the treasury, the financial regulator, and the centre's direct engagement with the financial sector's leadership. The direct engagement is the part the centre owns: the principal bankers, fund managers, and insurers are known to the centre, and the centre maintains the relationships through structured consultation and personal contact. The British management of the City of London is the long-standing case: the Treasury, the Bank of England, and the City's leadership have sustained a triangular relationship over generations, with the City's contribution to revenue and to the balance of payments understood as material, the City's mobility understood as real, and the engagement structured to give the City visibility into the direction of policy without conceding the prerogative to set it. De Gaulle's management of the French financial sector followed a comparable logic, with the state's strategic interest expressed through ownership stakes in the leading banks, directed lending to the priority sectors, and the cultivation of the sector's leadership as counterparties to the state's industrial policy. The craft in each case is the centre's continuous attention to the confidence on which its fiscal position rests.

9.4 The Management of State-Owned Enterprises

State-owned enterprises are economic actors whose leadership the government appoints and whose strategy the government influences, but whose operational dynamics the government does not directly control. They occupy strategic sectors: energy, transport, utilities, defence industries, and the commanding heights the state has chosen to retain. Their leadership is drawn from the centre's pool, often from the senior civil service or from the private sector on the centre's invitation. Their strategy is shaped by the government's policy direction, expressed through the ownership function and the sectoral ministry. Their operations are run by their management, within the framework the government sets, and the centre's intervention in operations is the exception rather than the rule.

The management of the state-owned enterprise relationship rests on three functions. The appointment of leadership is the first: the centre selects the chair, the chief executive, and the board, with attention to the strategic direction the enterprise is to take and the capacity of the individuals to take it there. The setting of strategic direction is the second: the centre defines the enterprise's objectives, the sectors it is to operate in, the returns it is to generate, and the public-

policy obligations it is to discharge. The balance between operational autonomy and political alignment is the third: the centre must give the enterprise's leadership the room to run the business competently, while ensuring that the conduct of the business aligns with the government's broader purposes. The balance is delicate and is reset continuously through the relationship between the ownership function and the enterprise's leadership.

The craft is in the restraint the centre exercises on the operational side. A state-owned enterprise whose leadership is changed with each government, whose strategy is revised with each minister, and whose operational decisions are subject to political direction will perform poorly regardless of the assets it holds. An enterprise whose leadership is given a clear mandate, the time to execute it, and the autonomy to run the business will perform to the level of the mandate and the leadership. Lee Kuan Yew's management of Singapore's economic development through the Economic Development Board, and the subsequent management of the state holding company Temasek and the government-linked companies under it, illustrates the principle: the government sets the strategic direction at the level of the holding company and the principal enterprises, appoints the leadership, and then exercises the ownership function through the board, with operational decisions reserved to the management. De Gaulle's management of the French industrial champions through the Commissariat général du Plan and the state's ownership function followed the same logic, with the discipline of restraint producing enterprises capable of carrying the state's strategic interest; the discipline is the centre's restraint, and the result is the enterprise's performance.

9.5 Domestic-Foreign Investor Coalitions

Domestic and foreign investors in a strategic sector often form coalitions that the centre must manage as networks rather than as separate relationships. The coalition may take the form of a joint venture between a domestic firm and a foreign partner, an industry association that represents both, or an informal alignment around a shared policy position. The domestic partner brings political access, local knowledge, and the legitimacy of national ownership; the foreign partner brings capital, technology, and access to international markets. The combination is more powerful than either group alone, and the coalition's influence on the climate in the sector is typically greater than the sum of its parts. The centre that engages the foreign investors alone, or the domestic investors alone, misreads the structure that shapes the sector.

The centre must map these coalitions and manage the relationships with them as networks. The mapping identifies the principal investors in each priority sector, the linkages between them, the policy positions they advance collectively, and the points at which their interests diverge. The management that follows engages the coalition through its principal nodes, addresses the collective positions through structured consultation, and tracks the divergences for separate treatment. The coalition is the unit of analysis, and the centre that treats it as a set of individual relationships mismanages the sector. The dynamics of a domestic-foreign coalition differ from the dynamics of either group alone, because the coalition's ask is typically a package that addresses both groups' interests, and the package is what holds the coalition together.

The history of catch-up development turns on the management of these coalitions. The Meiji period combined foreign debt, foreign technology transfer, and domestic entrepreneurial capacity through the government's direction of the zaibatsu formation and the state's selective engagement with foreign advisers and foreign capital, with the foreign element brought in on terms the centre set and the domestic element organised under the centre's direction. The Chinese Treaty Ports produced dense domestic-foreign coalitions around banking, shipping, and manufacturing, with the foreign concessionaire, the domestic comprador, and the regional authorities each holding a position the others could not displace, and the climate in each port shaped by the coalition's internal balance. The Singapore-Jurong industrial model, built on the Economic Development Board's cultivation of foreign investors in partnership with domestic state-owned vehicles and domestic suppliers, organised the coalition explicitly through the agency's structuring of joint ventures and industrial estates. In each case the government identified the coalition as the unit, managed the relationships as a network, and shaped the terms on which domestic and foreign capital combined; the principle is general, with the coalition as the actor and the centre's craft the management of the network.

9.6 Chapter Summary

The economic elites are the actors whose control of productive resources makes their cooperation material to the government's purposes. They share three characteristics: they control resources the government needs, they have constituencies the government must consider, and they have alternatives the government cannot ignore. The composition varies across jurisdictions; the structure of the category is constant. Colbert's mercantile elites, the Venetian merchant aristocracy, and the Dutch merchant regents and the VOC illustrate the structure across distinct constitutional settings. The centre identifies the actors whose resources are material and manages the relationships continuously.

The relationship with business leaders is conducted through regular engagement, the exchange of information, and the management of expectations, on the recognition that business leaders are partners whose cooperation is voluntary. The relationship with the financial sector is shaped by the particular dependency on the sector's confidence as the underpinning of the government's fiscal position. The management of state-owned enterprises rests on the appointment of leadership, the setting of strategic direction, and the balance between operational autonomy and political alignment, with the centre's restraint as the principal craft. The domestic-foreign investor coalitions in strategic sectors are managed as networks, with the coalition as the unit of analysis and the package of interests as the object of engagement. The operational craft in each case is the cultivation of the relationship, sustained across the policy cycle, on the recognition that the government's purposes are achieved through the actors' voluntary cooperation rather than against it.

Chapter 10 — Managing Bureaucratic Elites

The civil service, the military, the police, and the judiciary as first-order actors whose cooperation the government must manage, each with distinct requirements.

10.1 The Bureaucratic Elites as Actors

The civil service, the military, the police, and the judiciary constitute the bureaucratic elites of the state. They are part of the government in that they hold its offices, exercise its authority, and staff its apparatus. They are also actors in their own right, with corporate interests, professional cultures, and institutional dynamics that the centre does not command but must manage. The management of these elites is the management of cooperation within the government's own house.

Each elite controls something the government requires and cannot take by force: the civil service controls the routine execution of policy; the military controls the organised application of force; the police controls the daily enforcement of the law; the judiciary controls the authoritative interpretation of the legal order. None of these can be commandeered without cost. The centre secures their cooperation through cultivation, structure, and discipline, and the failure of any one degrades the government's capacity to act. The management of these elites is therefore a continuous function of the centre, conducted through relationships rather than through command.

The failure modes are familiar. Obstruction appears as delay, dilution, and the quiet burial of unwelcome directives. Leakage appears as the passage of internal positions to outside actors through channels that cannot be traced. Institutional resistance appears as the invocation of procedure, precedent, and professional norm against a direction the elite regards as improper. Bismarck's contest with the Prussian War Ministry over the coordination of strategy, and the chronic friction between the French prefectoral corps and the metropolitan police under the Third Republic, illustrate the pattern in mature states.

The four elites are not interchangeable. The military elite is disciplined, hierarchical, and corporate; its chain of command and operational culture have no parallel in the civil service. The judicial elite is professional, deliberative, and protective of its independence; its authority rests on the perceived distance from political direction. The civil service elite is generalist, continuous, and politically proximate; its tenure typically outlasts the principal it serves. The centre's management of each must begin from its particular character.

10.2 The Civil Service

The civil service is the permanent apparatus of government. It carries the institutional memory of the state, executes the routine business of administration, and staffs the ministries through which policy is turned into action. Its senior cadre occupies positions that typically outlast any political principal, and its accumulated knowledge of the files, the precedents, and the constituencies is the substrate on which political direction operates. The civil service is therefore both an instrument of the government and a constraint on it.

The centre's management of the civil service leadership has three elements. The first is the cultivation of the senior cadre: the identification, development, and posting of officials whose judgment and standing the centre can rely on across changes of principal. The second is the management of the boundary between political direction and administrative execution: political principals set direction, officials execute, and the boundary must hold in both directions. The third is the maintenance of the civil service's morale and sense of purpose, without which the apparatus becomes inert or hostile.

Lee Kuan Yew's management of the Singapore Administrative Service illustrates the cultivation element in its developed form. Scholarships identified high-potential entrants early, tracked postings broadened their experience across ministries, and salaries competitive with the private sector retained them through their careers. The French *grands corps* illustrate the cultivation element in a different form: the Conseil d'État, the Cour des comptes, and the Inspection générale des finances carry a common elite education, a corps identity that persists across postings, and a circulation between the senior civil service and the political leadership that binds the two together. The British Northcote-Trevelyan tradition, with its meritocratic recruitment and its generalist administrative class, illustrates the boundary element: officials advise and execute, ministers decide and answer. In each case the centre manages the cadre rather than commanding it.

Morale is the element most easily neglected and most difficult to restore. A civil service that has lost confidence in its principals will execute directives slowly, incompletely, and with the minimum engagement consistent with form. The recovery of morale requires sustained attention: the principals must use the senior cadre well, defend it from political pressure where defence is warranted, and credit it where credit is due. The reconstruction of the British civil service after the attrition of the 1970s and the Indonesian reform of the civil service after the institutional exhaustion of the late New Order each illustrate the effort required.

10.3 The Military

The military is the bearer of the state's monopoly on legitimate force. Its corporate identity is built around discipline, hierarchy, and the professional management of violence, and its culture is distinct from that of any other elite. The military's relationship with political authority is therefore unlike the civil service's: the chain of command runs from the political principal to the operational commander, but the professional autonomy of the officer corps in operational and doctrinal matters is a fact the centre cannot remove. The centre's management of the military leadership is the management of this duality.

The centre's task is the preservation of civilian authority without the erosion of military professionalism. Civilian authority means that the decision to employ force, the setting of strategic objectives, and the allocation of resources are political decisions taken by the government. Military professionalism means that the conduct of operations, the development of doctrine, and the internal management of the service are professional matters reserved to the officer corps. The two are in tension whenever political direction touches matters the officer corps regards as professional, and the centre's craft is in distinguishing the political from the professional in each case.

Bismarck's management of the Prussian military illustrates the tension in its sharpest form. The contest with the War Ministry and the General Staff over the coordination of strategy and the conduct of operations was never fully resolved, and the friction between chancellor and general staff recurred across decades. De Gaulle's management of the relationship between the French military and the Republic illustrates the recovery of civilian authority after its near-collapse. The trauma of 1958 and the putsch of 1961 produced a reconstitution of the relationship: the presidency was vested with the responsibility for defence, the officer corps was reorganised, and the political direction of nuclear strategy was made unambiguous. The Meiji oligarchs' management of the imperial army and navy illustrates the construction of the relationship from new foundations, with civilian direction established in principle but the institutional autonomy of the services codified in the independence of the service ministries from the civilian cabinet, a friction that later consumed the state.

The military elite's corporate interests — budget, doctrine, autonomy, status — must be managed rather than denied. A military that is starved of budget or stripped of doctrinal autonomy becomes politicised or hollow; a military whose corporate interests are conceded without limit becomes a state within the state. The centre's craft is to manage the budget, the doctrine, and the appointments in a way that keeps the officer corps professional and the civilian authority intact. Lee Kuan Yew's management of the Singapore Armed Forces, conducted through the systematic cultivation of a professional officer corps, the integration of the services with the civil defence and economic mobilisation apparatus, and the clear subordination of the military to the elected government, illustrates the craft in a small state where the margin for error is narrow.

10.4 The Police and the Security Services

The police and the security services are the enforcers of the state's domestic authority. They are present in the daily life of the public in a way the military is not, and their conduct is the daily face of the state for most of the population. Their work combines enforcement, the application of coercive power against those who break the law or threaten the order, with the maintenance of consent, on which the legitimacy of enforcement depends. The balance between enforcement and consent is the central operational problem of the police and the security services, and the centre's management of their leadership turns on this balance.

The distinct requirement is that the police and the security services enforce without becoming a political instrument and without becoming a force apart. A police that is a political instrument loses the consent on which enforcement depends; a police that is a force apart loses the accountability on which legitimacy depends. The management of the relationship between the security apparatus and the public is therefore a function of the centre, conducted through the appointment of commissioners, the setting of priorities, the oversight of conduct, and the handling of cases that touch the political interest. The centre that delegates this function to the interior ministry alone loses the capacity to manage the balance.

Comparative practice illustrates the management of the balance. The French prefectural corps, established under Napoleon and sustained through every subsequent regime, places a representative of the central state in each department with authority over the coordination of central services and

the maintenance of order, producing a unified channel through which the police, the gendarmerie, and the civilian administration are held to a common political direction. The British tradition of policing by consent, codified in the principles associated with Robert Peel, separates the operational direction of the police from the political direction of the government through the office of the constable and the local police authority, while the Home Office maintains the relationship at the centre. Lee Kuan Yew's management of the Singapore Internal Security Department and the police force illustrates the craft in a jurisdiction where the threat environment required sustained enforcement capacity: the security apparatus was integrated with the political direction of the government, and the services were systematically professionalised. The forms differ; the function is the same.

10.5 The Judiciary

The judiciary is the interpreter of the law and the protector of the constitutional order. Its work is the authoritative resolution of disputes, the interpretation of statutes, and the restraint of the other branches within the constitutional limits. The judiciary's distinct requirement is the preservation of its independence without the abdication of the government's responsibility for the justice system. Independence is the condition of the judiciary's authority; the government's responsibility for the justice system is the condition of its legitimacy.

The centre's management of the relationship with the judicial leadership operates through three instruments. The first is appointments: the selection of judges, particularly at the senior level, is the principal lever through which the character of the judiciary is shaped over time, and the centre that allows the appointments process to be captured by any single interest loses the instrument. The second is resourcing: the courts, the prosecutor service, and the legal aid apparatus require funding, staffing, and infrastructure that only the government can provide, and the level and condition of resourcing shape the judiciary's capacity to do its work. The third is the management of the boundary between political direction and judicial independence: the government does not direct the judiciary in the decision of cases, but the government sets the framework within which the judiciary operates, and the boundary must be drawn and defended in both directions.

The Venetian Republic's management of its judicial apparatus illustrates the relationship in its developed historical form. The Venetian judiciary was professionalised, salaried, and rotated to prevent the capture of offices by families or factions, and the councils of the Republic maintained the appointments and the oversight without entering the decision of cases. The British relationship between the Lord Chancellor, the judiciary, and the executive illustrates the same principles in a different tradition: the Lord Chancellor sat in all three branches until the constitutional reforms of the 2000s, and the reforms that created the Supreme Court and the Judicial Appointments Commission redistributed the instruments while preserving the relationship. De Gaulle's management of the Conseil d'État and the Constitutional Council, conducted through the constitutional architecture of the Fifth Republic, illustrates the construction of a judiciary that is independent in the decision of cases and integrated in the advisory and administrative functions of the state.

The judiciary's corporate culture, its professional norms, its deliberative character, and its protective stance toward its own independence must be respected rather than managed away. A government that attempts to bend the judiciary to its direction produces resistance; a government that fails to defend the judiciary from political attack produces demoralisation. The centre's craft is in the cultivation of the senior judicial leadership, the careful use of the appointments instrument, and the steady resourcing of the justice system, conducted over years and across changes of principal.

10.6 Chapter Summary

The civil service, the military, the police, and the judiciary constitute the bureaucratic elites of the state, and each is an actor with its own interests, cultures, and dynamics. The centre's management of these elites is the management of cooperation within the government's own apparatus. The failure modes — obstruction, leakage, institutional resistance — appear whenever the centre attempts to command what it must instead cultivate.

Each elite requires a distinct management. The civil service is managed through the cultivation of the senior cadre, the maintenance of the boundary between political direction and administrative execution, and the preservation of morale. The military is managed through the preservation of civilian authority without the erosion of military professionalism, with attention to the corporate interests that the officer corps defends. The police and the security services are managed through the balance of enforcement and consent, the appointment of commissioners, and the oversight of conduct. The judiciary is managed through appointments, resourcing, and the defence of the boundary between political direction and judicial independence.

The comparative record confirms the craft. Bismarck's contest with the Prussian military, de Gaulle's reconstruction of the French civil-military relationship after 1961, the Meiji oligarchs' construction of the imperial army and navy, Lee Kuan Yew's management of the Singapore civil service, armed forces, and security apparatus, and the Venetian Republic's management of its judicial apparatus each illustrate the management of these relationships in different traditions and different conditions. The government that fails to manage its bureaucratic elites loses the apparatus; the government that manages them well secures the conditions for governing.

Chapter 11 — Managing Social Elites

The academy, the media, the religious institutions, and the cultural institutions as actors whose standing and influence shape the conditions of governing. Each has distinct requirements.

11.1 Who the Social Elites Are

The social elites are the actors whose standing and influence shape the conditions under which the government operates, and they comprise the academy, the media, the religious institutions, and the cultural institutions. The academy takes in the universities, the research institutions, and the learned societies; the media takes in the press, the broadcasters, and the digital media; the religious institutions take in the established churches, the religious foundations, and the clerical leadership; and the cultural institutions take in the museums, the theatres, and the cultural foundations. Each holds an authority the government did not confer and cannot withdraw, and each shapes the intellectual, the moral, or the cultural setting in which the government's authority is exercised.

The shared characteristic is the form of the authority. The social elites are not commanded; they are cultivated. They hold their standing through expertise, through credibility, through moral authority, or through custodianship of the national inheritance, and the government's authority is exercised in the conditions they help to shape. The economic elite can be engaged through interest and the bureaucratic elite through structure; the social elite is engaged through respect, through recognition, and through the patient construction of relationships over years. The centre's instrument is cultivation, and the centre that mistakes command for cultivation loses the relationship and gains the resistance.

The four are distinct in the basis of their authority and in their dependencies on the state. The academy produces the expertise, the legitimation, and the officials of the future; the media produces the daily account of the government's conduct on which public judgment is formed; the religious institutions carry the moral authority that precedes the state and the connections to faith communities the state does not command; and the cultural institutions curate the national inheritance and shape the public's understanding of its history. Each depends on the state for the recognition and the framework within which it operates, with the broadcasters depending on the licence to transmit and the cultural institutions depending on the patronage without which they cannot exist. The centre's management of each begins from the particular character of the institution.

The historical record shows the management of the social elites as a continuous function of statecraft. The French monarchy cultivated the Sorbonne and the academies as instruments of intellectual cohesion, the Habsburg monarchy managed the universities across its multi-national empire as instruments of imperial loyalty, the Meiji oligarchs built Tokyo Imperial University as the seedbed of the modern official class, the British managed the BBC and the broadsheet press as intermediaries whose independence was the condition of their utility, the Venetian Republic managed the Church through the state-church relationship, the Ottoman state managed the faith communities through the millet system, and the Chinese imperial state managed the imperial

academy and the examination system as the central instrument of elite formation. The forms differ; the function is constant. The government that fails to manage its social elites loses the conditions of its authority.

11.2 The Academy

The academy is the source of the expertise, the legitimation, the next generation of officials, and the intellectual frameworks that shape public discourse. The universities, the research institutions, and the learned societies produce the technical, scientific, and historical knowledge on which policy depends, the credentialling of the professionals who staff the senior ranks, and the expert consensus that confers legitimacy on contested decisions. The intellectual frameworks that originate in the academy shape the terms in which public problems are defined and addressed, often for generations after their first articulation. The government's relationship with the academy is therefore one of structured dependency: the government commands the policy apparatus but depends on the academy for the knowledge and the people that make the apparatus work.

The centre's cultivation of the academy runs through four instruments. The first is the relationship with university leadership: the vice-chancellors, the rectors, and the presidents who hold the institutions, and whose judgment the centre comes to know through sustained engagement. The second is the advisory role: the councils, the commissions, and the panels that bring senior academics into the work of the government on terms that make their expertise available without requiring their conversion into officials. The third is the research funding that steers the academy's attention toward the questions the centre needs answered, on terms set jointly with the academic leadership; the fourth is the personal engagement of senior officials with the academic leadership of the jurisdiction, sustained across changes of principal on both sides. The instruments work together, and the centre that uses only one will find the field thin.

The management of academic opposition is the management of a field that produces both expertise and dissent. The same institutions that produce the expertise and the officials produce the scholars who contest the government's positions, and the centre's relationships must hold both. The serious academic opposition is engaged on its merits, answered in the forums where it is raised, and where possible absorbed into the policy process through the mechanisms of consultation and advisory appointment; the trivial opposition is left to dissipate in the academic conversation, which is well equipped to deal with it. A centre that cultivates only supportive voices loses access to the best expertise; a centre that cultivates only critical voices loses the legitimation that expert consensus provides. The instrument is the field, not the individual.

The historical record illustrates the cultivation in distinct traditions. The French monarchy's management of the Sorbonne and the academies, formalised under Colbert in the seventeenth century and sustained through the republics, integrated the senior faculties into the work of the state through consultative bodies, honours, and the recognition that the academies' standing was an asset to the regime. The Habsburg monarchy's management of the universities across its multi-national empire balanced the imperial interest in cohesion against the regional and confessional characters of the institutions, with the centre regulating appointments in fields touching public order and managing the tensions between the German, the Hungarian, the Czech, and the Polish faculties.

The Meiji oligarchs built Tokyo Imperial University as the seedbed of the modern official class, with the imperial universities managed as instruments of the state's modernising project and the intellectual discourse of the period shaped through the advisory councils around the oligarchs. The American and British policy discourse of the twentieth century illustrates the academy's role in its developed form, with the policy schools, the research universities, and the learned societies producing the frameworks that shaped the conduct of policy and the experts who circulated between the academy and the government across administrations.

11.3 The Media

The media is the principal intermediary between the government and the public. The press, the broadcasters, and the digital media produce the daily account of the government's conduct on which public judgment is formed. The government's communications travel through the media to the public, but the framing, the amplification, and the credibility they carry are determined by relationships the government does not command. The media holds a position that is neither the government's nor the public's but is exercised on the public's behalf against the government. The centre's management of the media relationship is therefore the management of an independent actor whose independence is the condition of its utility.

The centre's management runs through the cultivation of owners, editors, and senior correspondents. The owners set the editorial line; the editors set the framing; the senior correspondents set the tone of coverage; and the centre knows each, engages each at the level the engagement requires, and sustains the relationships across the cycle. The management of access is the principal instrument: exclusive briefings, off-the-record conversations, and early sight of policy offered in exchange for engagement. The management of exposure is the other side of the same instrument: the centre manages which officials speak to which outlets, which stories are given to which correspondents, and which lines of inquiry are encouraged or discouraged. The cumulative effect of these choices, exercised over years, shapes the landscape of coverage.

The balance between the government's need to communicate and the media's independence is the central operational problem. The government's communications require channels the public trusts; the public's trust depends on the media's independence from the government. The centre that captures the media loses the trust the channels depend on; the centre that cedes the media loses the capacity to communicate. The craft is in the management of the boundary: the government briefs and the media edits; the government provides access and the media decides what to publish; the government contests coverage it regards as wrong and the media decides whether to engage the contest. The boundary is reset daily, and the centre that respects it over years builds the credibility that makes its communications heard.

The historical record illustrates the management at scale. Bismarck's management of the press relied on the *Reichsanzeiger* as the official organ and on a network of editors cultivated through subsidy, access, and personal confidence, with the chancellor's personal relationships with the editors of the principal papers used to plant stories, frame debates, and damage opponents. The British management of the BBC, formalised in the twentieth century, worked through institutional independence governed by a charter and a licence fee, with the relationship managed at the level of

the chairmanship, the director-general, and the political editors, and editorial independence preserved through the arrangement. The American press corps, formalised in the daily briefing, the press pool, and the cultivation of senior correspondents whose relationship with the institution was sustained over careers, illustrates the management of the relationship in a tradition that takes the media's independence as given. Lee Kuan Yew's management of the Singapore press, conducted through the regulation of ownership, the management of the editorial line at the principal papers, and the systematic engagement with the correspondents whose coverage mattered, illustrates the craft in a jurisdiction where the government's interest in stability was held to require a closer management of the field, while de Gaulle's management of French broadcasting through the Office de radiodiffusion télévision française and the cultivation of a register in which the state spoke and was heard illustrates the management of broadcasting as an instrument of state presence.

11.4 The Religious Institutions

The religious institutions are the bearers of moral authority and the intermediaries between the government and the faith communities. The established churches, the religious foundations, and the clerical leadership hold an authority the state did not confer and cannot withdraw. They speak to the moral conditions of public life, mediate between the state and the communities whose primary loyalty is to the faith, and carry the traditions that precede the modern state. The government's relationship with the religious institutions is therefore one of structured coexistence: the state exercises the public authority; the religious institutions exercise the moral and the spiritual authority; and the boundary between them is the principal object of management.

The centre's management runs through the balance between the state's authority and the religious institution's autonomy. The state's authority extends to the public conduct of the institution: the law under which it operates, the property it holds, the recognition it enjoys, and the access it has to the public institutions. The institution's autonomy extends to its doctrine, its worship, its internal government, and the spiritual direction of its faithful. The centre manages the boundary through the relationship with the clerical leadership, conducted at the level of the senior bishops, the moderators, the muftis, and the chief rabbis who hold the institutions. The relationship is sustained through regular engagement, the management of the formal instruments, and the personal contact between the principals on both sides.

The handling of religious opposition turns on the recognition that the religious institutions become centres of opposition when the government's conduct is held to violate the moral order the institutions uphold, when the state's authority is held to encroach on the institution's autonomy, or when a faith community is held to be wronged. The instrument is the management of the relationship, not the suppression of the opposition. The serious religious opposition is engaged on its merits, addressed through the formal channels of the relationship, and where possible absorbed into the policy process through consultation and adjustment. The trivial opposition is left to the conversation within the institution. A government that suppresses religious opposition gains the resistance of the community and loses the moral authority the institution carries; a government that engages the opposition preserves the relationship and the authority.

The historical record illustrates the management across distinct constitutional traditions. The Venetian Republic's management of the Church, conducted through the state-church relationship that gave the Republic the appointment of bishops within its territory, the regulation of ecclesiastical property, and the restriction of papal authority in the Republic's internal affairs, illustrates the management of the relationship in a state that took the Church seriously and refused to be subordinate to it. The Ottoman millet system, under which the religious communities were governed through their own clerical leaderships, with the patriarch, the chief rabbi, and the senior bishops holding administrative authority over their faithful and serving as the intermediaries between the community and the state, illustrates the management of religious institutions as the principal channel between the state and the faith communities. The French concordat of 1801, under which the state recognised the Church, the state paid the clergy, and the state nominated the bishops, illustrates the management of the relationship through formal instrument that integrated the Church into the public order while preserving its spiritual authority. The Meiji oligarchs' management of Shinto, through the separation of shrine Shinto from temple Buddhism, the formal establishment of State Shinto as the framework of national ritual, and the regulation of the religious bodies through the Home Ministry, illustrates the management of the religious field as an instrument of state cohesion, while the British management of the established church, through the appointment of bishops, the Church's presence in the legislature, and the recognition of the Crown as the supreme governor, illustrates the absorption of the religious institution into the constitutional order.

11.5 The Cultural Institutions

The cultural institutions are the custodians of the national identity and the actors whose work shapes the public's understanding of the state and its history. The museums, the theatres, the opera houses, the cultural foundations, and the national cultural institutions hold the inheritance of the nation's art, its history, and its self-understanding, and they produce the work through which the public encounters that inheritance. Their authority rests on their custodianship and on the credibility of their curatorial judgment. The government's relationship with the cultural institutions is therefore one of patronage and restraint: the state provides the resources and the recognition; the institutions provide the curatorial judgment; and the boundary between them is the principal object of management.

The centre's management runs through the balance between state patronage and institutional autonomy. State patronage is the condition of the institutions' existence: the museums, the theatres, and the cultural foundations require funding, buildings, legal protection, and the recognition that confers their standing. Institutional autonomy is the condition of the institutions' authority: the curatorial judgment, the artistic direction, and the scholarly interpretation that give the institutions their credibility cannot be exercised under political direction without cost. The centre manages the boundary through the appointment of the leadership, the funding arrangements, and the personal engagement of senior officials with the directors and the chairs, and the craft is in the restraint the centre exercises on the curatorial side. A cultural institution whose leadership is changed with each

government, whose programme is revised with each minister, and whose curatorial decisions are subject to political direction loses the credibility that makes the institution worth holding.

The management of cultural opposition turns on the recognition that the cultural institutions become centres of opposition when the work they produce is held to challenge the state's account of the national history, when the artistic direction is held to depart from the public's sense of the proper, or when the institution is held to be captured by a faction the centre regards as hostile. The instrument is the management of the field, not the suppression of the work. The serious cultural opposition is engaged through the institutions themselves, through the appointment of leadership that can hold the institution and the public together, and through the patient cultivation of a cultural climate in which the work that matters can be made. A government that suppresses cultural opposition produces the resistance it fears; a government that engages the opposition preserves the institution and the climate in which the national culture is renewed.

The historical record illustrates the function across centuries. The French management of the cultural institutions, from the royal collections of the seventeenth century through the Louvre, the Comédie-Française, and the Académie des Beaux-Arts, illustrates the integration of the cultural institutions into the state's self-presentation, with the centre providing the resources and the recognition and the institutions providing the curatorial and the artistic judgment that gave French culture its standing. The Habsburg monarchy's management of the imperial collections, conducted through the Hofburg, the Belvedere, and the court theatres, illustrates the use of the cultural institutions as instruments of dynastic and imperial identity, with the collections managed as the visible inheritance of the house and the access to them managed as a mark of imperial favour. The Meiji oligarchs' management of cultural identity, through the preservation of the imperial collections, the establishment of the national museums, and the codification of the national treasures, illustrates the use of the cultural institutions as instruments of the construction of national identity in a state that was being remade. The role of the cultural institutions in the formation of national identity across history, from the Medici use of Florentine artistic patronage as the visible sign of the city's standing, to the Prussian use of the museums and the opera as the instruments of the state's self-presentation, to the post-colonial states' use of the national museum as the marker of the new nation's inheritance, illustrates the function in its general form.

11.6 Chapter Summary

The social elites are the actors whose standing and influence shape the conditions under which the government operates. The academy, the media, the religious institutions, and the cultural institutions each hold an authority the government did not confer and cannot withdraw. The shared characteristic is the form of the authority: they are not commanded; they are cultivated. The government's authority is exercised in the intellectual, the moral, and the cultural conditions they help to shape, and the centre's instrument is the patient construction of relationships over years.

Each social elite requires a distinct management. The academy is managed through the relationship with university leadership, the advisory roles, the research funding, and the personal engagement of senior officials, with the management of academic opposition conducted as the management of a field. The media is managed through the cultivation of owners, editors, and senior

correspondents, the management of access and exposure, and the calibration of the boundary between communication and independence. The religious institutions are managed through the balance between the state's authority and the institution's autonomy, the relationship with the clerical leadership, and the engagement of religious opposition on its merits. The cultural institutions are managed through the balance between state patronage and institutional autonomy, the appointment of leadership, and the restraint on the curatorial side.

The comparative record confirms the craft. The French monarchy's cultivation of the Sorbonne and the academies, the Habsburg monarchy's management of the universities, the Meiji oligarchs' construction of Tokyo Imperial University, and the Chinese imperial academy and the examination system illustrate the management of the academy across distinct traditions. Bismarck's press management through the *Reichsanzeiger* and his editors, the British BBC model, the American press corps, Lee Kuan Yew's management of the Singapore press, and de Gaulle's management of French broadcasting illustrate the management of the media. The Venetian state-church relationship, the Ottoman millet system, the French concordat, the Meiji management of Shinto, and the British established church illustrate the management of the religious institutions; the French cultural institutions, the Habsburg imperial collections, the Meiji cultural identity project, and the role of the cultural institutions in the formation of national identity across history illustrate the management of the cultural institutions. The government that fails to manage its social elites loses the conditions of its authority; the government that manages them well secures the conditions for governing.

Chapter 12 — Managing External Elites

Foreign governments, multinationals, and international institutions as actors whose cooperation the government must secure and whose influence it must manage. Including the flow of persons and ideas across borders.

12.1 Who the External Elites Are

The external elites are the actors whose principal base of authority and resources lies outside the jurisdiction the government commands. They comprise the governments of other states, the multilateral institutions, the multinational corporations, the international non-governmental organisations, and the diaspora communities whose networks extend across borders. Each operates across borders, holds loyalties and interests that extend beyond any single jurisdiction, and possesses resources and influence the government cannot directly command. They are counterparties to the government rather than subjects of it, and the engagement they require is therefore of a different kind from the engagement the domestic elites require. The government's authority over them is limited by the very conditions that make them external: they are not within the reach of the government's ordinary instruments, and they can withdraw their cooperation in ways the domestic actors cannot.

The shared characteristic that distinguishes the external elites is the combination of cross-border operation, divided loyalty, and independent resource base. The government of another state answers to its own constituents and not to the government it engages with; the multilateral institution answers to its membership and its charter; the multinational corporation answers to its shareholders and the markets it serves; the international non-governmental organisation answers to its donors and its mission; the diaspora community answers to the network of family, memory, and interest that binds it across borders. None of these can be reduced to a domestic constituency, and none can be managed by the instruments the government uses on its own apparatus. The centre that treats the external elites as if they were domestic, or as if they were within the government's authority, misreads the structure of the relationship from the outset. The engagement must be calibrated to the actor's actual base, not to the base the government might wish it held.

The composition of the external elite has varied across history, but the structure of the category is constant. Metternich's Europe was a system in which the governments of the great powers were the principal external actors for each state, and the management of the relationships among them constituted the European order. The Venetian Republic stood between the Byzantine and Ottoman empires and managed the relationships with each as the central strategic problem of the state, with the city's commercial, naval, and diplomatic apparatus organised around the conduct of that management. Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore confronted a category of external elites that included the major powers, the multinational corporations, and the regional institutions simultaneously, and the engagement of all three was conducted as a single integrated problem. In each case the centre identified the external actors, classified them by the kind of relationship each required, and managed the relationships as a portfolio rather than as a series of separate files.

12.2 The Management of Foreign Governments

The management of the relationships with foreign governments is the conduct of the diplomatic, strategic, and economic relationships through which the government secures the cooperation of other states. The three strands are interwoven but distinct: the diplomatic relationship is the conduct of the formal intercourse between the states; the strategic relationship is the management of the alignment or opposition on security questions; the economic relationship is the management of trade, investment, and finance between the jurisdictions. Each strand has its own instruments, its own channel, and its own cadence, and the centre's task is the integration of the three into a coherent posture toward each foreign government. A posture that is coherent across the strands is the product of direction from the centre; a posture that is incoherent is the product of the line ministries pursuing their own slice of the relationship without reference to the others. The integration is the work the centre cannot delegate.

The centre's function in the management of foreign governments has three elements. The coordination of the government's posture toward each foreign government across the line ministries is the first: the foreign ministry, the defence ministry, the trade ministry, the finance ministry, and the interior ministry each hold a piece of the relationship, and the pieces must be held to a common direction. The management of the personal relationships between leaders is the second: the conduct of the relationship at the level of the heads of government and the heads of state is the centre's direct responsibility, and the personal channel between leaders is the instrument on which the relationship turns in moments of strain. The management of the alliance and the rivalry is the third: the centre must hold the long-term assessment of whether the foreign government is an ally, a rival, or something in between, and must adjust the posture as the assessment shifts. The three together constitute the centre's ownership of the relationship.

Metternich's management of the Concert of Europe is the classical case of the management of foreign governments as a system. The Concert was the arrangement by which the great powers conducted their relations after 1815, and Metternich's conduct of Austria's position rested on the continuous management of the relationships with Russia, Prussia, Britain, and France through personal correspondence with the principal ministers, the calibration of Austria's posture on each question, and the maintenance of the balance that kept the system intact. Bismarck's management of the alliance system after 1871 illustrates the same craft in a different configuration: the Reinsurance Treaty, the Triple Alliance, and the Mediterranean Agreements were instruments held as a single system, with the relationships to Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Britain managed as a portfolio whose internal balances depended on each other. The Venetian diplomatic tradition, codified in the *relazioni* of the ambassadors and the cultivation of the resident envoys at the principal courts, illustrates the institutional form of the same craft, with the centre's posture informed by the envoys' reporting and adjusted through the personal engagement of the doge and the councils.

The British management of the relationship with the United States across the twentieth century illustrates the craft in the context of an asymmetric alliance. The relationship was managed at the level of the prime minister and the president through the personal channel, at the level of the foreign and defence ministries through structured consultation, and at the level of the intelligence services through the special exchange that developed during and after the Second World War. The

conduct of the relationship required the constant calibration of the British posture across the diplomatic, strategic, and economic strands. De Gaulle's management of the relationship with the United States and the European Community simultaneously illustrates the craft in a configuration of multiple foreign governments held in a single posture: the withdrawal from the integrated military command of NATO in 1966, the conduct of the relationship with the United States through the diplomatic and strategic channels, and the conduct of the relationship with the European Community through the agricultural, institutional, and budgetary negotiations together constituted a French posture held by the presidency across the line ministries. The principle in each case is the integration of the strands into a posture the centre owns.

12.3 The Management of Multilateral Institutions

The multilateral institutions are the standing international bodies through which governments pool authority, codify rules, and conduct collective business. They comprise the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the regional development banks, the United Nations system and its specialised agencies, and the trade organisations, including the World Trade Organization and the regional trade arrangements. Each institution has its own membership, its own governance, its own rules, and its own leadership, and each conducts its business through a continuous programme of negotiation, surveillance, and disbursement that the government must engage with on the institution's terms. The institution possesses a corporate interest, a bureaucratic culture, and a capacity to act independently of any single member that the aggregate of the members does not. The government's relationship with the institution is therefore a relationship with an actor that holds authority the government has helped to create but cannot unilaterally direct.

The management of the relationship with a multilateral institution rests on three functions. The management of the relationship with the institution's leadership is the first: the managing director, the president, the secretary-general, and the senior staff are actors whose conduct of the institution affects the government's interests, and the centre's engagement with them is direct, sustained, and conducted at the level of the principal. The management of the government's obligations under the institution's rules is the second: the conditions attached to disbursements, the surveillance under the institution's articles, the obligations under the trade regime, and the reporting requirements under the treaties are all matters the centre must hold across the line ministries. The cultivation of the government's standing within the institution is the third: the reputation for sound conduct, for constructive engagement, and for the capacity to deliver on commitments is a form of capital the centre accumulates over time and draws on in moments of need. The three functions together constitute the centre's ownership of the institutional relationship.

The management of International Monetary Fund conditionality across the developing world illustrates the craft in its demanding form. The government that enters a programme with the Fund accepts obligations on fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rate policy, and structural reform, and the conduct of the programme requires the centre's continuous engagement with the Fund's mission, the institution's management, and the executive board. The governments that have managed these programmes well have done so by maintaining a coherent position across the line ministries, by managing the relationship with the Fund's leadership at the level of the principal, and

by sustaining the standing within the institution that gives the government's positions weight. The governments that have managed them poorly have done so by allowing the line ministries to negotiate separately with the Fund, by failing to engage the institution's leadership at the level of the principal, and by treating the standing within the institution as a residual rather than as a cultivated asset.

The French management of the European institutions illustrates the craft in a configuration in which the institution's rules bear directly on the government's domestic policy. The conduct of the relationship with the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice has been a continuous function of the French presidency since the founding of the Communities, conducted through the secretary-general for European affairs, the line ministries, and the permanent representation in Brussels. The Singapore management of its ASEAN and World Trade Organization relationships illustrates the craft in a small state that has built its standing within the institutions as a form of strategic capital: the cultivation of the reputation for constructive engagement, the building of the networks within the institution's staff and the member states' delegations, and the use of the institutional platform to amplify the government's positions on the regional and global trade agendas together constitute a posture that exceeds the weight a small state would otherwise carry. The principle in each case is the management of the institution as an actor in its own right, with the relationship cultivated over time and the standing accumulated as capital.

12.4 The Management of Multinational Corporations

The multinational corporations are actors whose investment, technology, and market access the government needs, and whose political influence the government must manage. They differ from the domestic firms in that their decision-making base lies outside the jurisdiction, their loyalties are to shareholders and markets rather than to the host state, and their alternatives include relocation to another jurisdiction in a way that no domestic firm's alternatives do. The multinational's investment decision is taken at headquarters on the basis of the global portfolio, and the host government's task is to influence that decision within the framework the multinational's own logic sets. The influence the multinational holds over the host government flows from the same conditions: the investment, the technology, and the market access it commands are resources the government cannot replicate, and the threat of withdrawal is therefore a constraint on the government's conduct. The relationship is reciprocal but asymmetric, and the asymmetry runs in both directions in different respects.

The centre's management of the multinational relationship has three elements. The balance between attracting investment and preserving sovereignty is the first: the government offers the conditions the multinational requires to invest, and the centre must ensure that the conditions offered do not concede the capacity to govern. The management of the corporate relationship across the line ministries is the second: the trade ministry, the industry ministry, the finance ministry, and the sectoral regulators each hold a piece of the relationship with the multinational, and the pieces must be held to a common direction so that the multinational does not play the ministries against each other. The cultivation of the corporate leadership is the third: the chair, the

chief executive, and the regional heads of the principal multinationals are actors whose decisions the centre seeks to influence, and the influence runs through the personal engagement of the principal officials with the corporate leadership over the cycle of the investment.

The Meiji management of foreign investment and technology transfer illustrates the craft in its foundational form. The oligarchs' engagement with the foreign advisors, the purchase of foreign machinery and patents, and the negotiation of the contracts for the railways, the telegraphs, and the munitions plants were conducted under the centre's direction, with the foreign ministry, the finance ministry, and the industry ministry held to a common posture. The renegotiation of the unequal treaties, completed in the 1890s after decades of sustained effort, was the corollary: the recovery of the tariff and jurisdictional autonomy was the precondition for the management of the foreign economic presence on Japanese terms. The Singapore management of the multinational sector through the Economic Development Board illustrates the craft in its developed form: the Board was established as a single agency with the authority to negotiate with the multinationals, to offer the package of incentives and infrastructure the investors required, and to coordinate the line ministries' engagement with the sector, with the result that the multinationals were engaged through a single channel and the centre's posture was held coherently across the government.

The management of the oil majors across the producing states illustrates the craft in a sector in which the asymmetry runs hard against the government. The majors controlled the technology, the refining capacity, the shipping, and the marketing, and the producing states controlled the reserves. The establishment of the national oil companies, the negotiation of the production-sharing agreements, and the coordination of the producing states through the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries were instruments by which the producing governments sought to shift the asymmetry, with varying degrees of success. The governments that managed the relationship well maintained a coherent posture across the line ministries, built the national capability that reduced the dependence on the majors over time, and engaged the corporate leadership at the level of the principal. The governments that managed the relationship poorly allowed the line ministries to negotiate separately, failed to build the national capability, and conceded the centre's authority over the relationship to the sectoral ministry or to the major itself.

12.5 The Flow of Persons and Ideas

The flow of persons and ideas across borders is a dimension of the external relationships that the centre must manage alongside the management of the actors themselves. The flow comprises three principal currents: the movement of officials between national governments and the international institutions, the movement of corporate executives between domestic and foreign firms, and the movement of ideas through the academic and professional networks that span the jurisdictions. Each current carries influence in both directions: the officials who move take their national perspective into the institution and bring the institution's perspective back into the national government; the executives who move take their firm's practice into the host firm and bring the host firm's practice back; the ideas that move shape the policy and the practice on both sides of the exchange. The flow is a dimension the centre must attend to in its own terms, distinct from the

relationships with the external actors themselves, and the centre that neglects it finds its external relationships shaped by currents it has not managed.

The centre's management of the flow has three elements. The cultivation of the diaspora is the first: the communities of nationals abroad are a resource for the government's external relationships, and the cultivation through the consular network, the cultural institutions, and the structured engagement with the diaspora's leadership is a function the centre conducts alongside the relationships with the host governments. The management of the return of talent is the second: the nationals who have studied, worked, or established themselves abroad and who return to positions in the government, the professions, and the firms are a channel through which the external ideas and practices enter the domestic system, and the centre's posture toward the return shapes the terms on which the entry occurs. The engagement with the international professional networks is the third: the academic associations, the professional bodies, and the policy networks that span the jurisdictions are carriers of ideas, and the centre's engagement with them, conducted through the principal institutions and the principal officials, shapes the terms on which the ideas are received.

The Meiji management of the foreign advisors and the overseas study missions illustrates the craft in its foundational form. The oligarchs sent the Iwakura Mission to the United States and Europe in 1871 to study the institutions, the laws, and the practices of the Western states, and the mission's members returned to occupy the principal positions in the government and the administration. The foreign advisors employed in the Japanese ministries, the schools, and the army were engaged on terms the centre set, with the contracts limited in duration, the authority subordinated to the Japanese officials, and the transfer of knowledge to the Japanese counterparts made the explicit object of the engagement. The combination of the overseas study and the foreign advisors produced the flow of persons and ideas that constituted the Meiji modernisation, and the centre's management of the flow was the instrument by which the modernisation was conducted on Japanese terms. The renegotiation of the unequal treaties was the corollary, with the recovery of legal autonomy conducted in parallel with the cultivation of the foreign legal advisors and the reform of the Japanese legal system on the European models.

The Singapore management of the overseas scholarship system illustrates the craft in its developed form. The scholarship programme, established in the early years of the independence, sent the high-potential nationals to the principal universities abroad, with the bonds tying the scholars to a period of service in the public service on their return. The scholars who returned populated the senior civil service, the statutory boards, the government-linked companies, and the professions, and the network of the returned scholars constituted the channel through which the external ideas and practices entered the Singapore system. The French management of the international civil service illustrates the craft in a different configuration: the cultivation of the French presence in the secretariats of the international institutions, conducted through the careful placement of officials in the institution's staff and the sustained engagement with the institution's leadership, has been a continuous function of the French foreign ministry and the principal officials. The principle in each case is the management of the flow as a current the centre attends to in its own terms, with the cultivation of the diaspora, the management of the return, and the engagement with the networks held together as a single function.

12.6 Chapter Summary

The external elites are the actors whose principal base of authority and resources lies outside the jurisdiction the government commands. They comprise the governments of other states, the multilateral institutions, the multinational corporations, the international non-governmental organisations, and the diaspora communities. The shared characteristic is the combination of cross-border operation, divided loyalty, and independent resource base that distinguishes them from the domestic elites and sets the terms on which the centre must engage them. The composition of the category has varied across history, but the structure is constant, and the centre's task is the identification of the actors, the classification by the kind of relationship each requires, and the management of the relationships as a portfolio.

The management of foreign governments is the conduct of the diplomatic, strategic, and economic relationships as an integrated posture the centre owns. The management of multilateral institutions is the conduct of the relationship with the institution's leadership, the management of the obligations under the institution's rules, and the cultivation of the government's standing within the institution as capital accumulated over time. The management of multinational corporations is the balance between attracting investment and preserving sovereignty, the management of the corporate relationship across the line ministries, and the cultivation of the corporate leadership at the level of the principal. The flow of persons and ideas across borders is a distinct dimension the centre manages through the cultivation of the diaspora, the management of the return of talent, and the engagement with the international professional networks.

Metternich's Concert of Europe, Bismarck's alliance system, the Venetian diplomatic tradition, the British management of the relationship with the United States across the twentieth century, and de Gaulle's management of the relationship with the United States and the European Community each illustrate the management of foreign governments in different configurations. The management of International Monetary Fund conditionality across the developing world, the French management of the European institutions, and the Singapore management of its ASEAN and World Trade Organization relationships illustrate the management of multilateral institutions as actors in their own right. The Meiji management of foreign investment and technology transfer, the Singapore management of the multinational sector through the Economic Development Board, and the management of the oil majors across the producing states illustrate the management of the multinational corporations. The Meiji management of the foreign advisors and the overseas study missions, the Singapore management of the overseas scholarship system, and the French management of the international civil service illustrate the management of the flow of persons and ideas. The government that fails to manage its external elites loses the capacity to conduct its external relationships; the government that manages them well secures the conditions for the conduct of its purposes in the world.

Chapter 13 — Managing the Branches

The branches of the constitutional order as actors whose cooperation the government requires and as partners in the government's operations. Each is both an actor and a partner.

13.1 The Branches as Actors and Partners

The branches of the constitutional order — the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the oversight institutions, the qualifications institutions — are the principal organisational forms through which the state's authority is exercised. Each branch holds a constitutional position of its own, with powers defined by the constitution or by the long practice that has come to stand in for it. Each has its own leadership — the first minister and cabinet, the presiding officers and party leaders, the chief justice and senior judges, the auditors general and commissioners, the commissions and chairs — and each has its own constituency: the executive answers to the electorate and the council, the legislature to the electors and the parties, the judiciary to the legal profession and the constitutional tradition, the oversight institutions to the legislature and the public, the qualifications institutions to the professions and the service they govern. The branches stand as counterparts to the executive, not as subordinate bodies.

The centre's task is the management of the dependencies that cross the branches, leaving the conduct of branch functions to the branches themselves. The government requires the legislature's enactment of its programme, the judiciary's vindication of its laws, the oversight institutions' assurance of its stewardship, and the qualifications institutions' certification of its personnel. The centre coordinates these dependencies: it secures the legislative timetable, manages the appointments and the resourcing, preserves the independence of the oversight and qualifications functions, and conducts the relationships with the leadership of each branch through the cycle of government. The conduct of branch functions — the deliberation of statutes, the decision of cases, the audit of accounts, the certification of candidates — is reserved to the branches. The centre that reaches into the conduct of branch functions loses the cooperation of the branches it requires.

The distinction between coordination and command is the distinction on which the centre's effectiveness turns. Coordination is the management of dependencies across actors who are not subordinate: the centre identifies the dependencies, structures the engagement, and aligns the branches' conduct with the government's purposes through relationships. Command is the direction of subordinates: the centre issues instructions and expects compliance, and the relationship is hierarchical. The branches hold constitutional positions of their own, and the centre that confuses coordination with direction encounters resistance in the legislature, caution in the judiciary, friction in the oversight institutions, and rigidity in the qualifications institutions. The French Directory's attempts to manage the Councils by directive, the Stuart crown's attempts to manage parliament by prerogative, and the Habsburg centre's attempts to manage the crownlands' diets by instruction illustrate the pattern in mature states.

The historical record is consistent on the principle. The branches that are managed as partners in the government's operations cooperate; the branches that are managed as subordinates resist. The

management of each branch is a relationship, conducted through personal engagement, structured consultation, and the cultivation of the leadership that holds the branch's confidence. The relationships with the legislature, the judiciary, the oversight institutions, and the qualifications institutions each have their own character, and each is managed on its own terms. The French management of the executive-legislature relationship across the Republics, the British management of the relationship between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary, the American management of the separation of powers, the Meiji management of the Diet, the French management of the Cour des comptes, the British management of the Civil Service Commission, and the Singapore management of the Public Service Commission illustrate the management of the branches as relationships in different traditions and different conditions.

13.2 The Executive and the Legislature

The relationship between the executive and the legislature is the principal inter-branch relationship. The government requires the legislature's enactment of its legislative programme, its approval of the budget, and its assent to the treaties and the major appointments that the conduct of government depends on. The legislature has its own leadership, its own parties, its own committees, and its own constituencies, and the assent it gives is the assent of these actors, not the assent of a subordinate body. The centre's management of the relationship is the management of the dependencies that cross the two branches: the legislative programme, the budget, and the appointments that the government requires and that the legislature alone can provide. The relationship is conducted through the government's leadership in the legislature, the structured engagement with the legislative leadership, and the management of the legislative timetable.

The coordination of the government's legislative programme is the first element. The programme is the set of measures the government intends to enact in a session, ordered by priority and timed to the session's calendar. The centre drafts the programme, consults the legislative leadership on its feasibility, and sequences the measures to the legislature's capacity. The legislature will amend, defer, or reject measures, and the centre's craft is in the management of that response: the amendments that are accepted, the deferrals that are negotiated, and the rejections that are absorbed. Walpole's management of the House of Commons through the Treasury interest, with the systematic cultivation of the members whose support the government required and the careful sequencing of the government's measures to the session's calendar, illustrates the coordination of the programme in its early developed form.

The management of the relationship with the legislative leadership is the second element. The legislature's leadership — the presiding officers, the party leaders, the committee chairs — holds the levers through which the government's programme is enacted or delayed. The centre's engagement is conducted through regular consultation, the exchange of information, and the negotiation of the timetable and the amendments, sustained through the cycle of the session rather than only at the moments of decision. The French management of the executive-legislature relationship under the Third Republic illustrates the relationship in its developed form: the presidents of the Chamber and the Senate, the leaders of the parliamentary groups, and the rapporteurs of the principal committees were engaged as counterparts to the government, with the

relationship sustained through the cycle and the government's programme negotiated through the network. The chronic instability of the Third Republic's ministries was the consequence of a constitutional architecture in which the legislature could overthrow the government at will; the engagement itself, conducted by principals from Gambetta to Clemenceau, was the craft through which any government at all was sustained.

The management of the legislative timetable is the third element. The legislature's time is finite, and the measures the government presents compete with the members' initiatives, the committee inquiries, and the opposition's agenda. The centre's management of the timetable is the negotiation of the allocation of time between the government's programme and the legislature's other business, conducted through the legislative leadership and the business committee. De Gaulle's construction of the Fifth Republic's institutional architecture illustrates the resolution of the problem: the constitution of 1958 fixed the government's programme and the budget as the principal items of the legislative agenda, limited the legislature's power to overthrow the government, and authorised the government to legislate by ordinance in defined areas. The American management of the separation of powers illustrates the unresolved form, with the Congress controlling its own timetable; the Meiji management of the Diet, with the budget and programme negotiated with the parties through the privy council, and Lee Kuan Yew's management of Singapore's unicameral legislature, with the programme presented to a parliament dominated by the governing party and the timetable managed through the party whips, illustrate the construction of the relationship in different constitutional settings.

13.3 The Executive and the Judiciary

The relationship between the executive and the judiciary is the management of the boundary between the government's responsibility for the justice system and the judiciary's independence in the decision of cases. The judiciary is the interpreter of the law, the resolver of disputes, and the restrainer of the other branches within the constitutional limits. Its authority rests on the perceived distance from political direction, and that distance is the condition of its legitimacy. The government's responsibility for the justice system is the condition of the system's accountability: the courts, the prosecutor service, and the legal aid apparatus are public institutions, funded by the public and staffed by the public service, and the government answers for their operation. The centre's task is the preservation of the one without the abdication of the other.

The centre's management operates through three instruments. The first is appointments: the selection of judges, particularly at the senior level, is the principal lever through which the character of the judiciary is shaped over time, and the appointments process must be credible to the legal profession, the legislature, and the public. The centre that allows the appointments process to be captured by any single interest loses the instrument and the confidence of the profession. The second is resourcing: the courts, the prosecutor service, and the legal aid apparatus require funding, staffing, and infrastructure that only the government can provide, and the level and condition of resourcing shape the judiciary's capacity to do its work. The third is the management of the boundary between political direction and judicial independence: the government does not direct the

judiciary in the decision of cases, but the government sets the framework within which the judiciary operates, and the boundary must be drawn and defended in both directions.

The British management of the relationship between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary illustrates the architecture in its traditional form. The Lord Chancellor sat in all three branches — as a senior minister of the crown, as the presiding officer of the House of Lords, and as the head of the judiciary — and the office held the relationships together through the personal authority of its holder and the conventions that had accumulated around it. The reforms of the 2000s, which created the Supreme Court, the Judicial Appointments Commission, and the Ministry of Justice, redistributed the instruments while preserving the relationship: the Lord Chancellor's role was narrowed, the appointments process was formalised, and the Lord Chief Justice became the professional head of the judiciary. The relationship is now managed through formal channels rather than through the person of the Lord Chancellor, but the function — the preservation of judicial independence without the abdication of the government's responsibility for the justice system — is unchanged.

The French management of the Conseil d'État and the ordinary judiciary illustrates the architecture in a different tradition. The Conseil d'État stands at the intersection of the executive and the judicial, advising the government on legislation, adjudicating disputes between the citizen and the administration, and staffing the senior administrative posts through the *grands corps*. The ordinary judiciary, organised under the Cour de Cassation, is independent in the decision of cases; de Gaulle's construction of the Constitutional Council in 1958 added a body that reviews the constitutionality of the laws and that is staffed in part by appointments made by the political authorities. The American management of the appointment process illustrates the architecture in a separation-of-powers tradition: the president nominates the federal judges, the Senate confirms them, and the lifetime tenure of the federal judiciary is the principal constitutional protection of its independence, with the centre's instrument the cultivation of the Senate leadership and the selection of candidates whose standing the legal profession will recognise.

13.4 The Executive and the Oversight Institutions

The oversight institutions are the audit offices, the ombudsman, the inspectors general, and the bodies that scrutinise the government's conduct on behalf of the legislature and the public. They hold a constitutional position between the executive and the legislature: they are established by law, they are staffed by professionals, and they report to the legislature rather than to the government. Their function is the assurance of stewardship — the verification that the public funds have been spent as the legislature authorised, that the public's grievances have been addressed, and that the conduct of the administration has met the standards the law requires. The oversight institutions stand as counterparts to the executive, with their own leadership, their own professional staff, and their own reporting line to the legislature. The centre's task is the preservation of their independence without the erosion of the government's authority to govern.

The centre's management operates through three instruments. The first is appointments: the audit offices, the ombudsman, and the inspectors general are headed by officers whose selection the centre manages, often with the legislature's concurrence, and the credibility of the office depends

on the credibility of the appointment. The second is resourcing: the oversight institutions are funded through the budget, and the level of their resourcing shapes their capacity to do their work; the centre that under-resources an oversight institution invites the legislature's intervention, and the centre that over-resources an oversight institution invites the suspicion of capture. The third is the management of the response to the institutions' findings: the centre that ignores adverse findings loses the confidence of the legislature and the public, and the centre that accepts every finding without examination loses the authority to govern. The response is the principal instrument, and it is the one most often mishandled.

The French management of the Cour des comptes illustrates the architecture in its developed form. The Cour des comptes, established in the medieval period and reconstituted under Napoleon, audits the public accounts, reports to the parliament, and holds a constitutional position that protects its independence from the executive. The senior officers are drawn from the grands corps and hold tenure that the executive cannot disturb, and the institution's reports are submitted to the parliament and the public. The government's response is conducted through the formal channel of the replies to the observations and the budgetary process, with the discipline of the response as the principal instrument.

The British management of the National Audit Office and the American management of the Inspectors General illustrate the same architecture in different traditions. The Comptroller and Auditor General is an officer of the House of Commons, appointed by the crown on an address from the Commons, and the NAO's reports are submitted to the Public Accounts Committee, whose chair by convention comes from the opposition. The American inspectors general, established in 1978, are located within the departments but report to both the agency head and the Congress, with the protection of tenure and the access to information. In each case the architecture preserves the independence of the oversight function while keeping the government's authority to govern intact through the disciplined management of the response.

13.5 The Executive and the Qualifications Institutions

The qualifications institutions are the civil service commission, the training institutions, and the professional standards bodies that certify the personnel the government requires. They hold a constitutional position between the executive and the professions: they are established by law, they are staffed by professionals, and they certify the competence of the candidates who enter the public service, the judiciary, the audit profession, and the other branches of the state. Their function is the assurance of competence — the verification that the candidates who enter the public service meet the standards the work requires, that the training institutions develop the capacity the service needs, and that the professional standards bodies maintain the disciplines the professions depend on. The qualifications institutions stand as counterparts to the executive, with their own leadership, their own professional staff, and their own constituencies in the professions and the service they govern. The centre's task is the preservation of the qualifications function's independence without the erosion of the government's authority to manage its own personnel.

The centre's management operates through three instruments. The first is appointments: the civil service commission, the heads of the training institutions, and the chairs of the professional

standards bodies are officers whose selection the centre manages, and the credibility of the institutions depends on the credibility of the appointments. The second is resourcing: the qualifications institutions are funded through the budget, and the level of their resourcing shapes their capacity to do their work; the centre that under-resources a training institution starves the pipeline of the candidates the government requires, and the centre that over-resources a qualifications institution invites the capture of the institution by the centre's own preferences. The third is the management of the boundary between the qualifications function and the government's personnel management: the qualifications institutions certify competence, the government manages personnel, and the boundary must hold in both directions, with the centre respecting the institutions' certifications and the institutions respecting the government's right to assign and promote its personnel.

The French management of the ÉNA (now INSP) and the *grands corps* illustrates the architecture in its developed form. The ÉNA, established in 1945 to replace the fragmented recruitment of the pre-war republics, recruits the senior civil service through a competitive examination, trains the candidates in a common programme, and assigns them to the *grands corps* and the senior posts through a classment that ranks the graduates by their performance. The *grands corps* — the Conseil d'État, the Cour des comptes, the Inspection générale des finances, and the diplomatic corps — hold their own recruitment and promotion processes, with the ÉNA as the principal gateway and the corps as the career structure. The British management of the Civil Service Commission, established in 1855 on the Northcote-Trevelyan recommendations, illustrates the architecture in a different tradition: the commission recruits the administrative class through competitive examination, the recruitment is based on merit rather than patronage, and the commission's independence is the principal constitutional protection of the civil service's professionalism. The Singapore management of the Public Service Commission and the Civil Service College illustrates the architecture in a third tradition: the commission manages appointments, promotions, and discipline under constitutional protection, and the college develops the service's capacity through structured training aligned to the government's purposes.

The craft is in the discipline the centre exercises on the personnel-management side. A qualifications institution whose certifications the government overrides loses its authority, and the candidates who enter the service lose the assurance that their competence is the basis of their appointment. A qualifications institution whose certifications the government accepts without examination loses its accountability to the centre, and the standards of the service drift. The centre's craft is in the cultivation of the institutions' leadership, the steady resourcing of their work, and the consistent respect for their certifications, with the management of the personnel function conducted within the framework the institutions define. Lee Kuan Yew's management of the Singapore Public Service Commission, conducted through the protection of its independence, the careful selection of its members, and the respect for its determinations, illustrates the craft in a jurisdiction where the margin for patronage is narrow and the cost of capture is high.

13.6 Chapter Summary

The branches of the constitutional order — the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the oversight institutions, the qualifications institutions — are actors with their own constitutional positions, their own leadership, and their own constituencies. The centre's task is the management of the dependencies that cross the branches, leaving the conduct of branch functions to the branches themselves. The distinction between coordination and command is the distinction on which the centre's effectiveness turns: the branches that are managed as partners cooperate, and the branches that are managed as subordinates resist. The French Directory's attempts to manage the Councils by directive and the Stuart crown's attempts to manage parliament by prerogative illustrate the failure mode; the management of the dependencies, conducted through relationships, is the centre's craft.

The relationship with the legislature is the principal inter-branch relationship, managed through the coordination of the legislative programme, the engagement with the legislative leadership, and the management of the legislative timetable. The relationship with the judiciary is managed through appointments, resourcing, and the management of the boundary between political direction and judicial independence. The relationship with the oversight institutions is managed through the appointments of the audit offices, the ombudsman, and the inspectors general, the resourcing of their work, and the disciplined response to their findings. The relationship with the qualifications institutions is managed through the appointments of the civil service commission, the training institutions, and the professional standards bodies, the resourcing of their work, and the respect for their certifications within the framework of the government's personnel management.

The comparative record confirms the craft. The French management of the executive-legislature relationship across the Republics, the British management of the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary, the American management of the separation of powers, the Meiji management of the Diet, the French management of the Cour des comptes, the British management of the National Audit Office, the American management of the Inspectors General, the French management of the ÉNA and the grands corps, the British management of the Civil Service Commission, and the Singapore management of the Public Service Commission each illustrate the management of the branches as relationships in different traditions and different conditions. The government that fails to manage its branches loses the cooperation it requires; the government that manages them well secures the conditions for governing.

Chapter 14 — Managing the Head of State and the Court

The head of state and the court as actors whose position, standing, and engagement shape the conditions of governing. The relationship is managed in a time-neutral perspective.

14.1 The Head of State as Actor

The head of state is the constitutional office that holds the symbolic unity of the state and, in most constitutions, the formal locus of executive authority. The office is distinct from the head of government: the head of state embodies the state, the head of government directs the day-to-day business of governing. The head of state may be a monarch, a president elected directly or indirectly, or a collegial body. In every case the office carries a constitutional position, a personal standing derived from the office and from the individual who holds it, and a set of relationships with the government, the public, and external actors that the centre must manage.

The head of state holds reserve powers—the authority to dissolve the legislature, to dismiss the government, to appoint the first minister, to withhold assent—that are real in some constitutions and nominal in others. The distinction between real and nominal is a matter of constitutional convention and political practice rather than of text. The head of state may also carry a political base independent of the government: a president elected by direct universal suffrage possesses a popular mandate the government cannot match, and a monarch carries the legitimacy of dynasty. The head of state may have a personal agenda, expressed through patronage, preferences, or the cultivation of particular constituencies. The centre's task is to manage the relationship with the head of state as a dependency, ensuring that the office's position supports rather than undermines the government's capacity to govern.

The historical record illustrates the variation. The Venetian Doge held an office of high dignity with deliberately constrained powers, and the Venetian constitution limited the Doge's authority through councils, inquisitors, and ritual; the management of the Doge was the management of an actor whose symbolic position was indispensable and whose political position was contained. The French presidency under the Fifth Republic illustrates the opposite case: an office vested with explicit reserve powers and elected by direct suffrage, occupying a position of strategic authority the government cannot ignore. The Japanese emperor under the Meiji constitution held a position of formal supremacy that concealed a complex relationship with the oligarchic leadership, and the postwar constitution converted the office into a symbolic role; the Habsburg monarch held an office that combined dynastic legitimacy with active political authority across centuries. The centre's work in each case is to identify the actual position of the office and the office-holder and to manage the relationship accordingly.

The relationship between the centre and the head of state changes over time. The head of state's engagement may grow or diminish over a tenure, the personal standing of the office-holder may rise or fall, and the constitutional convention may shift. The centre that manages the relationship once and treats the management as settled loses the capacity to respond to changes in the office, in the office-holder, or in the political environment. The management of the head of

state is therefore a continuous function, conducted through regular contact, the careful management of the head of state's public role, and the maintenance of the boundary between the office's constitutional position and the government's political authority.

14.2 The Court and Its Management

The court is the institutional expression of the head of state's household and personal apparatus. It comprises the officials, attendants, advisers, and retainers who serve the head of state directly: the household, the privy purse, the private secretariat, the ceremonial apparatus, and the personal staff whose loyalty runs to the office-holder rather than to the government. The court has its own hierarchy, its own culture, and its own interests, and in most states it occupies a position between the head of state and the government that the centre cannot command. The court is, in this sense, an actor in its own right, and its management is a distinct function of the centre.

The court's hierarchy reproduces the head of state's position in concentrated form. The grand chamberlain, the lord steward, the private secretary, the marshal of the court, and their equivalents control access to the head of state, manage the head of state's calendar, shape the head of state's information environment, and conduct the daily business of the household. Their interests are the interests of the court: the preservation of the court's status, the defence of the court's prerogatives, the expansion of the court's budget and patronage, and the protection of the head of state's standing on which the court's own position depends. The centre's management of the relationship with the court's leadership is therefore a constant negotiation, conducted through the heads of the household and the private secretariat, in which the boundary between the court's domain and the government's domain is drawn and defended.

The boundary is the central problem. The court's natural tendency is to encroach on the government's functions: to advise the head of state on policy, to conduct parallel diplomacy through the head of state's personal contacts, to dispense patronage in competition with the government, to gather intelligence through the court's own channels, and to shape the head of state's public role in ways that reflect the court's interests rather than the government's programme. The government's natural tendency is to encroach on the court's domain: to treat the household as a department of state, to staff the private offices with political appointees, to subject the court's budget to political direction, and to use the head of state's ceremonial role as an instrument of political communication. The centre's craft is the maintenance of the boundary in both directions, so that the court serves the head of state without becoming a rival government, and the government serves the head of state without consuming the court.

The historical record is rich. Louis XIV's court at Versailles, established as the instrument of the French monarchy's management of the nobility, became in time an apparatus with its own corporate interests, its own factions, and its own dynamics that the monarchy itself had to manage, and the court of the late Bourbons consumed the resources of the state and obstructed the reforms the monarchy attempted. The British royal household, reformed across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through a series of measures that reduced its political functions and reorganised its financial arrangements, illustrates the steady management of the court's position by the government. The Japanese imperial court, reduced under the Meiji constitution to an apparatus of

the oligarchic state and rebuilt under the postwar constitution as a small, symbolic household, illustrates the reconstruction of the court in two different political settings. The Habsburg court at Vienna, with its elaborate household, its court chancellery, and its court councils, illustrates the management of a court across a multi-national empire in which the household was the visible expression of dynastic unity; the Ottoman court, centred on the sultan's household and the palace apparatus, illustrates the management of a court whose power derived from the personal service of the sultan and whose factions competed for control of the office itself.

14.3 The Management of the Relationship

The management of the relationship with the head of state is the conduct of the centre's continuous engagement with the office and the office-holder. The relationship has three elements: regular communication, the management of the head of state's engagement with the government's programme, and the management of the head of state's public role. Each element is conducted through structured channels: the first minister's regular audience, the cabinet's communication through the private secretary, the centre's preparation of briefing for the head of state's engagements. The balance between the head of state's constitutional position and the government's political authority is struck through these channels rather than through the assertion of either side's position.

Regular communication is the foundation. The head of state who is informed regularly, through the proper channels, of the government's programme, its progress, and its difficulties is a head of state whose engagement can be managed. The head of state who is informed irregularly, or through informal channels, becomes a centre of speculation, a focus for discontented actors, and a source of decisions the government has not anticipated. The form of the communication matters: the formal audience, the written briefing, the ceremonial occasion each carry their own signals, and the centre that allows the form to drift loses the capacity to manage the relationship. The British tradition of the weekly audience between the prime minister and the sovereign, conducted in private and without record, illustrates the form in a mature constitutional monarchy; the French tradition of the president's council with the prime minister and the ministers illustrates the form in a mixed executive.

The management of the head of state's engagement with the government's programme is the second element. The head of state may be invited to support the programme publicly, to lend the office's standing to particular initiatives, or to participate in the ceremonial occasions that mark the programme's progress. The engagement must be calibrated: too little engagement leaves the head of state marginal and the office's standing underused, while too much engagement implicates the head of state in the government's political fortunes and exposes the office to the consequences of the government's failures. The centre's calibration is conducted with attention to the head of state's own preferences, the office's conventions, and the political environment in which the engagement occurs. The management of the head of state's public role is the third element: the head of state's speeches, travels, and ceremonial occasions are instruments of state communication, and their use must be coordinated with the government's broader communication strategy.

The historical record illustrates the management. The British management of the royal prerogative across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries illustrates the steady drawing of the boundary between the office's constitutional position and the government's political authority, conducted through the gradual conversion of the prerogative from a personal to a constitutional instrument and through the conventions governing the sovereign's assent, dissolution, and appointment. The French management of the presidency under the Fifth Republic illustrates the management of a presidency with real reserve powers, conducted through the president's authority over defence and foreign policy, the president's relationship with the prime minister under cohabitation, and the president's use of the office's standing in public communication. The Japanese management of the emperor's role under the postwar constitution illustrates the management of an office reduced to a symbolic function, conducted through the cabinet's advice and approval, the emperor's strictly ceremonial public engagements, and the careful insulation of the emperor from political controversy. The forms differ; the function is the same: the centre manages the relationship so that the head of state's position supports rather than undermines the government's capacity to govern.

14.4 The Management of Succession

Succession is the transition from one head of state to the next. It is the moment at which the office's continuity is most exposed and the centre's capacity to manage the transition is most tested. Succession may be hereditary, in which case the centre's task is the management of the transition between reigns; it may be elective, in which case the centre's task is the management of the transition between administrations. In either form, succession carries political consequences that the centre must manage: the consolidation of the new office-holder's position, the readjustment of relationships within the government and the court, and the management of the public's response to the change. The centre's responsibility is the maintenance of the continuity of government across the transition and the management of the political consequences.

The preparation for succession begins long before the event. In a hereditary succession, the preparation is the cultivation of the heir: the management of the heir's education, the management of the heir's public role, the management of the heir's relationship with the government and the court, and the management of the court's expectations during the heir's tenure. In an elective succession, the preparation is the management of the electoral process: the centre's role in the selection of candidates, the management of the campaign's relationship with the sitting office-holder, and the preparation of the transition arrangements. In both forms, the centre must prepare for the transition without appearing to anticipate it, and the line between preparation and anticipation is one of the centre's most delicate judgments. A centre that prepares well manages the succession smoothly; a centre that prepares poorly or not at all manages the consequences badly.

The historical record illustrates the management. The French management of the presidential succession under the Fifth Republic illustrates the management of an elective succession in a system where the office carries real power, conducted through the electoral calendar, the outgoing president's role in the campaign, the handover of the nuclear codes and the constitutional authority, and the new president's installation. The British management of the royal succession illustrates the

management of a hereditary succession in a constitutional monarchy, conducted through the demise of the crown, the accession council, the coronation, and the management of the court's continuity across the transition. The Japanese management of the imperial succession, conducted through the ancient rituals and the modern constitutional forms, illustrates the management of a hereditary succession in a system where the office is symbolic. The Habsburg management of the succession across the monarchy's centuries, conducted through the dynastic arrangements, the arrangements for the inheritance of territories, and the management of the succession crises that punctuated the monarchy's history, illustrates the management of a hereditary succession in a complex composite state.

The management of the political consequences of succession is the third element. A succession changes the personal standing of the office, the dynamics of the court, and the relationships within the government. The new office-holder may have different preferences, different constituencies, and different relationships with the centre than the predecessor. The centre manages the readjustment: the cultivation of the new office-holder, the management of the court's expectations, the management of the government's relationship with the new office, and the management of the public's response. The succession that is managed well consolidates the new office-holder's position and the government's capacity to govern; the succession that is managed poorly exposes both to difficulty.

14.5 The Time-Neutral Perspective

The doctrine holds regardless of the individual who holds the office of head of state. The office's constitutional position, the centre's channels of communication, and the management of the relationship do not change with the office-holder. What changes is the application of the doctrine: the head of state may be active or passive, engaged or distant, supportive or resistant, and the centre adjusts the means to the character of the office-holder without adjusting the end. The end is constant—the management of the relationship so that the head of state's position supports rather than undermines the government's capacity to govern.

An active head of state requires more of the centre's attention than a passive one. The active office-holder has preferences, engages with the government's programme, and uses the office's standing to shape outcomes; the centre must manage the engagement, calibrate the public role, and maintain the boundary between the office's constitutional position and the government's political authority. A passive head of state requires less attention to engagement and more attention to the management of the office's standing, which can erode in the absence of an active office-holder. A supportive head of state is an asset the centre must use without exploiting; a resistant head of state is a constraint the centre must manage without provoking. The discipline is the same in each case: identify the character of the office-holder, identify the centre's interest in the relationship, and conduct the management accordingly.

The historical record illustrates the variation. The British management of active and passive monarchs across the constitutional monarchy's evolution illustrates the adjustment of the approach to the character of the office-holder without the adjustment of the doctrine, seen in Victoria's active engagement, Edward VII's social and diplomatic activity, George V's more constrained role, and

Elizabeth II's long and steady exercise of the office's symbolic function. The French management of strong and weak presidents under the Fifth Republic illustrates the adjustment in a system where the office carries real power, seen in de Gaulle's defining exercise of the office, Pompidou's continuation, Giscard d'Estaing's more constrained tenure, Mitterrand's long exercise of the office across cohabitation, and the distinct tenures that followed. The Japanese management of the emperor's role across the Meiji, Taisho, Showa, and Heisei reigns illustrates the adjustment in a system where the office's position changed fundamentally across the period, seen in the Meiji emperor's position at the centre of the oligarchic state, the Taisho emperor's constrained role during illness, the Showa emperor's exercise of the office through war and occupation and the long postwar symbolic role, and the Heisei emperor's careful exercise of the symbolic function.

The time-neutral perspective is the discipline of the doctrine. The centre that adjusts the doctrine to the character of the office-holder loses the capacity to manage the relationship when the office-holder changes; the centre that maintains the doctrine and adjusts the means secures the continuity of the management across changes of office-holder, across changes of government, and across changes of constitutional convention. The discipline is the centre's own: no one else enforces it, and no one else can.

14.6 Chapter Summary

The head of state and the court are actors whose position, standing, and engagement shape the conditions of governing. The head of state is an actor with a constitutional position, a personal standing, and a set of relationships that the government must manage as a dependency. The court is the institutional expression of the head of state's household and personal apparatus, with its own hierarchy, culture, and interests, and the centre's management of the court is the management of the boundary between the court's domain and the government's domain. The relationship is managed through regular communication, the management of the head of state's engagement with the government's programme, and the management of the head of state's public role. Succession is the moment at which the office's continuity is most exposed, and the centre's responsibility is the maintenance of the continuity of government across the transition and the management of the political consequences.

The historical record confirms the craft. The Venetian management of the Doge, the French management of the monarchy at Versailles and of the presidency under the Fifth Republic, the British management of the Crown across the constitutional monarchy's evolution, the Japanese management of the emperor from Meiji through the postwar constitution, the Habsburg management of the imperial court and the succession across the monarchy's centuries, and the Ottoman management of the sultan and the palace apparatus each illustrate the management of these relationships in different traditions and different conditions. The forms differ; the function is the same. The head of state and the court are managed as dependencies, with attention to their interests, their constituencies, and their dynamics, and the failure to manage them exposes the government to the consequences.

The time-neutral perspective is the discipline that secures the continuity of the management. The head of state may be active or passive, engaged or distant, supportive or resistant, and the

centre's craft is to adjust the approach to the character of the office-holder without adjusting the doctrine. The government that manages the relationship well secures the conditions for governing; the government that fails to manage the relationship exposes the office, the court, and the government to the consequences of an unmanaged dependency.

Chapter 15 — Network Mapping and Analysis

Part IV: Networks, Coalitions, Opposition, and Adversaries — The operational craft by which the centre maps, builds, and manages the networks and coalitions that shape its access to resources, and the management of opposition and adversaries.

15.1 What Network Mapping Is

Network mapping is the systematic identification of the actors in a given domain, the relationships among them, and the flows of resources, information, and influence that pass through those relationships. The actor is the unit; the relationship is the connection between two or more actors; the flow is what moves along the connection. A network is the configuration formed by the actors and their relationships taken together. The map is the representation of that configuration in a form the centre can read, maintain, and use.

The distinction from a stakeholder list is the distinction between a register of names and a representation of connections. A stakeholder list identifies the actors in a domain by name, position, and interest; it answers the question of who. A network map identifies the relationships among the actors, the strength and direction of each relationship, and the flows that pass through them; it answers the question of how. The stakeholder list is the substrate of the map, but the list alone does not show the centre which actors are connected, which connections carry weight, and which positions in the network confer influence. The management of a network is the management of the connections, and the management of the connections requires their prior identification.

The centre's need for the map follows from the structure of its dependencies. The centre depends on actors it does not command for revenue, for personnel, for information, for cooperation in implementation, and for consent. These actors are connected to one another through shared interests, common origins, financial ties, professional associations, and personal relationships, and the connections shape the way each actor responds to the centre. A change in the position of one actor affects the position of others through these connections, and an intervention by the centre that ignores the connections will produce effects the centre did not anticipate. The map is the instrument by which the centre anticipates these effects and acts on the network as a connected configuration of actors.

The Venetian Republic's management of its merchant elite illustrates the function in its developed historical form. The Council of Ten and the state inquisitors maintained a continuous record of the patriciate's commercial partnerships, family alliances, debt obligations, and correspondence, and the record was used to anticipate the political effects of commercial events and to identify the figures whose positions in the network gave them influence beyond their formal office. The Venetian network map was kept as a working intelligence instrument, updated through ambassadors' reports, informers' accounts, and the routine correspondence of the bureaucracy, and consulted whenever a decision touched the interests of the patriciate. The form was specific to Venice; the principle that the management of an elite requires the mapping of its connections is general.

15.2 The Mapping Method

The mapping method proceeds in five steps. The first step is the identification of the actors in the domain, conducted by name, position, and interest, and producing the substrate list from which the map is built. The second step is the identification of the relationships among the actors, conducted by tracing the financial, professional, familial, and personal connections that link them. The third step is the assessment of the strength and the direction of each relationship: whether the relationship is strong or weak, and whether influence flows in one direction or in both. The fourth and fifth steps are the identification of the hubs and the brokers — the actors whose positions confer disproportionate influence — and the identification of the clusters and the bridges — the groups of densely connected actors and the figures who connect one group to another.

The instruments through which the method is conducted are the relationship matrix, the network diagram, and the influence flow chart. The relationship matrix is the tabular record of the actors and their relationships, with the strength and direction of each relationship entered in the cell that corresponds to the pair. The matrix is the working document on which the assessment is conducted, because the tabular form forces the explicit treatment of every pair and exposes the gaps in the centre's knowledge. The network diagram is the visual representation of the matrix, with the actors shown as nodes and the relationships shown as edges, and the diagram is the instrument through which the structure of the network is read. The influence flow chart is the diagram of the flows of resources, information, and influence through the network, distinct from the network diagram: the network diagram shows the connections; the flow chart shows what moves through them.

The documentation of the map is the record of the method, the sources, and the assessment. Each relationship entered in the matrix is supported by a source: an observation, an informant's report, a public record, or an inference from conduct. The strength and direction assessments are entered with the basis on which they were made, and the basis is revised when the evidence changes. The hubs, brokers, clusters, and bridges identified in the analysis are recorded with the structural reasons for the identification, and the identification is revisited whenever the matrix is updated. The map without its documentation is a chart that cannot be checked, defended, or revised; the map with its documentation is an instrument the centre can use with confidence and adjust as the evidence requires.

The French monarchy's mapping of the nobility and the court factions illustrates the method in its developed historical form. Under Louis XIV and his successors, the court at Versailles was the dense node at which the high nobility, the bureaucratic families, the financial interests, and the foreign diplomatic corps intersected, and the king's ministers maintained continuous records of the marriages, the debts, the offices, the pensions, the quarrels, and the alliances that constituted the structure of the court. The memoirs of Saint-Simon and the reports of the lieutenant general of police document the working of the system in its detail: the relationships among the dukes and the ministers, the factions that formed around the princes of the blood, the brokerage exercised by the confessors and the favourites, and the points at which the king's intervention would move the whole. The French map was the instrument through which the monarchy managed a nobility it could not abolish and a court it could not do without.

15.3 The Identification of Hubs and Brokers

A hub is an actor whose position in the network confers influence disproportionate to formal standing. The hub is connected to many other actors, and the connections place the hub at the intersection of flows that would otherwise pass the hub by. A junior minister with connections across the cabinet, the senior civil service, the press, and the business community exercises influence the formal rank does not confer; a long-serving court official with connections across the families, the household, and the outside interests exercises a corresponding influence. The identification of the hub is the identification of the actor whose removal would leave a hole in the network that the formal structure does not fill.

A broker is an actor whose position bridges clusters that would otherwise be disconnected. The broker sits at the boundary between two groups, controls the flow of information and resources between them, and exercises an influence that derives from the bridging position itself. A banker who connects the commercial elite to the political elite, a lawyer who connects the bar to the security services, a religious figure who connects the devotional community to the state apparatus, each occupies a broker position, and the position is the source of the influence. The broker's power is the power over the connection between clusters, and the power persists as long as the clusters remain distinct and the connection remains scarce.

The centre's interest in the hubs and the brokers is the interest in leverage. The management of a network through the management of every relationship is impracticable; the management of a network through the management of the hubs and the brokers is feasible, because the hubs and the brokers are the actors whose positions shape the positions of others. The cultivation of a hub gives the centre influence across the cluster the hub anchors; the cultivation of a broker gives the centre access to the cluster the broker bridges. The displacement of a hub or a broker, conversely, can disrupt a network the centre finds hostile, and the centre's awareness of the hubs and the brokers in an opposing network is the precondition for the assessment of where the opposing network is vulnerable.

Bismarck's management of the political parties and the interest groups in the new German Empire illustrates the identification of the hubs and the brokers in its developed form. Bismarck mapped the parties of the Reichstag — the Conservatives, the National Liberals, the Free Conservatives, the Centre, the Progressives, the Social Democrats, the particularists — and the interest groups — the Agrarian League, the Central Association of German Industrialists, the Hanseatic merchant houses, the Catholic associations, the Protestant brotherhoods — and identified in each the figures whose positions gave them leverage over the rest. The management of the network was conducted through the cultivation of the identified figures: the agrarian leaders when the tariff was at issue, the industrial leaders when the trade policy was at issue, the Catholic leaders when the Kulturkampf was to be wound down, the particularist leaders when the federal balance was to be adjusted. The map made the management possible, by identifying the figures whose cultivation would move the relevant cluster.

15.4 The Assessment of Influence Flows

The assessment of influence flows is the assessment of how influence moves through the network. The assessment asks, for each relationship, which actor shapes the position of the other, and the answer distinguishes the relationships in which influence flows in one direction from those in which it flows in both. The relationships in which influence flows in one direction are the relationships of dependence: one actor follows the position of the other, and a change in the position of the second produces a change in the position of the first. The relationships in which influence flows in both directions are the relationships of reciprocity: each actor shapes the position of the other, and the relationship is sustained by the exchange. The map of the flows is the map of the network's dynamics, and the map distinguishes the connections that move the network from the connections that hold it in place.

The centre's use of the flow assessment is the identification of the points at which intervention will have the greatest effect and the points at which the network is vulnerable to disruption. The points of greatest effect are the points at which a small change in the position of one actor will produce a large change in the positions of others, and these points are typically the hubs and the brokers whose positions confer leverage. The points of vulnerability are the points at which the network depends on a single connection, a single broker, or a single hub, and the disruption of these points will fragment the network into clusters that can be addressed separately. The two sets of points overlap: the broker whose cultivation gives the centre access to a cluster is the broker whose displacement isolates the cluster from its support.

The assessment is conducted through the observation of behaviour over time. The positions the actors take on public questions, the timing of their shifts, the alignment of their statements with the statements of others, and the public evidence of their consultations are the materials from which the flows are inferred. The assessment is corrected by the exceptions: the actor who breaks from a position the centre expected reveals a relationship the centre had misread, and the break is the occasion for the revision of the matrix. The flow assessment is therefore a running inference, corrected at each observation and refined as the network produces new evidence.

The British management of the Indian princely families and the commercial houses illustrates the assessment of influence flows in an imperial setting. The political department of the India Office and the residents at the princely courts maintained continuous records of the marriages, the succession disputes, the financial obligations, the household factions, and the connections to the commercial houses that supplied the courts, and the records were used to identify the figures whose positions in the princely network shaped the positions of others. The Cold War contesting states conducted corresponding assessments of the political networks on the opposing side and on the non-aligned periphery: the maps of the communist party leaderships, the social democratic parties, the trade union federations, the churches, the academic networks, and the exile communities were maintained as working instruments, and the assessments of the flows were the basis for the decisions on where the cultivation of a single figure would shift the position of a cluster. The scale of the Cold War mapping was unprecedented; the principle on which it rested was older.

15.5 The Network Map as a Living Document

The network map is a document maintained over time, updated continuously as the network changes. The network changes: actors enter through appointment, election, marriage, and inheritance; actors exit through death, retirement, dismissal, and disgrace; relationships strengthen through shared work, shared interest, and shared adversity; relationships weaken through neglect, rivalry, and the passage of time; hubs rise as actors accumulate connections and fall as they lose them; brokers appear as new clusters form and disappear as the clusters merge or dissolve. The map that is not updated ceases to represent the network, and the centre that acts on a stale map acts on a representation of the network as it was. The maintenance of the map is therefore a continuous function, conducted alongside the other continuous functions of the centre.

The centre's discipline is the regular update of the map, the regular reassessment of the network, and the regular adjustment of the network management strategy. The regular update is the continuous entry of new observations into the matrix: the new appointments, the new marriages, the new partnerships, the new quarrels, the new alignments. The regular reassessment is the periodic review of the matrix as a whole, conducted to identify the shifts in the structure that the entry of individual observations may have concealed, and to revise the identification of the hubs, brokers, clusters, and bridges accordingly. The regular adjustment is the revision of the centre's network management strategy in light of the reassessment: the cultivation of the new hubs, the displacement of the obsolete ones, the attention to the new brokers, and the abandonment of the bridges that no longer carry weight.

The discipline requires the assignment of responsibility and the allocation of time. The map that is everyone's responsibility is maintained by no one, and the centre that treats the map as a product of spare moments produces a map that lags the network by months and years. The assignment of responsibility to a designated officer or unit, with the time and the access the work requires, is the precondition for the maintenance of the map as a living document. The officer responsible reports to the centre on the shifts in the network, the implications for the centre's strategy, and the adjustments the officer recommends, and the centre's principals test the recommendations against their own observation and their own reading of the network.

The Meiji oligarchs' management of the han factions and the new business groups illustrates the maintenance of the map as a living document. The oligarchs who carried through the restoration maintained, from the first years of the new regime, a continuous assessment of the factions that had formed around the domains — Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa, Hizen — and of the new business groups that were forming around the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda houses, and the assessment was revised as the factions merged, split, and recombined across the decades of the Meiji and Taishō periods. Lee Kuan Yew's management of the Singapore elite networks illustrates the maintenance of the map in a smaller jurisdiction and over a longer tenure: the networks of the civil service, the armed forces, the statutory boards, the government-linked companies, the professional firms, the trade unions, and the community organisations were continuously assessed, and the assessment informed the cultivation, the posting, and the timing of the leadership transitions. The form differed; the discipline of the living document was the same.

15.6 Worked Example: Mapping a Business-Political Network

A worked example illustrates the method. Consider a jurisdiction in which the centre is preparing a major reform of the financial sector, and the centre requires a map of the business-political network that the reform will touch. The actors in the domain are the major commercial banks, the investment houses, the insurance companies, the central bank, the finance ministry, the parliamentary committee on finance, the financial press, the law firms that specialise in financial regulation, the academic departments that supply the regulators, and the trade associations that speak for the industry. The substrate list of actors is the starting point; the map is built on the list.

The identification of the relationships proceeds by tracing the connections among the actors. The board interlocks between the commercial banks and the insurance companies are recorded; the partnerships between the investment houses and the law firms are entered; the movement of personnel between the central bank, the finance ministry, and the academic departments is traced; the trade associations' officers and their member firms are listed; the parliamentary committee members and their constituencies, their donors, and their former employers are identified. The matrix is built up pair by pair, and the gaps in the centre's knowledge are marked for further inquiry. The strength of each relationship is assessed by the frequency and the substance of the connection, and the direction is assessed by the observation of which actor follows the position of the other on public questions.

The analysis of the matrix identifies the hubs and the brokers. The senior partner of the law firm that acts for the largest commercial bank, the central bank, and two of the insurance companies is a hub: the position gives the firm influence across the financial sector disproportionate to its formal role. The academic economist who chairs the central bank's advisory panel, sits on the parliamentary committee's expert group, and writes the column the financial press follows is a broker: the position bridges the central bank, the parliament, the academy, and the press, and the bridges give the figure control over the flow of analysis among the clusters. The trade association chairman whose firm is a member of three of the banking groups and whose brother-in-law sits on the central bank board is a hub and a broker combined: the position is the kind the centre must identify before it acts. The identification of these figures is the identification of the points at which the centre's intervention will move the network.

The assessment of the influence flows identifies the points at which the network will respond to the reform. The major commercial banks follow the position of the central bank on regulatory questions, and the central bank's position is shaped by the academic economist through the advisory panel and by the senior law partner through the firm's advisory work: the flow runs from the academic and the lawyer to the central bank to the banks. The investment houses follow the position of the largest commercial bank, and the largest commercial bank's position is shaped by the trade association chairman through the family connection to the central bank board: the flow runs through the family tie. The reform's prospects depend on the cultivation of the academic, the lawyer, and the trade association chairman, and on the centre's awareness that the displacement of any one of the three will shift the position of a cluster. The American mapping of the political machines and the interest groups in the Progressive-era and New Deal periods illustrates the method in a comparable setting: the maps of the party machines, the railroads, the utilities, the farm blocs, the labour federations, and the reform associations were maintained as working instruments,

and the assessments of the hubs and the brokers informed the drafting, the timing, and the congressional management of the major reforms.

15.7 Chapter Summary

Network mapping is the systematic identification of the actors in a domain, the relationships among them, and the flows of resources, information, and influence through the network. The map is distinct from a stakeholder list: a stakeholder list identifies the actors; a network map identifies the connections among the actors. The centre's need for the map follows from the structure of its dependencies: the actors the centre depends on are connected to one another, and the management of the network requires the management of the connections. The work of mapping is the precondition for the work of management, and the centre that maps the network poorly manages the network poorly.

The method proceeds through the identification of the actors, the relationships, the strength and direction of each relationship, the hubs and the brokers, and the clusters and the bridges. The instruments are the relationship matrix, the network diagram, and the influence flow chart, and the documentation is the record of the sources and the assessments that supports each entry. The hubs and the brokers are the actors whose positions confer leverage, and the centre's cultivation of these figures gives the centre influence over the network as a whole. The assessment of the influence flows identifies the points at which intervention will have the greatest effect and the points at which the network is vulnerable to disruption.

The map is a living document, maintained through the regular update of the matrix, the regular reassessment of the network, and the regular adjustment of the centre's strategy. The discipline of maintenance is the discipline of continuous attention: the assignment of responsibility, the allocation of time, and the regular reporting of the shifts in the network to the principals who must act on them. The comparative record confirms the craft: the Venetian Republic's mapping of the merchant elite, the French monarchy's mapping of the court, Bismarck's mapping of the parties and the interest groups, the British mapping of the Indian princely families and the commercial houses, the Cold War mapping of the political networks, the Meiji oligarchs' mapping of the han factions and the business groups, Lee Kuan Yew's mapping of the Singapore elite, and the American mapping of the political machines and the interest groups each illustrate the function of the map as the instrument through which the centre manages the networks on which its access to resources depends. The government that maps its networks poorly manages them poorly; the government that maps them well secures the conditions for the management of its dependencies.

Chapter 16 — Coalition Building and Management

The assembly, maintenance, and management of the coalition that supports the government. The centre's craft is the continuous management of expectations, conflicts, and loyalties within the coalition.

16.1 What a Coalition Is

A coalition is a structured set of actors whose combined support sustains the government in office and underwrites its capacity to act. The actors may be political parties, factions within parties, regional or communal interests, business and labour organisations, religious bodies, military factions, or external patrons whose backing is required. The coalition is the configuration formed by these actors; the support is what they provide through votes, resources, personnel, consent, or non-opposition; the government is what the support sustains. A coalition exists where the actors who sustain the government are more than the governing party itself, or where the governing party is itself a coalition of factions whose separate support must be maintained. The government that commands the support of every actor it depends on has no coalition to manage; the government that depends on the support of actors it does not command has a coalition to manage.

The coalition is a political instrument assembled and maintained by the centre to serve the centre's need for support. A voluntary association is constituted by the agreement of its members and dissolves when the agreement dissolves; a coalition is constituted by the centre's need for the members' support and is maintained by the centre's continuous management of the relationships that sustain the support. The members are bound to the centre by interest, by obligation, and by the absence of acceptable alternatives, and the centre is bound to the members by the dependence of its position on their support. The coalition's terms are the terms the centre negotiates with each member in the light of the centre's need and the member's leverage, and the coalition that is treated as a voluntary association is a coalition the centre has ceased to manage.

The members of the coalition are unequal, and the centre distinguishes the core, the peripheral, and the marginal. The core members are those whose withdrawal would bring the government down: their support is indispensable, their leverage is high, and their management consumes the centre's closest attention. The peripheral members are those whose support is valuable but not indispensable: their withdrawal would weaken the government without toppling it, and their management is conducted with proportionate attention. The marginal members are those whose support is welcome but whose withdrawal would not significantly alter the government's position: their management is conducted lightly, through periodic contact without the investment of sustained effort. The classification is not fixed: a peripheral member may become core as conditions change, and the centre's continuous task is the reassessment of the classification in the light of the shifting balance.

Bismarck's assembly of the coalition that unified Germany illustrates the structure in its developed historical form. The coalition comprised the National Liberals, who supplied the parliamentary votes for the budget and the legislation of unification; the Conservatives, who

supplied the landed interest and the backing of the Prussian establishment; the Free Conservatives, who bridged the two; and the particularist groups whose acquiescence was required for the federal settlement. The core was the National Liberals and the Conservatives; the peripheral was the Free Conservatives and the southern particularists; the marginal was the smaller factions whose votes were traded issue by issue. Bismarck managed the coalition through the alternation of partners: the National Liberals on the constitutional and economic questions, the Conservatives on the military and imperial questions, the Centre Party on the winding down of the *Kulturkampf*. The coalition held for two decades, and the alternation among its members was the instrument through which Bismarck kept the centre's position without conceding the centre's authority to any one of them.

16.2 The Assembly of the Coalition

The assembly of a coalition is the construction of the support base on which the government will rest. The assembly proceeds through the identification of the actors whose support is required, the assessment of their interests and expectations, the negotiation of the terms of their support, and the formalization of the coalition in the arrangements that govern the relationships. The identification is conducted by the centre's mapping of the political terrain — the parties, the factions, the interests, and the patrons whose support or non-opposition the government needs — and the assessment is conducted through direct consultation and the analysis of the actors' positions. The negotiation is conducted through the exchange of commitments: the support the actor will provide, the price the centre will pay, the conditions each will respect. The formalization is the reduction of the terms to the coalition agreement, the distribution of offices, and the mechanisms for the management of disputes.

The centre is the architect of the coalition, the broker of the terms, and the guarantor of the commitments. The architect's work is the design of the coalition: the identification of the actors who must be included, the assessment of the configuration that will be stable, and the rejection of the actors whose inclusion would destabilise the whole. The broker's work is the negotiation of the terms: the conduct of the consultations with each prospective member, the management of the contradictions among the members' demands, and the construction of a package that the members can accept. The guarantor's work is the binding of the members to the commitments: the establishment of the mechanisms through which the commitments will be honoured, the management of the disputes that arise in their interpretation, and the enforcement of the consequences when a member defaults. The three functions are conducted together, and the centre that performs one without the others produces a coalition that is misdesigned, unagreed, or unenforced.

The Meiji oligarchs' assembly of the coalition that overthrew the Tokugawa and built the new state illustrates the assembly in its foundational form. The coalition was assembled from the *tozama* domains of the southwest — Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa, Hizen — with the court nobles of Kyoto, the reformist elements within the Tokugawa house, and the merchant houses of Osaka and Edo. The oligarchs identified the indispensable actors, assessed the interests of each — the domains' grievance at their exclusion from power, the court nobles' resentment at the shogunate's pre-eminence, the merchants' interest in the abolition of the feudal restrictions on trade — and

negotiated the terms through the alliances of 1867 and 1868. The formalization was conducted through the Charter Oath, the restoration of imperial rule, and the appointment of the domain leaders to the new offices. The coalition held through the early reforms — the abolition of the domains, the establishment of the prefectures, the conscription ordinance — and the oligarchs managed the departures within it through the alternation of inclusion and exclusion that characterised the first decades of the new regime.

De Gaulle's assembly of the coalition that established the Fifth Republic illustrates the assembly in a moment of constitutional reconstruction. The crisis of 1958 had dissolved the coalitions of the Fourth Republic, and the new coalition required a support base that could carry a new constitution and a new political order. De Gaulle identified the actors whose support was required: the army, the colons, the parties of the centre and the right, the senior civil service, the foreign allies whose backing was indispensable, and the public whose endorsement in referendum would legitimate the new order. The interests were assessed through the consultations of the spring and summer of 1958; the terms were negotiated through the constitutional text, the distribution of offices, and the undertakings given to the parties and the army; the formalization was conducted through the referendum of September 1958 and the elections of November. The coalition held for the first years of the regime; its adjustment — the shedding of the colons after 1962, the management of the army after the Algiers putsch, the alternation of the parties in support — was the work of the years that followed.

16.3 The Maintenance of the Coalition

The maintenance of a coalition is the continuous management of the relationships that sustain the support. The maintenance comprises four functions: the management of the relationships among the members, the management of the expectations each member holds of the centre, the resolution of the conflicts that arise within the coalition, and the management of the coalition's public face. The relationships are managed through the centre's continuous contact with each member, the cultivation of the personal ties that bind the members to the centre, and the management of the frictions that arise among the members themselves. The expectations are managed through the centre's clear communication of what it will and will not do and the regular accounting of the government's progress against the coalition's programme. The conflicts are managed through the centre's mediation, and the public face is managed through the coordination of the members' statements and the suppression of the public displays of disagreement that would weaken the coalition's standing.

The maintenance of the coalition requires the centre's active engagement with every member. The members' support is given and held conditionally, and the conditions require the centre's continuous attention. The member whose interests are neglected withdraws; the member whose expectations are disappointed turns critical; the member whose conflicts with another member are unmanaged ceases to cooperate; the member whose public position diverges from the coalition's drifts into opposition. The centre that engages with the core and neglects the peripheral finds the peripheral drifting into the marginal; the centre that engages with the marginal and neglects the core finds the core making demands the centre cannot meet. The discipline of maintenance is the

discipline of comprehensive engagement, conducted through the centre's designated officers and the principals' own attention, and the engagement with every member is the work through which the conditions of support are met.

The British management of coalition government across the wartime and postwar coalitions illustrates the maintenance in its developed form. The wartime coalition of 1940 to 1945, assembled under Churchill, comprised the Conservatives, Labour, and the Liberals, and was maintained through the war cabinet, the regular consultation of the party leaders, the distribution of offices, and the careful management of the public face of national unity. The maintenance required the management of the conflicts within the coalition — the tensions between the Conservative majority and the Labour presence on domestic policy, the disputes over the conduct of the war, the management of the Labour Party's separate conference and the Conservative backbenchers — and the management of the expectations of each member. The Lib-Lab pact of 1977 to 1978 under Callaghan and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition of 2010 to 2015 under Cameron illustrate the maintenance in different circumstances, each requiring the centre's continuous engagement with the members whose support the government depended on. The form varied; the discipline of the continuous engagement with every member was the same.

Lee Kuan Yew's assembly and maintenance of the coalition that governed Singapore illustrates the maintenance in a smaller jurisdiction and over a longer tenure. The coalition comprised the People's Action Party's own factions, the trade unions, the civil service, the armed forces, the professional classes, the business community, and the communal organisations whose support or non-opposition the government required. The maintenance was conducted through the continuous consultation of the members, the management of the expectations of each, the resolution of the conflicts among them, and the management of the coalition's public face through the government's disciplined communication. The coalition held across the decades of Lee's tenure and the tenures of his successors; the maintenance was the work through which it held, and the absence of the maintenance would have dissolved the coalition as it dissolved in comparable jurisdictions. The scale differed from the wartime British coalition; the discipline of the continuous engagement with every member was the same.

16.4 The Management of Coalition Conflict

Conflict within a coalition is the competition among the members for the resources, the positions, and the influence that the coalition's possession of power makes available. The resources are the budget, the patronage, and the policy concessions the coalition can distribute; the positions are the offices, the appointments, and the access to the centre that the coalition can confer; the influence is the shaping of the government's programme that the coalition's possession of authority makes possible. The competition among the members for these goods is the natural condition of the coalition, because the members are bound to the centre by interest and the interest is the acquisition of the goods. The conflict is the form in which the members pursue their interests inside the coalition, and the persistence of the conflict is the sign of the coalition's continuing utility to its members. The centre's task is the management of the conflict so that it remains within the coalition instead of breaking the coalition.

The centre's management of coalition conflict is conducted through three functions: the mediation of the conflicts among the members, the allocation of the costs and benefits of the coalition, and the prevention of the conflicts from fracturing the coalition. The mediation is the conduct of the consultations through which the members' disputes are addressed: the centre's intervention between the contending members, the centre's offer of the terms on which the dispute can be settled, and the centre's management of the consequences if the dispute is not settled. The allocation is the distribution of the goods the coalition commands: the budget among the members' interests, the offices among the members' claims, the policy concessions among the members' demands. The prevention is the management of the coalition's business so that the conflicts that would fracture the coalition do not arise: the avoidance of the questions on which the members are irreconcilable, the timing of the questions on which they are not, and the cultivation of the shared interests that hold the members together.

The Venetian Republic's management of the patriciate as a governing coalition illustrates the management of conflict in its most developed historical form. The patriciate was the body of nobles whose combined support sustained the republic's government, and the conflicts among them — the factional rivalries, the commercial competitions, the territorial disputes, the family feuds — were the constant material of the political life. The Venetian constitution managed the conflicts through the institutions that dispersed the patriciate's power: the Great Council, the Senate, the Council of Ten, the state inquisitors, the elaborate rotation of offices, and the prohibition on the concentration of authority in any one noble's hands. The mediation was conducted through the councils and the brokerage of the senior patricians; the allocation was conducted through the distribution of offices, the assignment of commands, and the commercial concessions; the prevention was conducted through the institutions that contained the conflicts and the sanctions that punished the factions that crossed the line. The form was specific to Venice; the principle that the coalition's conflicts must be managed within institutions that contain them is general.

The Habsburg monarchy's management of the coalition of nationalities illustrates the management of conflict in a composite state. The monarchy comprised the Germans, the Hungarians, the Czechs, the Poles, the Ruthenians, the South Slavs, the Italians, the Romanians, and the others whose combined support or non-opposition sustained the imperial government. The conflicts among them — the linguistic, the constitutional, the economic, the religious — were the constant material of the monarchy's political life, managed through the imperial council, the county diets, the crownland administrations, and the bilateral arrangements that the *Ausgleich* of 1867 established with Hungary. The mediation was conducted through the imperial ministry; the allocation was conducted through the distribution of offices, the assignment of expenditure, and the language ordinances; the prevention was conducted through the suppression of the irreconcilable questions and the cultivation of the dynastic loyalty that held the nationalities together. The monarchy's ultimate failure to manage the conflicts is the record against which the management of coalition conflict in a composite state is measured, and the failure illustrates the cost of the centre's inability to mediate, allocate, and prevent at the scale the coalition required.

16.5 The Adjustment of the Coalition

The coalition changes over time. The members enter and exit as circumstances shift; the balance of power within the coalition shifts as the members' leverage rises and falls; the external conditions change as the political environment, the economic circumstances, and the international position develop. The entry of new members occurs when the centre requires support it does not currently command: a new party, a new interest, a new communal group whose inclusion becomes necessary as the configuration of the support base changes. The exit of members occurs when their cost exceeds their value: the member whose demands the centre cannot meet, whose conduct the centre cannot defend, or whose support the centre can no longer use. The shift in the balance occurs as the members' leverage changes — the peripheral member becoming core, the core member becoming peripheral — and the external conditions change the coalition's terms, as the war that requires new members, the economic crisis that requires new concessions, or the international settlement that requires new alignments.

The centre's adjustment of the coalition is conducted through three operations: the addition of new members, the shedding of members whose cost exceeds their value, and the reconfiguration of the coalition's terms. The addition is the recruitment of new members: the identification of the actors whose inclusion would strengthen the coalition, the negotiation of the terms, and the management of the consequences for the existing members. The shedding is the expulsion or the managed withdrawal of members: the identification of the members whose cost exceeds their value, the negotiation of the exit terms, and the management of the consequences for the coalition's standing and the centre's reputation. The reconfiguration is the renegotiation of the terms on which the existing members are bound: the adjustment of the distribution of costs and benefits, the modification of the commitments the centre has given, and the alignment of the coalition's programme with the new conditions. The three operations are conducted together, and the centre that performs one without the others produces a coalition that is either enlarged without rebalancing, reduced without replacement, or reconfigured without consent.

The American management of the New Deal coalition illustrates the adjustment in its developed historical form. The coalition assembled by Roosevelt in 1932 comprised the urban machines, the labour movement, the southern Democrats, the progressive Republicans who crossed over, the African American voters who shifted from the party of Lincoln, and the intellectual reformers whose programmes the New Deal implemented. The coalition was adjusted across the 1930s: the addition of the labour unions after the Wagner Act, the consolidation of the African American voters as the relief programmes took effect, the shedding of the conservative Democrats whose opposition to the court-packing plan became overt. The coalition was reconfigured in the 1940s: the wartime mobilisation brought new members in, the conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats in Congress narrowed the legislative base, and the adjustments to the terms — the desegregation of the armed forces, the management of the southern reaction — set the conditions for the coalition's later evolution. The New Deal coalition held, in its adjusted form, for four decades; the adjustments were the work through which it held.

The French management of the coalition politics of the Third and Fourth Republics illustrates the adjustment in a system of chronic coalition instability. The Third Republic's coalitions were assembled and adjusted continuously: the parties of the centre-left and the centre-right, the radicals,

the socialists, the conservatives, and the parties of the right were combined and recombined in ministries that lasted months rather than years. The adjustment was conducted through the formation and dissolution of ministries, the renegotiation of the terms among the parties, and the management of the votes in the chamber that sustained or toppled the governments. The Fourth Republic inherited the system, and the chronic instability of the coalitions was the condition the Fifth Republic was constructed to remedy. The comparative record suggests that the adjustment of coalitions is a function the centre must perform, and the form the adjustment takes — the regular renegotiation of the Third and Fourth Republics or the periodic reconfiguration of the Fifth — is the choice the constitution and the political environment impose.

16.6 Worked Example: Assembling and Maintaining a Reform Coalition

A worked example illustrates the assembly and the maintenance of a coalition for a major reform programme. Consider a jurisdiction in which the government has decided to undertake a major reform of the public finances — the restructuring of the tax system, the reform of the public expenditure, and the modernisation of the social insurance arrangements — and the government's party does not command the parliamentary majority the reform requires. The coalition the centre must assemble comprises the governing party's own factions, the parliamentary group whose votes are required, the finance ministry and the central bank whose technical agreement is indispensable, the business organisations whose support will shape the public reception, the trade unions whose acquiescence will determine the implementation, the regional governments whose cooperation the reform requires, and the external institutions whose endorsement will determine the international reception. The identification of the members is the first step, and the assembly proceeds from the identification through the assessment, the negotiation, and the formalization.

The negotiation of the terms is conducted with each member, and the centre is the broker of the package. The governing party's factions are bound by the commitment to the programme and the distribution of the cabinet offices; the parliamentary group is bound by the concessions on the questions it cares about — the regional allocations, the sectoral exemptions, the timing of the measures; the finance ministry and the central bank are bound by the technical undertakings on the deficit, the monetary policy, and the exchange rate. The business organisations are bound by the corporate tax arrangements and the consultation arrangements; the trade unions are bound by the labour market provisions and the wage-policy undertakings; the regional governments are bound by the fiscal arrangements and the cooperation in implementation; the external institutions are bound by the financing and the conditionality. The formalization is the reduction of the package to the coalition agreement, the budget, the legislation, and the undertakings the centre and the members can be held to.

The management of conflict within the coalition is the work of the months and years that follow. The conflicts arise as the reform's costs and benefits become clear: the parliamentary group's constituencies that bear the costs, the trade unions that object to the labour market provisions, the business organisations that object to the corporate tax increases, the regional governments that object to the fiscal arrangements, the governing party's factions that object to the distribution of the cabinet offices. The centre's mediation is conducted through the regular

consultation of the members, the intervention in the disputes that cannot be settled at the official level, and the offer of the terms on which the disputes can be resolved. The allocation is conducted through the budget, the regulatory instruments, and the timing of the measures — the deferral of the costs, the acceleration of the benefits, the compensation of the losers — and the prevention is conducted through the avoidance of the irreconcilable questions and the cultivation of the shared interest in the reform's success.

The adjustment over time is the work of the years that follow the reform's implementation. The coalition's members change as the reform's effects become clear: the parliamentary group whose votes were required in the first year may not be required in the third, the trade unions whose acquiescence was indispensable at the outset may not be indispensable once the labour market arrangements are in place, the business organisations whose support was decisive at the outset may not be decisive once the corporate tax arrangements are settled. The centre's adjustment is the addition of new members — the regional governments whose cooperation becomes more important as the implementation proceeds, the new business organisations whose interests the reform has created — the shedding of members whose cost exceeds their value, and the reconfiguration of the terms on which the remaining members are bound. The reform's success is the work of the coalition's assembly, maintenance, conflict management, and adjustment, conducted together across the years the reform requires.

16.7 Chapter Summary

A coalition is a structured set of actors whose combined support sustains the government. The coalition is a political instrument, assembled and maintained by the centre, and the members are bound to the centre by interest, obligation, and the absence of acceptable alternatives. The members are unequal: the centre distinguishes the core, the peripheral, and the marginal, and manages each accordingly. The coalition that is treated as a voluntary association is a coalition the centre has ceased to manage, and the coalition the centre has ceased to manage is a coalition that will not hold.

The assembly of the coalition proceeds through the identification of the actors, the assessment of their interests, the negotiation of the terms, and the formalization of the arrangements. The centre is the architect, the broker, and the guarantor of the coalition, and the three functions are conducted together. The maintenance of the coalition is the continuous management of the relationships, the expectations, the conflicts, and the public face, conducted through the centre's active engagement with every member. The maintenance requires the centre's continuous attention, and the coalition's support is held conditionally on the conditions being met.

The management of coalition conflict is the mediation of the disputes, the allocation of the costs and benefits, and the prevention of the fracturing. The adjustment of the coalition is the addition of new members, the shedding of the members whose cost exceeds their value, and the reconfiguration of the terms. The comparative record confirms the craft: Bismarck's alternation among the German coalition's members, the Meiji oligarchs' assembly of the restoration coalition, de Gaulle's assembly of the Fifth Republic's founding coalition, the British management of the wartime and postwar coalitions, Lee Kuan Yew's maintenance of the Singapore coalition, the

Venetian management of the patriciate, the Habsburg management and failure with the nationalities, the American management of the New Deal coalition, and the French management of the chronic coalitions of the Third and Fourth Republics each illustrate the function the centre must perform. The coalition that is assembled well and managed poorly fails; the coalition that is assembled poorly and managed well cannot be saved; the coalition that is assembled well and managed well holds, for the time the conditions permit.

Chapter 17 — The Management of Opposition

Opposition as a feature of the political order: actors who challenge the government within the legitimate framework. The centre's craft is the management of opposition through engagement, co-optation, and the shaping of the terms of debate.

17.1 What Opposition Is

Opposition is the activity of actors who challenge the government's position, the government's policy, or the government's tenure, within the legitimate framework of the political order. The legitimate framework is the constitutional order and the body of conventions that establish how authority is contested, exercised, and transferred. Opposition actors operate within this framework: they contest elections, they argue in the legislature, they petition, they publish, they organise, and they seek to displace the government by the means the constitution provides. The actors who challenge the framework itself are a different category, and the management of them is conducted through different means.

The distinction from adversaries is the distinction between actors who contest the government within the framework and actors who contest the framework itself. The opposition accepts the constitutional order and seeks office within it; the adversary rejects the constitutional order and seeks to overturn it. The opposition's challenge is to the policy, the personnel, or the tenure of the government; the adversary's challenge is to the legitimacy of the political order that produces the government. The distinction is operational: the centre manages the opposition through engagement, co-optation, and the management of the terms of debate, and the centre manages the adversaries through containment, surveillance, and, where required, prosecution. The centre that confuses the two categories — that treats the opposition as adversaries and the adversaries as opposition — makes both harder to manage.

The recognition that opposition is a feature of the political order, not a pathology, is the recognition on which the management of opposition rests. The political order in which no opposition forms is the political order in which the constraints on the centre have been removed, and the removal of constraints is the condition under which the centre's errors compound without correction. The opposition provides the centre with the information the centre's own supporters do not provide: the costs the policy imposes on those outside the coalition, the failures the implementation produces in the field, and the grievances the next election will surface. The suppression of the opposition is more dangerous than its management, because the suppression removes the channels through which the centre learns what the centre needs to know.

The British formalisation of His Majesty's Loyal Opposition illustrates the recognition in its developed historical form. The title "Leader of His Majesty's Loyal Opposition" was used in the Commons from the early nineteenth century and given statutory recognition through the provision of a salary in the Ministers of the Crown Act 1937, and the formalisation marked the acceptance of the opposition as a constitutional function rather than a factional pathology. The British practice developed the institutions of the opposition: the shadow cabinet, the opposition days in the

Commons, the procedural rights of opposition business, and the salary and staffing of the opposition leadership. The form was specific to the British constitution; the principle that the opposition is a constitutional function is general, and the comparative record shows the principle established in different forms across the mature jurisdictions.

17.2 The Identification of the Opposition

The identification of the opposition is the systematic identification of the actors who challenge the government, the basis on which they challenge it, the resources they command, the constituency they mobilise, and the intensity with which they pursue the challenge. The identification is conducted continuously, because the opposition changes: new actors enter, old actors exit, the basis of the challenge shifts, and the intensity waxes and wanes with the political cycle. The identification produces the register from which the management strategy is developed, and the register is maintained as a living document alongside the network map and the dependency map. The centre that identifies the opposition poorly manages the opposition poorly, and the centre that identifies the opposition well is positioned to manage it through the means the framework allows.

The opposition actors fall into four categories. The institutional opposition is the opposition that operates through the institutions of the constitutional order: the parliamentary opposition, the opposition in the upper house, the opposition in the sub-national legislatures, and the opposition that contests the executive through the electoral process. The sectoral opposition is the opposition that forms around sectoral interests: the agrarian opposition, the industrial opposition, the labour opposition, the regional opposition, and the opposition of the professional and commercial groups whose interests the government's policy touches. The ideological opposition is the opposition that forms around ideological commitments: the conservative, the liberal, the socialist, the nationalist, the religious, and the ideological currents that organise opinion across the institutional and the sectoral lines. The personal opposition is the opposition that forms around persons: the displaced rival, the dismissed minister, the disappointed aspirant, and the figure whose opposition to the government is the opposition to the figures in it.

The assessment of each opposition actor is conducted along four dimensions. The basis of the opposition is the substantive ground on which the actor opposes the government — policy, interest, ideology, or person — and the assessment identifies the ground and the depth of the commitment to it. The resources of the opposition are the resources the actor commands: the votes in the legislature, the membership in the organisation, the finance, the press, the legal expertise, and the access to the public. The constituency of the opposition is the constituency the actor mobilises: the voters, the members, the subscribers, the supporters, and the public whose support the actor claims to represent. The intensity of the opposition is the intensity with which the actor pursues the challenge, distinguishing the actor who opposes the government on a specific measure from the actor who opposes the government as such.

Bismarck's management of the Reichstag opposition illustrates the identification in its developed form: the parties — the Conservatives, the Free Conservatives, the National Liberals, the Centre, the Progressives, the Social Democrats, the particularists — were continuously identified

and assessed along the basis, the resources, the constituency, and the intensity. The Habsburg centre's identification of the nationalist opposition illustrates the identification in a multinational setting: the German, the Hungarian, the Czech, the Polish, the South Slav, the Italian, and the Romanian national movements were identified, the leaderships assessed, the resources catalogued, and the constituencies mapped to the crownlands. The Venetian Republic's identification of the patrician opposition illustrates the identification in an oligarchic setting: the factions among the patriciate were tracked through the councils, the Ten, and the inquisitors, and the assessment of each faction's basis, resources, constituency, and intensity informed the management the doge and the councils conducted. The form differed; the identification along the four categories and the four dimensions was common.

17.3 The Management Through Engagement

Engagement is the management of the relationship with the opposition through dialogue, consultation, and the incorporation of opposition concerns into the government's policy. The dialogue is the regular exchange between the centre and the opposition leadership, conducted through formal channels and informal contacts, and the exchange keeps the centre informed of the opposition's position and the opposition informed of the government's intentions. The consultation on policy is the consultation of the opposition on the major measures before they are presented to the legislature or the public, and the consultation is conducted through briefings, expert groups, and the parliamentary committee process. The incorporation of opposition concerns is the modification of the government's policy to take account of the concerns the opposition has raised, where the modification is consistent with the government's objectives and the cost of the modification is less than the cost of the opposition's resistance.

Engagement and concession are distinct, and the distinction must be kept clear. Concession is the abandonment of the government's policy in response to the opposition's demand; engagement is the management of the relationship through which the opposition's concerns are expressed and addressed. The government that engages the opposition may modify the policy, may defer the policy, may reframe the policy, or may proceed with the policy unchanged, and the choice among these is the government's choice made on the government's assessment of the costs and the benefits. The engagement is the means through which the government manages the opposition's response to the choice, and the engagement is conducted regardless of the choice the government makes. The government that proceeds with the policy unchanged has greater need of the engagement than the government that modifies the policy, because the government that proceeds unchanged must manage the opposition's resistance to the unchanged policy.

The British management of the opposition through engagement illustrates the practice in its developed form: the consultation of the opposition leader on national security, the briefing on intelligence and diplomatic assessments, the convention that major constitutional changes are discussed before presentation, and the consultation on the timing of elections and the parliamentary session are the British instruments. The French management across the Republics illustrates the engagement in a different setting: the Third Republic's parliamentary management through the commissions and the *délégations*, the Fourth Republic's coalition management, and the Fifth

Republic's alternation through the cohabitation arrangements are the French instruments. The American management of the congressional opposition illustrates the engagement in a separation-of-powers setting: the consultation between the executive and the congressional leadership on major legislation, the use of the congressional committees as the forum, and the bipartisan conventions on foreign policy and national security are the American instruments. The form of the engagement differs across the settings; the principle of the consultation is common.

The practice of engagement requires the discipline of restraint and the consistency of treatment. The restraint is the restraint that keeps the engagement from collapsing into the personal attack: the opposition leadership is treated as the interlocutor, not as the enemy, and the language the centre uses to describe the opposition is the language the centre would accept from the opposition. The consistency of treatment is the consistency that keeps the engagement credible: the opposition is engaged on the major measures and the minor, on the measures the government expects to pass and the measures the government expects to lose, and the engagement is conducted through the same channels and the same officers over time. The engagement that is conducted only when the government needs the opposition's support is the engagement the opposition reads as manipulation, and the engagement the opposition reads as manipulation ceases to function as engagement.

17.4 The Management Through Co-optation

Co-optation is the management of the opposition through the incorporation of opposition figures into the government's apparatus, the appointment of opposition leaders to advisory roles, and the offering of positions that transform opposition into responsibility. The incorporation into the apparatus is the appointment of the opposition figure to a ministerial, a deputy ministerial, or a senior official position, bringing the figure inside the government and the figure's constituency into a relationship with the government. The appointment to advisory roles is the appointment to the councils, the commissions, the expert groups, and the advisory bodies the government maintains, giving the figure a voice in the policy without a vote in the government. The offering of positions that transform opposition into responsibility is the offering of the positions whose acceptance changes the figure's interest: the position that requires the figure to defend the policy the figure had opposed, the position that requires the figure to administer the measure the figure had criticised, and the position that turns former opposition into present responsibility.

The limits of co-optation are the limits that follow from the transformation the co-optation effects. The opposition figure who is co-opted may lose the constituency that supported the figure's opposition, because the constituency that supported the opposition may read the acceptance of the position as the abandonment of the cause. The government that co-opts may lose the direction the government's programme required, because the incorporation of the opposition figure into the government brings the figure's commitments and the figure's constituencies into the government's deliberation. The co-optation that succeeds is the co-optation that strengthens the government's position without diluting the government's programme, and the co-optation that fails is the co-optation that dilutes the programme without strengthening the position. The centre's judgment on

the co-optation is the judgment on the trade, and the trade is conducted in the specific case, on the specific figure, with the specific consequences in view.

Bismarck's management of the Reichstag opposition illustrates the co-optation through accommodation and the offering of positions. The Centre Party, against which Bismarck had conducted the Kulturkampf, was brought into the support of the government's measures through the winding down of the Kulturkampf and the consultation on the school and the church legislation; the National Liberal leader Bennigsen was offered a ministerial portfolio in 1877, and the offer, though declined, marked the form of the co-optation Bismarck was prepared to extend. The Meiji oligarchs' co-optation through the Diet illustrates the co-optation in a constitutional setting: the leaders of the opposition parties — the Jiyūtō, the Kaishintō, and their successors — were offered positions in the cabinet, the privy council, and the imperial appointive offices, transforming the leaders of the opposition into the officers of the state. The Habsburg co-optation of the nationalist leaders illustrates the co-optation in a multinational setting: the leaders of the German, the Hungarian, the Czech, and the Polish movements were incorporated into the imperial ministries, the governorships, and the officialdom, and the incorporation was the means through which the monarchy managed the nationalist opposition.

The discipline of co-optation is the discipline of the selection and the timing. The selection is the selection of the figures whose incorporation will strengthen the government and whose abandonment of the opposition will weaken it, conducted on the assessment of the figure's constituency, resources, and commitments. The timing is the timing that maximises the effect: the co-optation conducted too early reads as weakness, too late reads as capitulation, and at the right moment reads as strength. The co-optation conducted in batches, with several figures co-opted at once, dilutes the effect; the co-optation conducted singly preserves the effect. The discipline of selection and timing is the discipline through which the co-optation serves the management of the opposition rather than the management serving the co-optation.

17.5 The Management of the Terms of Debate

The management of the terms of debate is the management of the questions on which the government and the opposition contest, the management of the agenda on which the questions are arranged, and the prevention of the opposition's reframing on terms unfavourable to the government. The terms of debate are the questions as they are put to the public: the question as a question of security or of liberty, of prosperity or of fairness, of competence or of integrity. The framing of the question predisposes the answer the public gives, and the government that frames the question on favourable terms enters the contest with an advantage the opposition must overcome. The terms of debate are not neutral; they are shaped by the centre, and the shaping is the work conducted before the contest begins.

The management of the agenda is the management of the questions the public and the legislature consider at a given time. The agenda is set by the government's choice of the measures it presents, the order in which it presents them, and the timing of the presentation; the agenda is set by the government's choice of the issues it raises and the issues it leaves to the opposition to raise. The opposition that succeeds in placing its issue on the agenda forces the government to contest on

the opposition's terms, and the government that succeeds in keeping the opposition's issue off the agenda forces the opposition to contest on the government's terms. The agenda is the instrument through which the government manages the terms of the contest, and the agenda is managed through the legislative timetable, the executive calendar, the public statements, and the choice of the moments at which the government speaks and the moments at which it is silent.

The prevention of the opposition's reframing is the prevention of the opposition's redefinition of the question on which the contest is conducted. The opposition that redefines the question — that turns a question of competence into a question of integrity, that turns a question of policy into a question of legitimacy, that turns a question of means into a question of ends — shifts the contest to terms on which the government's defences are weaker. The government's response is the reassertion of the original frame, the demonstration that the reframing misrepresents the question, and the construction of the alternative frame that incorporates the legitimate concerns the opposition has raised without conceding the terms the opposition has proposed. The work of the reassertion and the reconstruction is continuous, because the opposition's reframing is continuous, and the government that loses the frame loses the contest regardless of the merits of the policy.

Lee Kuan Yew's management of the terms of debate in Singapore illustrates the management in its developed form: the framing of the questions of security, multiracial harmony, economic development, and the integrity of the public service as the questions on which the government was assessed, and the prevention of the opposition's reframing as questions of civil liberty and the concentration of power, were the discipline of the Singapore management. De Gaulle's framing in the Fifth Republic illustrates the management in a different setting: the framing of the constitution, decolonisation, the independence of the foreign policy, and the modernisation of the economy as the questions on which the government's legitimacy rested, and the prevention of the reframing as questions of the personal power of the president, were the French discipline. The American management across the party system illustrates the management in a separation-of-powers setting: the framing of the questions by the party in power, the contest of the frames by the opposition, and the role of the press and the academy as the intermediaries through which the frames are tested. The Venetian management of the patrician debate illustrates the management in an oligarchic setting: the framing by the doge and the councils, and the prevention of the reframing through the procedural disciplines of the councils.

17.6 The Boundary with Adversaries

The boundary between opposition and adversaries is the line at which the activity of the actor crosses from the contest within the framework into the contest against the framework. The opposition operates within the constitutional order: it contests the elections, it argues in the legislature, it publishes, it organises, and it seeks the displacement of the government by the means the constitution provides. The adversary operates outside the constitutional order: it seeks the overthrow of the order, the displacement of the regime, or the secession of a part of the jurisdiction, and it employs the means the constitutional order prohibits. The boundary is the line at which the means the actor employs or the ends the actor pursues cease to be those the constitutional order permits, and the crossing of the line is the crossing from opposition into adversarial conduct.

When the opposition crosses the line, the management shifts from engagement to containment. The engagement the centre conducts with the opposition — the dialogue, the consultation, the incorporation of concerns — is suspended, and the containment the centre conducts with the adversaries — the surveillance, the restriction, the prosecution — is initiated. The shift is not the shift the centre undertakes lightly, because the shift that classifies the opposition as the adversary removes the channels through which the opposition's concerns were addressed and the channels through which the opposition's information reached the centre. The shift is the shift the centre undertakes when the conduct of the actor leaves no alternative, and the shift is undertaken with the evidence that supports the classification and the procedures the constitutional order provides.

The centre's judgment on the crossing is the judgment on the assessment of the conduct, the intent, and the capacity of the actor. The conduct is the conduct the actor has engaged in: the public statements, the organisational activity, the financial transactions, and the contacts with the foreign and the subversive actors. The intent is the intent the conduct reveals: the intent to displace the government within the framework, the intent to displace the regime outside the framework, or the intent to secede from the jurisdiction. The capacity is the capacity the actor commands: the capacity to mobilise the constituency, the capacity to disrupt the public order, and the capacity to challenge the state's monopoly of force. The assessment of the conduct, the intent, and the capacity is the assessment on which the centre's judgment rests, and the judgment is revised as the assessment changes.

The French management of the opposition across the Republics illustrates the boundary and the judgment in their developed form. The Third Republic's management of the revolutionary opposition — the anarchist, the syndicalist, and the revolutionary socialist movements that rejected the Republic itself — illustrates the shift from engagement to containment: the movements that contested policy were engaged, the movements that contested the existence of the Republic were contained, and the line was drawn on the means employed and the ends pursued. The Habsburg management of the nationalist opposition illustrates the boundary in a multinational setting: the movements that sought the autonomy of the crownlands were engaged, the movements that sought secession were contained, and the judgment was revised as the conduct changed across the decades. The Venetian management of the patrician opposition illustrates the boundary in an oligarchic setting: the factions that contested the policy of the councils were engaged, the factions that conspired against the councils were contained, and the line was drawn on the conspiracy the evidence disclosed. The form differed; the line and the judgment were common.

17.7 Chapter Summary

Opposition is the activity of the actors who challenge the government within the legitimate framework of the political order, and the management of opposition is the centre's craft of engaging, co-opting, and shaping the terms of the contest. The distinction from adversaries is the distinction between the actors who contest the government and the actors who contest the framework: the opposition is managed through engagement, co-optation, and the management of the terms of debate; the adversaries are managed through containment. The recognition that opposition is a feature of the political order, not a pathology, is the recognition on which the

management rests, and the suppression of the opposition is more dangerous than its management because the suppression removes the channels through which the centre learns what it needs to know. The identification of the opposition — institutional, sectoral, ideological, and personal — and the assessment of each along the basis, resources, constituency, and intensity are the precondition for the management.

The management through engagement is the management of the relationship through dialogue, consultation, and the incorporation of concerns, and the engagement is distinct from concession: the centre engages the opposition on the measures it modifies, defers, reframes, and proceeds with unchanged. The management through co-optation is the management through the incorporation of opposition figures into the government's apparatus, the appointment to advisory roles, and the offering of positions that transform opposition into responsibility, and the limits are the loss of constituency and the loss of direction. The management of the terms of debate is the management of the questions, the agenda, and the prevention of the reframing, and the terms of debate are not neutral: they are shaped by the centre, and the government that loses the frame loses the contest regardless of the merits of the policy. The boundary with adversaries is the line at which the opposition crosses into the contest against the framework, and the crossing of the line shifts the management from engagement to containment.

The comparative record confirms the craft. The British formalisation of the loyal opposition, the French management of the opposition across the Republics, the Meiji management through the Diet, the Habsburg management of the nationalist opposition, the Venetian management of the patrician opposition, the American management across the party system, Bismarck's management of the Reichstag opposition, and Lee Kuan Yew's management in Singapore each illustrate the management of the opposition as a feature of the political order. The form differed across the settings; the principle that the opposition is a feature, not a pathology, and that the centre manages it through engagement, co-optation, and the shaping of the terms of debate, was common. The government that manages the opposition well secures the conditions for the conduct of its programme; the government that manages the opposition poorly, by suppression or by capitulation, loses the conditions on which the conduct of the programme depends.

Chapter 18 — The Management of Adversaries

Adversaries as actors who operate outside the legitimate framework to damage, delegitimize, or overthrow the government. The centre's craft is the management of adversaries through containment, neutralization, and the management of the conditions that give them support.

18.1 Who Adversaries Are

Adversaries are actors who operate outside the legitimate framework to damage, delegitimize, or overthrow the government. They differ from opposition in that opposition challenges the government within the framework, while adversaries challenge the framework itself. The line between opposition and adversary is uncertain at the edges, but the distinction is decisive: opposition competes for the powers the government holds; adversaries seek the destruction of those powers or of the order that confers them. The government that mistakes opposition for adversaries widens the terrain of conflict unnecessarily, and the government that mistakes adversaries for opposition concedes the advantage of surprise.

The distinction matters because the management differs. Opposition is managed through the ordinary instruments of political contest — the timetable, the budget, the public argument, the coalition — and the management is bounded by the framework the opposition accepts. Adversaries, by operating outside the framework, force the centre into the terrain between legal and effective, where the instruments are different, the constraints are different, and the risks of overreach are larger. The centre's recognition of the distinction is the first act of management: the opposition is contested; the adversary is contained and, where the conditions permit, neutralized. The conflation of the two is the common failure, and the failure produces either the repression of legitimate opposition or the indulgence of genuine adversaries.

The adversary takes four principal forms. The ideological adversary is the actor whose commitment to a doctrine places the destruction of the existing order among the actor's objectives: the communist parties of the interwar period, the anarchist networks of the late nineteenth century, the radical religious movements that deny the legitimacy of the secular state. The interest-driven adversary is the actor whose material position is so damaged by the government's policy that the actor is prepared to operate outside the framework to defeat the policy: the landowners displaced by reform, the monopolists threatened by regulation, the regional interests whose position a centralization threatens. The personal adversary is the actor whose grievance is the denial of office, honour, or recognition the actor believed owed, and whose ambition turns to destruction when the channels of advancement close. The external-backed adversary is the actor whose hostility is sustained by a foreign power's resources, direction, or protection, and whose action is conducted in coordination with the foreign power's interests.

The Venetian Council of Ten managed all four types across the centuries of the Republic's life. The ideological adversaries who carried republican or monarchical doctrines hostile to the aristocratic constitution were watched in the schools and the presses; the interest-driven adversaries among the patriciate, whose commercial ruin disposed them to conspiracy, were watched in the

debt records and the partnership books; the personal adversaries whose denied office turned to treachery were watched in the correspondence and the travel; the external-backed adversaries in the pay of the Habsburgs, the papacy, or the Ottoman Porte were watched at the frontier and in the diplomatic post. The Council's recognition of the four types shaped the four registers of response, and the recognition was the discipline that allowed a small aristocratic government to manage the threats a commercial republic confronted across five centuries. The four types persist across regimes, and the centre's recognition of the type determines the register of the response.

18.2 The Identification and Assessment of Adversaries

The identification of adversaries is the first task of management, and the identification precedes the response. The centre maintains a continuous map of the actors whose conduct places them outside the framework: the networks they form, the resources they command, the constituencies they address, the objectives they pursue, and the methods they employ. The identification is conducted through the instruments of intelligence — the surveillance of the communications, the penetration of the networks, the cultivation of informants, the observation of the public conduct — and the discipline of the identification is the discipline of distinguishing the adversary from the opposition and the dissenter. The dissenter criticizes; the opposition contests; the adversary acts outside the framework to damage, delegitimize, or overthrow. The conflation of the three is the failure that produces both the repression of dissent and the indulgence of conspiracy.

The assessment of the adversary is the assessment of the threat the adversary poses, and the assessment is conducted along three axes. The likelihood that the adversary will act is the function of the adversary's resources, the adversary's commitments, and the conditions the adversary confronts. The severity of the action the adversary is capable of is the function of the adversary's capacity and the vulnerability of the target. The time horizon within which the action is likely is the function of the adversary's preparations and the centre's countermeasures. The three axes together produce the ranking of the adversaries, and the ranking informs the allocation of the centre's attention and instruments.

The assessment is revised continuously, because the adversary's position changes with the conditions and the centre's countermeasures. The adversary who is contained today may be emboldened tomorrow by a shift in the conditions; the adversary who is dormant today may be activated tomorrow by a triggering event; the adversary who is weak today may be strengthened tomorrow by an external sponsor. The assessment is therefore a living document, maintained by the designated officers and reported to the principals at the regular intervals the cycle of government requires. The centre that assesses its adversaries once and forgets the assessment will be surprised by the adversary who moved, and the surprise is the failure the assessment was intended to prevent.

The Habsburg monarchy's management of the revolutionary movements of 1848 illustrates the identification and the assessment in their developed form. Metternich's police and the agencies that succeeded them maintained continuous records of the liberal nationalists, the democratic republicans, the socialists, and the national movements across the empire's crownlands — the figures, the networks, the foreign connections, the publications, the conspiracies. The assessment

failed in 1848 because the conditions shifted faster than the assessment tracked: the harvest failures, the fiscal crisis, the demonstration effect of the Paris rising, and the moderation of the imperial response combined to activate adversaries the assessment had ranked as dormant. The lesson the Habsburg centre drew, and the lesson the successor empires applied in the decades that followed, was the discipline of continuous revision and the recognition that the adversary's strength is a function of the conditions the centre itself shapes.

18.3 Containment

Containment is the primary strategy of the management of adversaries. The strategy is the restriction of the adversary's space, the limitation of the adversary's resources, and the isolation of the adversary from potential supporters. Containment is the strategy of the long term: it does not seek the destruction of the adversary, and it does not seek the frontal confrontation the adversary may welcome; it seeks the conditions under which the adversary's work is harder and less rewarding, and under which the adversary's appeal to the constituency is reduced. Containment is the strategy of the centre that recognizes the adversary as a feature of the political terrain the centre must manage rather than as a problem the centre can solve. The recognition is the recognition that the adversary who is destroyed may be succeeded by the adversary who is worse, and the adversary who is contained may be superseded by the constituency who has reconciled.

The restriction of the adversary's space is the conduct of the centre's instruments — the law, the administration, the public platform, the access to resources — in a manner that narrows the terrain on which the adversary operates. The adversary who organizes through associations is met by the regulation of associations; the adversary who organizes through the press is met by the management of the press's access and the cultivation of the press's competitors; the adversary who organizes through the schools is met by the management of the schools' staffing and the curriculum; the adversary who organizes through the regional administration is met by the centralization of the functions the adversary exploits. The restriction is conducted within the framework where the framework allows, and at the boundary of the framework where the framework requires. The centre's craft is in the conduct of the restriction without the crossing of the boundary that destroys the framework's legitimacy.

The limitation of the adversary's resources is the conduct of the centre's instruments — the tax, the regulation, the licensing, the procurement — in a manner that reduces the resources the adversary can command. The adversary who draws on foreign funding is met by the regulation of the foreign funding; the adversary who draws on the contributions of the constituency is met by the competition for the constituency's loyalty; the adversary who draws on the patronage of sympathetic businesses is met by the management of those businesses' relationships with the state. The isolation of the adversary from the potential supporters is the conduct of the centre's engagement with the constituency the adversary addresses, in a manner that reduces the constituency's willingness to support the adversary and increases the constituency's stake in the framework the adversary attacks.

Bismarck's management of the socialist movement through the Anti-Socialist Laws of 1878 illustrates containment in its developed form. The laws prohibited the socialist associations, the

socialist publications, and the socialist meetings, while leaving the socialist representation in the Reichstag untouched — the centre's recognition that the framework's boundaries prohibited the exclusion of the elected representatives even as the framework permitted the restriction of the extra-parliamentary organization. The containment reduced the movement's public space and raised the cost of its operations; the movement survived by adapting to the constraints, but the adaptation itself narrowed the movement's appeal and shifted its leadership toward the parliamentary register the centre controlled. The containment did not destroy the movement, because the conditions that gave the movement support — the urbanization, the industrial conflict, the absence of social insurance — persisted, and Bismarck's social legislation of the 1880s was the recognition that the containment of the adversary required the management of the conditions as well as the restriction of the space.

18.4 Neutralization

Neutralization is the reduction of the adversary's capacity to act, and the reduction is conducted through the co-optation of the adversary's supporters, the division of the adversary's leadership, and the redirection of the adversary's energy. Neutralization operates on the adversary's organization and the adversary's constituency, where containment operates on the adversary's space and resources. The co-optation of the supporters is the offering of the channels of advancement, recognition, and reward the adversary denies them — the office, the honour, the access, the policy concession — in a manner that shifts the supporters' interest from the adversary to the framework. The division of the leadership is the conduct of the centre's engagement with the leadership in a manner that exploits the differences of doctrine, of ambition, and of interest that the leadership contains. The two together reduce the adversary's capacity to mobilize.

The redirection of the adversary's energy is the conduct of the centre's instruments in a manner that channels the adversary's effort into the contests the centre can manage and away from the contests the centre cannot manage. The adversary who organizes around the local grievance is offered the local channel; the adversary who organizes around the doctrinal dispute is offered the doctrinal forum; the adversary who organizes around the personal ambition is offered the personal avenue. The redirection is the strategy of the centre that recognizes the adversary's energy as a feature of the political terrain the centre can shape, and the redirection succeeds when the adversary's energy is dissipated in the channels the framework provides. The redirection fails when the channels are too narrow for the energy, and the failure is the condition under which the redirection becomes the suppression and the suppression becomes the backlash.

The limits of neutralization are the limits of overreach. The adversary who is cornered — whose space is closed, whose resources are reduced, whose supporters are co-opted, whose leadership is divided, and whose energy is redirected — may become more dangerous than the adversary who is merely contained, because the cornered adversary has no exit and no stake in the framework. The centre that overreaches in the neutralization, by closing the channels of advancement to the adversary's constituency, by dividing the leadership through instruments that destroy the leadership's legitimacy, or by redirecting the energy through the suppression of the alternatives, creates the conditions for the backlash the neutralization was intended to prevent. The

recognition of the limits is the recognition that the neutralization must leave the adversary and the adversary's constituency a stake in the framework the centre defends.

De Gaulle's management of the Organisation armée secrète in 1961 and 1962 illustrates neutralization and its limits. The OAS was the organization of the officers and the settlers who rejected the Evian negotiations on Algerian independence and turned to violence against the French state. De Gaulle's response combined the containment of the organization through the police and the military instruments with the neutralization of the constituency: the settlers were offered the relocation, the compensation, and the recognition the framework provided; the officers were offered the reintegration, the honourable retirement, and the channels of advancement the army afforded. The neutralization divided the OAS leadership between the doctrinal hard core and the practical officers, and the division reduced the organization's capacity to act. The limits of the neutralization appeared in the persistence of the hard core — the small number of officers and settlers for whom no channel within the framework was acceptable — and the centre's recognition that the hard core could not be co-opted and must be contained by the law.

18.5 The Management of the Conditions

The management of the conditions that give adversaries support is the long-term response, and the long-term response is the address of the grievances the adversaries exploit, the correction of the failures the adversaries expose, and the strengthening of the institutions the adversaries attack. The recognition that the adversary is a symptom as well as a threat is the recognition that the adversary's strength is the function of the conditions the centre shapes. The management of the conditions is the management of the adversary's recruitment, the adversary's legitimacy, and the adversary's capacity to mobilize. The centre that addresses only the adversary and not the conditions will face the adversary's successor; the centre that addresses the conditions as well as the adversary reduces the terrain on which the successor can form.

The address of the grievances is the conduct of the policy in a manner that reduces the constituency's stake in the adversary. The grievance may be the economic dispossession the adversary organizes around, the regional exclusion the adversary exploits, the confessional discrimination the adversary mobilizes, the generational blockage the adversary channels, or the institutional failure the adversary exposes. The address is the conduct of the policy — the economic reform, the regional investment, the confessional accommodation, the generational renewal, the institutional repair — in a manner that reduces the grievance and the constituency's stake in the adversary's response. The address is the long-term work of the centre, conducted in the cycle of the policy rather than in the cycle of the crisis.

The correction of the failures and the strengthening of the institutions are the structural counterpart to the address of the grievances. The failures the adversaries expose — the corruption the adversary denounces, the impunity the adversary mobilizes against, the incompetence the adversary exploits — are the failures the centre must correct, because the failure left uncorrected is the adversary's strongest argument. The institutions the adversaries attack — the courts the adversary denounces as partial, the legislature the adversary denounces as unrepresentative, the administration the adversary denounces as captured — are the institutions the centre must

strengthen, because the institution left weak is the institution the adversary's alternative competes with. The management of the conditions is therefore the conduct of the reform programme as a counterpart to the management of the adversary, and the two are conducted together because the one without the other leaves the adversary's terrain intact.

The British management of the Irish nationalist movement across the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries illustrates the management of the conditions and its limits. The address of the grievances — Catholic Emancipation in 1829, the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 1869, the land acts of 1870, 1881, and 1903, the local government reforms of 1898 — reduced the constituency's stake in the most extreme forms of the nationalist movement and strengthened the constitutional nationalists who worked within the framework. The failure to address the constitutional question — the failure to settle Home Rule in the 1880s and 1890s, the Ulster question in 1912 and 1914, and the aftermath of the Easter Rising in 1916 — left the conditions that gave the separatist movement its support, and the centre that had managed the grievances was overtaken by the constitutional failure it had not addressed. The lesson is that the management of the conditions requires the address of the grievance and the constitutional question together.

18.6 The Boundary of the Legitimate

The boundary of the legitimate is the boundary within which the centre's management of the adversaries operates, and the boundary is set by the constitutional order the centre defends. The centre's instruments — the law, the administration, the intelligence, the police, the military — are the instruments the constitutional order provides, and the conduct of the instruments in the management of the adversaries is the conduct within the constitutional order. The crossing of the boundary — the use of the instruments beyond the constitutional authority, the suspension of the constitutional protections, the violation of the constitutional rights of the adversary and the adversary's constituency — is the centre's failure rather than the centre's success. The government that destroys the constitutional order to defeat its adversaries has defeated itself, because the government that has destroyed the order has destroyed the legitimacy on which its authority rests.

The boundary is a zone rather than a single line, and the zone is the terrain between legal and effective. The centre operates in the zone where the law is unclear, the authority is contested, and the instruments are uncertain; the centre's craft is the navigation of the zone without the crossing of the boundary that destroys the order. The navigation requires the discipline of the legal authority: the certification of the instruments by the officers whose function is the certification, the documentation of the conduct, the accountability to the oversight institutions, and the readiness to defend the conduct before the legislature and the courts. The centre that operates in the zone without the discipline of the legal authority crosses the boundary by increments, and the increments accumulate into the crossing the centre did not intend.

The boundary is defended by the centre's recognition of the adversary's rights within the framework. The adversary who is outside the framework retains the rights the framework confers: the right to due process, the right to freedom of expression up to the point of incitement, the right to association up to the point of conspiracy, and the right to political contest up to the point of violence. The centre's recognition of the rights is the centre's recognition of the framework's

legitimacy, and the recognition is the centre's principal defence against the adversary's claim to the moral high ground. The adversary whose rights the centre violates acquires the legitimacy the adversary could not have acquired by the adversary's own conduct, and the legitimacy is the resource the adversary uses to recruit, to mobilize, and to delegitimize the centre.

The American management of the communist movement through the Cold War illustrates the boundary and its management across four decades. The instruments of the management — the Smith Act prosecutions, the loyalty programmes, the congressional investigations, the surveillance programmes, the counterintelligence operations — were conducted under the legal authority the Congress provided and the courts reviewed, and the conduct was contested at the boundary throughout the period. The Supreme Court's revisions of the doctrine — the clear-and-present-danger test, the incitement standard, the limits on the congressional investigation — were the corrections of the boundary by the branch whose function is the correction, and the corrections preserved the legitimacy of the management even where the management's instruments were narrowed. The centre's recognition that the management must operate within the constitutional order the centre defended was the principal reason the management did not produce the backlash the comparable European managements of the interwar period had produced, and the recognition is the lesson the comparative record confirms.

18.7 Chapter Summary

Adversaries are actors who operate outside the legitimate framework to damage, delegitimize, or overthrow the government, and the centre's management of adversaries is the management through containment, neutralization, and the management of the conditions that give them support. The distinction from opposition is the distinction between the actor who challenges the government within the framework and the actor who challenges the framework itself; the recognition of the distinction is the first act of management. The four types — the ideological, the interest-driven, the personal, and the external-backed — each call for a different register of response, and the centre's recognition of the type determines the register. The identification and the assessment of the adversary — the networks, the resources, the constituencies, the objectives, the methods, and the likelihood, the severity, and the time horizon — are the continuous work on which the management rests.

Containment is the primary strategy: the restriction of the adversary's space, the limitation of the adversary's resources, and the isolation of the adversary from the potential supporters, conducted within the framework where the framework allows and at the boundary where the framework requires. Neutralization is the reduction of the adversary's capacity to act, conducted through the co-optation of the supporters, the division of the leadership, and the redirection of the energy, with the recognition that the cornered adversary and the overreaching centre both produce the backlash the management was intended to prevent. The management of the conditions — the address of the grievances, the correction of the failures, the strengthening of the institutions — is the long-term response, and the management is the recognition that the adversary is a symptom as well as a threat. The boundary of the legitimate is the boundary within which the centre's

management operates, and the boundary is defended by the centre's discipline and the centre's recognition of the adversary's rights within the framework.

The comparative record confirms the craft. The Venetian Council of Ten's management of the four types of adversary across the centuries; the Habsburg monarchy's identification and assessment of the revolutionary movements and the lessons of 1848; Bismarck's containment of the socialist movement through the Anti-Socialist Laws and the social legislation that addressed the conditions; de Gaulle's neutralization of the Organisation armée secrète through the combination of the police and the political instruments; the British management of the Irish nationalist movement through the address of the grievances and the limits the constitutional failure exposed; the American management of the communist movement through the Cold War and the Supreme Court's corrections of the boundary. The government that destroys the constitutional order to defeat its adversaries has defeated itself; the government that manages its adversaries within the order secures the conditions for the order's continuance.

Chapter 19 — The Stakeholder Map

Part V: The Centre's Craft — The operational tools and techniques by which the centre conducts its work. The stakeholder map is the centre's primary operational instrument.

19.1 What the Stakeholder Map Is

The stakeholder map is the comprehensive, living document that captures the government's relationships with the actors on whom it depends. The actors include the heads of the branches, the senior officials of the line ministries, the leaders of the major parties, the figures of the economic elite, the heads of the academy and the media, the diplomatic representatives of the foreign governments, and the secretariats of the multilateral institutions. Each actor is entered with name, position, and a structured assessment of the actor's relationship to the government and to the other actors. The map is comprehensive by design, because an actor omitted from the map is an actor the centre will not have considered when the time comes to act.

The distinction from a contact list is the distinction between a register of names and a representation of relationships. A contact list identifies the actors by name, position, and channel; it answers the questions of who and how to reach. A stakeholder map captures the relationships, the dependencies, and the dynamics among the actors and between the actors and the government; it answers the questions of what each actor wants, what each actor can do, and how the actors are connected. The contact list is the substrate; the map is the structure built on the substrate. A centre that works from a contact list conducts its meetings without preparation and its decisions without anticipation, because the list does not show the centre what it is about to walk into.

The stakeholder map is the centre's primary operational instrument. Every meeting the centre conducts is prepared through the map: the centre reviews the actor's position, interest, influence, and relationship, and the actor's connections to the other actors who will be affected by the meeting. Every decision the centre takes is assessed through the map: the centre identifies the actors whose positions will shift, the actors whose interests will be touched, and the actors whose responses will shape the implementation. Every intervention the centre makes is planned through the map: the centre sequences the engagements, the communications, and the inducements to move the relevant actors toward the desired positions. The map is the instrument through which the centre converts its knowledge of the stakeholder landscape into the conduct of its work.

The Venetian Republic's mapping of its merchant and diplomatic networks illustrates the function in its developed historical form. The Council of Ten and the state inquisitors maintained a continuous record of the patriciate's commercial partnerships, family alliances, debt obligations, and diplomatic correspondences, and the record was used to anticipate the political effects of commercial events, to identify the figures whose positions in the network gave them influence beyond their formal office, and to prepare the dispatches that went to the ambassadors abroad and the magistrates at home. The Venetian *relazioni*, the reports the ambassadors submitted to the Senate on their return, were structured to feed the map: the actors at the foreign court, the factions among them, the interests they pursued, and the relationships they held with Venice and with each

other. The form was Venetian; the principle that the management of dependencies requires the mapping of the actors is general.

19.2 The Construction of the Map

The construction of the stakeholder map proceeds in four steps. The first step is the identification of the actors in the government's environment, conducted by name, position, and the institutional address at which the actor is reached. The second step is the assessment of each actor's position, interest, influence, and relationship to the government, conducted through the structured assessment that follows. The third step is the mapping of the relationships among the actors: the alliances, the rivalries, the dependencies, and the flows of influence that connect them. The fourth step is the documentation of the sources, the assessments, and the reasoning, so that each entry can be checked, defended, and revised as the evidence changes.

The construction draws on four sources. The centre's own knowledge is the first: the principal's direct acquaintance with the actors, the meetings the centre has conducted, the correspondence the centre has exchanged, and the observations the centre's officers have made over years of engagement. The intelligence apparatus is the second: the assessments produced by the service that reports to the centre, the reporting from the stations abroad and the field offices at home, and the long-form analyses that place the individual actor in the wider setting. The line ministries are the third: the working knowledge each ministry holds of the actors in its domain, gathered in the course of regulation, contracting, and consultation. The public record is the fourth: the parliamentary proceedings, the press, the financial disclosures, the court judgments, the academic studies, and the open-source reporting that supplies the verifiable substrate of the map.

The integration of the four sources is the centre's work, and the work is judgment, not compilation. The sources disagree: the centre's knowledge and the intelligence assessment may diverge on an actor's position; the line ministry's account and the public record may diverge on an actor's influence. The centre resolves the disagreements through the assessment of the sources, the weighting of the evidence, and the entry of the assessment with the basis on which it was made. The map that integrates the sources well is the instrument the centre can use with confidence; the map that compiles the sources without integration is a stack of reports the centre will not trust when the decision must be taken.

The French monarchy's mapping of the court and the nobility illustrates the construction in its developed historical form. Under Louis XIV and his successors, the king's ministers maintained continuous records of the marriages, the debts, the offices, the pensions, the quarrels, and the alliances that constituted the structure of the court, and the records were built up from the reports of the intendants in the provinces, the lieutenant general of police in Paris, the ambassadors abroad, the household officials at Versailles, and the public record of the court's ceremonies and the parlement's proceedings. The memoirs of Saint-Simon and the correspondence of the ministers document the working of the system in its detail: the dukes and the ministers, the princes of the blood and the favourites, the confessors and the financiers, each entered with the position, the interest, the influence, and the relationship that the monarchy needed to know. The French map was

the instrument through which the monarchy managed a nobility it could not abolish and a court it could not do without.

19.3 The Assessment of Each Stakeholder

The assessment of each stakeholder comprises four elements: position, interest, influence, and relationship. The position is the stakeholder's stance toward the government and its programme: supportive, neutral, oppositional, or adversarial. The interest is what the stakeholder wants from the government: the policy outcomes the stakeholder seeks, the resources the stakeholder needs, the recognition the stakeholder values, and the access the stakeholder requires. The influence is the stakeholder's capacity to affect the government's objectives: the levers the stakeholder can pull, the constituencies the stakeholder can move, and the costs the stakeholder can impose. The relationship is the history and the current state of the government's engagement with the stakeholder: the meetings conducted, the agreements reached, the breaches suffered, and the trust accumulated or the trust lost.

The position and the interest are assessed together because the position follows from the interest. A stakeholder whose interests the government's programme advances will tend to a supportive position; a stakeholder whose interests the programme damages will tend to an oppositional or adversarial position; a stakeholder whose interests are not touched will tend to a neutral position, until the programme shifts in a direction that touches them. The assessment of the interest is therefore the foundation of the assessment of the position, and the assessment of the interest is conducted through the observation of what the stakeholder says, what the stakeholder does, and what the stakeholder has done in the past when comparable questions arose. The position entered on the map is the position the centre has inferred from this evidence, with the basis recorded and the inference open to revision.

The influence and the relationship are assessed together because the influence is shaped by the relationship. A stakeholder with strong formal levers and a poor relationship with the government may exercise less influence than the formal position suggests, because the government will route around the stakeholder where it can. A stakeholder with weak formal levers and a strong relationship may exercise more influence than the formal position suggests, because the government will consult the stakeholder and weight the stakeholder's views. The relationship is assessed through the history of the engagement: the frequency and the substance of the contact, the agreements kept and the agreements broken, the personal standing between the principals on each side, and the accumulation of trust or distrust across the years. The influence entered on the map is the influence the centre has observed, modulated by the relationship the centre has built.

The British management of the Indian political landscape through the residents and the political officers illustrates the assessment in its developed form. The resident at each princely court maintained a continuous assessment of the prince's position toward the paramount power, the interest the prince pursued, the influence the prince exercised over his own court and his neighbours, and the relationship the resident had built with the prince and the prince's ministers. The political department of the India Office and the foreign department of the Government of India consolidated the residents' assessments into the regional and all-India maps, and the maps were

revised as the princes aged, the ministers changed, the succession disputes developed, and the relationships with the paramount power shifted. The Cold War contesting states conducted corresponding assessments of the political actors on the opposing side and on the non-aligned periphery, with the position, the interest, the influence, and the relationship entered for each actor in the working dossiers the foreign ministries and the intelligence services maintained. The scale of the mapping was unprecedented; the four elements of the assessment were familiar.

19.4 The Mapping of Relationships

The mapping of relationships is the identification of the connections among the stakeholders, distinct from the assessment of each stakeholder taken alone. The alliances are the durable connections through which two or more stakeholders coordinate their positions: the party factions, the family networks, the business partnerships, the ideological affinities. The rivalries are the durable connections through which two or more stakeholders oppose each other: the successions disputed, the markets contested, the jurisdictions overlapping, the factions competing for the same constituency. The dependencies are the connections through which one stakeholder depends on another: the financial dependencies, the informational dependencies, the personal dependencies, the institutional dependencies. The flows of influence are the connections through which the position of one stakeholder shapes the position of another, moving through the alliances, the dependencies, and the hierarchies the stakeholders occupy.

The relationship map is the complement to the stakeholder assessment, and the two are used together. The stakeholder assessment captures each actor as an individual: the position, the interest, the influence, and the relationship. The relationship map captures the system: the configuration formed by the actors and their connections, the points at which the system is concentrated, the points at which the system is fragile, and the points at which an intervention will move more than the actor directly engaged. The centre that reads the stakeholder assessment without the relationship map sees the actors but not the system; the centre that reads the relationship map without the stakeholder assessment sees the system but not the actors. The two are read together, and the reading is the basis for the centre's anticipation of how the stakeholder landscape will respond to a decision.

The relationship map is the instrument through which the centre anticipates the indirect effects of its actions. A decision that touches one stakeholder will touch, through the alliances and the dependencies, the stakeholders connected to the first; an intervention that displaces one stakeholder will leave, through the rivalries and the flows, the connected stakeholders in altered positions. The centre that reads the relationship map before it acts identifies the chains of effect and the points at which the chains will fork, and the centre adjusts the decision, the timing, and the sequence to manage the chains it has identified. The centre that does not read the map acts on the immediate stakeholder and discovers the indirect effects when they arrive as surprises.

The Meiji oligarchs' mapping of the han leaderships and the new business groups illustrates the relationship map in its developed form. The oligarchs who carried through the restoration maintained, from the first years of the new regime, a continuous mapping of the factions that had formed around the domains — Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa, Hizen — and of the relationships among

the factions: the alliances that held the oligarchic coalition together, the rivalries that threatened to divide it, the dependencies of the newer figures on the founding oligarchs, and the flows of influence that ran from the oligarchs to the bureaucracy, the army, the navy, the court, and the new business groups forming around the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda houses. The map was revised as the factions merged, split, and recombined across the decades of the Meiji, Taishō, and early Shōwa periods, and the revisions informed the timing of the cabinet formations, the budget negotiations, the military expansions, and the commercial concessions. The form was Japanese; the principle that the management of an elite requires the mapping of its relationships is general.

19.5 The Maintenance of the Map

The maintenance of the map is the continuous work of keeping the map current. The stakeholder landscape changes continuously: stakeholders enter through appointment, election, marriage, and inheritance; stakeholders exit through death, retirement, dismissal, and disgrace; positions shift as interests are touched; influence waxes and wanes as constituencies move and resources accumulate or deplete; relationships form, strengthen, weaken, and dissolve as the work of government proceeds. The map that is produced once and filed ceases to represent the landscape within months, and the centre that acts on a stale map acts on a representation of the landscape as it was. The maintenance is therefore a continuous function, conducted alongside the other continuous functions of the centre, and the function is discharged through the regular update, the regular reassessment, and the regular adjustment.

The regular update is the continuous entry of new observations into the map. The new appointments, the new elections, the new marriages, the new partnerships, the new quarrels, and the new alignments are entered as they occur, with the date, the source, and the effect on the assessment recorded. The update is the work of the officer or the unit assigned to the maintenance of the map, and the work is conducted through the routine flow of the centre's knowledge: the meetings the centre conducts, the reports the centre receives, the press the centre reads, and the intelligence the centre is given. The map that is updated continuously is the map that is current on the day the centre must act; the map that is updated in periodic bursts is the map that is current on the day after the last burst.

The regular reassessment is the periodic review of the map as a whole, conducted to identify the shifts in the landscape that the entry of individual observations may have concealed. The reassessment asks whether the positions, the interests, the influences, and the relationships entered on the map still hold; whether the stakeholders the centre has been treating as central are still central; and whether the stakeholders the centre has been neglecting have moved into positions the centre must address. The regular adjustment is the revision of the centre's strategy in light of the reassessment: the cultivation of the new stakeholders, the reduced attention to the stakeholders whose positions have weakened, the revision of the engagement plans, and the reweighting of the centre's time and attention. The discipline of the regular reassessment and the regular adjustment is the discipline that keeps the map aligned with the landscape and the centre's strategy aligned with the map.

Bismarck's mapping of the Reichstag parties and the interest groups illustrates the maintenance of the map as a living document. The parties of the Reichstag — the Conservatives, the National Liberals, the Free Conservatives, the Centre, the Progressives, the Social Democrats, the particularists — and the interest groups — the Agrarian League, the Central Association of German Industrialists, the Hanseatic merchant houses, the Catholic associations, the Protestant brotherhoods — were continuously reassessed as the electoral cycles turned, the leaders aged and were replaced, the factions split and recombined, and the issues shifted from the Kulturkampf to the tariff to the colonial question to the naval bills. The adjustments the chancellor made to the coalition strategy — the cultivation of the agrarians when the tariff was at issue, the cultivation of the Centre when the Kulturkampf was to be wound down, the cultivation of the National Liberals when the trade policy was at issue — followed from the reassessments, and the reassessments followed from the continuous update of the map. The form was Bismarckian; the discipline of the living document is general.

19.6 The Use of the Map

The use of the map is the application of the map to the centre's operational work. The map is used in the preparation for meetings, the assessment of decisions, the identification of risks and opportunities, and the planning of interventions. Every meeting the centre conducts, every decision the centre takes, and every intervention the centre makes is prepared through the map. The centre that prepares its work through the map conducts its work with the knowledge of the landscape the map provides, and the centre that prepares its work without the map conducts its work without that knowledge.

The preparation for a meeting is the review of the stakeholder to be met: the stakeholder's position, interest, influence, and relationship, and the stakeholder's connections to the other actors who will be affected by what is said. The assessment of a decision is the identification of the stakeholders whose positions will shift, whose interests will be touched, and whose responses will shape the implementation, and the sequencing of the engagements and the communications that will move the stakeholders toward the desired positions. The two uses are connected: the meeting is conducted with the decision in mind, and the decision is taken with the meeting's outcome in mind. The centre that prepares its meetings through the map and assesses its decisions through the map conducts its work with the continuity the stakeholder landscape requires.

The identification of risks and opportunities is the reading of the map for the stakeholders whose positions are shifting, whose interests are converging or diverging, and whose influence is rising or falling. The risks are the shifts the centre must arrest: the stakeholder moving toward an oppositional position, the alliance forming against the government's programme, the dependency growing to a degree that constrains the centre's freedom of action. The opportunities are the shifts the centre can use: the stakeholder moving toward a supportive position, the alliance forming in support of the programme, the dependency the centre can convert into a durable relationship. The planning of interventions is the design of the engagements, the communications, and the inducements that will move the relevant stakeholders toward the desired positions, sequenced through the relationship map so that the indirect effects work with the centre.

Lee Kuan Yew's mapping of the Singapore elite illustrates the use of the map in its developed form. The networks of the civil service, the armed forces, the statutory boards, the government-linked companies, the professional firms, the trade unions, and the community organisations were continuously mapped, and the map was used in the preparation for the meetings with the heads of the institutions, the assessment of the policy decisions that touched the institutions, the identification of the risks and the opportunities the institutions presented, and the planning of the interventions the government made through the institutions. The cultivation of the rising figures, the posting of the senior officers, the timing of the leadership transitions, and the management of the public responses to the government's programme were each prepared through the map, and the preparation was the work of the operational craft the centre exercised. The form was Singaporean; the principle that the centre's operational craft is worked through the map is general.

19.7 Chapter Summary

The stakeholder map is the comprehensive, living document that captures the government's relationships with the actors on whom it depends. The map is distinct from a contact list: the contact list identifies the actors; the map captures the relationships, the dependencies, and the dynamics. The map is the centre's primary operational instrument: the basis for every meeting, every decision, every intervention. The construction of the map proceeds through the identification of the actors, the assessment of each actor's position, interest, influence, and relationship, the mapping of the relationships among the actors, and the documentation of the sources and the assessments. The four sources — the centre's own knowledge, the intelligence apparatus, the line ministries, and the public record — are integrated through the centre's judgment, and the integration is the work the map represents.

The relationship map is the complement to the stakeholder assessment, capturing the system of alliances, rivalries, dependencies, and flows of influence that connects the actors. The two are read together, and the reading is the basis for the centre's anticipation of how the stakeholder landscape will respond to a decision. The maintenance of the map is the continuous work of keeping the map current, conducted through the regular update, the regular reassessment, and the regular adjustment, and the discipline of the maintenance is the discipline that keeps the map aligned with the landscape and the centre's strategy aligned with the map. The use of the map is the application of the map to the centre's operational work: the preparation for meetings, the assessment of decisions, the identification of risks and opportunities, and the planning of interventions.

The historical record confirms the craft. The Venetian Republic's mapping of its merchant and diplomatic networks, the French monarchy's mapping of the court and the nobility at Versailles, the British mapping of the Indian political landscape through the residents and the political officers, the Meiji oligarchs' mapping of the han leaderships and the new business groups, Bismarck's mapping of the Reichstag parties and the interest groups, and Lee Kuan Yew's mapping of the Singapore elite each illustrate the function of the map as the centre's primary operational instrument. The American management of the stakeholder landscape through the interest group politics — the congressional leaderships, the committee chairs, the party caucuses, the trade associations, the labour federations, the advocacy groups, the think tanks, and the press — illustrates the function in

a large democratic jurisdiction in which the centre's authority over the stakeholders is constrained and the management of the stakeholders through the map is correspondingly central. The forms differ; the principle is constant: the stakeholder map is the instrument through which the centre converts its knowledge of the stakeholder landscape into the conduct of its work, and the centre that maintains the map poorly conducts its work poorly.

Chapter 20 — The Sensitive Meeting

The meeting between the centre's principal and a powerful actor: the operational craft of preparation, conduct, and follow-up. The sensitive meeting is the basic unit of the centre's relationship management.

20.1 What the Sensitive Meeting Is

The sensitive meeting is the meeting between the centre's principal and a powerful actor, conducted to manage a dependency, advance an objective, or address a risk. The principal is the first minister, the finance minister, the central bank governor, or another senior figure who carries the authority of the centre. The powerful actor is the head of a major bank, the chairman of a multinational subsidiary, the leader of a sectoral federation, the head of a religious institution, or the senior figure of a political faction. The sensitive meeting is the meeting in which the relationship between the centre and the actor is constituted, adjusted, or repaired, and the meeting is the instrument by which the relationship is moved from one state to another.

The distinction from the ordinary meeting is the distinction between a transaction and a relationship. An ordinary meeting exchanges information, confirms a decision, or completes a transaction, and the parties conduct their business and part without altering the relationship. A sensitive meeting involves an actor whose relationship with the government is material, whose cooperation is required for an objective the centre seeks, and whose reaction to the meeting will shape the relationship going forward. The ordinary meeting is conducted by the schedule; the sensitive meeting is conducted by the craft, and the craft is the discipline by which the centre secures the outcomes the relationship makes possible.

The sensitive meeting has been a tool of power throughout the history of the centre. Louis XIV held the lever and the coucher, the morning and evening rituals at which the high nobility attended, and held the private meetings with the ministers — Colbert, Louvois, Le Tellier — at which the business of the state was transacted. The British prime minister's meetings with the chairmen of the major banks and the leaders of industry, conducted in the private rooms at Downing Street, have shaped the relationship between the Treasury and the financial and industrial interests across two centuries. The Meiji oligarchs held the meetings with the heads of the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda houses at which the allocation of the government's patronage and the obligations of the houses were settled.

The sensitive meeting is prepared, conducted, and followed up with a craft that distinguishes the centre's work from the ordinary conduct of business. De Gaulle held the meetings with the leaders of the Algerian settler community in 1958 and 1961 at which the relationship between Paris and Algiers was redefined. The Venetian Doge received the foreign ambassadors in the Sala del Collegio, and the audiences were prepared, conducted, and followed up with the attention the Republic's interests required. Bismarck held the meetings with the leaders of the Reichstag parties at which the coalitions for the legislative session were assembled, and the Habsburg emperor held the audiences with the nationalist leaders of the crownlands at which the concessions and the

resistances of the centre to the demands of the nationalities were tested. The common lesson is the discipline: the preparation is the larger part, the conduct is the execution, and the follow-up is the realisation.

20.2 The Preparation

The preparation is the body of work that precedes the meeting, conducted by the centre's officials and reviewed by the principal. The preparation comprises the review of the stakeholder map, the briefing on the actor's position and interests, the definition of the meeting's objective, the strategy for the meeting, and the anticipation of the actor's concerns and objections. The preparation is the larger part of the craft: the meeting is the execution of the preparation, and the principal who enters the meeting without preparation enters at a disadvantage the actor will exploit. The preparation is conducted over days, not minutes, and the discipline of the preparation is the discipline by which the centre distinguishes the sensitive meeting from the ordinary.

The preparation begins with the review of the stakeholder map and the briefing on the actor. The stakeholder map identifies the actor's position in the relevant network, the actor's connections to other actors, and the actor's relationships with the centre. The briefing sets out the actor's interests, the actor's recent conduct, the actor's current preoccupations, and the actor's likely state of mind on the day of the meeting. The briefing records the actor's recent statements and decisions, the actor's relations with competitors and counterparts, the matters on which the actor has been pressed, and the figures whose counsel the actor will carry into the meeting. The briefing is the principal's window into the actor's position, and the briefing's quality determines the principal's readiness.

The objective of the meeting is the specific outcome the centre seeks: a commitment, a concession, a deferral, a message transmitted to the actor's network, or a relationship maintained at a level the centre requires. The objective is stated in one sentence and tested against the question of whether the meeting is the right instrument for the objective. The strategy is the plan by which the objective is to be achieved: the points the principal will make, the points the principal will concede, the points the principal will defer, and the points the principal will reserve for a later meeting. The strategy includes the anticipation of the actor's concerns and objections, the responses prepared for each, and the fallback positions the principal will take if the actor refuses the principal's central request. The objective without the strategy is a wish; the strategy without the objective is a sequence of points without a purpose.

Bismarck's preparation for the meetings with the Reichstag party leaders illustrates the discipline in its developed form. The leaders were met individually and at length, and the preparation for each meeting was conducted with the attention the centre's interests required: the leader's recent speeches, the leader's constituency, the leader's relations with the party's factions, the leader's personal obligations, and the leader's likely demands on the pending legislation were set out in the briefing. The objective of the meeting — the votes required for the army bill, the tariff, the Septennat — was defined in advance, and the strategy was the sequence by which Bismarck would advance from the opening to the close. The Habsburg emperor's audiences with the Czech, the Hungarian, the Polish, and the South Slav leaders were prepared on the same

principle, with the briefing setting out the leader's position within the nationalist movement, the leader's relations with Vienna, and the concessions the leader would seek and those the leader would reject. The preparation made the meetings productive; the meetings without preparation would have been gestures.

20.3 The Conduct

The conduct is the execution of the preparation in the meeting itself, conducted by the principal with the discipline the preparation established. The conduct comprises the opening, the management of the agenda, the management of the substance, and the close. The opening establishes the tone and the frame; the management of the agenda keeps the meeting on the points the strategy identified; the management of the substance engages the actor's responses without losing the objective; the close fixes the commitments, signals the next steps, and concludes the meeting on the note the principal chooses. The principal conducts the meeting with the discipline of the preparation, adjusting to the actor's responses without losing the objective, and the actor reads the conduct as the measure of the centre's seriousness.

The opening is the first minutes of the meeting, in which the principal sets the tone and the frame. The principal acknowledges the actor's standing, refers to a matter of mutual interest or recent shared experience, and establishes the basis on which the meeting will proceed; the opening is the principal's selection of the note on which the meeting will be conducted — the note of confidence, the note of consultation, the note of warning, or the note of partnership. The close fixes the commitments the meeting has produced, signals the next steps, and concludes the meeting on the note the principal chooses. The principal summarises the points agreed, the points deferred, and the points on which the principal and the actor disagree, states the commitments the principal has made and the commitments the actor has made, and signals the follow-up — the meeting, the communication, the consultation — that will follow. The opening is prepared in advance; the close is prepared in advance in the form the principal intends to use if the meeting has gone as planned, and adjusted in the conduct to the form the meeting's actual progress requires.

The principal advances through the points in the order the strategy set, and adjusts the order when the actor's responses reveal a concern that requires earlier treatment. The principal concedes the points the strategy identified as concessionable, defers the points the strategy identified as deferrable, and reserves the points the strategy identified as reservable. The principal holds the objective in view: the meeting's purpose is the objective, and the conduct is the discipline by which the objective is held while the actor's responses are engaged. The principal who is led by the actor through the actor's preferred points, without the principal's objective shaping the path, has conceded the meeting.

De Gaulle's meetings with the Algerian settler leaders in 1958 and 1961 illustrate the conduct in its developed form. The opening established the note of the meeting: the general who had returned to power addressed the settler leaders with the authority of the office and the personal standing the moment required, and the actors in the room read the opening as the principal intended. The substance was managed through the principal's reading of the actors' responses — the concessions on the military and the civil position, the deferrals on the political future, the

warnings on the conduct the centre would not accept — and the close fixed the commitments and signalled the next steps. The craft was the craft the Venetian Doge applied in the audience with the foreign ambassador: the preparation conducted in advance, the conduct adjusted to the ambassador's responses, and the close fixing the position the Republic would take.

20.4 The Management of the Relationship

The management of the relationship within the meeting is the recognition that the meeting is about the relationship between the centre and the actor as well as about the substance under discussion. The substance is the matter on the table: the investment, the legislation, the concession, the cooperation. The relationship is the standing between the centre and the actor that determines whether the substance is agreed, deferred, or refused, and the standing is maintained or eroded in the conduct of the meeting. The principal who attends to the substance and not to the relationship leaves the meeting with an agreement the actor may not honour and a relationship the actor may not sustain.

The personal dimension of the management of the relationship is the cultivation of trust, the management of tone, and the reading of the actor's signals. The cultivation of trust is the principal's conduct of the meeting in a manner the actor perceives as straight: the principal's statements are credible, the principal's commitments are kept, and the principal's reservations are stated rather than concealed. The management of tone is the principal's adjustment of the register — the formal, the consultative, the direct, the warm — to the actor's position and the matter under discussion. The reading of the actor's signals is the principal's attention to the actor's words, the actor's silences, the actor's shifts of posture and emphasis, and the principal's adjustment of the conduct in light of the reading.

The reading of the actor's signals is the operational craft within the personal dimension. The actor's opening words reveal the frame the actor has brought to the meeting; the actor's first response to the principal's first point reveals the actor's preparation and the actor's concern; the actor's silences reveal the points on which the actor is withholding or considering; the actor's shifts of emphasis reveal the points on which the actor is prepared to move. The principal who reads the signals and adjusts the conduct — by addressing the concern, by exploring the silence, by testing the shift — conducts the meeting as a living exchange. The principal who does not read the signals conducts the meeting as a recital of the prepared points, and the actor's responses, unattended, shape the meeting's outcome without the principal's intervention.

The Venetian Doge's audiences with the foreign ambassadors and the Habsburg emperor's audiences with the nationalist leaders illustrate the management of the relationship in its developed historical forms. The Doge, attended by the senators and the secretaries of the Collegio, received the ambassador's credentials and the ambassador's message, and the conduct of the audience — the formality of the address, the warmth or the coolness of the reception, the length of the audience, the composition of the Republic's delegation — signalled to the ambassador the standing of the ambassador's sovereign in the Republic's estimation. The Habsburg emperor's audiences with the Czech, the Hungarian, the Polish, and the South Slav leaders were conducted on the same principle: the form of the audience, the length of the audience, the figures the emperor invited to be present,

and the words the emperor chose were read by the nationalist leaders as the measure of the centre's regard for the nationality they represented. The substance was the matter under discussion; the relationship was the standing the audience established, and the management of the relationship was the craft by which the audience's form was selected.

20.5 The Follow-Up

The follow-up is the body of work that follows the meeting, conducted by the centre's officials and reviewed by the principal. The follow-up comprises the documentation of the meeting, the communication of the outcomes, the implementation of the commitments, and the maintenance of the relationship. The follow-up is where the meeting's value is realised or lost: a meeting that is not followed up is a meeting that did not happen, and the commitments made in the meeting, undocumented, uncommunicated, and unimplemented, dissolve into the recollections of the parties and the interests of the day. The discipline of the follow-up is the discipline by which the meeting's outcomes are converted into the centre's results.

The documentation of the meeting is the record of the points discussed, the points agreed, the points deferred, and the points on which the parties disagreed. The record is prepared by the centre's officials within hours of the meeting, reviewed by the principal, and circulated to the centre's principals and the officials who will implement the commitments. The record is the centre's record; the actor may keep the actor's own, and the two records may differ, and the centre's record is the basis on which the centre will act. The communication of the outcomes is the transmission of the record's substance to the officials who will implement the commitments, the principals whose work the commitments affect, and the actors in the centre's network whose positions the meeting has shifted.

The implementation of the commitments is the work of converting the commitments into the actions the centre promised and the actions the actor promised. The centre's commitments are assigned to the responsible officials, with the deadlines the principal agreed, and tracked through to completion; the actor's commitments are noted, and the actor's performance is observed. The maintenance of the relationship is the conduct of the relationship after the meeting, through the routine contacts between the centre's officials and the actor's office, the follow-up consultations the principal may hold, and the centre's attention to the actor's position in the network as the network shifts. The relationship maintained is the relationship the centre can call on at the next meeting; the relationship neglected is the relationship the centre will have to rebuild.

The Meiji oligarchs' follow-up to the meetings with the zaibatsu leaders and Lee Kuan Yew's follow-up to the meetings with the foreign investors illustrate the follow-up discipline in its developed forms. The oligarchs' meetings with the heads of the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda houses were followed by the documentation of the concessions and the obligations in the relevant ministries, the communication of the outcomes to the officials who would implement them, and the maintenance of the relationship through the routine contact between the oligarchs' offices and the houses. Lee Kuan Yew's meetings with the chairmen of the multinational corporations considering investment in Singapore were followed by the documentation of the terms in the Economic Development Board's records, the communication of the commitments to the

ministries and the statutory boards that would implement them, and the maintenance of the relationship through the chairmen's subsequent visits and the principal's follow-up communications. The meetings were the occasion; the follow-up was the work, and the work was the discipline by which the meeting's value was realised.

20.6 Worked Example: A Meeting with a Foreign Investor

Consider a jurisdiction in which the centre's principal — the first minister — is to meet the chairman of a multinational corporation considering a major investment in the jurisdiction. The investment, if made, would employ several thousand workers, introduce a technology the jurisdiction lacks, and contribute a material share of the centre's revenue over the next decade. The corporation has met with the officials of the investment promotion agency, has examined the sites, and has indicated that the chairman will meet the first minister before the corporation's board takes the decision. The meeting is the principal's opportunity to secure the investment, and the centre's preparation, conduct, and follow-up will shape the corporation's decision.

The preparation begins with the review of the stakeholder map and the briefing on the chairman and the corporation. The stakeholder map identifies the corporation's position in the relevant sector, the corporation's competitors, the corporation's suppliers, the corporation's relationships with other governments, and the corporation's connections to the jurisdiction's existing investors and business figures. The briefing sets out the chairman's career, the chairman's recent statements, the chairman's reputation among the corporation's peers, the chairman's advisors, and the chairman's known preoccupations — the labour market, the regulatory regime, the political stability, the tax treatment, the infrastructure. The objective of the meeting is the chairman's commitment to recommend the investment to the corporation's board, and the strategy is the sequence by which the principal will address the chairman's concerns, present the centre's offer, and secure the commitment.

The principal opens the meeting with the acknowledgment of the chairman's standing and the reference to the corporation's prior engagement with the investment promotion agency, and the note the principal chooses is the note of partnership. The principal manages the agenda through the chairman's concerns in the order the strategy set, and adjusts the order when the chairman's first response reveals a concern about the labour regime that requires earlier treatment. The principal concedes the points the strategy identified as concessionable — the expedited permitting, the dedicated infrastructure — defers the points the strategy identified as deferrable — the further tax concession — and reserves the points the strategy identified as reservable — the equity participation the centre may seek. The principal reads the chairman's signals — the silence on the labour regime after the principal's explanation, the shift of emphasis to the infrastructure, the request for a follow-up meeting with the finance minister — and adjusts the conduct accordingly.

The close fixes the commitments: the chairman's commitment to recommend the investment to the board, the principal's commitment to the expedited permitting and the dedicated infrastructure, and the follow-up meeting with the finance minister within the week. The follow-up begins within hours of the meeting: the centre's officials prepare the record, the principal reviews the record, and the record is communicated to the finance ministry, the investment promotion agency, the

infrastructure ministry, and the principal's office. The implementation of the principal's commitments — the expedited permitting, the dedicated infrastructure, the follow-up meeting with the finance minister — is assigned to the responsible officials with the deadlines the principal agreed. The maintenance of the relationship is conducted through the follow-up meeting, the principal's subsequent communication with the chairman, and the centre's attention to the corporation's board's decision as the decision approaches.

20.7 Chapter Summary

The sensitive meeting is the meeting between the centre's principal and a powerful actor, conducted to manage a dependency, advance an objective, or address a risk. The sensitive meeting is distinguished from the ordinary meeting by the materiality of the relationship, the necessity of the actor's cooperation, and the effect of the meeting on the relationship going forward. The preparation, the conduct, and the follow-up are the three phases of the craft, and the preparation is the larger part: the meeting is the execution of the preparation, and the principal who enters the meeting without preparation enters at a disadvantage the actor will exploit.

The preparation comprises the review of the stakeholder map, the briefing on the actor, the definition of the objective, the strategy, and the anticipation of the actor's concerns. The conduct comprises the opening, the management of the agenda, the management of the substance, and the close, and the principal conducts the meeting with the discipline of the preparation, adjusting to the actor's responses without losing the objective. The management of the relationship is the recognition that the meeting is about the relationship as well as the substance, and the personal dimension — the cultivation of trust, the management of tone, the reading of the actor's signals — is the craft within the craft. The follow-up comprises the documentation, the communication, the implementation, and the maintenance, and the follow-up is where the meeting's value is realised or lost.

The comparative record confirms the craft. The French king's meetings with his ministers at Versailles, the British prime minister's meetings with the business leaders at Downing Street, the Meiji oligarchs' meetings with the zaibatsu leaders, Lee Kuan Yew's meetings with the foreign investors, de Gaulle's meetings with the Algerian settlers, the Venetian Doge's audiences with the foreign ambassadors, Bismarck's meetings with the Reichstag party leaders, and the Habsburg emperor's audiences with the nationalist leaders each illustrate the sensitive meeting as the basic unit of the centre's relationship management. The form differs across the jurisdictions and the centuries; the discipline of the preparation, the conduct, and the follow-up is the same. The centre that conducts its sensitive meetings with the craft the discipline requires secures the relationships on which its access to resources depends; the centre that does not, loses them.

Chapter 21 — The Negotiation

The negotiation between the centre and a powerful actor over a matter of mutual consequence: the operational craft of preparation, conduct, and documentation.

21.1 What the Negotiation Is

The negotiation is the structured process by which the centre and a powerful actor reach an agreement on a matter of mutual consequence. The agreement is a binding exchange of commitments: the centre's commitment to do, to refrain, or to provide, in return for the actor's commitment to do, to refrain, or to provide. The matter is of mutual consequence when the centre's objective cannot be achieved without the actor's cooperation, and the actor's objective cannot be achieved without the centre's consent. The negotiation is the instrument by which the centre and the actor settle the terms on which the cooperation will be given and the consent will be granted.

The distinction from the sensitive meeting is the distinction between an agreement and a relationship. The sensitive meeting manages the relationship between the centre and the actor; the negotiation reaches an agreement between them. A sensitive meeting may produce an agreement, and a negotiation may sustain a relationship, but the primary purpose differs. The sensitive meeting is the instrument of the relationship; the negotiation is the instrument of the agreement, and the agreement is the matter the centre and the actor must settle for the objective to be achieved. The relationship may make the negotiation possible; the negotiation is what the relationship is asked to deliver.

The negotiation may span multiple meetings, conducted over weeks or months, with the substance advancing across the meetings and the positions converging over time. The span is set by the complexity of the matter, the gap between the parties' opening positions, and the political constraints on each side. Metternich's negotiations at the Congress of Vienna ran from September 1814 to June 1815, with the substantive work conducted across hundreds of meetings among the four allied powers, the smaller German states, the Italian principalities, the Swiss, the Swedes, the Spanish, the Portuguese, and the papal delegation. The Final Act of the Congress recorded the agreement reached across the meetings, and the agreement reconstituted the European state system after a quarter-century of war.

The negotiation has been the instrument of the centre's agreements with powerful actors throughout the history of the state. The Venetian Republic negotiated the commercial treaties with the Byzantine Empire, the Mamluk Sultanate, the Ottoman Empire, and the trading cities of the Levant, with the terms governing the Venetian quarters, the customs duties, the consular jurisdiction, and the rights of passage settled in writing and preserved in the state archives. The Meiji oligarchs negotiated the revision of the unequal treaties imposed on the Tokugawa regime, with the work proceeding across two decades and multiple rounds, the foreign powers yielding extraterritoriality and tariff restraint in stages as the oligarchs reformed the legal system, the courts, and the administration. The agreement is the negotiation's product, and the agreement recorded is the centre's record and the actor's obligation.

21.2 The Preparation

The preparation is the body of work that precedes the negotiation, conducted by the centre's officials and reviewed by the principal. The preparation comprises the definition of the centre's objectives, the assessment of the actor's objectives, the identification of the zone of possible agreement, the development of the centre's strategy, and the preparation of the fallback position. The preparation is the larger part of the negotiation: the negotiation's conduct is the execution of the preparation, and the principal who enters the negotiation without preparation enters at a disadvantage the actor will exploit. The discipline of the preparation is the discipline by which the centre distinguishes the negotiation from the ordinary conversation.

The definition of the centre's objectives is the work of stating what the centre seeks from the agreement, in the order of the centre's priorities. The objectives are stated as the centre's preferred outcome, the centre's minimum acceptable outcome, the elements the centre will trade, and the elements the centre will not trade. The assessment of the actor's objectives is the parallel work, conducted from the centre's intelligence on the actor: the actor's preferred outcome, the actor's minimum acceptable outcome, the actor's constraints, and the actor's pressures. The centre's objectives and the actor's objectives, set side by side, identify the points of overlap and the points of conflict, and the points of overlap are the negotiation's terrain.

The zone of possible agreement is the space between the centre's minimum acceptable outcome and the actor's minimum acceptable outcome, in which an agreement is possible that both sides will accept. The zone is identified by the centre's analysis of the actor's position, tested against the centre's intelligence on the actor's constraints and the actor's alternatives, and refined as the negotiation's conduct reveals the actor's actual willingness. The strategy is the plan by which the centre will move the negotiation through the zone to the centre's preferred outcome: the opening position, the sequence of concessions, the points on which the centre will hold, and the close. The fallback position is the centre's best alternative to an agreement, prepared in advance and held in reserve, and the fallback is the centre's floor: the principal who enters the negotiation without a fallback has no measure of when to walk away.

Bismarck's preparation for the Congress of Berlin in 1878 illustrates the discipline in its developed form. The congress was convened to settle the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano that Russia had imposed on the Ottoman Empire after the war, and the preparation began with the definition of the centre's objectives: the limitation of Russian gains, the restraint of pan-Slav agitation, the protection of the Habsburg position in the Balkans, and the avoidance of a general war. The assessment of the other powers' objectives — Russia's, Britain's, France's, the Habsburgs', Italy's, and the Ottomans' — was conducted through the diplomatic channels before the congress convened, and the zone of possible agreement was identified on the Bulgarian question, the Armenian question, the Balkan borders, and the Ottoman commitments. Lee Kuan Yew's preparation for the negotiations with the British over Singapore's independence in the early 1960s followed the same discipline: the objectives stated, the British position assessed across the defence commitment, the base, and the trade arrangements, the zone identified, and the fallback — the alternative arrangement Singapore could sustain if the British terms were unacceptable — held in reserve. The preparation made the negotiations productive; the negotiations without the preparation would have been exposures.

21.3 The Conduct

The conduct is the execution of the preparation across the negotiation's meetings, conducted by the principal with the discipline the preparation established. The conduct comprises the opening, the exchange of positions, the exploration of the zone of agreement, the management of the concessions, and the close. The opening sets the negotiation's frame; the exchange of positions establishes the parties' opening demands; the exploration tests the zone of agreement; the management of concessions moves the parties through the zone; the close fixes the agreement. The principal conducts with the discipline of the preparation, adjusting to the actor's responses without losing the objective, and the actor reads the conduct as the measure of the centre's seriousness.

The opening is the principal's establishment of the negotiation's frame: the matter under negotiation, the centre's view of the matter, the basis on which the centre will proceed, and the principal's reading of the relationship in which the negotiation is conducted. The exchange of positions is the presentation of the parties' opening demands: the centre's demand, the actor's demand, and the gap between them. The exploration is the principal's testing of the actor's positions through the questions asked, the alternatives proposed, and the points pressed, and the exploration reveals the actor's actual willingness — the points on which the actor will move, the points on which the actor will hold, and the points on which the actor's position is brittle. The close is the principal's fixing of the agreement, the principal's summarising of the terms reached, and the principal's securing of the actor's assent.

The principal advances through the negotiation by holding the objective in view and adjusting the path to the actor's responses. The principal who conducts the negotiation as a recital of the prepared positions, without adjustment to the actor's responses, concedes the negotiation to the actor's reading of the principal. The principal who abandons the preparation in response to the actor's opening, and improvises in the conduct, concedes the negotiation to the moment's pressure. The discipline is the discipline of the prepared path adjusted by the read responses: the principal holds the strategy's frame, adjusts the sequence to the actor's concerns, and uses the fallback as the floor below which the principal will not go.

The British negotiations with the Chinese government over Hong Kong's handover from 1982 to 1984 illustrate the conduct in its developed form. The opening, conducted in the meeting between Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping in September 1982, established the parties' positions: the British position on the validity of the treaties and the Chinese position on the recovery of sovereignty. The exchange that followed, across the formal rounds and the informal channels, tested the zone of possible agreement: the British conceded the recovery of sovereignty, the Chinese conceded the preservation of Hong Kong's capitalist system and way of life for fifty years, and the parties converged on the formula of one country, two systems. Metternich's conduct at the Congress of Vienna followed the same discipline: the opening established the allied position on the French settlement, the exchange tested the smaller powers' positions on the German and Italian rearrangements, and the close fixed the Final Act. The conduct adjusted to the responses — Talleyrand's manoeuvres on behalf of France, the Saxon question, the Polish question — without losing the objective of the settlement that would secure the peace.

21.4 The Management of Concessions

The management of concessions is the discipline by which the principal moves the negotiation through the zone of possible agreement without surrendering the centre's objective. The management comprises the sequencing, the sizing, and the justification of the concessions; the recognition that concessions are traded, not yielded; and the requirement that the trade be visible to the other side. The concession yielded without a return is a surrender; the concession yielded in return for a concession is a trade; the concession whose trade is invisible to the actor is a concession wasted. The principal who concedes without sequencing, without sizing, without justification, and without return concedes the negotiation's structure to the actor.

The sequencing is the order in which the concessions are made: the lesser concessions early, to establish the principal's willingness to move; the substantive concessions in the middle, when the actor's reciprocal movement has been secured; the final concessions at the close, in return for the actor's final concessions. The sizing is the magnitude of each concession: large enough to be recognised, small enough to preserve the centre's position, and calibrated to the actor's reciprocal movement. The justification is the framing of each concession: the principal states the basis on which the concession is made, the value the centre places on the concession, and the reciprocal movement the centre expects. The justification makes the trade visible to the actor and makes the actor's reciprocal concession the actor's obligation.

The management of the concession's political consequences at home is the discipline the principal exercises in parallel with the negotiation's conduct. Every concession the principal makes in the negotiation is a concession the principal will be required to defend before the council, the legislature, the public, and the factions whose support the centre requires. The concession defensible at home is the concession that can be presented as the price of the agreement the centre has secured; the concession indefensible at home is the concession that will erode the centre's position and embolden the centre's opponents. The principal who negotiates without the home political constraint in view negotiates an agreement the centre may not be able to ratify, and the agreement unrati ed is the negotiation's failure.

De Gaulle's negotiations with the Algerian FLN at Évian in 1961 and 1962 illustrate the management of concessions in its developed form. The concessions — the recognition of Algeria's independence, the guarantees for the settlers and the military, the arrangements for the Sahara's hydrocarbons, the preferential arrangements for the French-Algerian economic relationship — were sequenced across the rounds at Lugrin and Évian, sized to the FLN's reciprocal movement, and justified as the price of the peace France required. The political consequences at home — the settler revolt, the generals' putsch of April 1961, the OAS's terrorism, the referendums of January 1961 and April 1962 — were managed in parallel, with the concessions defended as the terms without which the war would continue. The Habsburg negotiations over the *Ausgleich* of 1867 followed the same discipline: the concessions to Hungary — the dual structure, the Hungarian control of the Hungarian half's administration, the common foreign, military, and financial arrangements — were sequenced, sized, and justified as the price of the monarchy's survival, and the political consequences — the Czech and the Polish and the South Slav dissatisfaction, the German liberal resentment — were managed, imperfectly, across the decades that followed. The

concession is the negotiation's instrument; the management of the concession is the discipline by which the instrument is used.

21.5 The Documentation

The documentation is the body of work that follows the agreement, conducted by the centre's officials and reviewed by the principal. The documentation comprises the recording of the agreement, the management of the interpretation, and the preservation of the record. The negotiation does not end with the handshake; the negotiation ends with the documented agreement that both sides accept, and the agreement undocumented is the agreement that will be contested, reinterpreted, or repudiated when the circumstances shift. The discipline of the documentation is the discipline by which the negotiation's work is converted into the centre's settled position.

The recording of the agreement is the work of drafting the text that sets out the parties' commitments, the terms on which the commitments are made, and the procedures by which the commitments are to be implemented. The drafting is conducted by the centre's legal advisers and reviewed by the principal, with the text tested against the questions the actor's future conduct may raise and the ambiguities the actor's future interpretation may exploit. The text is the parties' agreement reduced to the words both sides will accept, and the words are the agreement's definitive form: the principal's recollection, the actor's recollection, and the officials' notes are subordinate to the text. The text is read, reread, and refined until the principal and the actor's principal accept it, and the acceptance is the negotiation's close.

The management of the interpretation is the work of preserving the agreed meaning of the text against the parties' future attempts to reinterpret it. The text's meaning is fixed by the negotiating record — the notes, the drafts, the exchanges — and the negotiating record is preserved by the centre's officials and held in reserve for the interpretive disputes that may arise. The interpretation is managed in the conduct of the agreement's implementation: the centre's officials apply the text in the manner the centre understands, communicate the centre's understanding to the actor's officials, and address the actor's attempts to depart from the agreed meaning with the negotiating record's evidence. The preservation of the record is the centre's protection against the actor's revisionism and the centre's own forgetfulness, and the record preserved is the record the centre can invoke.

The Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, the Évian Accords of 1962, and the Ausgleich of 1867 each illustrate the documentation in its developed form. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson negotiated the Versailles terms across the six months of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, with the drafting conducted by the legal advisers and the principals reviewing the texts before signature. The texts' implementation was managed through the diplomatic channels, the consular services, and the administrative arrangements the texts established, and the interpretive disputes were addressed with the negotiating records the parties preserved. The Venetian Republic's commercial treaties with the Byzantine Empire, the Mamluk Sultanate, and the Ottoman Empire were documented with the same care, with the texts preserved in the state archives of the Doge's Palace and the interpretation managed by the bailo, the consuls, and the ambassadors the

Republic maintained in the trading cities. The agreement recorded, interpreted, and preserved is the negotiation's product; the agreement without the documentation is the negotiation undone.

21.6 Worked Example: A Negotiation with a Foreign Investor

Consider a jurisdiction in which the centre is to negotiate the terms of a major foreign investment with a multinational corporation. The investment, if made on acceptable terms, would employ several thousand workers, introduce a technology the jurisdiction lacks, contribute a material share of the centre's revenue over the next decade, and anchor a sector the centre seeks to develop. The corporation has indicated its interest, has examined the sites, and has signalled that the terms — the tax treatment, the regulatory regime, the local content requirements, the dispute resolution arrangements — are the matters on which the corporation's board will decide. The negotiation is the centre's opportunity to secure the investment on terms the centre can accept, and the centre's preparation, conduct, concessions, and documentation will shape the outcome.

The preparation begins with the definition of the centre's objectives: the investment secured, the local employment maximised, the technology transfer achieved, the revenue share acceptable, the regulatory regime preserved, and the centre's sovereign discretion on environmental and labour matters retained. The assessment of the corporation's objectives — the tax minimisation, the regulatory predictability, the repatriation of profits, the protection of the corporation's intellectual property, the access to the regional market — is conducted from the centre's intelligence on the corporation and the corporation's recent negotiations with other jurisdictions. The zone of possible agreement is identified: the centre's minimum acceptable outcome on each term, the corporation's likely minimum, and the overlap that an agreement can occupy. The strategy is the sequence by which the centre will move through the zone, and the fallback — the alternative investment or the alternative development path the centre can sustain if the corporation's terms are unacceptable — is held in reserve.

The conduct opens with the principal's establishment of the negotiation's frame: the investment's importance to the jurisdiction, the centre's willingness to negotiate the terms, and the centre's reservation on the matters the centre will not trade. The exchange of positions tests the gap: the corporation's opening demand, the centre's opening position, and the distance between them. The exploration reveals the corporation's actual willingness: the points on which the corporation will move, the points on which the corporation will hold, and the points on which the corporation's position is brittle. The management of concessions moves the parties through the zone: the centre concedes the accelerated depreciation, the corporation concedes the local content threshold; the centre concedes the dedicated infrastructure, the corporation concedes the technology transfer undertaking; the centre concedes the dispute resolution through international arbitration, the corporation concedes the centre's environmental and labour discretion. The close fixes the agreement, with the principal and the chairman summarising the terms and securing the assent.

The documentation follows within days: the centre's legal advisers and the corporation's counsel draft the investment agreement, the principal and the chairman review the draft, and the text is refined until the parties accept it as the definitive form of the agreement. The implementation is managed through the centre's ministries and statutory boards, with the

corporation's commitments tracked against the deadlines the agreement sets. The interpretation is managed through the centre's routine engagement with the corporation's local executives, and the negotiating record — the briefing notes, the draft texts, the exchanges — is preserved by the centre's officials against the interpretive disputes that may arise. The negotiation that began with the corporation's interest ends with the documented agreement the centre and the corporation accept, and the agreement is the centre's record and the corporation's obligation.

21.7 Chapter Summary

The negotiation is the structured process by which the centre and a powerful actor reach an agreement on a matter of mutual consequence. The negotiation is distinguished from the sensitive meeting by the primary purpose: the negotiation reaches an agreement, the sensitive meeting manages a relationship. The negotiation may span multiple meetings, conducted over weeks or months, with the substance advancing across the meetings and the positions converging over time. The preparation, the conduct, the management of concessions, and the documentation are the four phases of the craft, and the preparation is the larger part.

The preparation comprises the definition of the centre's objectives, the assessment of the actor's objectives, the identification of the zone of possible agreement, the development of the strategy, and the preparation of the fallback. The conduct comprises the opening, the exchange of positions, the exploration of the zone, the management of the concessions, and the close. The management of concessions comprises the sequencing, the sizing, and the justification, the recognition that concessions are traded, and the requirement that the trade be visible to the other side. The political consequences at home are managed in parallel, with the principal defending the concessions as the price of the agreement the centre has secured. The documentation comprises the recording, the management of the interpretation, and the preservation of the record, and the negotiation ends with the documented agreement that both sides accept.

The comparative record confirms the craft. Metternich's negotiations at the Congress of Vienna, Bismarck's at the Congress of Berlin, Clemenceau's at the Paris Peace Conference, Lee Kuan Yew's with the British over Singapore's independence and with the foreign investors, de Gaulle's with the FLN at Évian, the Meiji oligarchs' over the unequal treaties, the Venetian Republic's commercial treaties with the Levantine and the Mediterranean powers, the British over Hong Kong's handover, and the Habsburgs over the Ausgleich each illustrate the negotiation as the instrument by which the centre and a powerful actor reach an agreement on a matter of mutual consequence. The form differs across the jurisdictions and the centuries; the discipline of the preparation, the conduct, the concessions, and the documentation is the same. The centre that negotiates with the craft the discipline requires secures the agreements on which its objectives depend; the centre that does not, fails to.

Chapter 22 — The Briefing and the Position Paper

The documents by which the centre frames decisions for the principal: the operational craft of the briefing, the position paper, and the decision memorandum.

22.1 What the Briefing Is

The briefing is the document by which the centre presents to the principal the situation, the options, the assessment, and the recommendation, in a form that permits the principal to decide. The principal is the first minister, the finance minister, the cabinet, or another senior figure whose authority the decision requires. The situation is the state of the matter on which the decision is to be taken; the options are the courses of action available; the assessment is the centre's evaluation of each option against the situation; the recommendation is the centre's proposal for the decision. The briefing is the principal instrument of decision-support, and the centre's craft in the briefing is the framing of the decision in a form that permits the principal to decide.

The distinction from a recitation of facts is the distinction between a compilation of information and an instrument of decision. A recitation of facts presents what is known without framing what is to be done; a briefing presents what is known in the form that makes the decision possible. The recitation leaves the principal to construct the decision from the information; the briefing constructs the decision for the principal, subject to the principal's revision or rejection. The centre that presents the principal with a recitation of facts has discharged the function of a registry; the centre that presents the principal with a briefing has discharged the function of the centre.

The centre's craft in the briefing is the framing of the decision for the principal. The framing comprises the selection of the situation the principal needs to know, the selection of the options the principal should consider, the assessment of each option against the centre's judgment, and the recommendation the centre offers. The framing is the centre's exercise of its function: the centre selects what the principal will see and what the principal will not see, the order in which the principal will see it, and the comparison the principal will be invited to make. The principal who reads the briefing reads the centre's framing, and the principal's decision is shaped by the framing the centre has provided.

The French *mémoire* under the monarchy and the Republic illustrates the briefing in its developed historical form. The *mémoire* was the document by which the minister or the intendant presented to the king, and later to the minister of the Republic, the situation, the options, the assessment, and the recommendation on the matter under decision. The form was refined across the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, and the *mémoire* became the principal instrument through which the French centre conducted the work of decision-support. The British red box and the cabinet memorandum illustrate the same function in a different tradition: the red box carries the briefing papers on which the principal acts, and the cabinet memorandum is the instrument through which the matter is framed for the cabinet's decision. The form differs across the traditions; the function of the briefing as the centre's instrument of decision-support is constant.

22.2 The Structure of the Briefing

The structure of the briefing comprises six elements: the situation, the objective, the options, the assessment, the recommendation, and the implications. The situation sets out the state of the matter on which the decision is to be taken; the objective sets out the outcome the centre seeks; the options set out the courses of action available; the assessment sets out the centre's evaluation of each option against the objective and the situation; the recommendation sets out the centre's proposal for the decision; the implications set out the consequences the decision will produce. The six elements are ordered as the decision is ordered: the situation defines the field, the objective defines the destination, the options define the paths, the assessment evaluates the paths, the recommendation selects the path, and the implications trace the path's consequences. The structure is the discipline by which the briefing serves the decision.

The discipline of the structure is the discipline by which each element serves the decision. The situation without the objective is a description without a purpose; the objective without the situation is a wish without a context; the options without the assessment are a menu without a judgment; the assessment without the recommendation is an analysis without a conclusion; the recommendation without the implications is a proposal without a reckoning. The principal who receives a briefing in which any element is missing receives a briefing in which the decision is harder than it should be, because the missing element is the element the principal will have to supply. The discipline of the structure is the discipline by which the centre supplies the elements the principal needs and does not leave the principal to supply them.

The omission of any element degrades the principal's capacity to decide. The omission of the situation leaves the principal to decide without the context; the omission of the objective leaves the principal to decide without the purpose; the omission of the options leaves the principal to decide among the options the centre has framed without seeing the options the centre has not framed. The omission of the assessment leaves the principal to assess the options without the centre's judgment; the omission of the recommendation leaves the principal to decide without the centre's proposal; the omission of the implications leaves the principal to decide without the reckoning of the consequences. The principal may supply the missing elements, but the principal's supply is the work the centre was to perform, and the principal's supply displaces the work the principal was to perform.

The Venetian *relazione* illustrates the structure in its developed historical form. The ambassador on return from the foreign court submitted to the Senate the *relazione*, the report that set out the situation of the court to which the ambassador had been accredited, the objectives the Republic pursued in the relationship, the options the Republic had in the conduct of the relationship, the assessment of each option, the recommendation for the policy, and the implications the policy would produce. The structure of the *relazione* was the structure the Senate required to conduct its business, and the ambassadors were trained in the form across the centuries of the Republic's life. The Meiji oligarchs' use of the memorial to frame policy for the Genrō and the cabinet illustrates the same structure in a different tradition: the memorial set out the situation, the objective, the options, the assessment, the recommendation, and the implications, and the form became the principal instrument through which the oligarchs conducted the work of decision-support for the emperor and the council.

22.3 The Position Paper

The position paper is the document by which the centre establishes the government's position on a matter of strategic consequence. The matter of strategic consequence is the matter that touches the government's long-term interests, the government's relations with the major actors, or the government's standing in the international or the domestic order. The position paper sets out the government's assessment of the matter, the government's objectives, the government's policy, and the government's terms of engagement with the actors involved. The position paper is the document the centre produces when the matter requires the government to take a position that will guide the conduct of the ministries, the agencies, and the principal's engagements over the period the matter remains live.

The distinction from the briefing is the distinction between the document for the principal's decision and the document for the government's posture. The briefing is framed for the principal who must decide; the position paper is framed for the government that must hold a position. The briefing is consumed by the principal and the small circle of the principals; the position paper is communicated, in the form the centre determines, to the ministries, the agencies, and the actors whose conduct the position will shape. The briefing ends with the decision; the position paper begins with the decision and endures for the period the position holds. The two are connected — the position paper often follows the briefing and the decision the briefing produced — and the two are distinct instruments for distinct purposes.

The position paper's use is the basis for the government's engagement with the actors involved. The actors include the ministries whose conduct the position will guide, the agencies whose operations the position will shape, the foreign governments whose relations with the government the position will define, the economic actors whose interests the position will touch, and the public whose expectations the position will set. The position paper provides the reference point against which the engagements are conducted: the ministries consult the position paper when they plan their work, the agencies consult it when they conduct their operations, the foreign governments consult it when they assess the government's intentions, and the public reads it, in the form the centre releases, when it forms its view. The position paper is the instrument by which the centre aligns the government's conduct with the government's position.

De Gaulle's use of the position paper to shape the Fifth Republic's strategic direction illustrates the function in its developed form. The position papers prepared for the General's consideration on the constitution, the decolonisation, the nuclear programme, the relations with the Atlantic alliance, and the conduct of the foreign policy set the positions the government held across the first decade of the Fifth Republic. The positions shaped the engagements the ministries conducted and the public statements the principal made. The Habsburg use of the *Denkschrift* illustrates the same function in a different tradition: the *Denkschrift* was the document by which the centre framed the monarchy's strategic decisions on the Hungarian, the Czech, the South Slav, and the Italian questions, and the form was used across the nineteenth century to establish the position the monarchy would hold in the conduct of its internal and its external affairs. The form differed; the function of the position paper as the instrument of the government's posture is constant.

22.4 The Decision Memorandum

The decision memorandum is the document that records the principal's decision and the basis for it. The memorandum is prepared by the centre after the principal has taken the decision, on the basis of the briefing the principal received and the principal's deliberation. The memorandum sets out the matter decided, the options the principal considered, the assessment the centre provided, the principal's decision, the reasoning the principal gave for the decision, and the actions the decision authorises. The memorandum is the official record of the decision, and the memorandum's authority is the authority of the principal whose decision it records.

The memorandum's function is threefold: the preservation of the record, the communication of the decision, and the authorisation of the action. The preservation of the record is the preservation of the decision and its basis for the centre, for the principal's successors, and for the institutions whose function is the review of the government's conduct. The communication of the decision is the transmission of the decision to the officials who will implement it, the principals whose work the decision affects, and the actors whose conduct the decision shapes. The authorisation of the action is the conferment of the authority the officials require to act, and the authorisation is the function the memorandum performs for the officials who would otherwise lack the authority to proceed.

The discipline of the memorandum is the discipline of the record that survives the principal's departure. The principal who took the decision will leave the office; the officials who implemented the decision will be transferred; the actors whose conduct the decision shaped will move on. The memorandum is the document that remains, and the memorandum's quality determines whether the decision will be understood, sustained, or reversed by the principals and the officials who succeed the principals who took it. The memorandum that records the decision and the basis clearly and honestly equips the successors to sustain the decision; the memorandum that records the decision and the basis poorly leaves the successors to reconstruct the decision from the recollections and the correspondence, and the reconstruction is the work the memorandum was to perform.

Bismarck's use of the *Kaiserliche Botschaft* to frame decisions for the emperor and the Reich illustrates the decision memorandum in its developed historical form. The *Botschaft* was the document by which the emperor, on the chancellor's advice, communicated the decision and the basis to the Reichstag and the public, and the form was used for the major decisions of the Bismarckian period — the army bills, the social legislation, the colonial acquisitions, the alliance treaties. Lee Kuan Yew's use of the briefing and the decision record to maintain the centre's grip on the Singapore government illustrates the same function in a different tradition: the decision records prepared in the prime minister's office set out the decision, the basis, the officials responsible, and the deadlines, and the records were the instruments through which the centre held the implementation to the decision the principal had taken. The form differed; the function of the decision memorandum as the record that survives is constant.

22.5 The Drafting Craft

The drafting craft is the craft of writing the briefing, the position paper, and the decision memorandum in the form the documents require. The craft comprises four qualities: clarity,

concision, precision, and honesty. Clarity is the quality by which the document is understood by the principal on the first reading; concision is the quality by which the document contains no word that does not serve the decision; precision is the quality by which the document's statements are exact and its distinctions are sharp; honesty is the quality by which the document's assessment is the centre's actual assessment and the document's recommendation is the centre's actual recommendation. The four qualities are the qualities of the document that serves the principal, and the absence of any one degrades the document's service.

The briefing that is unclear, verbose, imprecise, or dishonest does not serve the principal. The unclear briefing leaves the principal uncertain of the situation, the options, the assessment, and the recommendation; the verbose briefing buries the decision in the prose and leaves the principal to extract the decision from the document. The imprecise briefing blurs the distinctions on which the decision turns and leaves the principal to decide among options the document has not distinguished; the dishonest briefing presents the assessment the centre does not hold and the recommendation the centre does not prefer. Each failure is a failure of the centre's function, and each failure is the failure the drafting craft is to prevent.

The briefing that fails in clarity, concision, precision, or honesty serves the drafter rather than the principal. The unclear briefing serves the drafter who has not done the work of understanding; the verbose briefing serves the drafter who has not done the work of selection; the imprecise briefing serves the drafter who has not done the work of distinction; the dishonest briefing serves the drafter who has not done the work of judgment. The centre that tolerates the drafting that serves the drafter has failed in its function, because the centre's function is to serve the principal. The discipline of the drafting is the discipline by which the centre's service to the principal is maintained.

The British civil service's tradition of the briefing and the cabinet memorandum illustrates the drafting craft in its developed form. The tradition, refined across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, holds that the briefing is to be written in the plainest English the subject permits, that the sentences are to be short, that the distinctions are to be sharp, and that the recommendation is to be the recommendation the official holds. The Venetian tradition of the *relazione* illustrates the same craft in a different setting: the ambassadors were trained to write the *relazione* in the form the Senate could act on, with the situation stated, the options distinguished, the assessment given, and the recommendation offered. The form differed; the four qualities of the drafting craft are constant.

22.6 Worked Example: A Briefing for a Major Decision

Consider a jurisdiction in which the centre's principal — the first minister — must decide whether to proceed with a major reform of the energy sector. The sector supplies the jurisdiction's electricity, employs a substantial workforce, and contributes a material share of the government's revenue. The reform under consideration would restructure the sector's ownership, introduce competition in the generation, and adjust the regulatory regime. The reform has been under preparation in the relevant ministry for two years, the consultation with the sector's actors has been conducted, and the principal must decide whether to proceed, to defer, or to abandon the reform. The centre's officials prepare the briefing for the principal's decision.

The briefing opens with the situation: the state of the sector, the condition of the infrastructure, the conduct of the actors, the position of the workforce, the views of the public, and the constraints the government's fiscal position imposes. The objective follows: the reform that secures the sector's viability, the investment the sector requires, and the prices the consumers will pay, consistent with the government's fiscal and political constraints. The options are set out: the proceeding with the reform as prepared; the deferring of the reform for further consultation; the modification of the reform to address the objections the actors have raised; the abandoning of the reform and the maintenance of the status quo. The assessment evaluates each option against the objective, with the costs, the benefits, the risks, and the political effects of each stated plainly. The recommendation is the modification of the reform, with the principal's decision sought on the specific modifications the centre proposes.

The principal reads the briefing, considers the assessment, and decides. The principal's decision is to proceed with the reform, with the modifications the centre recommended and one further modification the principal adds on the basis of the principal's judgment of the political effects. The principal's reasoning, recorded in the discussion the principal holds with the centre's officials, is the reasoning the centre's assessment supported, supplemented by the principal's judgment of the political feasibility the assessment could not fully capture. The principal's decision is taken in the meeting, and the centre's officials prepare the decision memorandum immediately after the meeting's close.

The decision memorandum records the matter decided, the options the principal considered, the assessment the centre provided, the principal's decision, the reasoning the principal gave, and the actions the decision authorises. The memorandum is communicated to the energy ministry, the finance ministry, the principal's office, and the officials who will implement the reform. The authorisation is the authority the energy ministry requires to proceed with the implementation; the record is the document the principal's successors and the oversight institutions will consult when the reform's implementation is reviewed. The position paper, prepared on the basis of the decision, establishes the government's position on the reform and is communicated to the sector's actors and the public. The briefing, the decision, the memorandum, and the position paper together constitute the centre's conduct of the decision.

22.7 Chapter Summary

The briefing is the document by which the centre presents to the principal the situation, the options, the assessment, and the recommendation, in a form that permits the principal to decide. The distinction from a recitation of facts is the distinction between information and decision-support, and the centre that presents the principal with a recitation of facts has discharged the function of a registry rather than the function of the centre. The centre's craft in the briefing is the framing of the decision, and the framing is the centre's selection of what the principal will see, the order in which the principal will see it, and the comparison the principal will be invited to make. The structure of the briefing comprises the situation, the objective, the options, the assessment, the recommendation, and the implications, and the discipline of the structure is the discipline by which each element serves the decision.

The position paper is the document by which the centre establishes the government's position on a matter of strategic consequence, and the distinction from the briefing is the distinction between the document for the principal's decision and the document for the government's posture. The position paper's use is the basis for the government's engagement with the actors involved, and the actors include the ministries, the agencies, the foreign governments, the economic actors, and the public whose conduct the position will shape. The decision memorandum is the document that records the principal's decision and the basis for it, and the memorandum's function is the preservation of the record, the communication of the decision, and the authorisation of the action. The discipline of the memorandum is the discipline of the record that survives the principal's departure.

The drafting craft is the craft of clarity, concision, precision, and honesty, and the briefing that fails in any of the four serves the drafter rather than the principal. The comparative record confirms the craft. The French *mémoire* under the monarchy and the Republic, the British red box and the cabinet memorandum, the Venetian *relazione*, the Meiji memorial, de Gaulle's position paper in the Fifth Republic, Bismarck's *Kaiserliche Botschaft*, Lee Kuan Yew's briefing and decision record in Singapore, and the Habsburg *Denkschrift* each illustrate the briefing, the position paper, and the decision memorandum as the centre's instruments of decision-support and posture. The forms differ across the traditions and the centuries; the principle that the centre frames the decisions that others make through the documents it produces is constant. The centre that drafts its documents with the craft the discipline requires equips the principal to decide and the government to act; the centre that does not, leaves the principal to decide without support and the government to act without alignment.

Chapter 23 — Territorial Representation

The placement of the centre's officials in the regions and the management of regional elite relationships: the operational craft of the centre's territorial reach.

23.1 What Territorial Representation Is

Territorial representation is the placement, by the centre, of its own officials in the regions of the jurisdiction, charged with the management of the centre's relationships with the regional and local elites on whom the centre's reach into the territory depends. The territorial representative is the centre's man or woman in the region: the figure who carries the centre's authority, communicates the centre's priorities, observes the regional realities, and reports the regional conditions to the centre. The function exists because the centre does not govern the territory directly: the centre governs through the regional administrations, the regional economic actors, the regional political figures, and the regional civic institutions, and the management of these dependencies requires a continuous presence the centre's own ministers cannot provide. The centre that cannot reach into the territory cannot manage its dependencies there, and the territorial representative is the instrument of that reach.

The distinction from the field offices of the line ministries is the distinction between the centre's representation and the sectoral administration. The line ministry's field office represents the ministry: the agriculture ministry's regional director implements the agriculture programme, the education ministry's inspector supervises the schools, the public works ministry's regional engineer oversees the roads. The territorial representative represents the centre as a whole: the figure who carries the centre's general authority rather than a ministry's sectoral authority, and who manages the relationships the centre requires across the full range of the regional actors. The line ministry's field office is the centre's hand in the sector; the territorial representative is the centre's eyes, ears, and hands in the territory. The conflation of the two deprives the centre of its territorial instrument, because the sectoral director cannot manage the relationships the centre requires and the territorial representative cannot administer the sectoral programme.

The function is threefold: the observation of the regional conditions, the communication of the centre's priorities, and the management of the regional relationships. The observation is the continuous reading of the regional political, economic, and social conditions, conducted through the representative's contacts with the regional elites, the regional administrations, and the regional civic institutions, and reported to the centre in the regular dispatches. The communication is the transmission of the centre's priorities to the regional actors, in the register the regional context requires, with the adjustments the regional conditions impose. The management is the cultivation of the relationships with the regional elites, the resolution of the conflicts the centre's priorities generate, and the protection of the centre's interests in the territory. The three together constitute the territorial reach, and the reach is the condition the centre's authority in the territory requires.

The French monarchy's intendant system and the Republic's préfet system illustrate the function in its developed historical forms. The intendant, sent from Paris into the généralité, was

the king's man in the province: the figure who reported the provincial conditions to the controller-general, communicated the king's orders to the provincial estates and the parlements, and managed the relationships with the local nobility, the clergy, and the urban notables on whom the monarchy's reach into the province depended. The *préfet*, instituted by the law of 28 Pluviôse Year VIII and maintained through the Republics that followed, performed the same function for the central state in the *département*: the manager of the relationships with the mayors, the general councillors, the chambers of commerce, and the local political figures. The Venetian Republic's *rettori* in the Terraferma and the maritime possessions, and the Ottoman sultan's *valis* and *pashas* in the provinces, performed the function in their respective registers. The form differs across the regimes while the principle is constant: the centre that cannot reach into the territory cannot manage its dependencies there.

23.2 The Territorial Representative

The territorial representative is the role through which the centre's territorial reach is exercised, and the role combines the diplomatic, the administrative, and the political. The representative is the centre's diplomat in the region: the figure who manages the relationships with the regional elites as the ambassador manages the relationships with the foreign government. The representative is the centre's administrator in the region: the figure who oversees the regional administrations, ensures the implementation of the centre's decisions, and certifies the regional conditions the centre's policies require. The representative is the centre's political operator in the region: the figure who reads the regional political configurations, manages the regional political conflicts, and secures the regional political support the centre's authority requires. The three together constitute the role, and the role is the role of the centre in the region, exercised by the figure the centre has chosen to exercise it.

The profile of the territorial representative is the profile of the senior operator the centre trusts with the centre's authority in the region. The representative has the experience of the centre's work: the years in the central ministries, the councils, or the first minister's office, in which the representative has absorbed the centre's priorities, methods, and register. The representative has the capacity for the territorial work: the reading of the regional configurations, the cultivation of the regional relationships, the management of the regional conflicts, and the discretion the regional context requires. The representative has the personal standing the centre's authority requires: the presence the regional elites will respect, the discipline the centre's interests require, and the judgement the centre's authority in the region will be tested by. The competencies are the competencies of the political operator rather than the competencies of the administrator, and the administrator manages the programme while the representative manages the relationships on which the centre's territorial reach depends.

The territorial representative is selected for the political and the relational capacity, and the recognition of the distinction from the administrator is the centre's first act in the selection. The administrator manages the sectoral programme through the sectoral instruments: the budget, the staffing, the regulation, the inspection. The representative manages the centre's relationships with the regional elites through the relational instruments: the meeting, the consultation, the mediation,

the cultivation, the warning. The representative selected for the administrative capacity and posted to the territorial role performs the administrative work and neglects the relational work, and the centre's territorial reach decays under the representative's tenure; the representative selected for the relational capacity performs the relational work and engages the administrative work through the regional administrations the centre has appointed. The selection is the centre's selection of the figure the centre trusts with the centre's authority, and the trust is the trust of the political operator.

The Meiji oligarchs' placement of their own men in the prefectures, Lee Kuan Yew's management of the statutory boards and the grassroots organisations, and the Habsburg monarchy's selection of the Statthalter and the Landespräsidenten illustrate the selection in its developed forms. The oligarchs who carried through the restoration — Ōkubo, Itō, Yamagata, Matsukata, Inoue — placed the figures of their own domains and their own confidence in the prefectures the new regime created, and the figures carried the oligarchs' authority into the territory the regime had to consolidate; the consolidation of the Meiji state in the 1870s and 1880s was the work of the placement. Lee Kuan Yew's management of the People's Association, the housing board, the port authority, and the other statutory boards and grassroots organisations proceeded on the same principle: the chairmen and chief executives were the centre's men and women, selected for the capacity to manage the relationships the centre's authority required. The Habsburg monarchy's selection of the crownland chiefs proceeded on the same principle, with Vienna choosing the figures whose loyalty and capacity the centre trusted. The form differs across the regimes while the principle is constant: the territorial representative is the centre in the region, and the centre chooses its best, because the representative is the centre's authority in the territory.

23.3 The Management of Regional Elites

The management of the regional elites begins with the identification of the regional actors, and the identification is the construction of the regional stakeholder map. The regional actors include the elected officials of the regional and local governments, the senior officials of the regional administrations, the heads of the regional economic institutions — the chambers of commerce, the major employers, the landowners, the financial institutions — the regional political figures of the parties and the movements, the regional heads of the religious, the educational, and the civic institutions, and the regional figures whose influence exceeds their formal office. Each is identified by name, position, interest, influence, and relationship to the centre. The representative who has not mapped the regional elites cannot manage them, because the representative does not know whom to meet, whom to cultivate, whom to manage, and whom to watch.

The cultivation of the relationships is the continuous work of the representative's tenure, and the work is conducted through the routine and the exceptional. The routine is the regular contact: the meetings with the mayors, the chambers of commerce, the bishops, the rectors, the party officials, and the civic leaders, conducted on the cycle the regional calendar imposes. The exceptional is the contact the regional events require: the crisis that demands the representative's intervention, the opportunity that requires the representative's cultivation, the conflict that requires the representative's mediation. The cultivation is the building of the trust the centre's reach requires: the trust that the regional elites will receive the representative's communications, accept the

representative's representations, and consult the representative before the regional decisions that affect the centre. The trust is built over months and years, and the trust is the asset the centre draws on when the centre's priorities require the regional elites' cooperation.

The territorial representative's craft is the craft of translation, and the translation is conducted in two directions. The first direction is the translation of the centre's priorities into the regional context: the rendering of the centre's decisions, the centre's programmes, and the centre's concerns in the register the regional elites will receive, with the framing the regional context requires, and with the adjustments the regional conditions impose. The centre's decision, communicated in the centre's register, will be received by the regional elites as the centre's imposition; the same decision, communicated in the regional register, with the regional framing, will be received as the centre's recognition of the regional interest. The second direction is the translation of the regional realities into the centre's understanding: the rendering of the regional conditions, the regional grievances, and the regional opportunities in the form the centre will read, with the weight the centre will credit, and with the recommendations the centre will act on. The representative who translates well in both directions is the representative the centre keeps; the representative who translates well in one direction only is the representative the centre replaces.

The British management of the Indian political service and the district officers and the Habsburg management of the crownland administrations illustrate the management of the regional elites in its developed historical forms. The political officer — the resident at the princely court, the agent to the governor-general, the political agent in the tribal area — was the centre's territorial representative in the Indian register, charged with the management of the relationships with the prince, the prince's ministers, the court factions, and the neighbouring chiefs. The district officer — the collector, the magistrate, the deputy commissioner — was the centre's territorial representative in the British Indian register, charged with the management of the relationships with the landlords, the moneylenders, the village headmen, the religious leaders, and the local political figures. The cultivation of the relationships was the daily work of the officers' tenures, conducted through the tours, the durbars, and the consultations, and the translation was the work of the dispatches the officers sent to the foreign department and the provincial governments. The Habsburg Statthalter and the Landespräsidenten proceeded on the same principle in the crownlands, cultivating the relationships with the diets, the noble families, the church hierarchies, and the national movements.

23.4 The Relationship with the Centre

The relationship between the territorial representative and the centre is the relationship of the instrument to the principal, and the relationship is conducted through the reporting, the consultation, and the support. The reporting is the continuous communication of the regional conditions to the centre: the regular dispatches, the periodic assessments, the exceptional reports the regional events require, and the responses to the centre's requests for information. The reporting is the centre's eyes in the territory: the source on which the centre's understanding of the regional conditions rests, and the basis on which the centre's decisions affecting the region are taken. The representative who reports well gives the centre the regional knowledge the centre cannot acquire from the centre's seat; the representative who reports poorly leaves the centre to act on the centre's

assumptions, and the assumptions are the substitute the centre will pay for in the regional reactions the centre did not anticipate.

The consultation is the exchange between the representative and the centre on the centre's decisions affecting the region, and the exchange is the centre's use of the representative's knowledge before the centre's decisions are taken. The centre consults the representative on the regional implications of the centre's policies, the regional reception the centre's decisions will receive, and the regional adjustments the centre's decisions require. The representative consults the centre on the regional initiatives the representative proposes, the regional commitments the representative intends to make, and the regional crises the representative is managing. The consultation is the discipline by which the centre's decisions are aligned with the regional conditions and the representative's actions are aligned with the centre's priorities, and the discipline is the discipline the centre's territorial reach requires.

The support the centre provides the representative is the support the representative's authority in the region requires: the standing the centre's appointment confers, the access the centre's channels provide, the resources the centre's instruments supply, and the backing the centre's principals give when the representative's representations require the centre's intervention. The representative is the centre's instrument, exercising the centre's authority in the territory, and the authority is the authority the centre has conferred and the centre can withdraw. The representative who acts in the region without the centre's support loses the regional standing the centre's appointment conferred; the centre that loses contact with its representatives has lost its territorial reach, because the representatives unconnected to the centre cease to be the centre's instruments and become the regional figures the centre has appointed but does not direct. The relationship is the discipline by which the centre's territorial reach is sustained, and the discipline is the discipline of the centre's continuous engagement with the representatives it has posted.

The French intendant's relationship with the controller-general, the Venetian rettore's relationship with the Senate, and the American federal field office's relationship with the Washington departments illustrate the relationship in its developed historical forms. The intendant's dispatches to the controller-general — the reports on the provincial harvests, the tax collections, the conduct of the provincial estates, the dispositions of the local nobility, and the rumours the popular mood generated — were the centre's eyes in the provinces, and the controller-general's responses were the centre's direction of the intendant's conduct. The Venetian rettore's dispatches to the Senate — the reports on the civic factions, the conduct of the subject city's councils, the fortifications, the revenues, and the neighbouring powers' movements — were the Republic's eyes in the Terraferma and the Stato da Mar. The American federal field offices — the regional offices of the federal departments, the United States attorneys, the federal marshals, the regional administrators of the agencies — conduct the reporting and the consultation with the Washington departments, and the departments' support is the standing the federal authority requires in the states and the localities. The form differs across the centuries; the principle is constant: the representative is the centre's instrument, and the centre that maintains the relationship maintains its territorial reach.

23.5 The Management of the Centre-Region Tension

The tension between the centre's priorities and the region's interests is the structural condition the territorial representative manages, and the management is the daily work of the representative's tenure. The centre's priorities — the fiscal targets, the security measures, the regulatory regimes, the development programmes, the personnel decisions — are the priorities the centre has set in the light of the centre's view of the jurisdiction's interests. The region's interests — the regional economic concerns, the regional political configurations, the regional cultural traditions, the regional historical grievances — are the interests the regional elites articulate in the light of the regional view of the region's concerns. The tension between the two is the tension the representative is posted to manage, and the management is the balance that maintains both the centre's authority and the region's cooperation.

The representative's management of the tension is conducted through the advocacy and the enforcement, and the two are the two directions of the representative's work. The advocacy is the representative's representation of the region's interests within the centre: the reports that set out the regional conditions, the consultations that argue the regional adjustments, the representations that seek the centre's accommodation of the regional concerns, and the warnings that signal the regional reactions the centre's decisions will provoke. The enforcement is the representative's implementation of the centre's priorities within the region: the communication of the centre's decisions to the regional elites, the management of the regional reactions, the application of the centre's instruments where the regional cooperation is withheld, and the reporting of the regional compliance to the centre. The two together constitute the management, and the management is the craft by which the centre's authority and the region's cooperation are both maintained.

The craft of the management is the balance, and the balance is the balance the regional context requires. The representative who advocates for the region within the centre without enforcing the centre's priorities within the region becomes the regional figure the centre has appointed, and the centre's authority in the region decays under the representative's tenure. The representative who enforces the centre's priorities within the region without advocating for the region within the centre becomes the centre's proconsul the regional elites resist, and the region's cooperation in the region decays under the representative's tenure. The balance is the conduct of the advocacy and the enforcement in the proportions the regional context requires, with the discretion the regional elites will read as the representative's judgement and the centre will read as the representative's loyalty. The balance is the balance of the judgement the centre has selected the representative to exercise, and the judgement is the judgement the regional context and the centre's interests together require.

The French *préfet*'s management of the tension between Paris and the *département*, the Ottoman *vali*'s management of the tension between Constantinople and the province, and the American federal field office's management of the tension between Washington and the state illustrate the management in its developed forms. The *préfet*, posted to the *département* by the President of the Republic on the advice of the interior ministry, was charged with the enforcement of the centre's laws and the centre's decisions in the *département*, and the management of the relationships with the mayors, the general councillors, the chambers of commerce, and the local political figures on whom the enforcement depended. The *préfet*'s advocacy for the *département* within the interior ministry — the reports on the local conditions, the requests for the adjustments,

the warnings on the local reactions — was the advocacy the centre's decisions required, and the préfet's enforcement of the centre's decisions in the département was the enforcement the centre's authority required. The Ottoman vali, posted to the province by the sultan's irade, managed the same tension in the Ottoman register: the enforcement of the Porte's orders and the management of the relationships with the provincial notables, the ulema, the ayan, and the garrison commanders. The form differs; the principle is constant: the centre's authority and the region's cooperation are both maintained through the representative's balance of the advocacy and the enforcement.

23.6 Worked Example: A Territorial Representative's First Year

Consider a jurisdiction in which the centre's principal — the first minister — appoints a new territorial representative to a region the centre has identified as a priority: a region with a major industrial base, a regional capital with a distinct civic tradition, a regional political configuration that includes a powerful regional party and a strong chamber of commerce, and a recent history of friction with the centre over the regional share of the fiscal settlement. The representative is a senior figure from the first minister's office, with experience in the centre's industrial policy and political management, and the appointment is the centre's recognition that the region requires the centre's attention and reach. The representative arrives in the regional capital in the late summer, takes the residence the centre maintains, and opens the office the centre has staffed. The first year begins with the mapping, and the mapping is the foundation on which the cultivation, the management, and the consolidation will be built.

The first months are the months of the mapping, conducted through the rounds the representative makes of the regional actors. The representative meets the mayors of the regional cities, the chair of the regional council, the heads of the regional parties, the chairman of the chamber of commerce, the chief executives of the major employers, the bishops of the regional dioceses, the rectors of the regional universities, the editors of the regional press, and the senior officials of the regional administrations. The meetings are the representative's introductions, and the introductions are the representative's readings: the position, the interest, the influence, and the relationship of each actor, entered into the regional stakeholder map the representative constructs. The mapping reveals the configuration the representative has inherited: the dominance of the regional party, the dependence of the chamber of commerce on the major employers, the friction between the regional capital and the peripheral districts, and the grievances the regional actors carry against the centre's prior decisions.

The middle months are the months of the cultivation, conducted through the routine the representative establishes and the exceptional the regional events require. The routine is the monthly meetings with the chair of the regional council, the quarterly consultations with the chamber of commerce, the periodic audiences with the bishops and the rectors, and the continuous contact with the regional party's leadership. The exceptional arrives in the late autumn, when a major employer announces the closure of a regional plant and the layoff of several thousand workers: the crisis the centre's response must address, and the test of the representative's cultivation. The representative convenes the regional actors to coordinate the response, consults the centre on the measures the centre can offer, and communicates the centre's response in the register

the regional context requires. The crisis is managed: the centre's offer is received by the regional elites as the centre's recognition of the regional interest, and the regional elites' cooperation is received by the centre as the region's acceptance of the centre's authority.

The closing months are the months of the consolidation, conducted through the follow-up the crisis required and the relationships the cultivation has built. The representative reports the regional conditions to the centre in the regular dispatches, consults the centre on the regional implications of the centre's forthcoming decisions, and advocates for the region's interests in the centre's deliberations. The representative enforces the centre's priorities in the region — the fiscal targets, the regulatory regimes, the personnel decisions — through the relationships the cultivation has built, with the adjustments the regional conditions require. The first year ends with the centre's presence established in the region: the regional elites receive the representative as the centre's figure, the centre receives the representative's reports as the region's voice, and the territorial reach the centre requires is the reach the representative has constructed. The principle is the principle of the craft: the centre's reach into the territory is the work of the representative's tenure, and the work is the work the centre has selected the representative to perform.

23.7 Chapter Summary

Territorial representation is the placement, by the centre, of its own officials in the regions of the jurisdiction, charged with the management of the centre's relationships with the regional and local elites on whom the centre's reach into the territory depends. The territorial representative is distinct from the field office of the line ministry: the field office represents the sectoral ministry; the territorial representative represents the centre as a whole. The function is threefold: the observation of the regional conditions, the communication of the centre's priorities, and the management of the regional relationships. The representative is the centre's eyes, ears, and hands in the territory, and the centre that cannot reach into the territory cannot manage its dependencies there. The representative is selected for the political and the relational capacity rather than for the administrative capacity, and the centre chooses its best, because the representative is the centre in the region.

The relationship between the territorial representative and the centre is the relationship of the instrument to the principal, conducted through the reporting, the consultation, and the support. The representative is the centre's instrument, exercising the centre's authority in the territory, and the authority is the authority the centre has conferred and the centre can withdraw; the centre that loses contact with its representatives has lost its territorial reach. The management of the centre-region tension is the daily work of the representative's tenure, conducted through the advocacy for the region within the centre and the enforcement of the centre's priorities within the region. The craft is the balance that maintains both the centre's authority and the region's cooperation, and the balance is the balance of the judgement the centre has selected the representative to exercise. The representative who balances well keeps the centre's reach and the region's cooperation; the representative who does not loses one or the other.

The historical record confirms the craft. The French monarchy's intendants and the Republic's préfets, the Venetian Republic's rettori in the Terraferma and the Stato da Mar, the Ottoman sultan's

valis and pashas in the provinces, the British residents and the district officers in the Indian political service, the Habsburg Statthalter and the Landespräsidenten in the crownlands, the Meiji oligarchs' prefectural governors, Lee Kuan Yew's chairmen of the statutory boards and the grassroots organisations, and the American federal field offices in the states and the localities each illustrate the territorial representative as the centre's eyes, ears, and hands in the territory. The forms differ across the regimes and the centuries; the discipline of the placement, the management of the regional elites, the relationship with the centre, and the management of the centre-region tension is the same. The centre that maintains its territorial representation maintains its territorial reach; the centre that does not, governs the territory through the regional elites it cannot reach, and the regional elites the centre cannot reach are the regional elites the centre cannot manage.

Chapter 24 — The Transition

The preparation for and management of a transition of government: the operational craft by which the centre preserves continuity across the change of office-holder.

24.1 What the Transition Is

The transition is the period between the decision to change the office-holder and the new holder's assumption of the office. The decision may be made by an election, a vote of the legislature, a resignation, an abdication, a death, or a coup that installs a successor by force. The period is bounded by the moment the decision becomes binding on the centre and the moment the new holder takes the powers of the office. The transition is the interval in which the authority of the old holder is fading, the authority of the new holder is not yet established, and the centre must carry the work of the government across the gap. Every office-holder is replaced, and the centre that has not prepared for the replacement will be overtaken by it.

The transition is the moment of maximum vulnerability for the government. The old authority is fading; the office-holder who is leaving cannot commit the government to new undertakings, and the actors who depend on the government know that the commitments the office-holder has made will be reviewed by the successor. The new authority is not yet established: the office-holder who is arriving has not taken the powers of the office and cannot yet speak with the authority the office confers. The dependencies the government manages — the financial, the political, the diplomatic, the security — are exposed in the interval, because the actors on whom the government depends read the transition as the moment to press their claims, to test their leverage, or to withdraw their cooperation pending the settlement of the new order.

The comparative record confirms the vulnerability. The French transition from the Fourth Republic to the Fifth in 1958 was conducted under the shadow of the Algerian crisis, with the army in revolt and the prospect of a paratroop landing on Paris; the four months between the investiture of de Gaulle and the constitutional referendum were the months in which the dependencies of the French state — the army, the settlers, the parties, the unions, the foreign allies — were most exposed. The Meiji transition from the Tokugawa order in 1868, with the resignation of the shogun, the confrontation at Toba-Fushimi, and the surrender of Edo Castle, was the months in which the domains, the foreign powers, and the rural populations tested the new order. The Venetian Republic's management of the interregna between Doges is the most institutionalised case: the period between a Doge's death and the election of the successor was governed by formal instructions to the temporary heads of the Republic, and the Republic's business — the embassies, the fleets, the courts, the treasuries — continued without interruption, because the Republic could not afford the interruption.

The centre's craft in the transition is the preservation of continuity across the change. The centre is the body of officials, procedures, and records that persists across the holders of the office, and its work in the transition is to carry the commitments, the dependencies, and the conduct of the government from the old holder to the new without loss. The centre does not decide the transition:

the decision is made by the constitutional procedure or the political event that produces the change. The centre manages the transition: it prepares the materials the new holder will need, it maintains the relationships the government depends on, and it supports the new holder's establishment of authority in the first days. The continuity is the centre's contribution; the change is the office-holder's.

24.2 The Preparation

The preparation for the transition is the body of work the centre conducts before the transition begins. The preparation comprises the transition brief, the inventory of the government's commitments and dependencies, the identification of the decisions that must be made in the first days, and the identification of the relationships that must be established in the first days. The preparation is conducted in the routine of the government's work — the maintenance of the records, the cultivation of the relationships, the assessment of the risks — and is consolidated in the months or weeks before the transition is expected. The preparation is conducted before the transition begins because once the transition begins there is no time for preparation: the interval is consumed by the briefings, the meetings, the communications, and the decisions.

The inventory of the commitments and the dependencies is the foundation of the preparation. The inventory records the commitments the government has made — the legislation, the contracts, the treaties, the undertakings to the parties, the public, and the foreign governments — and the state of each: the implementation in train, the deadlines approaching, the risks attaching, and the actors whose cooperation is required. The inventory records the dependencies the government manages — the financial, the political, the diplomatic, the security, the informational — and the actors on whom each rests, the state of each relationship, and the commitments the government has made to each actor. An inventory that exists only in the heads of the outgoing officials is an inventory that will be lost in the change, and the centre that has not written the inventory has not prepared.

The identification of the decisions that must be made in the first days is the second element, and the identification of the relationships that must be established is the third. The centre identifies the decisions that will fall to the new holder in the first days: the appointments, the legislation, the responses to the events in train, the communications, the meetings that cannot be deferred. The centre identifies the decisions that cannot be made by the outgoing holder and cannot be deferred to the new holder's second month: the decisions on which the government's commitments depend, the decisions on which the actors' confidence depends, the decisions on which the centre's own function depends. The relationships that must be established in the first days are the relationships with the heads of the branches, the senior officials, the leaders of the parties, the figures of the economic elite, the heads of the academy and the media, the diplomatic representatives, and the secretariats of the multilateral institutions. The relationships left unestablished in the first days will be harder to establish in the second month.

The Habsburg management of the succession transitions illustrates the preparation in its developed historical form. The Habsburg court maintained the successor's household from the heir's majority, with the tutors, the councillors, and the military and diplomatic advisers who would form the new emperor's inner circle, and the preparation of the heir for the office was conducted

over decades rather than months. The Privy Conference and the State Chancery kept the inventories of the monarchy's commitments and dependencies — the treaties, the dynastic obligations, the concessions to the crownlands, the standing of the army and the finances — updated continuously and consolidated on the emperor's death. The Singapore management of the transition from Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong in 1990 was prepared over a longer arc still: the successor was identified years in advance, was given the cabinet positions in which the dependencies of the government were managed, and was supported by the standing machinery of the party and the civil service in the preparation of the transition. The form differed; the principle that the preparation must precede the transition is general.

24.3 The Transition Brief

The transition brief is the document that conveys to the new office-holder the state of the government. The brief sets out the commitments the government has made, the dependencies the government manages, the risks the government faces, the opportunities the government may pursue, and the relationships the government holds with the actors in its environment. The brief is the centre's transmission of its working knowledge to the new holder, and the brief's quality determines the new holder's readiness in the first days. The brief is prepared by the centre's senior officials, reviewed by the outgoing holder where the holder is available, and delivered to the new holder in the interval between the decision and the assumption.

The distinction from a policy paper is the distinction between a description and an argument. A policy paper argues a position: it presents the options and the recommendation, and it seeks the principal's decision. The transition brief describes the terrain: it sets out the commitments, the dependencies, the risks, the opportunities, and the relationships as they are, without argument for what they should be. The new holder will form the policy in the first weeks and months; the brief is the map of the terrain the new holder must navigate to form the policy. The discipline of the brief is the discipline of description: honest about the commitments and the state of their implementation, complete in the dependencies and the actors on whom each rests, and free of the advocacy that would shape the new holder's policy before the holder has considered the terrain.

The brief is structured to the centre's functions. The opening section sets out the constitutional position of the office, the powers the new holder will exercise, the conventions and the practices that govern the holder's conduct, and the standing of the office in the system. The sections that follow set out the state of the government's work in each domain: the financial, the economic, the security, the diplomatic, the legislative, the political, the public. Each section records the commitments, the dependencies, the risks, the opportunities, and the relationships in the domain, and the decisions that will fall to the new holder in the first days. The brief closes with the inventory of the first meetings the new holder will conduct — the heads of the branches, the senior officials, the leaders of the parties, the figures of the economic elite, the diplomatic representatives — and the centre's recommendation on the order in which the meetings should be conducted.

The American presidential transitions illustrate the brief in its developed form. The transition to Lincoln in 1860 and 1861 was conducted in the four months between the election and the inauguration, and the materials the outgoing administration and the senior officials of the federal

government prepared set the terrain the new president would navigate through the secession crisis. The transition to Roosevelt in 1932 and 1933 was conducted in the same four-month interval, and the brief the Hoover administration provided on the state of the banks, the unemployment, the international debts, and the diplomatic negotiations was the material on which Roosevelt's first Hundred Days were built. The British transition briefs, prepared by the Cabinet Secretary and the Permanent Secretaries of the departments, are the model of the discipline: honest about the commitments and the risks, complete in the dependencies, and free of the advocacy, so that the new prime minister who reads the brief in the first hours enters the office with the centre's working knowledge at hand.

24.4 The Management of the Dependencies

The management of the dependencies through the transition is the centre's central task in the interval. The dependencies the government manages are the relationships the government holds with the actors on whom it depends, and the transition is the moment at which the actors are most likely to test the relationships. The centre's work in the interval is the maintenance of the relationships, the prevention of the actors' exploitation of the transition, and the preservation of the actors' confidence in the continuity of the government's commitments. The work cannot be delegated to the new holder, because the new holder has not yet taken the office and cannot speak with the office's authority. The work cannot be performed by the outgoing holder, because the outgoing holder's authority is fading and the actors read the outgoing holder's commitments as provisional.

The maintenance of the relationships is the routine work of the centre conducted at a heightened tempo in the interval. The centre's officials continue the contacts with the actors — the heads of the banks, the leaders of the parties, the senior officials of the foreign governments, the commanders of the security forces — and the contacts are conducted with the attention the transition requires. The centre's officials communicate the centre's continuity: the government's commitments stand, the dependencies are managed, the work continues. The centre's officials communicate the procedure of the transition: the date of the assumption, the form of the new holder's first communications, the channels through which the actors will engage the new holder. The actors who read the centre's continuity in the centre's conduct maintain their confidence; the actors who read discontinuity withdraw their cooperation pending the new order.

The prevention of the actors' exploitation of the transition is the second task, and the preservation of the actors' confidence in the continuity of the government's commitments is the third. The actors read the transition as the moment to press their claims, to test their leverage, or to settle their accounts with the outgoing order: the financial actors may move capital, the political actors may form coalitions, the diplomatic actors may press their demands, the security actors may test the centre's authority. The centre's work is to anticipate the exploitation and to forestall it: to communicate to the financial actors that the commitments to the currency and the banks stand, to communicate to the political actors that the constitutional procedure is unbroken, to communicate to the diplomatic actors that the treaty obligations stand, and to communicate to the security actors that the centre's authority over the forces is intact. The bondholders, the treaty partners, the

contractors, and the parties to the government's undertakings must be assured that the commitments survive the change of office-holder.

The French transition from the Fourth Republic to the Fifth in 1958 illustrates the management in its most demanding form. The dependencies of the French state in the interval — the army in Algeria, the settlers, the parties, the unions, the foreign allies — were each managed by the centre's officials through the four months of the transition, and the management was the work that prevented the dissolution of the state. The American transition to Roosevelt in 1932 and 1933 illustrates the management of the financial dependencies in their most demanding form: the banking crisis of February 1933, in the last weeks of the Hoover administration, was managed by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury through the interval, and the continuity of the financial commitments — the gold standard, the deposits, the international debts — was the work that preserved the financial system for the new administration to address. The Venetian management of the dependencies in the interregnum between Doges illustrates the management in its most institutionalised form: the ambassadors continued their dispatches, the fleets continued their patrols, the courts continued their sittings, and the creditors continued to be paid, because the Republic's business was the business of the Republic and not of the Doge.

24.5 The First Days

The first days of the new holder's tenure are the days in which the new holder's authority is established and the centre's support of the establishment is the centre's work. The first days comprise the establishment of the working relationships, the first decisions, and the first communications. The establishment of the working relationships is the conduct of the first meetings with the heads of the branches, the senior officials, the leaders of the parties, the figures of the economic elite, the diplomatic representatives, and the secretariats of the multilateral institutions. The first decisions are the decisions the centre has identified as the decisions that must be made in the first days: the appointments, the responses to the events in train, the communications. The first communications are the communications to the public, the actors, and the foreign governments that establish the new holder's authority and the new holder's direction.

The centre's craft in the first days is the support of the new holder's establishment of authority. The centre's officials brief the new holder on the meetings, prepare the materials, document the meetings in the centre's records, and communicate the outcomes to the officials who will implement them. The centre's officials support the new holder's first decisions: they prepare the decision materials, they identify the legal and the procedural requirements, they document the decisions, and they communicate the decisions to the actors affected. The centre's officials support the new holder's first communications: they draft the communications, they identify the channels, they time the communications to the events, and they monitor the responses. The centre that does not support the new holder in the first days is the centre that will not be trusted by the new holder in the months that follow.

The management of the expectations of the actors is the second task of the first days, and the preservation of the centre's own function across the change is the third. The actors have formed expectations of the new holder during the interval — the expectations the centre has shaped

through its management of the dependencies and the expectations the actors have formed through their own reading of the new holder. The centre's work in the first days is to manage the expectations: to communicate the new holder's authority, the new holder's direction, and the centre's continuity in the support of the new holder. The centre's function in the first days is the centre's function in every day: the maintenance of the records, the cultivation of the relationships, the conduct of the analysis, the preparation of the decisions, and the implementation of the commitments. The actors whose expectations are managed in the first days conduct their cooperation on the basis of the new holder's establishment; the actors whose expectations are not managed conduct their cooperation on the basis of their own reading, and the centre's management of the dependencies in the subsequent months is harder.

De Gaulle's first days in June 1958 illustrate the establishment in its most decisive form: the general invested with the powers of the office moved in the first days to the consultations with the party leaders, the briefings with the military and the diplomats, the visit to Algiers, and the preparation of the constitutional referendum. Goh Chok Tong's first days in November 1990 illustrate the establishment in its most orderly form: the new prime minister moved in the first days to the meetings with the cabinet, the civil service, the party, and the foreign governments, and the centre's officials supported the meetings with the discipline the transition required. The British management of the transitions from Churchill to Eden in 1955 and from Eden to Macmillan in 1957 illustrates the establishment in its most institutionalised form: the new prime minister moved in the first days to the audiences with the sovereign, the meetings with the cabinet, the consultations with the parliamentary party, and the communications to the foreign governments, with the Cabinet Secretary and the Permanent Secretaries supporting each step. The form differs across the jurisdictions; the discipline of the centre's support of the new holder's establishment is the same.

24.6 Worked Example: A Transition of Government

Consider a jurisdiction in which the first minister has announced a resignation, to take effect in six weeks, and the governing party has selected a successor. The successor is a senior figure in the party, has held two cabinet portfolios, and has the confidence of the parliamentary party but has not been the centre's principal. The transition will be conducted in the six weeks between the announcement and the assumption, and the centre's craft in the interval will be the craft of carrying the government's commitments, dependencies, and conduct from the outgoing holder to the new. The centre's senior officials begin the preparation on the day of the announcement, and the six weeks are organised around the four elements of the transition: the preparation, the brief, the management of the dependencies, and the first days.

The preparation begins with the consolidation of the transition brief. The inventory of the government's commitments — the legislation in train, the contracts let, the treaties signed, the undertakings to the parties and the public and the foreign governments — and the inventory of the dependencies — the financial, the political, the diplomatic, the security — are consolidated, with the state of each commitment and the actors on whom each dependency rests recorded. The decisions that must be made in the first days are identified: the appointment of the cabinet, the

response to the budget cycle, the response to a diplomatic event in train, the communications. The relationships that must be established in the first days are identified: the heads of the branches, the senior officials, the leaders of the parties, the figures of the economic elite, the diplomatic representatives. The brief is delivered to the successor in the first week of the interval, in the form the centre's discipline requires: honest, complete, and free of advocacy.

The management of the dependencies is conducted through the six weeks at the heightened tempo the transition requires. The centre's officials continue the contacts with the heads of the banks and the leaders of the parties, the senior officials of the foreign governments and the commanders of the security forces, and the contacts communicate the centre's continuity. The centre's officials anticipate the exploitation: the financial actors who may move capital on the uncertainty, the political actors who may form coalitions against the successor, the diplomatic actors who may press their demands in the interval. The centre's officials forestall the exploitation through the communications that the government's commitments stand, the constitutional procedure is unbroken, and the centre's authority over the forces is intact. The centre's officials preserve the confidence of the actors who have relied on the government's commitments: the bondholders are assured of the debt service, the treaty partners are assured of the obligations, the contractors are assured of the contracts.

The first days of the new holder's tenure are conducted with the centre's support. The new holder assumes the office on the day of the assumption, and the centre's officials conduct the first meetings: the heads of the branches, the senior officials, the leaders of the parties, the figures of the economic elite, the diplomatic representatives. The centre's officials brief the new holder on each meeting, prepare the materials, document the meetings in the centre's records, and communicate the outcomes to the officials who will implement them. The new holder's first decisions — the appointment of the cabinet, the response to the budget cycle, the response to the diplomatic event, the first communications — are prepared by the centre's officials with the legal and the procedural requirements, documented in the centre's records, and communicated to the actors affected. The transition is complete: the government's commitments, dependencies, and conduct have been carried from the outgoing holder to the new, and the centre's function persists across the change.

24.7 Chapter Summary

The transition is the period between the decision to change the office-holder and the new holder's assumption of the office. The transition is the moment of maximum vulnerability for the government: the old authority is fading, the new authority is not yet established, and the dependencies the government manages are exposed to the actors' testing. The centre's craft in the transition is the preservation of continuity across the change, and the continuity is the centre's contribution to the change the office-holder's selection produces.

The preparation is the body of work conducted before the transition begins: the transition brief, the inventory of the commitments and the dependencies, the identification of the decisions that must be made in the first days, and the identification of the relationships that must be established. The transition brief is the document that conveys to the new holder the state of the government, and the brief is description rather than advocacy, honest, complete, and free of the

arguments that would shape the new holder's policy before the holder has considered the terrain. The management of the dependencies through the interval is the centre's central task: the maintenance of the relationships, the prevention of the actors' exploitation, and the preservation of the actors' confidence in the continuity of the government's commitments. The first days of the new holder's tenure are the days in which the new holder's authority is established, and the centre's support of the establishment, the management of the expectations of the actors, and the preservation of the centre's own function are the tasks of the first days.

The comparative record confirms the craft. The French transition from the Fourth Republic to the Fifth in 1958, the British management of the transitions from Churchill to Eden to Macmillan across 1955 and 1957, the American transitions to Lincoln in 1860 and 1861 and to Roosevelt in 1932 and 1933, the Meiji transition from the Tokugawa order in 1868, the Venetian management of the interregna between Doges, the Habsburg management of the succession transitions, and the Singapore transition from Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong in 1990 each illustrate the transition as the moment of maximum vulnerability and the centre's craft as the preservation of continuity across the change. The form differs across the jurisdictions and the centuries; the discipline of the preparation, the brief, the management of the dependencies, and the first days is the same. The centre that conducts its transitions with the craft the discipline requires carries the government across the change without loss; the centre that does not, loses the continuity the government's dependencies require.

Chapter 25 — The Crisis of Confidence

The crisis of confidence: the moment when the government's dependencies are threatened and the centre's craft is the restoration of the actors' confidence. Different crises require different responses; the centre's discipline is the diagnosis and the response.

25.1 What a Crisis of Confidence Is

A crisis of confidence is the moment when the actors on whom the government depends lose confidence in the government's capacity or commitment. The actors are the revenue base that pays the tax, the investor community that holds the debt, the public whose acquiescence sustains the government's legitimacy, the coalition partners whose support sustains the majority, the security forces whose obedience sustains the order, and the foreign governments whose cooperation sustains the state's position abroad. The crisis is the loss of confidence the event triggers, and the event is the trigger — the demonstration, the rout, the scandal, the refusal of credit, the troop movement — that sets the loss in motion. The crisis is the cascade that follows the event, and the centre's craft is the diagnosis of the loss, the response to the trigger and the cascade, and the restoration of the confidence through action and the communication of the action.

The distinction between the event and the crisis is the distinction the centre must hold from the first hour. The event is visible: the run on the currency, the collapse of the polls, the mutiny of the regiment, the publication of the tapes. The crisis is the cascade of decisions by the actors that follows the event and propagates through the dependencies: the withdrawal of deposits, the refusal to refinance the debt, the withholding of tax, the defection of the coalition partners, the refusal of orders by the security forces, the withdrawal of recognition by the foreign governments. The cascade is sometimes visible and sometimes quiet, and the centre that attends to the event and not to the cascade has misdiagnosed the crisis. The diagnosis is the identification of the actors whose confidence has been lost, the actors whose confidence is at risk, and the channels through which the loss is propagating.

The centre's response is the action that addresses the trigger and arrests the cascade, and the response is conducted on the hours and the days, not the weeks and the months. The fiscal crisis is addressed by the diagnosis of the fiscal position and the communication of the plan; the political crisis is addressed by the management of the coalition and the communication with the public; the security crisis is addressed by the deployment of the security apparatus and the demonstration of the government's control; the reputational crisis is addressed by the accountability for the failure and the demonstration of the reform. The restoration is the sustained work that follows the response, conducted through the implementation of the measures and the communication of the implementation, and the restoration is the test by which the centre's work is judged in the months and the years after the event.

The Venetian Republic's management of the conspiracies through the Council of Ten illustrates the diagnosis of a crisis of confidence within the political class. The Republic was governed by a patriciate whose confidence in the constitution and in one another sustained the

state, and the recurrent conspiracies against the doge and the constitution — the conspiracy of Marin Falier in 1355, in which the doge himself conspired against the patriciate, and the later plots that the Ten's inquisitors detected and suppressed — threatened the patriciate's confidence in the Republic's continuity. The Council of Ten diagnosed the conspiracy as a crisis of the patriciate's confidence, responded through the arrest and the execution of the conspirators and the constitutional adjustments that prevented the recurrence, and restored the confidence through the secrecy of the procedure and the demonstration that the Republic's institutions were capable of defending the constitution. The event was the conspiracy; the crisis was the loss of confidence the conspiracy threatened; the centre's task was the management of the loss.

25.2 The Fiscal Crisis

The fiscal crisis is the loss of confidence in the government's fiscal management by the revenue base, the investor community, or the external financiers. The revenue base is the population and the firms that pay the taxes and submit to the assessments; the investor community is the domestic and foreign holders of the government's debt and the banks that finance the government's short-term needs; the external financiers are the international institutions and the foreign governments that provide the balance-of-payments support and the project financing. The fiscal crisis manifests in the refusal of credit at the rates the government can sustain, the flight of capital from the currency, the withholding of tax by the revenue base, and the demand for higher yields that raises the cost of the debt the government must refinance. The fiscal crisis is the type of crisis in which the cascade is most readily measurable, because the prices of the government's paper and the levels of the reserves register the actors' confidence hour by hour.

The response comprises the diagnosis of the fiscal position, the communication of the government's plan, the management of the relationships with the financial actors, and the restoration of the confidence through action. The diagnosis sets out the revenue, the expenditure, the debt, the reserves, and the financing gap, and distinguishes the structural from the cyclical: a cyclical deficit that will close with the recovery is a different problem from a structural deficit that will not. The communication sets out the plan to close the gap, the measures to be taken, the timeline, and the consequences for the actors whose confidence has been lost; the communication that conceals the gap or qualifies the measures propagates the loss. The management of the relationships engages the central bank, the finance ministry, the commercial banks, the foreign creditors, and the international institutions in the order their leverage requires, and the management is the conduct of the consultations through which the plan is tested and the support is secured.

The British management of the sterling crisis of 1976 illustrates the fiscal crisis in its developed form. The Labour government of Callaghan and Healey faced the run on sterling, the depletion of the reserves, and the requirement of the loan from the International Monetary Fund; the cascade was the refusal of the markets to hold sterling at the existing parity and the demand of the Fund for the public expenditure cuts as the condition of the loan. The diagnosis was the recognition that the fiscal gap was structural rather than cyclical and that the public expenditure plans the government had inherited could not be sustained. The communication was the plan to cut public expenditure and to accept the conditions the Fund would set, delivered by the chancellor and

the prime minister to the parliamentary party, the trade unions, and the financial community; the management was the negotiation with the Fund through the autumn of 1976 and the engagement of the parliamentary party and the unions whose support the implementation required. The restoration was the conclusion of the loan, the implementation of the cuts, and the stabilisation of the currency, and the centre's composure through the negotiation — the chancellor's refusal to resign, the prime minister's steady communication — was the condition of the confidence's return.

The fiscal crisis has a slower tempo than the political or the security crisis, but the centre's discipline is the same. The British management in 1976 succeeded because the diagnosis was honest, the communication was direct, and the response was implemented; the failure of fiscal crisis management elsewhere has followed the opposite pattern — the diagnosis concealed, the response deferred, the communication vague, and the confidence further eroded by the centre's conduct. The restoration of the confidence is the work of months and years, and the centre that treats the fiscal crisis as a matter of the announcement rather than the action has misunderstood the crisis and prolonged the loss. The fiscal crisis is the type in which the centre is most visibly tested by the markets, because the markets register the actors' confidence in the prices the government cannot talk away.

25.3 The Political Crisis

The political crisis is the loss of confidence in the government's legitimacy or direction by the public, the coalition, or the political elites. The public is the electorate whose acquiescence sustains the government's mandate; the coalition is the parties and factions whose support sustains the government's majority; the political elites are the senior figures of the state — the party elders, the senior officials, the military leaders, the figures of the constitutional order — whose confidence sustains the government's authority. The political crisis manifests in the collapse of the polls, the defection of the coalition partners, the public withdrawal of support by the senior figures, and the emergence of a successor whom the elites begin to consider. The political crisis is the type in which the cascade is most dangerous, because the loss of confidence by one set of actors propagates to the others through the channels of political observation.

The response comprises the diagnosis of the political position, the management of the coalition, the communication with the public, and the restoration of the confidence through leadership. The diagnosis sets out the government's standing in the polls, the coalition's cohesion, the elites' confidence, and the channels through which the loss is propagating, and the diagnosis distinguishes the loss that can be arrested by the response from the loss that has passed the point of arrest. The management of the coalition engages the partners, the factions, and the senior figures in the order their leverage requires, and addresses the demands the loss has amplified. The communication with the public addresses the public's confidence directly, through the speech, the broadcast, and the gesture that signal the government's direction, and the communication is the discipline by which the principal's leadership is demonstrated.

The French management of the crisis of May 1968 illustrates the political crisis in its acute form. The student and worker protests of May threatened the government of de Gaulle with the loss of confidence by the public and the political elites, and the cascade of strikes and occupations

threatened the state's capacity to function. De Gaulle's departure to Baden-Baden on 29 May 1968 — the visit to General Massu, the commander of the French forces in Germany — was the diagnosis of the political position: the recognition that the government's authority rested on the confidence of the armed forces and that the loss of that confidence would be the loss of the state. The return to Paris on 30 May, the dissolution of the National Assembly, and the broadcast to the nation were the response: the demonstration that the government retained the capacity to act, the management of the coalition through the dissolution that offered the electorate a choice, and the communication with the public through the broadcast that restored the public's confidence. The restoration was the elections of June 1968, the majority secured by the gaullist parties, and the confidence rebuilt through the action.

The French management of the generals' putsch of April 1961 illustrates the political crisis in its security dimension. The putsch of the four generals in Algiers — Challe, Salan, Jouhaud, and Zeller — threatened the government's authority over the army and the state's authority over the territory, and the cascade of defections within the officer corps threatened the government's capacity to maintain order. De Gaulle's response was the broadcast of 23 April 1961, delivered in the uniform of the commander-in-chief, and the invocation of the article of the constitution that conferred the emergency powers on the president. The management of the coalition was the engagement of the political class across the parties and the senior officials whose loyalty the crisis required; the communication with the public was the broadcast that framed the putsch as a violation of the constitution and the army as the servant of the state. The restoration was the failure of the putsch, the confinement of the army to the barracks, and the demonstration of the government's capacity to maintain the authority the constitution conferred.

25.4 The Security Crisis

The security crisis is the loss of confidence in the government's capacity to maintain order or defend the state. The actors whose confidence is at risk are the security forces — the police, the gendarmerie, the military — whose obedience the government requires to maintain order; the public, whose confidence in the government's protection sustains its acquiescence; and the foreign governments, whose confidence in the government's capacity to defend the state sustains the alliances and the cooperation. The security crisis manifests in the refusal of orders by the security forces, the collapse of public order, the failure of the defences, and the foreign governments' withdrawal of confidence in the state's capacity to meet its obligations. The security crisis is the type in which the cascade is most physical, because the loss of confidence is registered in the movement of troops and the breakdown of the public order rather than in the prices of the government's paper.

The response comprises the diagnosis of the security position, the deployment of the security apparatus, the communication of the government's control, and the restoration of the confidence through the demonstration of capacity. The diagnosis sets out the threat, the forces available, the loyalty of the forces, and the channels through which the cascade is propagating, and the diagnosis distinguishes the regional insurrection from the national rising and the loyal regiment from the doubtful. The deployment engages the police, the gendarmerie, and the military in the order the

threat requires, and the deployment is the action by which the government's capacity is demonstrated. The communication addresses the public, the security forces, and the foreign governments, and the communication is the discipline by which the demonstration is made known and the centre's control is established.

The Meiji management of the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877 illustrates the security crisis in its classical form. The rebellion of Saigō Takamori and the Satsuma samurai threatened the government's authority over southern Kyūshū and the government's capacity to maintain the order the Meiji reforms had established. The diagnosis was the recognition that the rebellion was a regional insurrection rather than a national rising, that the conscript army's loyalty was the condition of the response, and that the imperial guard and the conscript divisions were the forces available. The deployment was the mobilisation of the conscript army under the command of the imperial officials, the concentration of the forces against the Satsuma samurai at Kagoshima, and the prosecution of the campaign through the sieges and the engagements that ended at the battle of Shiroyama. The communication was the imperial rescripts that framed the rebellion as a violation of the emperor's peace and the conscript army as the instrument of the restoration, and the restoration was the defeat of the rebellion and the demonstration that the government's forces could prevail over the samurai whose class the reforms had displaced.

The Singapore management of the racial riots of 1964 and 1969 and the Habsburg management of the 1848 revolutions illustrate the security crisis in the urban and the imperial forms. The Singapore riots — the Prophet's Birthday riots of July 1964 and the riots of May 1969 that followed the spillover from the general election — threatened the government's authority over the island's communities and the public's confidence in the government's capacity to maintain the communal peace. The diagnosis was the recognition of the communal dimension of the disorder, the deployment was the curfew and the security forces, and the communication was the broadcast of the prime minister and the engagement of the community leaders; the restoration was the sustained work of the integration policies, the public housing, and the security apparatus that prevented the recurrence. The Habsburg management of the 1848 revolutions — the revolutions in Vienna, Pest, Prague, Milan, and Venice — was the security crisis in the imperial form: the diagnosis of the nationalist and the liberal demands, the deployment of the military under Windischgrätz, Radetzky, and Jelačić, the flight of the emperor Ferdinand from Vienna, and the restoration of the order through the campaigns of 1848 and 1849. The restoration was partial: the order was restored, the constitutional concessions were withdrawn, and the abdication of Ferdinand in favour of Franz Joseph in December 1848 stabilised the dynasty, but the nationalist demands were deferred, and the confidence of the nationalities was not rebuilt.

25.5 The Reputational Crisis

The reputational crisis is the loss of confidence in the government's integrity or competence through scandal, failure, or exposure. The actors whose confidence is at risk are the public, whose confidence in the government's integrity sustains its legitimacy; the political elites, whose confidence sustains the government's authority; the senior officials, whose confidence sustains the government's capacity to act; and the foreign governments, whose confidence sustains the state's

standing abroad. The reputational crisis manifests in the collapse of the polls, the public withdrawal of support by the elites, the resignation of the senior officials, and the foreign governments' distancing from the government. The reputational crisis differs from the other types in the centre's vulnerability, because the conduct at issue is the conduct of the centre itself, and the centre's response is the conduct by which the centre distinguishes itself from the conduct at issue.

The response comprises the diagnosis of the reputational damage, the management of the disclosure, the accountability for the failure, and the restoration of the confidence through the demonstration of reform. The diagnosis sets out the conduct at issue, the actors implicated, the actors whose confidence has been lost, and the channels through which the loss is propagating, and the diagnosis distinguishes the conduct that requires the accountability from the conduct that requires the explanation. The management of the disclosure engages the press, the parliament, and the public in the order the disclosure requires, and the management is the discipline by which the disclosure's tempo is controlled and the government's posture is maintained. The accountability for the failure is the resignation, the dismissal, or the prosecution of the actors implicated, and the accountability is the action by which the government separates itself from the conduct at issue.

The American management of the constitutional crisis of 1974 — the Watergate scandal and the resignation of President Nixon — illustrates the reputational crisis in its developed form. The conduct at issue was the cover-up of the break-in at the Democratic National Committee's offices and the abuse of the powers of the office against the political opponents, and the cascade was the loss of confidence by the public, the Congress, the senior officials, and the foreign governments, propagated through the hearings of the Senate committee, the investigation of the special prosecutor, the publication of the White House tapes, and the articles of impeachment voted by the House committee. The diagnosis was the recognition that the conduct had crossed the line the constitution required and that the accountability was the resignation; the management of the disclosure was the engagement of the Congress, the special prosecutor, and the press, and the publication of the tapes that the Supreme Court ordered released. The accountability was the resignation of the president on 9 August 1974 and the succession of the vice president, Gerald Ford, to the office. The restoration was the pardon of the former president by the successor, the confirmation of the new vice president under the procedures the Twenty-fifth Amendment established, and the reforms of the campaign finance, the ethics in government, and the intelligence agencies that demonstrated the constitutional order's capacity to hold the executive accountable.

The reputational crisis is the type in which the centre most resists the response the crisis requires, because the accountability is the dismissal of the centre's own. The American management in 1974 succeeded because the institutions — the Congress, the senior officials, the special prosecutor, the Supreme Court, the successor — held the executive accountable through the procedures the constitution provided. The failure of reputational crisis management elsewhere has followed the opposite pattern: the conduct denied, the disclosure resisted, the accountability refused, the reforms deferred, and the confidence further eroded by the centre's conduct. The restoration of the confidence is the work of the accountability and the reform, and the centre that treats the reputational crisis as a matter of the communication rather than the accountability has misunderstood the crisis and prolonged the loss.

25.6 The Common Craft

The common craft across the types of crisis is the speed of the response, the clarity of the communication, the coherence of the government's posture, and the maintenance of the centre's own composure. The speed of the response is the recognition that the cascade propagates on the hours and the days, not the weeks and the months, and that the response that arrives after the cascade has propagated is the response that has failed. The clarity of the communication is the recognition that the actors read the centre's statements as the measure of the centre's seriousness, and that the vague statement, the qualified commitment, and the contradictory signals are read as the centre's uncertainty and propagate the loss. The coherence of the posture is the recognition that the actors read the government as a whole, and that the divergence between the ministries, the public divisions within the coalition, and the conflicting statements by the principals are read as the government's loss of control.

The maintenance of the centre's composure is the recognition that the centre that panics has failed, regardless of the crisis's outcome, and that the composure is the discipline by which the centre is judged. The composure is the absence of panic in the centre's conduct, not the absence of alarm in the centre's assessment, and the alarm is the recognition of the crisis that the composure addresses. The principal who disappears from the public view in the first hours of the crisis, the minister who contradicts the prime minister in the first broadcast, the official who is seen to hesitate in the first deployment — each of these is the loss of the composure that the actors read as the centre's loss of control. The composure is the conduct of the response in the manner the centre has prepared, and the preparation is the work that precedes the crisis and that the crisis tests.

The British management of the Suez crisis of 1956 illustrates the failure of the common craft across the types. The Suez crisis was a fiscal, political, security, and reputational crisis simultaneously: the run on sterling that followed the invasion, the loss of the parliamentary and the public confidence, the failure of the military operation to achieve the political objective, and the loss of the international standing through the opposition of the United States and the censure of the United Nations. The centre — the Eden government — failed on each of the craft's dimensions: the response was delayed and the operation misjudged, the communication was deceptive and the public misled, the posture was incoherent and the cabinet divided, and the composure was lost in the prime minister's absence from the public view and his collapse under the strain. The consequence was the resignation of the prime minister, the withdrawal of the forces, and the demonstration that the centre that fails the common craft fails the crisis, regardless of the underlying merits of the action.

The Venetian Republic's management of the recurrent conspiracies through the Council of Ten illustrates the common craft in its disciplined form. The Ten's response to the conspiracy was the speed of the arrest in the hours after the discovery, the secrecy of the procedure that controlled the disclosure, the coherence of the Republic's posture through the doge and the councils, and the composure of the patriciate through the conduct of the trial and the execution. The Ten's discipline was the recognition that the crisis was the loss of confidence within the patriciate, and the restoration was the demonstration that the Republic's institutions were capable of defending the constitution. The crisis is a test of the centre; the centre that maintains the speed, the clarity, the

coherence, and the composure through the crisis has passed the test, and the centre that has lost any of the four has failed, regardless of the crisis's outcome.

25.7 Chapter Summary

The crisis of confidence is the moment when the actors on whom the government depends lose confidence in the government's capacity or commitment. The crisis is the loss of confidence the event triggers, and the event is the trigger that sets the loss in motion. The centre's craft is the diagnosis of the loss, the response to the trigger and the cascade, and the restoration of the confidence through action and the communication of the action. The fiscal, the political, the security, and the reputational crises are the types through which the loss propagates, and the centre's discipline is the diagnosis of the type, the response to the type, and the restoration appropriate to the type.

The fiscal crisis is the loss of confidence by the revenue base, the investor community, or the external financiers, and the response is the diagnosis of the fiscal position, the communication of the plan, the management of the financial relationships, and the restoration through the implementation of the plan. The political crisis is the loss of confidence by the public, the coalition, or the political elites, and the response is the diagnosis of the political position, the management of the coalition, the communication with the public, and the restoration through leadership. The security crisis is the loss of confidence in the government's capacity to maintain order or defend the state, and the response is the diagnosis, the deployment, the communication, and the restoration through the demonstration of capacity. The reputational crisis is the loss of confidence in the government's integrity or competence, and the response is the diagnosis, the management of the disclosure, the accountability for the failure, and the restoration through the demonstration of reform.

The common craft across the types is the speed of the response, the clarity of the communication, the coherence of the government's posture, and the maintenance of the centre's composure. The comparative record confirms the craft. The British management of the sterling crisis of 1976, the French management of the crisis of May 1968 and the generals' putsch of April 1961, the Meiji management of the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, the Singapore management of the racial riots of 1964 and 1969, the Habsburg management of the 1848 revolutions, the American management of the constitutional crisis of 1974, and the Venetian management of the conspiracies through the Council of Ten each illustrate the craft in its developed forms. The British failure in the Suez crisis of 1956 illustrates the failure of the craft across the types simultaneously. The crisis is a test of the centre; the centre that maintains the craft through the crisis has passed the test, and the centre that has not, has failed, regardless of the crisis's outcome.

Chapter 26 — The Public Position

The management of the government's public position: the operational craft by which the centre frames the posture the government presents to the actors and to the public.

26.1 What the Public Position Is

The public position is the government's stated posture on a matter: what it intends, what it will accept, and what it will not accept. The position is expressed in the formal communications of the government — the statement, the speech, the answer to the question, the briefing, the rescript, the broadcast. The position is distinguished from the government's private assessment, which is the centre's own understanding of the matter held among the principals and the senior officials. The private assessment comprises the centre's reading of the conditions, the centre's evaluation of the options, and the centre's recognition of the constraints; the public position comprises the centre's declaration of its posture to the actors whose responses the centre must manage.

The public position is the government's declared stance, and the centre's craft is the management of the relationship between the declared stance and the private assessment. The relationship is the discipline by which the centre holds the gap between the two without collapse: the position that drifts from the assessment loses the centre's contact with the conditions; the position that mirrors the assessment loses the centre's capacity to act. The centre maintains the gap through the framing, the consistency, the disclosure, and the adjustment, and the gap is the space within which the centre's operational craft is exercised. The gap is the discipline by which the government's declared posture serves the government's objectives rather than foreclosing them. The discipline requires the centre to distinguish the framing from the falsehood, the discretion from the misrepresentation, and the adjustment from the reversal, and the centre that confuses the distinctions has lost the discipline the position requires.

The position is constructed by the centre in consultation with the ministers and the officials whose responsibilities the position touches. The construction begins with the private assessment, proceeds through the choice of the framing, and concludes with the clearance of the position across the principals. The clearance is the discipline by which the government speaks with one voice: the ministers whose responsibilities are touched clear the language, the officials whose advice is required clear the substance, and the centre clears the framing. The position that emerges from the clearance is the government's position, and the principals who have cleared it are bound to it in their subsequent statements.

The Venetian Republic's management of the public position through the controlled disclosure of the Senate's decisions illustrates the craft in its classical form. The Senate deliberated in secret, and the decisions of the Senate were released to the public and to the foreign governments through the formal channels the Republic had established. The controlled disclosure was the management of the position: the decisions that required the public's knowledge were released, the decisions that required the foreign government's attention were signalled through the diplomatic channels, and the decisions that required the secrecy for the Republic's capacity to act were withheld. The Republic's

discipline was the recognition that the public position was the product of the Senate's deliberation and the council's release, and the position that the public received was the position the Republic had framed for the public's reception.

26.2 The Framing of the Position

The framing of the position is the choice of the framing, the choice of the language, and the choice of the audience. The framing is the selection of the aspect under which the matter is presented: the fiscal measure as the consolidation of the public finances or as the austerity imposed on the poor; the security operation as the defence of the order or as the repression of the dissent; the diplomatic engagement as the negotiation of the peace or as the capitulation to the adversary. The language is the selection of the words, the register, and the tone: the technical language that signals the government's command of the matter, the plain language that signals the government's contact with the public, the formal language that signals the government's authority. The audience is the selection of the actors to whom the position is addressed: the parliament, the public, the markets, the foreign governments, the security forces, each addressed in the manner the audience requires.

The framing shapes the actors' understanding of the government's posture and the actors' response to it. The actors read the framing as the measure of the government's seriousness, the government's direction, and the government's capacity, and the actors' responses are framed by the framing the government has chosen. The framing that presents the measure as the consolidation invites the response of the markets and the parliamentary supporters; the framing that presents the measure as the austerity invites the response of the unions and the opposition. The discipline is the anticipation of the responses the framing will provoke, and the choice of the framing that advances the government's objectives without provoking the reactions the government cannot manage.

The framing that advances the government's objectives without provoking the unmanageable reactions is the framing that the centre arrives at through the testing. The testing is the conduct of the consultation with the officials, the ministers, and the trusted intermediaries whose reading of the actors' likely responses informs the centre's choice. The testing is conducted in the days and the hours before the position is declared, and the testing is the discipline by which the centre avoids the framing that provokes the reactions the government cannot manage. The framing that emerges from the testing is the framing that the formal communications will express, and the formal communications are the expression of the framing the centre has chosen.

De Gaulle's use of the televised address and the press conference illustrates the framing in its developed form. The televised address of April 1961 on the generals' putsch in Algiers — delivered in the uniform of the commander-in-chief and the language of the constitution — framed the putsch as the violation of the constitutional order and the army as the servant of the state, and the framing invited the response of the public's support and the army's obedience. The press conference of September 1961 on the future of Algeria — conducted in the formal setting of the Élysée and the language of the negotiation — framed the settlement as the recognition of the Algerian right to self-determination and the preservation of the French interests, and the framing invited the response of the parties' acceptance and the public's relief. De Gaulle's craft was the choice of the framing that advanced the government's objective — the withdrawal from Algeria without the civil war —

through the language and the audience that the objective required, and the framing was the discipline by which the formal communications expressed the position the centre had constructed.

26.3 The Management of Consistency

The management of consistency is the alignment of the public position across the government's officials, across the government's communications, and across time. The officials are the ministers, the spokespersons, the parliamentary secretaries, the senior civil servants, and the field representatives whose statements the public and the actors receive as the government's position. The communications are the statements, the speeches, the briefings, the press releases, the parliamentary answers, the broadcasts, and the formal documents through which the position is expressed. The time is the period over which the position is maintained, from the moment of the declaration to the moment of the adjustment, and the consistency across time is the discipline by which the position's credibility is sustained.

The government that speaks with multiple voices has no position, because the actors who hear the multiple voices receive the divergence as the government's uncertainty or the government's division. The government that changes its position without explanation has no credibility, because the actors who observe the change receive the absence of the explanation as the government's mistake or the government's concealment. The consistency is the discipline by which the position is maintained as the government's position, and the discipline is the conduct of the clearance, the briefing, and the monitoring through which the divergence is prevented. The clearance establishes the position before the statement; the briefing communicates the position to the speakers; the monitoring tracks the statements and corrects the divergences.

The British management of the public position through the lobby system and the prime minister's communications illustrates the consistency in its institutional form. The lobby system — the daily briefing of the parliamentary correspondents by the prime minister's official spokesman — was the channel through which the government's position was communicated to the press, on the understanding that the briefing was attributed to the Downing Street sources rather than to the spokesman by name. The grid of the announcements — the weekly schedule of the government's communications, cleared across the departments and managed by the prime minister's office and the cabinet office — was the instrument through which the consistency across the departments was maintained. The prime minister's questions in the House of Commons, the ministerial statements, and the government's amendments to the legislation were the channels through which the position was tested and maintained in the parliament, and the discipline of the clearance, the briefing, and the monitoring was the craft by which the position was sustained across the channels and the time.

The French management of the public position through the Élysée and Matignon illustrates the consistency in the dual-executive form. The French Fifth Republic divides the executive between the president of the Republic, housed at the Élysée, and the prime minister, housed at Matignon, and the division requires the management of the consistency across the two centres. The management is conducted through the council of ministers, the general secretaries of the two houses, and the communications advisers the president and the prime minister have appointed, and the management is the discipline by which the two centres speak with the single voice the

constitution's practice requires. The discipline is tested when the president and the prime minister belong to different political majorities — the cohabitation — and the test is the conduct of the consistency through the division of the responsibilities the constitution prescribes and the personal engagement the principals conduct.

26.4 The Management of Disclosure

The management of disclosure is the decision of what to reveal, what to withhold, and what to signal. The revelation is the publication of the information that the actors require for their confidence: the fiscal figures that the markets require, the policy intentions that the parliament requires, the security assessments that the allies require. The withholding is the retention of the information that the disclosure would compromise: the negotiation positions, the intelligence assessments, the operational plans, the internal divisions. The signalling is the communication of the information through the channels and the manner that convey the position to the actors without the formal declaration: the background briefing, the off-the-record conversation, the leak to the trusted correspondent, the diplomatic demarche.

The balance between the transparency that builds the confidence and the discretion that preserves the government's capacity to act is the discipline the centre maintains. The transparency is the disclosure that assures the actors of the government's seriousness: the publication of the fiscal figures, the commitment to the policy intentions, the sharing of the assessments with the allies. The discretion is the withholding that protects the government's room for the action: the retention of the negotiation positions, the protection of the intelligence sources, the concealment of the internal divisions. The balance is the daily judgement of the centre's communications staff, exercised through the gradient of the disclosure across the actors: the full position to the principals, the substantial position to the parliamentary supporters, the public position to the parliament and the press, the formal position to the public and the foreign governments.

The American management of the public position through the White House communications operation illustrates the disclosure in its institutional form. The White House press secretary's daily briefing — on the record, on background, on deep background, and off the record — was the gradient of the disclosure through which the position was communicated to the press corps. The background conversation with the trusted correspondents, the leak to the selected outlets, and the formal statement from the podium were the channels through which the position was signalled to the actors the centre sought to reach. The discipline of the operation was the conduct of the gradient across the actors and the time, and the discipline was maintained by the communications staff the president had entrusted with the management of the position. The operation's success was measured by the consistency of the position the press corps received and the discretion the centre preserved in the conduct of the business the press could not observe.

Lee Kuan Yew's personal management of the government's positioning illustrates the disclosure in its concentrated form. The prime minister's personal engagement with the position — the drafting of the speeches, the selection of the audiences, the timing of the statements — was the discipline by which the position was framed, communicated, and maintained across the years of the premiership. The disclosure was conducted through the gradient the prime minister personally

managed: the full position to the cabinet, the substantial position to the parliamentary party, the public position to the parliament and the press, the formal position to the public, and the diplomatic position to the foreign governments. The discipline was the prime minister's personal conduct of the consistency and the disclosure, and the discipline was sustained by the concentration of the communications function in the prime minister's office and the senior officials the prime minister had entrusted with the position's management. The Singapore model demonstrates the disclosure in the form the principal's personal engagement allows, and the form requires the principal's sustained attention to the position the centre maintains.

26.5 The Management of the Position Through Time

The management of the position through time is the adjustment of the position as the conditions change, the management of the perception of the adjustment, and the preservation of the position's credibility through the change. The conditions change because the circumstances the position addressed have altered: the fiscal position has worsened, the security situation has shifted, the coalition has fractured, the foreign government has moved. The adjustment is the revision of the position the conditions require, and the adjustment is the recognition that the position that cannot be revised is the position that cannot be sustained. The management of the perception is the framing of the adjustment as the continuity of the government's direction rather than the reversal of the government's undertaking, and the preservation of the credibility is the conduct of the adjustment in the manner that sustains the actors' confidence.

The position that cannot be adjusted has been overtaken by the conditions, and the position that is adjusted without management has lost its credibility with the actors. The adjustment that the centre conducts in the open, with the explanation the actors require, sustains the credibility through the change; the adjustment that the centre conducts in the concealment, without the explanation the actors can trace, destroys the credibility the change requires. The discipline is the conduct of the adjustment through the stages — the signal of the change, the explanation of the change, the framing of the continuity within the change — and the stages are the operations by which the credibility is preserved. The signal is the indication to the trusted actors that the position is under review; the explanation is the publication of the reasons for the adjustment; the framing is the construction of the continuity between the previous position and the revised.

The discipline of the centre through the transition is the timing of the adjustment, the order of the stages, and the management of the perception. The timing is the choice of the moment at which the adjustment is conducted: the early adjustment that anticipates the conditions, the timely adjustment that responds to the conditions, the late adjustment that follows the conditions. The order is the sequence in which the actors are informed: the principals first, the parliamentary supporters second, the parliament third, the public fourth, the foreign governments in the order the diplomatic channels require. The management of the perception is the conduct of the adjustment in the manner the actors read as the government's continuation rather than the government's reversal, and the management is the discipline by which the credibility is sustained through the change.

The Meiji oligarchs' use of the imperial rescript to frame the government's position illustrates the management of the position through time in its institutional form. The Charter Oath of 1868 —

the five-article declaration issued in the emperor's name at the establishment of the new government — framed the position of the new regime as the modernisation of the institutions, the consultation of the public, and the engagement with the world, and the framing was the position the oligarchs maintained through the decades of the reform. The Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 — the declaration of the moral and the civic principles the government required the schools to teach — framed the position of the government as the synthesis of the constitutional modernisation and the Confucian morality, and the framing was the position the oligarchs constructed to manage the tension between the modernisation and the tradition. The management of the position through the rescripts was the discipline by which the oligarchs adjusted the position to the conditions — the modernisation, the constitutional development, the international competition — while preserving the continuity of the emperor's authority, and the rescripts were the instrument by which the adjustment was framed as the continuity.

26.6 Worked Example: Managing a Difficult Public Position

A government that has declared its position on the public spending — the commitment to maintain the expenditure on the public services and the rejection of the austerity — faces the deterioration of the fiscal position that requires the revision of the position. The private assessment, conducted by the treasury and the central bank, establishes that the fiscal gap has widened beyond the level the previous position assumed, and that the expenditure plans the government has announced cannot be sustained without the financing the markets will not provide on the terms the government can accept. The centre's principals — the first minister, the finance minister, the senior officials — recognise that the public position must be adjusted, and that the adjustment must be conducted in the manner that preserves the government's credibility with the public, the parliamentary supporters, and the markets. The centre's task is the management of the position through the framing, the consistency, the disclosure, and the adjustment.

The framing of the adjustment is the choice of the aspect under which the revision is presented: the consolidation of the public finances that protects the services the government has committed to maintain, rather than the austerity the government has committed to reject. The language is the technical register that signals the government's command of the fiscal position, combined with the plain register that signals the government's contact with the public's concerns. The audience is the sequence of the actors the adjustment must reach: the parliamentary supporters in the confidential briefing that precedes the public announcement, the markets in the publication of the fiscal figures that accompanies the announcement, the public in the broadcast that follows the announcement, the foreign governments in the diplomatic communication that runs alongside. The framing is tested against the responses the actors are likely to produce, and the framing that emerges from the testing is the framing that the formal communications will express.

The consistency of the position is maintained through the clearance, the briefing, and the monitoring. The clearance establishes the position across the ministers — the finance minister who announces the measures, the spending ministers whose departments are affected, the parliamentary leader who manages the legislature — and the principals clear the language before the announcement. The briefing communicates the position to the spokespersons, the parliamentary

supporters, and the senior officials whose subsequent statements must conform to the position, and the briefing is conducted in the hours before the announcement. The monitoring tracks the statements — the press, the parliament, the social media — and the divergences are corrected through the rapid engagement of the centre's communications staff with the speakers who have departed from the position. The disclosure is the gradient: the full position to the principals and the senior officials, the substantial position to the parliamentary supporters, the public position to the parliament and the press, and the formal position to the public.

The adjustment through the time is conducted in the stages: the signal of the change through the confidential indication to the parliamentary supporters and the trusted correspondents that the fiscal position has worsened; the explanation of the change through the publication of the fiscal figures and the announcement of the measures; the framing of the continuity through the broadcast that presents the adjustment as the protection of the services the government has committed to maintain. The management of the perception is the conduct of the adjustment in the manner the actors read as the government's continuation of its direction — the protection of the services — rather than the government's reversal of its undertaking — the rejection of the austerity. The preservation of the credibility is the conduct of the adjustment through the stages, in the order, and with the explanation that sustain the actors' confidence through the change. The worked example illustrates the discipline in its developed form: the framing that advances the objective without provoking the unmanageable reactions, the consistency that maintains the position across the speakers and the channels, the disclosure that balances the transparency and the discretion, and the adjustment that preserves the credibility through the change.

26.7 Chapter Summary

The public position is the government's stated posture on a matter: what it intends, what it will accept, and what it will not accept. The position is the government's declared stance, distinguished from the government's private assessment, and the centre's craft is the management of the relationship between the two. The position is constructed by the centre in the clearance across the principals, and the position that emerges is the government's position to which the principals are bound. The Venetian Republic's management of the position through the controlled disclosure of the Senate's decisions illustrates the craft in its classical form.

The framing of the position is the choice of the framing, the language, and the audience, and the framing shapes the actors' understanding of the posture and their response. The management of consistency is the alignment of the position across the officials, the communications, and the time, and the discipline is the conduct of the clearance, the briefing, and the monitoring. The management of disclosure is the decision of what to reveal, what to withhold, and what to signal, and the balance is the discipline by which the transparency and the discretion are held. The management of the position through time is the adjustment of the position as the conditions change, the management of the perception of the adjustment, and the preservation of the credibility through the change.

The comparative record confirms the craft. The Venetian Republic's management of the position through the controlled disclosure of the Senate's decisions, the British management

through the lobby system and the prime minister's communications, the French management through the Élysée and Matignon, the American management through the White House communications operation, Lee Kuan Yew's personal management of the government's positioning, de Gaulle's use of the televised address and the press conference, and the Meiji oligarchs' use of the imperial rescript each illustrate the craft in its developed forms. The key lesson is that the public position is managed up to the point where the formal communications begin, and the centre's craft is the framing of the position that the formal communications will express. The centre that conducts the framing, the consistency, the disclosure, and the adjustment with the discipline the position requires has maintained the position; the centre that has let the discipline lapse has lost the position, regardless of the underlying merits of the government's undertaking.

Chapter 27 — The Personal Relationship

Part VI: The Personal Craft — The individual dimension of statecraft, where the operational craft is conducted through personal relationships. The personal relationship is the substrate of the centre's work.

27.1 What the Personal Relationship Is

The personal relationship is the relationship between the centre's principal and the principal of an actor on whom the government depends. The centre's principal is the first minister, the president, the chancellor, or the head of government whose authority the centre exercises; the actor's principal is the head of the party, the head of the firm, the head of the union, the head of the security service, or the head of the foreign government whose cooperation the government requires. The personal relationship is the relationship between these two persons, conducted through the meetings, the correspondence, the conversations, and the shared experiences by which the principals know one another as persons. The relationship exists where the principals have established the direct knowledge of one another that the official business alone does not produce.

The personal relationship constitutes the substrate of the operational craft, and the centre that treats the personal relationship as a supplement has misjudged its place. The management of the government's dependencies is conducted through personal relationships because the actors are persons and the decisions are made by persons. The vote the party leader delivers, the credit the banker extends, the cooperation the foreign minister provides, the obedience the general renders — each is the decision of a person taken in the light of the person's assessment of the government, and the person's assessment is shaped by the personal knowledge the principal and the actor have of one another. The operational craft that proceeds without the personal relationship proceeds on the documents alone, and the documents are read in the light of the relationship or its absence.

The personal relationship runs alongside the institutional relationship and is the medium through which the institutional relationship is given substance. The institutional relationship between the centre and the actor is defined by the law, the convention, the contract, or the protocol; the personal relationship is defined by the principals' knowledge of one another, the trust they have built, and the history they have shared. The institutional relationship is the same whoever holds the office; the personal relationship is unique to the persons who hold the offices at a given time, and it changes when the persons change. The centre that treats the institutional relationship as sufficient has neglected the medium through which the institutional relationship is made effective.

The Venetian Republic's management of the personal relationships among the patriciate illustrates the substrate in its developed historical form. The Republic was governed by a hereditary patriciate whose families were bound to one another and to the constitution by the dense personal networks the councils, the commissions, the embassies, and the marriages wove across generations. The doge, the councillors, the savii, the ambassadors, and the provveditori were persons who had grown up together, served together in the embassies and the fleets, married one another's daughters, and inherited one another's feuds. The management of the Republic's dependencies — the

terraferma cities, the maritime colonies, the mercantile communities, the papal court, the foreign powers — was conducted through the personal relationships among the patriciate's principals, and the institutions of the Republic were the framework within which the personal relationships operated. The Republic that endured for a millennium endured because the patriciate's personal networks sustained the institutions through the successions, the wars, and the conspiracies that destroyed the institutions of less-networked states.

27.2 The Cultivation of the Relationship

The cultivation of the personal relationship is the work by which the centre's principal and the actor's principal move from the formal acquaintance of their offices to the mutual knowledge and the mutual trust on which the operational craft depends. The cultivation comprises the initial contact, the development of familiarity, the building of mutual understanding, and the establishment of trust. The initial contact is the first meeting or exchange in which the principals address one another directly; the familiarity is the ease that develops through the regular contact; the mutual understanding is the knowledge each principal acquires of the other's interests, pressures, and manner; the trust is the confidence each principal acquires that the other will act within the understanding they have established. The cultivation is conducted over time, through the regular contact, the shared experience, and the exchange of confidences, and the centre's craft is the patience and the consistency the cultivation requires.

The cultivation begins with the initial contact and proceeds through the deliberate deepening of the relationship across the meetings, the correspondence, and the shared work. The initial contact is the principal's first meeting with the actor's principal, conducted in the form the circumstances require — the courtesy call, the working meeting, the formal audience, the private dinner — and the principal's preparation for the contact is the work of knowing the actor's principal's history, interests, and pressures before the meeting begins. The deepening is the conduct of the subsequent meetings, in which the principals move from the formal exchange to the substantive exchange, and from the substantive exchange to the personal exchange that the trust requires. The shared work — the negotiation, the joint project, the crisis managed together — is the medium through which the principals come to know one another's judgment and one another's conduct under pressure.

The cultivation requires the patience that resists the demand for the immediate return and the consistency that builds the principal's reputation across the relationships. The patience is the recognition that the trust is built across the meetings, and that the principal who presses the relationship for the immediate concession has consumed the trust the relationship is meant to build. The consistency is the recognition that the principal's conduct across the relationships is known to the actors through the networks that connect them, and that the principal who cultivates one relationship at the expense of another cultivates neither. The centre's craft is the conduct of the cultivation across the relationships the centre requires, with the patience and the consistency that build the relationships the operational craft will use.

The French court's management of the personal relationships through the salon and the audience illustrates the cultivation in its developed historical form. The court of Louis XIV at

Versailles was the instrument by which the king cultivated the personal relationships with the great nobles, the ministers, the bishops, the magistrates, and the foreign ambassadors on whose cooperation the government of France depended. The lever and the coucher, the daily audiences, the council meetings, the hunts, the dinners, and the evening conversations were the occasions through which the king and the court observed one another, exchanged confidences, and established the knowledge and the trust the government's business required. The salon — in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries the salon of Madame de Rambouillet, Madame de Sévigné, Madame Geoffrin, and their successors — was the parallel institution through which the ministers, the diplomats, the writers, and the patrons cultivated the relationships the formal audiences could not produce. The cultivation was the work of the court and the salon together, and the centre that mastered the cultivation mastered the government of France.

27.3 The Maintenance of the Relationship

The maintenance of the personal relationship is the work by which the centre's principal sustains the relationship across the time the operational craft requires it. The maintenance comprises the regular contact, the management of the relationship through the changes of circumstance, and the management of the relationship through the disagreements. The regular contact is the periodic meeting or exchange through which the principals renew the knowledge and the trust the cultivation has built; the management through the changes of circumstance is the adaptation of the relationship to the shifts in the principals' positions, the government's circumstances, or the actor's interests; the management through the disagreements is the conduct of the relationship across the disputes the operational craft produces. The relationship is maintained by the principal's active engagement, and the centre that relies on the inertia of the past contact has allowed the relationship to decay.

The regular contact is the discipline by which the relationship is kept current, and the discipline is the recognition that the relationship decays without the renewal. The regular contact is the periodic meeting — the weekly, the monthly, the quarterly — that the principal schedules with the actor's principal, the working dinner that the principal hosts, the courtesy call that the principal pays on the occasion of the actor's promotion, the condolence or the congratulation that the principal offers on the family event. The contact is the medium through which the principal and the actor's principal renew the knowledge of one another's positions, exchange the information the formal channels do not carry, and test the trust the cultivation has built. The principal who suspends the regular contact when the relationship appears dispensable discovers, when the need returns, that the relationship has decayed and the cultivation must be resumed.

The management of the relationship through the changes of circumstance and the disagreements is the work that the regular contact makes possible. The changes of circumstance — the actor's promotion or dismissal, the government's majority or minority, the country's prosperity or austerity, the alliance's strength or weakness — alter the conditions under which the relationship operates, and the principal's engagement is the adaptation of the relationship to the altered conditions. The disagreements — the policy the principal and the actor's principal dispute, the decision the principal takes against the actor's preference, the concession the principal makes that

the actor opposes — test the trust the cultivation has built, and the principal's craft is the conduct of the relationship across the disagreement without the rupture the disagreement threatens. The principal who maintains the relationship through the change and the disagreement maintains the relationship the operational craft requires.

Bismarck's maintenance of the personal relationships with the Kaiser and the party leaders illustrates the maintenance in its developed historical form. The relationship with Kaiser Wilhelm I was the relationship on which Bismarck's chancellorship rested, and the maintenance was the daily engagement through which Bismarck sustained the emperor's confidence across the wars, the constitutional conflicts, and the disagreements the construction of the Reich produced. Bismarck's craft was the management of the emperor's hesitations — the morning audience at which the chancellor presented the dispatches, the walks in the park at which the policy was discussed, the occasional concession on the matter the emperor cared about to preserve the chancellor's authority on the matters the emperor did not. The relationships with the party leaders — Bennigsen of the National Liberals, Windthorst of the Centre Party, the leaders of the Conservatives — were maintained through the parliamentary dinners, the private conversations, and the periodic meetings through which Bismarck managed the coalitions the Reichstag required. The maintenance was the work of two decades, and the relationships the maintenance sustained were the instruments through which Bismarck governed Germany until the new Kaiser dismissed the chancellor in 1890 and the relationships the cultivation and the maintenance had built were dissolved by the departure.

27.4 The Use of the Relationship

The use of the personal relationship is the deployment of the relationship in the operational craft of the centre. The use comprises the meeting that is easier because the relationship exists, the negotiation that is smoother because the trust is present, and the crisis that is managed because the channel is open. The meeting is easier because the principals who have the relationship proceed directly to the substance; the negotiation is smoother because the principals who have the trust exchange the concessions without the posturing the absence of trust requires; the crisis is managed because the principals who have the channel communicate directly when the formal channels are blocked or insufficient. The relationship is the instrument of the centre's objectives, and the centre uses it in the service of the government's work.

The use of the relationship is the discipline by which the centre draws on the cultivation and the maintenance to advance the government's work. The meeting that is easier is the meeting in which the principal and the actor's principal dispense with the preliminaries the formal meeting requires, address the substance directly, and reach the conclusion the formal meeting would have required several sessions to reach. The negotiation that is smoother is the negotiation in which the principals exchange the concessions across the table and the agreement is reached in the form the principals can defend to their respective constituencies. The crisis that is managed is the crisis in which the principal and the actor's principal communicate directly, exchange the information the formal channels cannot carry, and reach the decision the crisis requires in the hours the speed of the response demands. The centre that uses the relationship in the meeting, the negotiation, and the crisis harvests the cultivation and the maintenance the centre has invested.

Lee Kuan Yew's use of the personal relationships with his colleagues and with the foreign leaders illustrates the use in its developed historical form. The relationships with the colleagues — Goh Keng Swee, Toh Chin Chye, S. Rajaratnam, Lim Kim San, and the other founders of the People's Action Party — were the relationships through which the government's major decisions were taken across the four decades of Lee's prime ministership. The cabinet meetings, the private dinners, the late-night conversations, and the periodic retreats were the occasions through which the colleagues tested one another's judgments, exchanged the confidences, and reached the decisions the formal agenda could not produce. The use was the deployment of the relationships in the crises — the separation from Malaysia in 1965, the British military withdrawal in 1968, the recession of 1985 — and in the long-term projects — the public housing, the industrial estates, the education system, the armed forces. The relationships with the foreign leaders — the Tunku in Kuala Lumpur, Suharto in Jakarta, Thatcher and later Major in London, the presidents in Washington, Deng Xiaoping in Beijing — were the channels through which the diplomatic, the commercial, and the security relationships were conducted, and the meetings the relationships made possible were the meetings through which the cooperation was secured.

The Meiji oligarchs' use of their personal relationships with one another and with the emperor illustrates the use in its collective form. The oligarchs — Itō Hirobumi, Ōkubo Toshimichi, Kido Takayoshi, Yamagata Aritomo, Inoue Kaoru, Matsukata Masayoshi, and their successors — were bound by the shared experience of the restoration, the shared work of the reforms, and the personal networks the han loyalties and the councils of government sustained. The relationships among the oligarchs were the medium through which the major decisions — the abolition of the domains, the conscription ordinance, the land tax revision, the constitution, the unequal treaty revision — were negotiated, contested, and concluded within the governing group before they were presented to the emperor and the public. The relationships with the emperor were the relationships through which the oligarchs secured the imperial sanction the reforms' legitimacy required, and the audiences, the memorials, and the privy councils were the occasions through which the oligarchs cultivated, maintained, and used the imperial relationship in the service of the state's modernisation. The Meiji state that emerged in the four decades after the restoration was the product of the oligarchs' collective use of their personal relationships, and the constitution of 1889 was the formalisation of the relationships that had governed the state since the restoration.

27.5 The Limits of the Personal Relationship

The limits of the personal relationship are the boundaries within which the relationship operates and beyond which the relationship fails. The limits are three: the personal relationship complements the institutional relationship without substituting for it; the personal relationship depends on the principals who hold it; the personal relationship operates within the actor's interests without overriding them. The personal relationship and the institutional relationship are complements, and the personal relationship that is treated as a substitute for the institutional relationship is the relationship that has been overestimated. The personal relationship is held by the persons who hold the offices, and the persons who hold the offices change, and the relationship that has not been anchored in the institutions is the relationship that is dissolved when the persons

depart. The actor's interests are the actor's interests, and the personal relationship that is asked to override the actor's interests is the relationship that is asked for more than the relationship can bear.

The recognition of the limits is the discipline by which the centre manages the personal relationship within the boundaries the limits define. The personal relationship supplements the institutional relationship and makes the institutional relationship more effective; the centre that relies on the personal relationship where the institutional relationship is required has neglected the institutional work the relationship cannot discharge. The personal relationship is bounded by the tenure of the principals, and the centre that has not built the institutional relationships that will survive the principals' departure has built the centre's work on the persons and neglected the offices. The personal relationship is bounded by the actor's interests, and the centre that asks the relationship to override the actor's interests asks the actor's principal to act against the actor's interests, and the actor's principal who acts against the actor's interests is the principal who will not long remain the actor's principal.

The management of the relationship within the limits is the centre's craft, and the craft is the conduct of the personal relationship and the institutional relationship in parallel, with the recognition that the personal relationship is the medium and the institutional relationship is the structure. The personal relationship is cultivated and maintained and used within the limits, and the centre that observes the limits preserves the relationship across the time the operational craft requires it. The centre that exceeds the limits — that substitutes the personal for the institutional, that depends on the principals' continuance, that asks the relationship to override the interests — discovers that the relationship fails when the limits are exceeded, and the failure of the relationship is the failure of the operational craft that depended on it. The discipline of the limits is the discipline by which the personal relationship is sustained as the substrate of the operational craft.

De Gaulle's personal relationships with his ministers and with the heads of state illustrate the limits in their developed historical form. The relationships with the ministers — Couve de Murville at the Quai d'Orsay, Pompidou at Matignon, Debré and Messmer in the defence and the interior portfolios, Pisani in agriculture, Peyrefitte in the justice and the information portfolios — were the relationships through which the general conducted the government of the Fifth Republic. The relationships were cultivated through the councils of ministers, the private audiences, the lunches at the Élysée, and the periodic reshuffles through which the general renewed the government; the relationships were used in the conduct of the Algerian settlement, the independence of the African colonies, the nuclear programme, and the management of the 1968 crisis. The limits were observed in the succession: when Pompidou succeeded de Gaulle in 1969, the personal relationships de Gaulle had cultivated did not survive the departure, but the institutional relationships of the Fifth Republic — the presidency, the government, the Quai d'Orsay, the councils — continued, and Pompidou cultivated the personal relationships the institutions of the Republic required. The relationships with the heads of state — Adenauer in Bonn, Kennedy and Johnson in Washington, Macmillan and Wilson in London, the Soviet leaders in Moscow — were the relationships through which the diplomacy of the Fifth Republic was conducted, and the limits were observed in the recognition that the relationships operated within the interests: the relationship with Adenauer coexisted with the French refusal to subordinate the force de frappe to the alliance, and the relationship with Kennedy coexisted with the French opposition to the Multilateral Force.

27.6 Chapter Summary

The personal relationship is the relationship between the centre's principal and the principal of an actor on whom the government depends, and the personal relationship is the substrate of the operational craft. The management of the government's dependencies is conducted through personal relationships because the actors are persons and the decisions are made by persons. The cultivation is the work by which the principals move from the formal acquaintance to the mutual knowledge and the mutual trust, conducted over time through the regular contact, the shared experience, and the exchange of confidences. The maintenance is the work by which the principal sustains the relationship across the changes of circumstance and the disagreements, and the use is the deployment of the relationship in the meeting, the negotiation, and the crisis, in the service of the government's objectives.

The limits are the boundaries within which the relationship operates: the personal relationship complements the institutional relationship, depends on the principals who hold it, and operates within the actor's interests. The recognition of the limits is the discipline by which the centre manages the personal relationship within the boundaries the limits define, and the centre that exceeds the limits discovers that the relationship fails when the limits are exceeded. The comparative record confirms the craft: the Venetian patriciate's networks sustained the Republic across the millennium, the French court's salon and audience cultivated the relationships the government of France required, Bismarck's relationships with the Kaiser and the party leaders maintained the chancellor's authority for two decades before dissolving at the departure, Lee Kuan Yew's relationships with his colleagues and the foreign leaders used the cultivation in the service of Singapore's construction, the Meiji oligarchs' relationships with one another and with the emperor used the collective personal craft in the service of the state's modernisation, and de Gaulle's relationships with his ministers and the heads of state observed the limits in the succession and the interests.

The British prime minister's personal relationships with the cabinet and the monarch illustrate the personal craft in its sustained historical form. The relationships with the cabinet — the chief ministers, the chancellor, the foreign secretary, the home secretary, and the holders of the other great offices — were the relationships through which the prime minister managed the government's decisions, conducted through the cabinet meetings, the bilateral audiences, the weekend at Chequers, and the periodic reshuffles through which the prime minister renewed the government. The relationships with the monarch — from Victoria's relationships with Peel, Disraeli, and Gladstone through Elizabeth II's relationships with Churchill, Macmillan, Wilson, Thatcher, and Blair — were the relationships through which the prime minister managed the crown's role in the constitution, conducted through the weekly audiences, the correspondence, and the periodic audiences the constitution required. The personal craft of the prime minister was the cultivation, the maintenance, the use, and the recognition of the limits across the relationships the office sustained, and the prime minister who neglected the personal dimension neglected the foundation on which the operational craft of the centre was conducted.

Chapter 28 — The Cultivation of Trust

Trust as the currency of the centre: earned through consistency, honesty, and the discharge of commitments, and lost through the failure of any of the three. The cultivation of trust is the centre's most demanding craft.

28.1 What Trust Is

Trust is the actor's confidence that the centre will act in a manner the actor can predict and rely on. The actor is any party on whom the government depends — the minister, the official, the banker, the foreign counterpart, the party leader, the commander of the forces. The trust is the expectation the actor holds that the centre's response to a situation will fall within the range the actor has come to rely on, and that the centre's word, once given, will be kept. The trust is the actor's settled judgement, formed over time, that the centre is dependable in the conduct of its business. The trust the actor extends is the operational condition of the cooperation the government requires, and the centre that has earned the trust has earned the right to the actor's cooperation.

The distinction from friendship is the distinction between an institutional judgement and a personal one. Friendship is the warmth one party bears another; trust is the confidence the actor holds in the centre's predictable behaviour. The two may coincide, and the actor may both like the principal and trust the centre, but they are separable, and the centre that confuses the warmth with the trust has misread the terrain. The actor who trusts the centre will cooperate with the centre even when the actor dislikes the principal; the actor who does not trust the centre will withhold the cooperation even when the actor likes the principal. Trust is the operational currency; friendship is the personal accompaniment, and the centre that treats the second as a substitute for the first will find the dependencies unmanaged when the warmth cools.

Trust between the centre and an actor is built through three channels of the centre's conduct: the consistent discharge of the commitments the centre has made, the honest communication of the centre's position, and the predictable response to the actor's concerns. The discharge of commitments is the centre's delivery of the undertakings it has given to the actor and the undertakings it has given to others that the actor observes. The honest communication is the centre's candour about what it will do, what it cannot do, and what it has not yet decided; the candour that conceals the limits or the reservations propagates the loss the candour was meant to prevent. The predictable response to the actor's concerns is the centre's regular and considered attention to the matters the actor raises, with the centre's evident willingness to take the actor's position into account. The three channels are interdependent: the failure of one compromises the others, and the centre that discharges its commitments but communicates dishonestly has undermined the trust the discharge was meant to build.

The Venetian Republic's cultivation of trust through the institutional culture of the patriciate illustrates the three channels in their developed historical form. The patriciate was the hereditary political class whose members staffed the councils, the magistracies, the embassies, and the colonial administrations, and the trust the patricians bore one another and the institutions was the

condition of the Republic's continuity across the centuries. The discharge of commitments was sustained by the formalities of the office — the oath each patrician swore on entry to the Great Council, the audit of each magistrate's accounts at the end of his term, and the accountability of the office-holder to the councils — and the honest communication was sustained by the secrecy of the councils and the candour of the ambassadors' *relazioni* to the Senate. The predictable response to the patricians' concerns was sustained by the regularity of the councils' sittings and the institutionalised channels through which a patrician's grievance was heard and addressed. The patriciate's trust in the Republic was the asset the Republic drew on in its recurrent crises, and the Republic that survived the conspiracies, the wars, and the economic shocks drew on the trust the institutional culture had built.

28.2 The Earning of Trust

The earning of trust is the accumulation, over time, of acts that demonstrate the centre's reliability in the discharge of commitments, the honesty of communication, and the consistency of behaviour. The single act earns little: the single kept commitment, the single candid communication, the single considered response are noticed and discounted, because the actor reads the single act as the act of a moment and not as the conduct of a centre. The accumulation is the pattern the actor observes across many acts and across many situations, and the pattern is the evidence on which the actor's trust is formed. The earning is therefore slow, conducted in the routine of the centre's work and not in the gesture, and the centre that seeks to earn trust through the gesture rather than the routine has misunderstood the earning. The centre that has accumulated the pattern of reliable conduct over years is the centre to which the actors extend the trust the centre requires; the centre that has not is the centre to which the actors extend no such trust.

The discharge of commitments is the first channel through which trust is earned. The commitment is the undertaking the centre has given — the undertaking to the minister, the official, the banker, the foreign counterpart, the party leader, the commander of the forces — and the discharge is the centre's delivery of the undertaking in the manner and the time the centre has indicated. The discharge that is partial, delayed, or qualified is the discharge that erodes the trust the commitment was meant to build, because the actor reads the partial, the delayed, or the qualified discharge as the centre's uncertainty about its own word. The discharge that is full and timely is the discharge that builds the trust the centre draws on in the subsequent undertaking, and the centre's reputation among the actors is the accumulation of the discharges the centre has delivered. The centre that has discharged its commitments over years is the centre to which the actors extend the benefit of the doubt when the centre's conduct is in question; the centre that has not is the centre to which the actors extend no such benefit.

The honesty of communication is the second channel through which trust is earned, and the consistency of behaviour over time is the third. The honesty of communication is the centre's candour about its position — its willingness to tell the actor what the centre will do, what the centre cannot do, and what the centre has not yet decided, and to do so without the qualification that conceals the limits. The honesty that admits the limit is the honesty that builds trust, because the actor reads the admission as the centre's seriousness about its word; the honesty that conceals the

limit is the dishonesty that erodes trust, because the actor reads the concealment as the centre's indifference to its word. The consistency of behaviour is the centre's conduct of its business in the manner the actor has come to expect, with the conduct sustained across the situations and across the changes of personnel. The centre whose behaviour is consistent is the centre the actor can predict; the centre whose behaviour is volatile is the centre the actor must hedge against, and the hedging is the withdrawal of the trust the centre requires.

The Meiji oligarchs' cultivation of trust among themselves and Lee Kuan Yew's cultivation of trust with the foreign investors illustrate the earning in its developed forms. The Meiji oligarchs — Itō Hirobumi, Ōkubo Toshimichi, Yamagata Aritomo, Inoue Kaoru, Matsukata Masayoshi, Kido Takayoshi — had earned one another's trust through the years of the Restoration's preparation and the consolidation, and the trust was sustained by the routine of their consultations, the candour of their memoranda, and the consistency of their conduct across the crises of the 1870s and the 1880s. The trust was the asset the oligarchs drew on in the negotiations over the constitution, the unequal treaties, the fiscal reforms, and the regional expeditions, and the trust survived the disagreements among the oligarchs because the disagreements were conducted within the channels the trust had established. Lee Kuan Yew's cultivation of trust with the foreign investors followed a different path but the same discipline: the trust was earned through the consistent discharge of the commitments the Singapore government had made to the investors — the tax undertakings, the regulatory undertakings, the infrastructure undertakings — and through the candour of the communication when the undertakings required revision. The investors who had dealt with the Singapore government over years extended the benefit of the doubt to the government when the regional crises threatened the stability the investors required, and the trust was the asset the government drew on in the retention of the investment the development depended on.

28.3 The Maintenance of Trust

The maintenance of trust is the continuation of the behaviour that earned it, the management of the expectations the trust has created, and the management of the disappointments that inevitably arise. The continuation of the behaviour is the discipline by which the centre conducts the routine of its work in the manner the actors have come to expect, with the discharge of commitments, the honesty of communication, and the consistency of behaviour sustained across the situations and the changes of personnel. The management of the expectations is the centre's attention to the expectations the actors have formed on the basis of the centre's past conduct, and the centre's care not to allow the expectations to outrun the centre's capacity or its intention. The management of the disappointments is the centre's response to the situations in which the centre's conduct has fallen short of the actor's expectation, and the response is the candour, the accountability, and the correction that limit the disappointment's propagation. The maintenance is therefore the conduct of the centre's business as the centre has conducted it, with the additions and the revisions the situations require, and the centre that maintains the trust is the centre that has made the maintenance the daily practice rather than the occasional effort.

The management of the expectations the trust has created is the discipline by which the centre prevents the trust from generating the expectations the centre cannot meet. The actor who trusts the

centre forms expectations of the centre's conduct, and the expectations rise with the trust: the centre that has discharged its commitments is expected to discharge the subsequent commitments, the centre that has communicated honestly is expected to communicate honestly in the subsequent matter, and the centre that has responded consistently is expected to respond consistently in the subsequent situation. The expectations are the trust's product, and the centre's discipline is the management of the expectations through the candour about the centre's limits — the willingness to tell the actor what the centre cannot do, and to tell the actor before the actor has formed the expectation the centre cannot meet. The centre that allows the expectations to outrun the capacity sets the disappointment in train, and the disappointment is the loss the maintenance is meant to prevent. The management of the expectations is therefore the centre's communication of its limits as carefully as the centre communicates its undertakings, with the two communications held in the same candour.

The management of the disappointments is the centre's response to the situations in which the centre's conduct has fallen short, and the response is the test of the centre's discipline. The disappointments are inevitable: the commitment that cannot be discharged in the time indicated, the communication that proves to have been mistaken, the response that does not address the actor's concern. The centre's response to the disappointment is the candour that acknowledges the shortcoming, the accountability that accepts the responsibility, and the correction that addresses the cause. The disappointment that is acknowledged, accounted for, and corrected is the disappointment that limits the loss of trust; the disappointment that is denied, deflected, or left uncorrected is the disappointment that propagates the loss. The maintenance of the trust is therefore the conduct of the centre's business in the routine and the conduct of the centre's response in the disappointment, and the centre that maintains the routine and the response has made the maintenance the daily practice the trust requires.

The French cultivation of trust through the *grands corps* and the administrative culture, and the British cultivation of trust between the civil service and the political leadership, illustrate the maintenance in its institutionalised forms. The French *grands corps* — the Conseil d'État, the Cour des comptes, the Inspection des finances, the diplomatic corps, the prefectural corps, and the *grandes écoles* from which they are recruited — sustained the trust between the state and its senior officials through the institutional culture of the corps. The culture comprised the recruitment by competition, the formation by apprenticeship, the advancement by seniority and inspection, and the solidarity of the corps in the conduct of the state's business, and the trust was maintained across the changes of regime — the July Monarchy, the Second Republic, the Second Empire, the Third Republic, Vichy, the Fourth Republic, the Fifth — because the culture persisted across the regimes. The British cultivation of trust between the civil service and the political leadership followed a different path but the same discipline: the trust was built through the convention of the permanent secretary's tenure across the changes of government, the candour of the advice the permanent secretary gave the minister, and the minister's acceptance of the civil service's advice as the advice the minister required. The British trust was maintained through the convention of the civil service's impartiality and the political leadership's restraint in the direction of the civil service, and the convention was sustained by the daily practice of the relationship — the morning meeting, the briefing, the submission, the minute — rather than by the formal instrument.

28.4 The Loss of Trust

The loss of trust is the actor's withdrawal of the confidence the actor has placed in the centre, and the loss is the consequence of the failure of one or more of the three channels through which the trust was built. The failure of consistency is the centre's conduct of its business in a manner the actor has not come to expect — the commitment discharged late or partially, the response inconsistent with the centre's previous responses, the behaviour the actor cannot predict. The failure of honesty is the centre's concealment of its position — the qualification that hides the limit, the assurance that conceals the reservation, the statement that proves to have been false. The failure of commitment is the centre's non-discharge of the undertaking it has given — the promise broken, the obligation unmet, the word withdrawn. The three failures are interchangeable in their effect: the actor who has lost the trust through any one of the three withdraws the trust the centre requires, and the withdrawal is the same whether the cause was the inconsistency, the dishonesty, or the broken commitment.

The loss of trust is rapid and the recovery is slow, and the asymmetry is the principal's most demanding discipline. The trust that was earned over years is lost in the day, the week, or the month, because the actor reads the single failure as the disclosure of the centre's true character and discounts the years of consistent conduct as the preparation for the failure. The recovery requires the renewed accumulation of the acts that earned the trust in the first place, and the accumulation must be conducted in the awareness that the actor's confidence has been shaken and that the actor will read the centre's conduct with the suspicion the failure has instilled. The recovery is therefore the work of months and years, and the centre that treats the recovery as the work of the announcement or the gesture has misunderstood the loss. The asymmetry between the rapid loss and the slow recovery is the asymmetry that distinguishes trust from the other assets the centre manages, and the centre that has not internalised the asymmetry will treat the trust as renewable in the moment of the loss and will be surprised by the actor's withholding.

The centre's response to the loss of trust is the acknowledgment, the accountability, the reform, and the patient reconstruction, conducted in that order and without the deflection that compromises the sequence. The acknowledgment is the centre's candid admission that the trust has been lost and that the centre's conduct has been the cause, and the acknowledgment is the prerequisite for the recovery because the actor will not extend the confidence to a centre that has not admitted the loss. The accountability is the centre's acceptance of the responsibility for the conduct that caused the loss — the resignation, the dismissal, the prosecution, the disciplinary action — and the accountability is the action by which the centre separates itself from the conduct that failed. The reform is the centre's revision of the procedures, the personnel, or the practices that produced the failure, and the reform is the demonstration that the centre has addressed the cause and not merely the symptom. The patient reconstruction is the renewed accumulation of the acts that earn the trust, conducted over the months and the years and without the announcement that substitutes for the conduct.

Bismarck's cultivation of trust with Kaiser Wilhelm I and the loss of it under Kaiser Wilhelm II, and de Gaulle's cultivation and loss of trust with his ministers, illustrate the loss in its developed forms. Bismarck's trust with Wilhelm I was built over the decades of the chancellorship through the consistent discharge of the commitments Bismarck had made to the Kaiser, the candour of

Bismarck's communication of his position even when the position was unwelcome, and the preservation of the monarchical authority the Kaiser required. The trust was lost under Wilhelm II through the failure of the consistency: the new Kaiser's conduct of the business in a manner Bismarck could not predict, the new Kaiser's reservations about Bismarck's diplomacy, and the dismissal of Bismarck in March 1890, with the loss rapid and the recovery not made. De Gaulle's cultivation of trust with his ministers was built through the candour of his communication and the consistency of his behaviour in the conduct of the Fifth Republic's business, and the trust was the asset the ministers drew on in the Algerian settlement, the constitutional revision, and the foreign policy of the 1960s. The trust was lost with the ministers who disagreed with the conduct of the 1968 crisis — the dismissal of the ministers who had formed the alternative, the departure of the figures who had served the Republic since its foundation — and the loss was the asset the centre drew on in the referendum of 1969 that produced the resignation.

28.5 Trust and the Centre's Function

The relationship between trust and the centre's function is the relationship between the asset the centre holds and the work the asset enables. The centre that is not trusted cannot manage the government's dependencies, because the actors on whom the government depends will not cooperate with a centre they do not trust, and the cooperation is the substance of the dependency's management. The minister who does not trust the centre will withhold the candour the centre requires to advise; the official who does not trust the centre will withhold the discretion the centre requires to act; the banker who does not trust the centre will withhold the credit the government requires to finance; the foreign counterpart who does not trust the centre will withhold the cooperation the state requires to conduct the diplomacy; the party leader who does not trust the centre will withhold the support the government requires to sustain the majority; the commander who does not trust the centre will withhold the obedience the government requires to maintain the order. The withholding is the substance of the loss, and the centre that has lost the trust has lost the capacity to manage the dependencies the government requires to function. The relationship is therefore direct: the centre's function is the management of the dependencies, and the dependencies are managed through the cooperation of the actors, and the cooperation is extended on the basis of the trust the actors place in the centre.

Trust is an institutional asset of the centre, distinct from the personal quality of the principal, and the distinction is the distinction that governs the centre's continuity across the changes of personnel. The principal who has earned the trust of the actors has earned it on behalf of the centre, and the trust persists across the principal's departure if the centre's conduct persists across the departure. The principal who has earned the trust as a personal quality — the trust the actors extend to the principal and not to the centre — has earned a trust that does not survive the principal's departure, and the centre that has relied on the personal trust has lost the asset when the principal has departed. The institutional asset is the trust the actors extend to the centre on the basis of the centre's conduct, sustained by the procedures, the records, and the conventions that persist across the principals. The centre that maintains the institutional asset maintains the government's capacity

to govern across the changes of the office-holder, and the centre that has relied on the personal quality has placed the capacity at the hazard of the principal's tenure.

The centre that maintains the trust maintains the government's capacity to govern, and the centre that loses the trust loses the capacity, regardless of the formal powers the office confers. The formal powers are the powers the constitution or the law provides, but the exercise of the powers requires the cooperation of the actors, and the cooperation is extended on the basis of the trust. The centre that has the formal powers but not the trust is the centre that finds the powers inoperative — the orders issued and not obeyed, the commitments made and not credited, the communications delivered and not believed. The trust is therefore the operational complement to the formal power, and the centre that has the one without the other has the form of the authority without the substance. The centre that maintains both the formal powers and the trust is the centre that governs; the centre that has the powers but not the trust is the centre that presides over the dissolution of the authority the powers were meant to exercise.

The comparative record confirms the relationship across the cases: the Venetian Republic's continuity across the centuries rested on the patriciate's trust in the institutions, sustained by the institutional culture of the councils and the magistracies, and the Republic's dissolution in 1797 followed the loss of the patriciate's confidence in the Republic's capacity to defend the state. The Meiji oligarchs' conduct of the Restoration's business rested on the trust the oligarchs bore one another, sustained by the routine of the consultations and the candour of the memoranda; the oligarchs' dissolution in the 1900s followed the deaths of the founders and the loss of the personal trust the founders had built, with the institutional trust the constitution had established insufficient to sustain the conduct the oligarchs had conducted. Lee Kuan Yew's cultivation of trust with the foreign investors sustained the investment the development required, and the trust was maintained across the changes of leadership through the continuity of the centre's conduct. The British cultivation of trust between the civil service and the political leadership sustained the government's capacity across the changes of government, with the trust maintained by the daily practice of the relationship and not by the formal instrument. The lesson is the same across the cases: the centre that maintains the trust maintains the government's capacity to govern, and the centre that loses the trust loses the capacity, regardless of the formal powers the office confers.

28.6 Chapter Summary

Trust is the actor's confidence that the centre will act in a manner the actor can predict and rely on, and the trust is built through the centre's consistent discharge of its commitments, its honest communication, and its predictable response to the actor's concerns. The trust is distinct from friendship, and the centre that confuses the warmth of its personal relationships with the trust the actors place in the centre has misread the terrain. The trust between the centre and an actor is earned through the accumulation of acts that demonstrate the centre's reliability, conducted in the routine of the centre's work and not in the gesture. The earning is slow and the loss is rapid, and the asymmetry is the principal's most demanding discipline. The three channels — the discharge, the honesty, the consistency — are interdependent, and the failure of one compromises the trust the others have built.

The maintenance of trust is the continuation of the behaviour that earned it, the management of the expectations the trust has created, and the management of the disappointments that inevitably arise. The maintenance is the daily practice of the centre's conduct, and the centre that maintains the trust is the centre that has made the maintenance the daily practice rather than the occasional effort. The loss of trust is the actor's withdrawal of the confidence the actor has placed in the centre, and the loss is the consequence of the failure of consistency, the failure of honesty, or the failure of commitment. The centre's response to the loss is the acknowledgment, the accountability, the reform, and the patient reconstruction, conducted in that order and without the deflection that compromises the sequence. The loss is rapid and the recovery is slow, and the centre that has internalised the asymmetry treats the trust as the asset that requires the daily maintenance and the patient recovery.

The relationship between trust and the centre's function is the relationship between the asset the centre holds and the work the asset enables. The centre that is not trusted cannot manage the government's dependencies, because the actors will not cooperate with a centre they do not trust. The trust is an institutional asset of the centre, distinct from the personal quality of the principal, and the centre that maintains the institutional asset maintains the government's capacity to govern across the changes of the office-holder. The comparative record confirms the relationship: the Venetian patriciate, the French *grands corps*, the Meiji oligarchs, the Singapore leadership and the foreign investors, Bismarck and the Kaiser, de Gaulle and his ministers, and the British civil service and the political leadership each illustrate the cultivation, the maintenance, the loss, and the recovery of the trust the centre requires to govern. The trust is the currency of the centre, earned through consistency, honesty, and the discharge of commitments, and lost through the failure of any of the three; the cultivation of the trust is the centre's most demanding craft.

Chapter 29 — The Judgment of the Centre

The faculty by which the centre's principals navigate the choices that the discipline does not determine: judgment under political pressure, under uncertainty, and under time constraint.

29.1 What the Judgment of the Centre Is

The judgment of the centre is the faculty by which the principals make the choices that the operational craft does not determine. The craft provides the framework: the stakeholder map that records the actors, the scenarios that frame the futures, the consultation procedure that gathers the views, the decision memo that records the options, the documentation that preserves the choice. Within the framework the principal must choose, and the choice is the exercise of judgment. The judgment is the principal's determination of which option to take when the framework has done its work and the choice remains, and the discipline of the framework is the condition the judgment requires.

The judgment is the product of the experience the principal has accumulated, the knowledge the principal has acquired, and the disciplined assessment of the situation the framework has produced. The principal who has the experience, the knowledge, and the assessment, and who applies them to the choice, is exercising judgment. The principal who acts on the unexamined preference has surrendered the discipline; the principal who applies the framework without the experience and the knowledge is being clever rather than wise. The craft is the discipline; the judgment is the work within the discipline that the discipline cannot perform for itself, and the centre that confuses the two has misunderstood the function of each.

The Venetian Republic's Council of Ten illustrates the institutional form of the judgment. The Ten were the body of patricians who sat in continuous session and made the choices the routine of the Republic's administration did not determine: the choices about the conspiracy, the sedition, the foreign threat, the conduct of the doge, the detention of the suspect. The routine administration was the craft — the savi, the avogadori, the councils, the magistracies — and the Ten were the judgment that the craft could not produce. The Ten's records show the choices the routine did not determine: the decision to execute the doge Marin Falier in 1355 for the conspiracy against the patriciate, the decision to confine the doge to the palace in the later interregna, the decision to open the state inquisition in the sixteenth century, the decision to detain the foreign ambassador whose correspondence threatened the Republic. The Ten are the institutional form the modern centre inherits, and the individual principal's judgment is the form the modern centre requires.

The judgment is exercised in the moments the discipline does not determine, and the moments recur through the work of the centre. The choice of the official for the post when the candidates are equal, the choice of the policy when the options are balanced, the choice of the moment to act when the timing is the principal's to set, the choice of the interlocutor when the channels are multiple, the choice of the response when the provocation is the principal's to read — each of these is a judgment the principal must make. The principal who has developed the judgment makes the choice; the principal who has not developed the judgment defers the choice, or makes it badly, or makes it by

the default the routine produces. The development of the judgment is the work of a career, and the centre that does not develop the judgment of its principals has failed in its function.

29.2 Judgment Under Political Pressure

The judgment under political pressure is the faculty by which the principal makes the choices the discipline does not determine when the pressure on the principal is the pressure of the political actors. The pressures are the pressure to favour a powerful actor, the pressure to defer to the head of state, and the pressure to respond to the public mood. Each pressure distorts the judgment; the principal who yields to the pressure has made a concession, and the concession dressed as a judgment is the centre's most common failure. The centre's discipline is the maintenance of the operational craft's integrity under pressure, and the recognition that the judgment distorted by the pressure is a concession rather than a judgment.

The pressure to favour a powerful actor is the pressure the financial, the political, or the security actor exerts when the actor's interest and the government's interest diverge. The discipline is the conduct of the consultation through the stakeholder map and the decision memo, the documentation of the actor's interest and the government's interest as distinct, and the choice of the government's interest over the actor's where the divergence requires. Bismarck's management of the alliances from 1871 to 1890 illustrates the discipline. The Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in 1887 was the choice to maintain the relationship with Russia despite the divergence between Russia's interest in the Balkans and Austria's, and the choice was the judgment that the relationship with Russia was the condition of the European peace the German state required.

Bismarck's failure in the management of Kaiser Wilhelm II illustrates the pressure to defer to the head of state and the centre's failure to maintain the discipline. The new Kaiser's volatility, his demands for the personal regime, his interventions in the foreign and the domestic policy, and his dislike of the chancellor's pre-eminence were the pressures Bismarck failed to manage. Bismarck's response was the manipulation of the dissolution and the parliamentary manoeuvre that had served under Wilhelm I, and the response failed under the new Kaiser because the new Kaiser dismissed the chancellor rather than tolerate the manoeuvre. The judgment that had served Bismarck for two decades failed in the management of the principal's principal, and the failure was the failure of the discipline the centre's craft requires.

The British management of the imperial retreat from 1945 to 1970 illustrates the judgment under the pressure of the public mood and the pressure of the foreign ally. The retreat was conducted under the pressure of the public's reluctance to sustain the expenditure of the empire, the pressure of the United States' opposition to the colonial order, and the pressure of the nationalist movements in the territories. The Labour government's judgment in India in 1947 was the recognition that the partition was the condition of the withdrawal and that the delay would worsen the violence; the Conservative government's judgment in the Suez operation of 1956 was the failure to recognise that the operation could not succeed against the opposition of the United States and the censure of the United Nations. The centre's discipline through the retreat was the maintenance of the operational craft's integrity: the recognition of the dependencies, the management of the relationships, and the conduct of the withdrawals in the order the dependencies

required. The retreat succeeded where the judgment held; the retreat failed where the judgment yielded to the pressure.

29.3 Judgment Under Uncertainty

The judgment under uncertainty is the faculty by which the principal makes the choices the discipline does not determine when the information is incomplete, the evidence is ambiguous, and the consequences are unpredictable. The choices are the decisions that must be made with the incomplete information, the assessments that must be made with the ambiguous evidence, and the commitments that must be made with the unpredictable consequences. The discipline is the management of the uncertainty through the stakeholder map, through the scenarios, through the hedging of the commitments, and through the staged commitment that allows the revision as the information arrives. The judgment is the principal's determination of which commitment to make, at which stage, and on which evidence, when the framework has reduced but not eliminated the uncertainty.

The Meiji oligarchs' construction of the modern Japanese state from 1868 to 1890 illustrates the judgment under uncertainty in its most demanding form. The oligarchs — Ōkubo, Itō, Yamagata, Matsukata, Inoue, Kido, and the figures who surrounded them — faced the choice of the institutions the new state would adopt, and the choice was conducted under the uncertainty of the foreign threat, the domestic disorder, the fiscal constraint, and the absence of the precedent. The Charter Oath of 1868 was the commitment to the consultation and the modernisation; the abolition of the domains in 1871 was the commitment to the centralisation; the drafting of the constitution in the 1880s was the commitment to the constitutional form the oligarchs would shape. Each commitment was made on incomplete information, and the oligarchs hedged each commitment through the staged implementation, the consultation of the foreign models, and the cultivation of the domestic support.

The Habsburg monarchy's failures in the management of the nationality question illustrate the judgment under uncertainty in its failure. The monarchy faced the choice of the concessions to the nationalities from the 1848 revolutions to the 1914 collapse, and the choice was conducted under the uncertainty of the consequence of each concession. The Ausgleich with Hungary in 1867 was the concession to the Magyars that satisfied the Magyar demand and intensified the Slav demand; the language ordinances of Badeni in 1897 were the concession to the Czechs that provoked the German obstruction and were withdrawn; the annexation of Bosnia in 1908 was the commitment that satisfied the strategic objective and intensified the South Slav pressure. Each choice was made under uncertainty, and the failure was the failure to hedge the commitment through the staged implementation and the cultivation of the support the commitment required.

The centre's craft under uncertainty is the conduct of the assessment through the scenarios and the commitment through the hedging. The scenarios are the construction of the plausible futures the principal must consider, and the hedging is the design of the commitment that performs adequately across the scenarios. The principal who commits fully to one scenario without the hedge has made a bet rather than a judgment; the principal who hedges so thoroughly that the commitment is no commitment has made an evasion rather than a judgment. The judgment is the choice of the

commitment that serves the government's interest across the scenarios and that can be revised as the information arrives, and the discipline is the recognition that the uncertainty is the condition the principal operates in rather than the obstacle the principal removes.

29.4 Judgment Under Time Constraint

The judgment under time constraint is the faculty by which the principal makes the choices the discipline does not determine when the decision must be made faster than the preparation would allow. The choices are the decisions that must be made before the assessment is complete and the responses that must be given before the consultation is concluded. The discipline is the reliance on the prepared judgment — the habits of thought and the frameworks of assessment the principal has developed before the moment of pressure. The prepared judgment is the judgment the principal has developed through the career, and the principal who has not developed the prepared judgment will make the choice the moment's pressure produces rather than the choice the situation requires.

De Gaulle's judgment in the construction of the Fifth Republic in 1958 illustrates the prepared judgment under the time constraint. The Algerian crisis of May 1958 — the revolt of the army in Algiers, the prospect of the paratroop landing on Paris, the collapse of the Fourth Republic's authority — required the response the routine could not produce. De Gaulle's prepared judgment was the framework he had developed through the war, the gaullist movement of the 1940s, and the years at Colombey: the recognition that the parliamentary regime had failed, the recognition that the constitutional authority of the president was the condition of the state's recovery, and the recognition that the investiture was the moment to obtain the authority the reform required. The Bayeux speech of 1946 was the framework; the investiture of 1 June 1958 was the application; the constitution of the Fifth Republic was the implementation. The judgment was the prepared judgment applied under the time constraint, and the discipline was the years of preparation the moment tested.

De Gaulle's failure in the management of May 1968 illustrates the failure of the prepared judgment under the time constraint. The student protests that began at Nanterre in March 1968 and the worker strikes that followed in May escalated faster than the assessment the principal had conducted could complete, and de Gaulle's initial response — the dismissal of the protests as a passing phenomenon, the broadcast of 24 May that the public read as out of touch, the absence from the public view in the days that followed — was the failure of the prepared judgment to hold under the time constraint. The departure to Baden-Baden on 29 May was the principal's recognition that the prepared judgment had failed and that the consultation with the armed forces was the condition of the recovery; the return to Paris on 30 May, the dissolution of the National Assembly, and the broadcast to the nation were the application of the prepared judgment in the second moment. The recovery was successful; the failure was the initial management, and the failure was the failure of the prepared judgment to hold in the first days of the crisis.

The centre's craft under time constraint is the preparation that precedes the moment and the composure that conducts the moment. The preparation is the cultivation of the habits of thought and the frameworks of assessment the principal will apply when the moment arrives, and the preparation is the work of the years before the moment. The composure is the conduct of the

response in the manner the preparation has equipped the principal to conduct, and the composure is the discipline by which the principal is judged in the moment. The centre that has prepared the judgment will pass the moment; the centre that has not prepared the judgment will fail the moment, regardless of the underlying merits of the choice.

29.5 The Development of Judgment

The development of judgment is the work of a career, and the centre that does not develop the judgment of its principals has failed in its function. The development is conducted through the experience of the decisions the principal makes, the study of the history the principal reads, the mentorship of the senior principals the principal serves under, and the reflection on the principal's own decisions the principal conducts. The development is the cultivation of the habits of thought and the frameworks of assessment the principal will apply in the moment of pressure, and the development is the work the principal conducts in the years before the moment. The judgment that holds in the moment is the judgment the principal has developed over the career, and the judgment that fails in the moment is the judgment the principal has not developed.

Lee Kuan Yew's career illustrates the development of judgment across the range of the challenges the centre faces. The challenges Singapore confronted from 1959 to 1990 were the challenges of the small state surrounded by the larger powers, the challenges of the multi-ethnic society emerging from the colonial order, the challenges of the economy without the natural resources, and the challenges of the security without the strategic depth. Lee's judgment was the judgment developed through the experience of the merger with Malaya in 1963 and the separation in 1965, through the study of the history of the small states and the colonial retreats, through the mentorship of the senior figures of the British colonial service, and through the reflection on the decisions of the first years that the later years corrected. The judgment was the product of the career, and the centre that Singapore built was the centre that the judgment had built.

The Meiji oligarchs' collective development illustrates the development through the mentorship and the study of history. The oligarchs were the samurai of the domains who had overthrown the Tokugawa order, and the judgment they exercised in the construction of the modern state was the judgment developed through the mentorship of the senior figures of the Tokugawa reform, the study of the Western institutions through the Iwakura mission of 1871 to 1873, and the reflection on the decisions of the early years the later years corrected. The collective development was the development of the group, and the oligarchs' correspondence and the records of the conferences show the mutual cultivation of the judgment the construction of the state required. The development was the work of the decades the oligarchs held the office, and the judgment they exercised in the 1880s was the judgment the 1870s had developed.

The British management of the imperial retreat illustrates the development through the reflection on the decisions. The retreat was conducted by the principals who had served in the colonial service, the Foreign Office, the Cabinet, and the prime minister's office, and the judgment they exercised was the judgment developed through the experience of the colonial administration, the study of the history of the empires, the mentorship of the senior figures, and the reflection on the decisions of the earlier withdrawals the later withdrawals corrected. The judgment of the 1957

withdrawal from Malaya was the judgment the 1947 withdrawal from India had developed; the judgment of the 1960 withdrawal from the African colonies was the judgment the earlier withdrawals had developed. The development was the work of the decades, and the centre that did the work developed the judgment the retreat required; the centre that did not do the work failed in the function.

29.6 Chapter Summary

The judgment of the centre is the faculty by which the principals make the choices the operational craft does not determine. The craft provides the framework; the judgment makes the choices within the framework. The judgment is the product of the experience, the knowledge, and the disciplined assessment of the situation, and the principal who has the experience, the knowledge, and the assessment, and who applies them to the choice, is exercising judgment. The Venetian Republic's Council of Ten illustrates the institutional form; the individual principal who exercises the judgment within the framework is the form the modern centre requires.

The judgment is exercised under the political pressure, under the uncertainty, and under the time constraint. The political pressure is the pressure to favour the powerful actor, to defer to the head of state, and to respond to the public mood; the discipline is the maintenance of the operational craft's integrity under the pressure, and the recognition that the judgment distorted by the pressure is a concession. Bismarck's management of the alliances and the British management of the imperial retreat illustrate the discipline under the political pressure; Bismarck's failure in the management of the Kaiser illustrates the failure. The uncertainty is the condition the principal operates in; the discipline is the management of the uncertainty through the scenarios and the hedging, and the Meiji oligarchs' construction of the modern state illustrates the discipline while the Habsburg failures in the nationality question illustrate the failure.

The time constraint is the condition the moment imposes; the discipline is the reliance on the prepared judgment, and de Gaulle's construction of the Fifth Republic in 1958 illustrates the discipline while his failure in May 1968 illustrates the failure. The development of the judgment is the work of a career, conducted through the experience, the study of history, the mentorship, and the reflection, and the centre that does not develop the judgment of its principals has failed in its function. Lee Kuan Yew's career, the Meiji oligarchs' collective development, and the British management of the imperial retreat illustrate the development through the decades. The judgment is the faculty the centre's principals exercise when the discipline does not determine the answer, and the development of the judgment is the work the centre must conduct through the career of every principal the centre holds.

Chapter 30 — Comparative Traditions

Part VII: Comparative Practice — The traditions that shape the operational craft of the centre across jurisdictions. The principles that transfer and the forms that do not.

30.1 The UK Cabinet Manual Tradition

The UK Cabinet Manual is the codification of the operational conventions of the centre of government in the United Kingdom, prepared by the Cabinet Secretary and first published in 2011. The Cabinet Manual sets out the conventions governing the formation and dissolution of government, the conduct of cabinet business, the management of the executive-legislature relationship, and the management of transitions between governments. The conventions were previously implicit, sustained by precedent, by the practice of the civil service, and by the recollection of the Cabinet Secretary. The codification was the recognition that the centre's craft can be written down without being weakened.

The conventions on the formation and dissolution of government address the discretion of the monarch in the appointment of the prime minister and the conditions under which parliament is dissolved. The Lascelles Principles, set out in a letter to The Times in 1950 by the king's private secretary, defined the three conditions under which the monarch could refuse a dissolution. The codification of these conventions provided the framework for the formation of the coalition government in May 2010, when the hung parliament required the civil service to support the negotiations between the Conservative and the Liberal Democrat parties. The Cabinet Secretary's role as the principal adviser on the appointment was the operational form of the convention, and the Cabinet Manual set out the form for the record.

The conventions on the conduct of cabinet business address the collective responsibility of the ministers, the management of the cabinet's agenda, the recording of the decisions, and the management of the disagreements. The codification drew on the precedent books the Cabinet Office had maintained and on the practice of the cabinets since the war. The conventions on the management of the executive-legislature relationship address the government's accountability to parliament, the management of the legislative programme, and the conduct of the relationship with the opposition. The codification set out the conventions in the form the civil service could apply, and the application was the operational craft the conventions supported.

The conventions on the management of transitions address the conduct of the transfer of power between governments, the access of the opposition to the civil service before an election, and the conduct of the negotiations where the election produces a hung parliament. The codification drew on the precedents of the transitions of 1964, 1974, and 1997, and on the practice developed for the 2010 transition. The contribution of the UK Cabinet Manual is the demonstration that the conventions of the centre can be written down without being weakened, and the recognition that the centre's work is sustained by the practice the codification sets out. The codification has been drawn on by other jurisdictions, and the Cabinet Manual has been revised and updated to reflect the formations and the transitions that followed.

30.2 The Singapore Whole-of-Government Approach

The Singapore whole-of-government approach is the integrated management of the government's dependencies through the coordination of the ministries, the statutory boards, and the organs of the centre under the leadership of the Prime Minister's Office. The approach rests on the principle that every dependency is the centre's responsibility, and that the line ministry's sectoral perspective must be subordinated to the centre's strategic perspective when the two conflict. The approach was developed under Lee Kuan Yew and the People's Action Party from 1959, and the institutions were built to support the approach over the six decades of the party's dominance. The approach is the operational form of the recognition that a small state with no natural resources and a vulnerable position in the international order cannot afford the fragmented management of its dependencies.

The Prime Minister's Office is the locus of the centre's coordination, and the organs of the office provide the capacity the centre requires. The permanent secretaries meet as a group under the chairmanship of the head of the civil service, and the coordination across the ministries is conducted through the regular meetings and the shared posting of the senior officials. The whole-of-government approach operates through the rotation of the senior officials across the ministries and the statutory boards, and the rotation is the mechanism by which the centre's perspective is maintained in the line ministries. The permanent secretary who has served in finance, in trade, in defence, and in the Prime Minister's Office carries the centre's perspective into every portfolio.

The Economic Development Board is the instrument through which the government manages the economic dependencies on the foreign investors and the multinational corporations. The board was established in 1961 with the mandate to attract the foreign investment the country required for employment and for the development of the industrial base, and the board was given the operational autonomy and the authority to negotiate the terms the investors required. The board's officers cultivated the relationships with the chief executives of the multinational corporations, the embassies, and the trade associations, and the relationships were the centre's management of the dependency on the foreign capital. The board's integration with the Jurong Town Corporation, the Development Bank of Singapore, and the trade ministries was the whole-of-government approach in its operational form, and the integration was the condition of the investment the country secured.

The contribution of the Singapore whole-of-government approach is the demonstration that the management of the dependencies is the centre's responsibility and that the institutional configuration can be designed to support the responsibility. The approach has been applied to the management of the water supply, the management of the racial and the religious peace, the management of the relations with the neighbouring states, and the management of the response to the financial crises of 1997 and 2008. The approach has been adapted to the size and the position of Singapore, and the institutional configuration is the product of the city-state's scale and its vulnerability. The principle of the centre's responsibility for every dependency transfers; the institutional configuration is the form the principle takes in the Singapore context.

30.3 The French Relations Extérieures and Préfet System

The French doctrine of the management of the central state's relationships is the institutionalisation of the centre's reach into the territory, into the European Union, and into the private sector through dedicated instruments. The doctrine is the operational form of the Jacobin tradition of the unitary state, in which the centre's authority is exercised directly in the territory through the representatives of the centre. The doctrine comprises the préfet in the regions, the Secrétariat général des affaires européennes for the European Union, and the ministerial cabinets for the private sector and the civil society. The doctrine was built over the two centuries of the French state's development, and the institutions are the cumulative product of the Napoleonic, the republican, and the post-war European periods.

The préfet is the centre's territorial representative in the département, established by the law of 28 Pluviôse Year VIII and sustained through the regimes that followed. The préfet is the representative of the government and of each minister, the custodian of the state's authority in the département, and the supervisor of the local services of the state. The function is the centre's eyes, ears, and hands in the territory: the observation of the political and the social conditions, the communication of the government's decisions, the management of the crises, and the coordination of the state's services. The préfet's authority over the local services of the state is the operational form of the centre's reach into the territory, and the préfet's accountability to the Ministry of the Interior is the line of authority that connects the territory to the centre.

The Secrétariat général des affaires européennes is the centre's instrument for the management of the relationship with the European Union, established in 1973 under the authority of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Secrétariat coordinates the French positions on the European dossiers across the ministries, ensures the coherence of the French voice in the Council and the European Council, and manages the transposition of the European law into the French legal order. The function is the whole-of-government coordination of the European business, and the authority over the line ministries is the operational form of the centre's reach into the European Union. The ministerial cabinets are the centre's instruments for the management of the relationships with the private sector and the civil society, and the cabinets' practice of the personal engagement with the business leaders and the leaders of the civil society is the operational form of the centre's reach into the economy and the society.

The contribution of the French doctrine is the institutionalisation of the territorial representative as the centre's instrument in the regions, and the recognition that the centre's reach into the territory is a core function, not an administrative afterthought. The préfet system has been adapted to the decentralisation of 1982 and the further reforms, and the préfet's authority has been recalibrated to the new distribution of competences between the state and the local governments. The Secrétariat général des affaires européennes has been adapted to the enlargement of the European Union and the extension of the Union's competences. The ministerial cabinets have been adapted to the changes in the relationship between the state and the private sector, and the doctrine's contribution is the demonstration that the centre's reach into the territory, into the European Union, and into the private sector is the operational craft of the centre.

30.4 The Indonesian Coordination Model

The Indonesian coordination model is the configuration of the coordinating ministries, the national development planning agency, and the interface between the planning agency and the line ministries that manages the government's dependencies across the archipelago. The model is the operational form of the centre's coordination of a state of more than seventeen thousand islands, more than three hundred ethnic groups, and a regional dispersion that stretches from Sumatra to Papua. The model was built in the Sukarno and the Suharto periods and refined through the reformasi era that followed 1998. The model is the adaptation of the centre's discipline to a context of the geographic and the cultural complexity that few other jurisdictions match.

The coordinating ministries are the centre's instruments for the coordination of the line ministries within the functional clusters, and the clusters are the economic affairs, the political, legal, and security affairs, the human development and cultural affairs, and the maritime and investment affairs. The coordinating minister is the president's delegate for the cluster, and the coordinating minister's authority is the centre's authority over the line ministries in the cluster. The coordinating minister chairs the meetings of the line ministers in the cluster, resolves the disputes, and presents the cluster's position to the cabinet. The coordinating minister's office is the centre's instrument for the management of the dependencies within the cluster, and the office's staff is the centre's capacity for the coordination.

The Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Bappenas, is the national development planning agency, established in 1963 with the mandate to prepare the national development plans and to coordinate the implementation across the line ministries. The Bappenas-ministry interface is the operational form of the centre's coordination of the development priorities, and the interface comprises the planning, the budgeting, and the monitoring of the development programmes. Bappenas works with the Ministry of Finance on the budget, with the line ministries on the programmes, and with the regional governments on the implementation, and the coordination is the centre's management of the dependency on the development resources. The interface is the institutional form of the recognition that the centre's coordination of the development is the condition of the development's success in a context of the geographic and the cultural complexity.

The contribution of the Indonesian coordination model is the adaptation of the centre's discipline to a context of the geographic and the cultural complexity, and the recognition that the centre's function is the same even where the institutions are different. The coordinating ministries are the institutional form of the centre's coordination, and the form is the response to the size and the diversity of the archipelago. The Bappenas-ministry interface is the institutional form of the centre's planning, and the form is the response to the requirement that the development priorities be coordinated across the line ministries and the regions. The model's contribution is the demonstration that the centre's function is the same in Jakarta as in London, in Singapore, or in Paris, and that the institutions are the form the function takes in the Indonesian context.

30.5 The Management of Non-Party Elites

The management of non-party elites is the centre's cultivation of the relationships with the actors outside the governing apparatus whose cooperation the government requires. The actors are

the business leaders, the religious leaders, the cultural leaders, the academic leaders, and the professional leaders whose authority over their constituencies sustains the government's capacity to act. The cooperation is the dependence: the business leaders' investment decisions, the religious leaders' authority over the congregations, the cultural leaders' authority over the audiences, the academic leaders' authority over the knowledge, and the professional leaders' authority over the standards. The management is the centre's recognition that the cooperation is the dependency, and the cultivation is the operational craft by which the dependency is managed.

The structured engagement is the institutional form of the centre's cultivation, and the forms are the councils, the boards, the advisory bodies, the consultations, and the regular meetings through which the relationships are conducted. The structured engagement provides the channels for the communication of the government's decisions, the consultation of the elites' views, and the management of the disagreements. The structured engagement is the visible form of the relationship, and the visible form is the demonstration that the government values the elites' cooperation. The structured engagement is supported by the personal relationships between the principals and the senior officials on one side and the elites on the other, and the personal relationships are the substance the structured engagement carries.

The personal relationships are the centre's cultivation of the individual ties with the elites, conducted through the private meetings, the correspondence, the hospitality, and the informal contacts that the structured engagement does not carry. The personal relationships are the centre's recognition that the cooperation depends on the persons, and that the management of the relationship is the management of the trust between the persons. The management of the expectations is the centre's communication of what the government will do and what it will not, what the elites can expect and what they cannot, and the communication is the discipline by which the disappointments are prevented and the trust is sustained. The management of the contributions is the centre's recognition that the elites' contributions to the government's objectives are the return on the cultivation, and the recognition is the discipline by which the contributions are sought, received, and acknowledged.

The principle is found across the jurisdictions, and the institutional forms vary. The Venetian Republic managed the non-party elites through the councils of the church, the guilds, and the confraternities, and through the personal cultivation by the doge and the councils. The Meiji oligarchs managed the non-party elites through the genrō's personal relationships with the zaibatsu heads, the Buddhist sect leaders, and the university presidents, and through the institutional engagement of the Privy Council and the House of Peers. Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew managed the non-party elites through the People's Association, the statutory boards, the trade associations, and the personal cultivation by the prime minister and the senior ministers. The French Republic manages the non-party elites through the Economic, Social and Environmental Council and the personal cultivation by the ministers and the préfets, and the principle of the centre's cultivation of the relationships with the non-party elites transfers across the jurisdictions while the institutional forms are the product of the constitutional tradition, the political history, and the administrative culture.

30.6 What Transfers and What Does Not

The principles that transfer across the jurisdictions are the principles of the centre's craft: the function of the centre as the manager of the dependencies, the discipline of the dependency management, the construction of the stakeholder map, the conduct of the sensitive meeting, the management of the transition, the response to the crisis, the cultivation of the personal relationship, and the maintenance of the trust. The principles are the operational form of the recognition that the centre's work is the same in every jurisdiction, because the dependencies are the same and the dependencies' management is the same. The UK Cabinet Manual, the Singapore whole-of-government approach, the French relations extérieures and the préfet system, and the Indonesian coordination model each embody the principles in different institutional forms. The principles are the substance; the institutions are the form.

The forms that do not transfer are the institutional configurations, and the configurations are the product of the constitutional tradition, the political history, and the administrative culture of each jurisdiction. The UK Cabinet Manual is the product of the Westminster tradition, the uncodified constitution, and the convention-based practice of the civil service. The Singapore whole-of-government approach is the product of the city-state's scale, the dominance of the People's Action Party, and the integration of the political and the administrative leadership. The French préfet system is the product of the Jacobin tradition, the unitary state, and the centralised administration, and the Indonesian coordination model is the product of the archipelago's geography, the constitutional distribution of the authority, and the reformasi era's recalibration of the civil-military relationship.

The centre that copies another jurisdiction's form without understanding its own context has failed in the most fundamental judgment the centre is required to make. The judgment is the judgment of the centre's own context, and the context is the constitutional tradition, the political history, the administrative culture, the size, the geography, and the position in the international order. The centre that copies the UK Cabinet Manual in a jurisdiction without the Westminster tradition has copied the form without the substance. The centre that copies the Singapore whole-of-government approach in a jurisdiction without the city-state's scale has copied the form without the substance. The centre that copies the French préfet system in a jurisdiction without the Jacobin tradition has copied the form without the substance, and the centre's judgment is the judgment of what transfers and what does not.

The comparative discipline is the discipline of learning from the other jurisdictions without copying them, and the discipline is the operational form of the recognition that the centre's work is the same in substance and different in form. The comparative discipline requires the centre to know the other jurisdictions' practices, to understand the contexts that produced them, to distinguish the principles from the forms, and to apply the principles in the centre's own forms. The centre that masters the comparative discipline has the capacity to develop its own institutional configuration in the light of the principles, and the configuration is the centre's own form of the craft. The comparative discipline is the discipline of the centre's own judgment, and the judgment is the test the centre's practice is held to.

30.7 Chapter Summary

The comparative traditions are the traditions that shape the operational craft of the centre across the jurisdictions, and the traditions are the UK Cabinet Manual, the Singapore whole-of-government approach, the French relations extérieures and the préfet system, and the Indonesian coordination model. The UK Cabinet Manual is the codification of the operational conventions of the centre, and the contribution is the demonstration that the conventions can be written down without being weakened. The Singapore whole-of-government approach is the integrated management of the dependencies under the Prime Minister's Office, the French relations extérieures and the préfet system are the institutionalisation of the centre's reach into the territory, into the European Union, and into the private sector, and the Indonesian coordination model is the adaptation of the centre's discipline to a context of the geographic and the cultural complexity.

The management of non-party elites is the centre's cultivation of the relationships with the actors outside the governing apparatus whose cooperation the government requires, and the principle is found across the jurisdictions while the institutional forms vary. The principles that transfer are the principles of the centre's craft: the function, the dependency management, the stakeholder map, the sensitive meeting, the transition, the crisis response, the personal relationship, and the cultivation of trust. The forms that do not transfer are the institutional configurations, and the configurations are the product of the constitutional tradition, the political history, and the administrative culture of each jurisdiction.

The centre that copies another jurisdiction's form without understanding its own context has failed in the most fundamental judgment the centre is required to make. The comparative discipline is the discipline of learning from the other jurisdictions without copying them, and the discipline is the operational form of the recognition that the centre's work is the same in substance and different in form. The principles are the substance; the institutions are the form. The centre's task is the application of the principles in the centre's own forms, and the application is the test the centre's practice is held to.

Appendix A — The Stakeholder Map Template

The template for the stakeholder map: the comprehensive document that captures the government's relationships with the actors on whom it depends.

A.1 The Map's Structure

The stakeholder map is the comprehensive document that records the government's relationships with the actors on whom the government depends. The map is held by the centre as the standing record of the dependencies the centre manages, the actors who hold them, and the relationships among those actors. The map comprises four components: the actor inventory, the assessment of each actor, the relationship map, and the influence flow chart. The components are maintained together, with the inventory as the foundation on which the assessment, the relationship map, and the influence flow chart are built, and the map's value lies in its wholeness.

The components relate as layers, each building on the layer beneath. The inventory establishes who the actors are; the assessment overlays judgment on each entry; the relationship map connects the actors into the network of alliances, rivalries, dependencies, and influence flows; and the influence flow chart represents the dynamics of that network, tracing the paths by which one actor's actions affect another's position. The components are constructed in this order and read in this order, and each component is interpretable only with the components beneath it. The Venetian Republic maintained the records of its ambassadors and baili as a map of the Republic's dependencies across the terraferma, the maritime colonies, and the European powers; the French foreign ministry's *mémoire* system recorded the assessment of each court to which an ambassador was posted; and the modern Cabinet Office in London, the Prime Minister's Office in Singapore, and the Secretary-General of the Government in Paris each maintain the map in the structured form the contemporary state requires.

A.2 The Actor Inventory

The actor inventory is the list of actors on whom the centre has a present or prospective dependency, recorded in the fields that identify and locate each actor. Each entry is one actor, whether an individual, an institution, or a faction. The standard for entry is the existence of the dependency: the actor is entered when the centre identifies that the centre's objective requires the actor's cooperation, consent, or restraint, and the actor is removed when the dependency no longer obtains. The inventory is the foundation of the stakeholder map, and the assessment, the relationship map, and the influence flow chart draw their actors from it.

Each entry carries seven fields: name, position, institution, category, basis of standing, constituency, and resources. The name, position, and institution fields identify the actor and the office held; the category field classifies the actor against the typology — legislative, executive, judicial, financial, commercial, media, religious, social, or foreign — with secondary categories noted where the actor crosses types. The basis of standing field records the source of the actor's

position — election, appointment, inheritance, wealth, expertise, or following — because the basis determines the means by which the actor may be moved. The constituency field records the people or interests the actor represents, and the resources field records the means the actor commands — votes, funds, personnel, networks, information, or legitimacy.

The standards for entry govern who is recorded, in what form, and on what evidence. The entry is created by the centre's officials when the dependency is identified, with the seven fields populated from the centre's intelligence on the actor. The entry is reviewed at the quarterly cycle and revised when the actor's position, institution, or resources change, and removed when the dependency is gone, with the basis recorded so the entry can be restored if the dependency returns. The French cabinet's *fiches de suivi*, the British Cabinet Office's stakeholder records, and the Singapore Prime Minister's Office's intelligence files each apply the discipline in their respective forms, and the working character of the inventory is the same in each. An entry without the fields populated is an entry that misleads the centre that relies on it.

A.3 The Assessment Fields

The assessment fields are the six fields that overlay the inventory entry with the centre's judgment of the actor at the moment of the entry's update. The assessment is the centre's reading of the actor, recorded in the fields of position, interest, influence, relationship history, current state, and next action. The assessment is signed by the official who makes it, dated to the day, and supported by the basis recorded in the entry. The assessment is distinguished from the centre's preference: the centre records the actor's position as the centre judges it, and the discipline of holding the judgment distinct from the preference is the discipline by which the assessment remains useful.

The position field records the actor's stance toward the centre's objective on a four-point scale: supportive, neutral, oppositional, or adversarial. The interest field records the actor's stake in the objective — what the actor gains, what the actor loses, and what the actor fears — because the interest is the basis on which the actor's position may be moved. The influence field records the actor's capacity to affect the objective's outcome, on the scale of high, medium, or low, with the basis recorded. The relationship history field records the prior pattern of the centre's dealings with the actor; the current state field records the actor's present condition, preoccupations, and pressures; and the next action field records the centre's planned move on the actor, with the date by which the action is to be taken.

The standards for assessment govern the form, the basis, and the revision. The position is recorded as a single scale value, with the narrative held in the relationship history and the current state. The basis for each field is recorded in a note attached to the field, with the source identified and the date of the source noted. The assessment is revised at the monthly cycle for the current state and next action fields, at the quarterly cycle for the position and influence fields, and at the annual cycle for the interest and relationship history fields, and immediately on a reassessment trigger regardless of the cycle. The mature practice requires that no field be recorded without its basis, and the field without its basis is the field that misleads.

A.4 The Relationship Map

The relationship map is the component that connects the actors in the inventory into the network of relationships that constitute the terrain on which the centre operates. The relationship is the unit of the map, and each relationship is recorded as a link between two actors, with the type, the direction, and the basis documented. The map records four relationship types: alliances, rivalries, dependencies, and influence flows. The relationship map is the instrument by which the centre sees the network, and the centre that sees only the actors misses the structure that determines how the actors will move.

The alliance is the relationship in which two actors cooperate, on the basis of shared interest, shared ideology, shared constituency, or shared history. The rivalry is the relationship in which two actors contest, on the basis of conflicting interest, conflicting ideology, conflicting constituency, or conflicting history. The dependency is the relationship in which one actor depends on another for resources, legitimacy, or position, with the direction of the dependency recorded. The influence flow is the relationship in which one actor's actions affect another's position, with the channel of the influence — personal, institutional, financial, or mediated — recorded.

The standards for mapping govern what is recorded and on what evidence. Relationships are recorded only when the centre has evidence for them, and the evidence is recorded in the relationship's basis field. The centre distinguishes observed relationships from suspected relationships, with the distinction noted in the entry, so that the centre's reading of the network is held distinct from the centre's speculation. The map is updated when relationships shift — an alliance forms or breaks, a rivalry intensifies or subsides, a dependency deepens or lifts, an influence flow strengthens or weakens — and the update is recorded with the date and the basis. The Venetian ambassadors reported the alliances and the rivalries of the European courts in their dispatches to the College, and the College's reading of the network was the Republic's instrument of statecraft.

A.5 The Maintenance Protocol

The maintenance protocol is the set of rules by which the stakeholder map is kept current, comprising the update schedule, the reassessment triggers, and the review process. The protocol is the condition under which the map functions as a living document. The actors, the relationships, and the influence flows shift continuously, and a map that records a past state as a present state misrepresents the terrain on which the centre operates. The maintenance protocol assigns the responsibility for each component to the officials who manage it, and assigns the principal's review to the schedule the protocol sets.

The update schedule runs on three cycles: the monthly update of the current state and next action fields of every active assessment; the quarterly review of the full inventory, with each entry confirmed, revised, or removed; and the annual reassessment of every entry, with the relationship history, the interest, and the influence fields reconsidered from the foundation. The reassessment triggers are the events that require immediate update, regardless of the cycle: a crisis that activates an actor, a personnel change that alters the actor's position or influence, a public statement that shifts the actor's stance, a legislative or electoral outcome that changes the actor's resources, or a

shift in the relationship between two actors that the centre's officials observe. The review process is the principal's periodic review of the map at the quarterly cycle, with the principal reading the assessment of every high-influence actor and the relationship map of the principal's portfolio. The British Cabinet Office's weekly stakeholder review, the Singapore Prime Minister's Office's daily intelligence cycle, and the French Secretary-General's periodic briefings each apply the discipline in their respective forms.

The map as a living document is the practice by which the stakeholder map remains the centre's instrument, distinct from a record that ages on the shelf. The map's living character is the product of the maintenance discipline, distinct from the format in which the map is held: a database left unmaintained misleads as much as a paper file left unmaintained, and a paper file maintained with the discipline serves as well as a database maintained with the discipline. The principal's review is the test of the discipline, because the principal's reading exposes the entries that are out of date, the relationships that are unrecorded, and the influence flows that have been missed. The map that survives the review is the map the centre can rely on; the map that does not survive is the map the centre's officials must revise before the centre relies on it again.

A.6 Chapter Summary

The stakeholder map is the comprehensive document that records the government's relationships with the actors on whom the government depends. The map comprises four components: the actor inventory, the assessment of each actor, the relationship map, and the influence flow chart, with the inventory as the foundation, the assessment as the overlay, the relationship map as the connection, and the influence flow chart as the dynamic. The inventory records the actors in the seven fields of name, position, institution, category, basis of standing, constituency, and resources, and the assessment overlays the six fields of position, interest, influence, relationship history, current state, and next action. The relationship map connects the actors into the network of alliances, rivalries, dependencies, and influence flows, and the influence flow chart traces the dynamics of that network.

The maintenance protocol governs the update schedule, the reassessment triggers, and the review process by which the map is kept current. The update schedule runs on the monthly, quarterly, and annual cycles, with each cycle assigned to the components it covers; the reassessment triggers are the events that require immediate update; and the review process is the principal's periodic reading of the map. The map as a living document is the product of the maintenance discipline, and the discipline is the centre's instrument for keeping the map reliable. The stakeholder map is the centre's record of the terrain on which it operates, and the centre that maintains the map with the discipline the protocol requires operates with the knowledge the terrain demands.

Appendix B — The Sensitive Meeting Preparation Checklist

The checklist for the preparation, conduct, and follow-up of the sensitive meeting between the centre's principal and a powerful actor.

B.1 The Preparation Checklist

The preparation checklist is the set of disciplines by which the centre's principal enters the sensitive meeting with the powerful actor prepared to conduct it to a defined end. The checklist comprises six elements: the stakeholder map review, the actor briefing, the objective definition, the strategy, the anticipation of concerns, and the logistics. Each element is the work of the centre's officials in the days before the meeting, and each is the principal's work in the hours before the meeting begins. The meeting that is entered without the preparation is the meeting that proceeds at the actor's pace, on the actor's terms, and toward the actor's ends, and the centre that has not prepared has ceded the meeting before it begins. The preparation is the discipline by which the centre retains the conduct of the meeting, and the checklist is the instrument by which the preparation is verified complete.

The stakeholder map review is the re-examination of the centre's stakeholder map in the light of the specific meeting, and the standard is that the principal enters the meeting knowing the actor's position in the network, the actor's recent relationships with the centre and with the other actors, and the changes in the actor's position since the map was last revised. The review is conducted against the current map, because the actor's position shifts with the political, the commercial, and the diplomatic circumstances, and the meeting entered on the basis of an out-of-date map is the meeting entered on a false premise. The actor briefing is the consolidated intelligence the centre's officials prepare on the actor's principal, and the standard is that the briefing covers the actor's interests, the actor's pressures, the actor's recent conduct, and the actor's known positions on the matters the meeting will address. The briefing is concise, current, and sourced, and the principal who has read it enters the meeting with the knowledge the meeting requires.

The objective definition is the principal's statement of what the meeting is to achieve, and the standard is that the objective is specific, realisable in the meeting, and ranked where there are several. The objective that is vague — to discuss the relationship — is the objective that cannot be tested at the meeting's close, and the objective that is unattainable in the meeting — to secure the actor's agreement to the reform — is the objective that sets the meeting up for the failure the principal will then have to explain. The strategy is the principal's plan for the conduct of the meeting toward the objective, and the standard is that the strategy specifies the principal's opening, the principal's concessions, the principal's reserves, and the principal's walk-away. The anticipation of concerns is the work of identifying the concerns the actor's principal is likely to raise, and the standard is that each anticipated concern is paired with the principal's response. The logistics are the arrangements — the venue, the timing, the attendees, the protocol — and the standard is that the logistics are confirmed, controlled by the centre where they can be, and consistent with the relationship the meeting is to sustain.

B.2 The Conduct Checklist

The conduct checklist is the set of disciplines by which the centre's principal manages the meeting itself, from the opening through the close. The checklist comprises five elements: the opening, the agenda management, the relationship management, the substance management, and the close. The meeting is a managed event in which the principal pursues the objective through the interaction with the actor's principal, and the conduct checklist is the discipline by which the principal retains the conduct of the event. The principal who enters the meeting prepared and then allows the meeting to drift has wasted the preparation, and the principal who manages the meeting to the close has converted the preparation into the outcome. The conduct is the work of the meeting, and the checklist is the structure within which the work is done.

The opening is the principal's conduct of the first minutes of the meeting, and the standard is that the principal establishes the purpose, the scope, and the tone of the meeting in the opening exchange. The opening may be formal or informal, brief or extended, according to the relationship and the protocol, but the opening that does not establish the purpose has left the meeting's direction to the actor. The agenda management is the principal's conduct of the meeting's progress through the matters to be addressed, and the standard is that the principal controls the sequence, the pacing, and the time given to each matter. The agenda is the principal's instrument, and the principal who allows the actor's principal to set the agenda has ceded the meeting's direction; the principal who manages the agenda retains the meeting's direction and the time within which the objective is to be pursued.

The relationship management is the principal's conduct of the personal dimension of the meeting — the courtesy, the listening, the acknowledgment of the actor's principal's position, the management of the disagreement without the rupture — and the standard is that the relationship is sustained or strengthened through the meeting. The substance management is the principal's conduct of the matters themselves — the points made, the concessions offered, the reserves held, the concerns addressed — and the standard is that the substance is conducted toward the objective the preparation has defined. The close is the principal's conduct of the final minutes, and the standard is that the close summarises the conclusions reached, confirms the undertakings given, and establishes the follow-up. The close that does not summarise the conclusions has left the meeting's outcome to the actor's interpretation, and the close that does not establish the follow-up has left the outcome to dissipate in the days after the meeting.

B.3 The Follow-Up Checklist

The follow-up checklist is the set of disciplines by which the centre converts the meeting's outcomes into action and into the maintenance of the relationship. The checklist comprises four elements: the documentation, the communication, the implementation, and the relationship maintenance. The meeting's outcomes are realised in the days and the weeks after the meeting, and the follow-up is the work by which the realisation is secured. The principal who has conducted the meeting well and then neglected the follow-up has allowed the meeting's outcomes to dissipate, and the centre that has not prepared the follow-up before the meeting has begun has delayed the follow-up beyond the point at which it can be effective. The follow-up is the discipline by which the

meeting's outcomes are made durable, and the checklist is the instrument by which the follow-up is verified complete.

The documentation is the record the centre prepares of the meeting, and the standard is that the record is prepared within the day, approved by the principal, and held in the form the centre's records require. The record covers the attendees, the matters discussed, the conclusions reached, the undertakings given, and the follow-up agreed, and the record is the basis on which the centre will conduct the communication and the implementation. The communication is the centre's transmission of the meeting's outcomes to the actors who need to know them, and the standard is that the communication is timely, calibrated to each recipient, and consistent with the principal's position. The communication to the actor's principal is the confirmation of the undertakings; the communication to the centre's officials is the instruction for the implementation; the communication to the other actors is the management of the information the meeting has produced, and the standard for each is the precision the meeting's sensitivity requires.

The implementation is the centre's execution of the undertakings the principal has given in the meeting, and the standard is that each undertaking is assigned, scheduled, and tracked to completion. The undertaking that is unassigned is the undertaking that will not be executed, and the undertaking that is untracked is the undertaking whose non-execution will be discovered at the next meeting with the actor's principal. The relationship maintenance is the centre's work of sustaining the personal relationship through the period between the meeting and the next, and the standard is that the maintenance is active, calibrated, and continuous. The maintenance comprises the principal's follow-up communication with the actor's principal, the centre's continuing engagement with the actor's officials, and the principal's personal contact on the occasions the relationship requires, and the standard for each is that the maintenance preserves the relationship the meeting has used or strengthened. The follow-up that closes the meeting's outcomes without sustaining the relationship has converted a meeting into a transaction, and the transaction is the form of engagement that does not produce the next meeting's ease.

B.4 Chapter Summary

The sensitive meeting preparation checklist comprises the preparation, the conduct, and the follow-up of the meeting between the centre's principal and the powerful actor, and the three checklists together constitute the discipline by which the meeting is managed from the decision to meet to the realisation of the outcomes. The preparation checklist covers the stakeholder map review, the actor briefing, the objective definition, the strategy, the anticipation of concerns, and the logistics, and the standard for each is the completeness the meeting's conduct requires. The conduct checklist covers the opening, the agenda management, the relationship management, the substance management, and the close, and the standard for each is the retention of the meeting's direction by the principal. The follow-up checklist covers the documentation, the communication, the implementation, and the relationship maintenance, and the standard for each is the durability of the meeting's outcomes and the relationship that produced them.

The three checklists are integrated across the meeting's cycle, and the integration is the discipline that distinguishes the managed meeting from the unmanaged encounter. The preparation

defines the objective and the strategy the conduct will pursue; the conduct pursues the objective through the strategy and produces the outcomes the follow-up will realise; the follow-up realises the outcomes and sustains the relationship the next meeting will require. Each checklist feeds the next, and the centre that operates one checklist without the others has broken the cycle the meeting's management requires. The checklists are the centre's instruments, and the centre that uses them across the cycle of meetings with the powerful actors converts the meetings from the risks they would otherwise be into the engagements the government's work requires.

The comparative record confirms the discipline. The French president's preparation for the meetings with the German chancellor, the British prime minister's preparation for the audiences with the monarch, the Singapore prime minister's preparation for the meetings with the foreign investors and the neighbouring heads of government, and the Indonesian president's preparation for the meetings with the regional governors and the military commanders — each is the disciplined conduct of the sensitive meeting with the powerful actor, and each rests on the preparation, the conduct, and the follow-up the checklists prescribe. The centre that has internalised the checklists as practice meets the powerful actor prepared, conducts the meeting managed, and follows up disciplined, and the meetings the centre conducts on this basis are the meetings through which the government's dependencies are managed and the government's work is done.

Appendix C — The Coalition Assessment Framework

The framework for assessing the coalition that supports the government: the identification of members, the assessment of each, and the assessment of the coalition as a whole.

C.1 The Coalition Inventory

The coalition inventory is the identification of the actors whose support the government requires to govern, set out as a structured list with the position, interest, and contribution of each member. The inventory is the foundation of the coalition assessment: the assessment is conducted against the inventory, and an inventory that omits a material member produces an assessment that misrepresents the coalition. The inventory is maintained as a living document, reviewed at intervals determined by the cadence of the political calendar — after elections, after reshuffles, after major legislative tests, and at periodic intervals.

The identification of members proceeds from the stakeholder map and from the centre's working knowledge of the actors whose support has been counted on in the recent past. Members include the parliamentary parties whose votes sustain the government, the factions within those parties whose leaders carry weight, the sectoral and confessional bodies whose endorsement secures constituencies, the regional and municipal leaders whose cooperation the centre requires for implementation, and the figures whose public endorsement the centre has cultivated. Members are categorised by their position relative to the centre: core members whose support is essential and stable, peripheral members whose support is expected but contingent, and marginal members whose support is traded for specific terms. The categorisation is provisional and is revised as the assessment proceeds.

For each member the inventory records the contribution and the cost. The contribution is what the member brings: votes in parliament, endorsement in public, restraint in opposition, expertise in policy, access to a constituency, or implementation on the ground. The cost is what the member extracts in return: ministerial posts, policy concessions, regulatory favours, public honours, protection from scrutiny, or appointment to boards. The contribution and the cost are recorded in the inventory as the basis for the assessments that follow, and the recording is governed by the standard of candour: the inventory that records the contributions and conceals the costs is an inventory the centre cannot govern from.

C.2 The Member Assessment

The member assessment is the structured evaluation of each member of the coalition against six fields: position, interest, influence, relationship, commitment, and expectation. The position is the member's place in the political system — the office held, the constituency represented, the network the member leads, and the formal and informal standing the member carries. The interest is what the member seeks from the government and from the coalition: the policy outcomes, the patronage, the protection, the standing, the access. The interest is the member's reason to be in the

coalition, and the assessment that does not state the interest plainly cannot anticipate the conditions under which the member leaves.

The influence is the member's capacity to affect the coalition's strength — the votes the member can deliver, the endorsements the member can secure, the constituencies the member can move, and the obstruction the member can mount. The relationship is the standing between the member and the centre: the history of the relationship, the trust accumulated or eroded, the personal ties to the principal and the senior officials, and the grievances the member carries. The commitment is the member's present disposition to remain in the coalition: the strength of the commitment, the conditions on which it rests, and the events that would test it. The expectation is what the member believes the coalition and the government owe the member over the term — the offices, the policies, the honours, the access, and the deference — and the expectation is the field on which the centre's management of the member succeeds or fails.

The standards for the member assessment are evidence, candour, and revision. The evidence standard requires that each field be assessed on documented conduct — the member's voting record, public statements, private communications, and observed responses to recent tests — apart from impression or preference. The candour standard requires that the assessment state the member's position plainly, including the assessments the principal may find unwelcome: the member whose commitment is weakening, the member whose expectation has outgrown the centre's capacity, the member whose influence is overstated. The revision standard requires that the assessment be updated at the intervals the inventory review sets and after every event that materially alters a field — a reshuffle, a legislative test, a public quarrel, or a change in the member's circumstances. The assessment that is not revised becomes a fiction, and the centre that governs from a fiction loses the coalition.

C.3 The Coalition Assessment

The coalition assessment is the evaluation of the coalition as a whole, conducted by aggregating the member assessments and examining the properties of the aggregate. The properties assessed are the coalition's coherence, its stability, its vulnerabilities, and its opportunities. Coherence is the alignment of the members' interests with the government's programme — the degree to which the members support the programme on its merits, apart from the terms they have extracted. Stability is the durability of the coalition under the pressures the term will impose: the legislative tests, the budgetary contests, the crises, the by-elections, and the slow erosion of the government's standing. The coalition's coherence and stability are distinct: a coalition may be coherent but unstable, or stable but incoherent, and the assessment that conflates them misreads the coalition's position.

The vulnerabilities are the conditions under which the coalition breaks: the member whose defection is most likely, the policy on which the coalition is most divided, the constituency in which the coalition's combined endorsement is weakest, and the external event — a scandal, an economic shock, a foreign crisis — that would strain the coalition beyond capacity. The vulnerabilities are assessed against the members' positions and against the centre's working sense of the political environment, and the assessment of each vulnerability states the trigger, the member

or members exposed, and the consequence for the government. The opportunities are the conditions under which the coalition can be strengthened: the member who can be brought closer, the policy on which the coalition can be united, the constituency in which a coordinated effort would extend the coalition's reach, and the external event that would consolidate the coalition's standing. The opportunities are the positive counterpart of the vulnerabilities, and the assessment that records the vulnerabilities and omits the opportunities leaves the centre without the basis for action.

The standards for the coalition assessment are aggregation, proportionality, and independence. The aggregation standard requires that the coalition assessment be derived from the member assessments — the coalition is the sum of its members in their relationships, and an assessment that lacks grounding in the member assessments is speculation. The proportionality standard requires that the weight given to each member in the aggregation reflect the member's contribution and influence: the member whose votes the government requires is weighted more heavily than the member whose endorsement is welcome, and the assessment that weights all members equally misrepresents the coalition. The independence standard requires that the coalition assessment be free of the principal's preference and the centre's optimism: the coalition is assessed as it is, and the assessment that flatters the principal or hides the weakness is the assessment from which the centre cannot govern.

C.4 The Adjustment Assessment

The adjustment assessment is the evaluation of the changes the coalition requires, conducted by examining the inventory, the member assessments, and the coalition assessment together and identifying the adjustments that would strengthen the coalition. The adjustments are of three kinds: members to be added, members to be shed, and terms to be renegotiated. The addition of a member is the recruitment of an actor who is presently outside the coalition and whose inclusion would extend the coalition's strength, fill a gap in the coalition's reach, or reduce a vulnerability. The shedding of a member is the deliberate withdrawal of the coalition's support from an actor whose cost has exceeded the member's contribution, whose conduct has become a liability, or whose presence blocks a more valuable addition. The renegotiation of terms is the adjustment of the contribution and the cost of a member whose position has shifted: the member who has asked for more, the member whose contribution has grown, and the member whose commitment requires a new basis.

The identification of members to be added proceeds from the gaps the coalition assessment identifies: the constituency the coalition cannot reach, the expertise the coalition lacks, the regional strength the coalition has lost, and the votes the coalition requires for the next legislative test. The candidates for addition are assessed against the same six fields applied to the existing members, and against the member's compatibility with the coalition's present composition: the member whose inclusion would alienate an existing member is a candidate only if the addition's gain exceeds the alienation's cost. The identification of members to be shed proceeds from the costs the inventory records and from the conduct the member assessments report: the member whose cost has grown without a corresponding growth in contribution, the member whose conduct has become a public liability, and the member whose continued inclusion blocks a stronger alternative.

Shedding is conducted with the discipline the relationship's history requires: the member who is shed clumsily becomes an adversary, and the centre's management of the departure is the test of the centre's craft.

The renegotiation of terms is the most frequent form of adjustment, conducted continuously as the members' positions shift and the government's needs change. The renegotiation is governed by the standard of reciprocity: the member who is asked for more is offered more, and the member who is offered more is asked for more. The renegotiation is governed by the standard of timeliness: the terms that are renegotiated before the member's commitment is tested are renegotiated at the centre's initiative, and the terms that are renegotiated after the test are renegotiated at the member's. The mid-term reviews of the German coalition agreements, the 2012 review of the British coalition's programme, and the continuous adjustment of Italian and Israeli coalition terms illustrate the renegotiation in its developed forms. The renegotiation is governed by the standard of record: every renegotiated term is recorded in the inventory as the new basis of inclusion, and the centre that relies on memory in place of the record forgets the terms and is surprised by the member's grievance.

C.5 Chapter Summary

The coalition assessment framework comprises the coalition inventory, the member assessment, the coalition assessment, and the adjustment assessment, applied in sequence and revised at the cadence the political calendar requires. The inventory identifies the members, categorises them by position, and records the contribution and the cost of each. The member assessment evaluates each member against the six fields — position, interest, influence, relationship, commitment, expectation — under the standards of evidence, candour, and revision. The coalition assessment aggregates the member assessments into the properties of the coalition as a whole — coherence, stability, vulnerabilities, opportunities — under the standards of aggregation, proportionality, and independence.

The adjustment assessment identifies the changes the coalition requires: the members to be added, the members to be shed, and the terms to be renegotiated. The additions fill the gaps the coalition assessment identifies, the sheddings remove the members whose cost has exceeded their contribution, and the renegotiations adjust the terms as the members' positions shift. The adjustments are governed by the standards of compatibility, reciprocity, timeliness, and record, and the centre that conducts the adjustments at the centre's initiative preserves the initiative the coalition's management requires. The framework is the operational instrument by which the coalition is known, adjusted, and held together across the term.

The coalition that supports the government evolves across the term: members enter, members leave, terms shift, and the coalition the centre formed at the outset is the coalition the centre has assessed, adjusted, and reassessed at every interval. The centre that omits the assessment governs from a picture that has drifted from the reality, and the drift is the condition under which the coalition's collapse surprises the centre. The framework is the discipline by which the picture is kept current, and the discipline is the difference between the coalition the centre supposes it has

and the coalition the centre actually has. The coalition that is assessed is the coalition that can be managed, and the coalition that is managed is the coalition that endures.

Appendix D — The Transition Brief Template

The template for the transition brief: the document that conveys to the new office-holder the state of the government's commitments, dependencies, risks, and relationships.

D.1 The Brief's Structure

The transition brief is organised in five sections in a fixed order: the commitments section, the dependencies section, the risks section, the relationships section, and the decisions for the first days. The order reflects the use the new holder makes of the brief, not the order in which the centre prepares the materials. The centre prepares the components in parallel, against the standing records it maintains in the routine of the government's work, and consolidates them in the period before the transition. Each section is written so that it can be read on its own and so that the new holder can navigate between sections by reference.

The components are not independent of one another. Each commitment rests on a dependency: the commitment to a foreign government rests on the diplomatic relationship that sustains it, and the commitment to a contractor rests on the financial relationship that funds it. Each dependency carries a risk: the financial dependency on a creditor carries the risk of withdrawal, and the political dependency on a coalition partner carries the risk of defection. Each risk requires a relationship to manage: the response to a financial risk is conducted through the relationship with the creditor, and the response to a political risk is conducted through the relationship with the coalition partner. The decisions for the first days draw on all four: the new holder's choices about which commitments to honour, which dependencies to sustain, which risks to address, and which relationships to cultivate.

The brief is governed by three standards: fixed structure, source traceability, and scheduled review. The fixed structure allows the new holder to locate information without re-learning the format and allows successive briefs to be compared across transitions. The source traceability requires every commitment, dependency, risk, and relationship to be traced to the record from which it is drawn. The scheduled review subjects the brief to a panel that includes the centre's senior officials and at least one principal not involved in the preparation, and the review record is appended to the brief delivered to the new holder.

D.2 The Commitments Section

The commitments section sets out the outstanding commitments the government has made to the actors in its environment, with the status of each and the consequences of fulfilment or non-fulfilment. A commitment is an undertaking the government has given, formally or informally, to an actor on whom the government depends. The undertakings include legislation in train, contracts let, treaties signed, undertakings to parties, undertakings to the public, undertakings to foreign governments, and undertakings to the branches. Each commitment is recorded with the actor to whom it is given, the form of the commitment, the date, the consideration, the status, and the consequence of fulfilment or non-fulfilment.

The status of each commitment is recorded as one of four: in train, delivered, at risk, or breached. In train means the commitment is being implemented as agreed and the implementation is on schedule. Delivered means the commitment has been fulfilled and only the residual obligations of reporting, monitoring, and review remain. At risk means the implementation has encountered an obstacle — political, financial, administrative, or diplomatic — that threatens the schedule or the substance. Breached means the commitment has not been fulfilled and the actor to whom it was given has been or will be informed of the failure.

The standards for the commitments section are the standards of the centre's records. Every commitment is traced to the instrument by which it was made — the legislation, the contract, the treaty, the communiqué, or the minute of the meeting — and every status is traced to the most recent assessment in the centre's files. The consequence of fulfilment or non-fulfilment is recorded plainly: the cost of the commitment if fulfilled and the cost of the actor's reaction if not. The commitments are presented in the order of the actors to whom they are made — the branches, the parties, the public, the foreign governments, the contractors — and within each actor, in the order of the date by which the commitment falls due.

D.3 The Dependencies Section

The dependencies section sets out the resource dependencies the government manages, with the actors on whom each depends and the state of each relationship. A resource dependency is the government's dependence on an actor it does not command for a resource the government requires to operate. The dependencies are the financial, the human, the informational, the institutional, and the political. Each dependency is recorded with the resource, the actors on whom the dependency rests, the state of the relationship with each actor, and the consequence of the actor's withdrawal or reduction of the resource.

The actors on whom a dependency rests are the actors who control the resource. The financial dependency rests on the taxpayers, the bondholders, the banks, and the international institutions; the human dependency rests on the professions, the labour market, and the educational institutions; the informational dependency rests on the media, the academy, and the intelligence services; the institutional dependency rests on the branches, the sub-national governments, and the international organisations; the political dependency rests on the parties, the coalitions, the public, and the constituencies. The state of each relationship is recorded as one of four: sound, strained, deteriorating, or broken. The state is assessed on the centre's most recent contact with the actor, not on the centre's aspiration for the relationship.

The standards for the dependencies section are the standards of the centre's records. Every dependency is traced to the assessment in the centre's files, every actor is named plainly, and every state of the relationship is traced to the most recent contact recorded. The consequences of withdrawal or reduction are recorded plainly: the fiscal consequence of the bondholders' refusal to roll over the debt, the operational consequence of the professionals' departure, the political consequence of the coalition partner's defection. The dependencies are presented in the standard order — financial, human, informational, institutional, political — and within each dependency, the actors are presented in the order of the share of the resource they provide.

D.4 The Risks and Relationships Sections

The risks section sets out the risks the government faces, with the probability and consequence of each and the response in place. A risk is a contingency that, if it materialises, would damage the government's capacity to govern. The risks include the financial — a run on the currency, a sovereign-debt crisis, a banking failure — the political — a coalition defection, a vote of no confidence, a public-order crisis — the security — an attack, an insurgency, a foreign incursion — the diplomatic — a treaty failure, a sanction, an escalation — and the administrative — a service-delivery failure, a procurement collapse, a personnel crisis. Each risk is recorded with the contingency, the probability assessed as high, medium, or low, the consequence assessed as catastrophic, severe, or moderate, and the response in place, comprising the plan, the resources, and the authority designated.

The relationships section sets out the key relationships the new holder must establish in the first days, with the actors involved and the recommended approach. A relationship is the channel through which the government transacts with an actor on whom it depends, and the relationships the new holder must establish in the first days are the relationships that cannot be delegated to officials. The relationships include the head of state, the leaders of the branches, the leaders of the parties, the senior officials of the centre, the commanders of the security forces, the heads of the banks, the senior diplomatic representatives, and the figures of the economic and social elite. Each relationship is recorded with the actor, the form of the first meeting — audience, call, briefing, or dinner — the matters to be raised, and the recommended approach, comprising the tone, the emphasis, the asks, and the offers.

The standards for the risks and the relationships sections are the standards of the centre's records. Every risk is traced to the assessment in the centre's files, every probability and consequence is the centre's current judgement, and every response in place is traced to the plan, the resources, and the authority designated. Every relationship is traced to the centre's most recent contact with the actor, and every recommended approach is the centre's standing judgement updated for the transition. The risks are presented in the order of consequence, with the catastrophic first, and the relationships are presented in the order in which the new holder should establish them, with the head of state first, then the leaders of the branches, then the senior officials, then the leaders of the parties, then the rest.

D.5 Chapter Summary

The transition brief is organised in five sections in a fixed order: the commitments, the dependencies, the risks, the relationships, and the decisions for the first days. The components are not independent: each commitment rests on a dependency, each dependency carries a risk, each risk requires a relationship to manage, and the decisions for the first days draw on all four. The brief is governed by fixed structure, source traceability, and scheduled review, and the three standards together account for the brief's authority across transitions.

The commitments section sets out the government's outstanding commitments with the status of each and the consequences of fulfilment or non-fulfilment, recorded against the centre's standing instruments and assessments. The dependencies section sets out the resource dependencies with the

actors on whom each rests and the state of each relationship, recorded in the standard order and assessed on the centre's most recent contact. The risks section sets out the risks with the probability, the consequence, and the response in place, and the relationships section sets out the key relationships the new holder must establish in the first days with the actors involved and the recommended approach.

The discipline of the brief is the discipline of description: honest about the commitments and the state of their implementation, complete in the dependencies and the actors on whom each rests, plain in the risks and the responses in place, and direct in the relationships and the recommended approaches. The new holder who reads the brief in the first hours enters the office with the centre's working knowledge at hand. The brief's quality determines the new holder's readiness in the first days, and the centre's craft in the preparation of the brief is the centre's contribution to the continuity of the government across the change of office-holder.

Appendix E — The Crisis Response Checklist

The checklist for the centre's response to a crisis of confidence: the diagnosis, the response, and the restoration of confidence across the fiscal, political, security, and reputational types.

E.1 The Common Response Checklist

The common response checklist applies to every crisis regardless of type, and the elements are the speed of the response, the clarity of the communication, the coherence of the posture, and the composure of the centre. The four elements are common because the actors on whom the government depends read the centre's conduct on each regardless of the crisis type, and the centre that fails on any of the four propagates the loss regardless of the underlying merits of the response. The checklist is run from the first hour and revisited through each day of the response, because the elements degrade under pressure and the centre's discipline is the maintenance of the four through the duration. The common checklist precedes the type-specific checklists, because the type-specific response cannot succeed on a centre that has failed the common craft.

The standards for each element are concrete and observable. The speed of the response requires the centre's first statement within the first hour of the event and the centre's first action within the first day, because the cascade propagates on the hours and the response that arrives after the cascade has propagated has failed. The clarity of the communication requires the centre's statements to be specific, consistent, and unqualified, and the centre that issues the vague statement, the qualified commitment, or the contradictory signal propagates the loss the communication was meant to arrest. The coherence of the posture requires the government to speak as one, and the divergence between the ministries, the public divisions within the coalition, and the conflicting statements by the principals are read as the government's loss of control. The composure of the centre requires the principals to be visible and the conduct of the response to be in the manner the centre has prepared, because the principal who disappears from public view or the minister who contradicts the prime minister has lost the composure the actors read as the centre's loss of control.

The running of the common checklist is the principal's personal discipline, and the principal who delegates the running to the officials has abandoned the discipline. The principal convenes the crisis committee within the first hour, sets the posture and the message in the first meeting, and confirms the statement before its release. The principal reviews the four elements at the opening of each subsequent meeting, because the elements are the test the centre applies to its own conduct, and the centre that does not test itself in the crisis has relied on the conduct the crisis has already invalidated. The common checklist is the discipline the centre maintains regardless of the type, and the type-specific checklists that follow are built on the common craft the four elements establish.

E.2 The Fiscal Crisis Checklist

The fiscal crisis checklist applies to the loss of confidence by the revenue base, the investor community, or the external financiers, and the elements are the diagnosis of the fiscal position, the communication of the plan, the management of the financial actor relationships, and the restoration of the confidence through action. The fiscal crisis manifests in the refusal of credit at the rates the government can sustain, the flight of capital from the currency, the withholding of tax by the revenue base, and the demand for higher yields on the debt the government must refinance. The prices of the government's paper and the levels of the reserves register the actors' confidence hour by hour, and the centre that attends to the announcement in place of the prices has misdiagnosed the test. The fiscal crisis has a slower tempo than the political or the security crisis, and the discipline of the checklist is the maintenance of the four elements through the duration.

The standards for each element are concrete and observable. The diagnosis requires the centre to establish the fiscal position within the first day, to distinguish the structural deficit from the cyclical deficit, and to set the financing gap as the figure the plan must close. The communication requires the plan to be specific in its measures, credible in its timeline, and direct in its consequences for the actors whose confidence has been lost, and the communication that conceals the gap or qualifies the measures has propagated the loss. The management of the relationships requires the centre to engage the central bank, the finance ministry, the commercial banks, the foreign creditors, and the international institutions in the order their leverage requires. The restoration requires the implementation of the measures the plan announced and the publication of the implementation's progress, because the confidence returns through the action and the demonstration of the action.

The running of the fiscal crisis checklist is the chancellor's and the central bank governor's joint discipline, and the principal coordinates the two and confirms the plan before its publication. The principal engages the parliamentary party and the coalition partners whose support the implementation requires, because the fiscal plan that lacks the political support fails in the implementation regardless of its technical adequacy. The principal maintains the engagement with the international institutions through the duration of the response, because the institutions' confidence is the condition of the external financing and the institutions' public assessment registers the markets' confidence in the plan. The restoration is the work of months and years, and the centre that treats the fiscal crisis as a matter of the announcement in place of the action has misunderstood the crisis and prolonged the loss.

E.3 The Political Crisis Checklist

The political crisis checklist applies to the loss of confidence by the public, the coalition, or the political elites, and the elements are the diagnosis of the political position, the management of the coalition, the communication with the public, and the restoration of the confidence through leadership. The political crisis manifests in the collapse of the polls, the defection of the coalition partners, the public withdrawal of support by the senior figures, and the emergence of a successor whom the elites begin to consider. The political crisis is the type in which the cascade is most dangerous, because the loss of confidence by one set of actors propagates to the others through the

channels of political observation. The discipline of the checklist is the diagnosis of the loss, the arrest of the cascade, and the restoration of the confidence through the leadership the centre demonstrates.

The standards for each element are concrete and observable. The diagnosis requires the centre to establish the government's standing in the polls, the coalition's cohesion, the elites' confidence, and the channels through which the loss is propagating, and the diagnosis distinguishes the loss that can be arrested by the response from the loss that has passed the point of arrest. The management of the coalition requires the centre to engage the partners, the factions, and the senior figures in the order their leverage requires, and to address the demands the loss has amplified. The communication with the public requires the principal to address the public directly, through the speech, the broadcast, and the gesture that signal the government's direction. The restoration requires the principal to demonstrate the leadership through the action and the conduct that the public, the coalition, and the elites observe, because the confidence returns through the leadership the centre demonstrates.

The running of the political crisis checklist is the principal's personal discipline, and the principal who delegates the management of the coalition or the communication with the public to the officials has abandoned the discipline. The principal convenes the coalition leaders within the first day, addresses the public within the first week, and engages the senior figures whose confidence the crisis has tested. The principal reviews the diagnosis at each subsequent meeting, because the political position changes as the cascade propagates and the centre that does not track the change has misdiagnosed the response the position requires. The restoration is the work of weeks and months, and the centre that treats the political crisis as a matter of the communication in place of the leadership has misunderstood the crisis and prolonged the loss.

E.4 The Security and Reputational Crisis Checklists

The security crisis checklist applies to the loss of confidence in the government's capacity to maintain order or defend the state, and the elements are the diagnosis, the deployment, the communication, and the demonstration of capacity. The security crisis manifests in the refusal of orders by the security forces, the collapse of the public order, the failure of the defences, and the foreign governments' withdrawal of confidence in the state's capacity to meet its obligations. The diagnosis requires the centre to establish the threat, the forces available, the loyalty of the forces, and the channels through which the cascade is propagating, and to distinguish the regional insurrection from the national rising. The deployment requires the centre to engage the police, the gendarmerie, and the military in the order the threat requires, and the deployment is the action by which the government's capacity is demonstrated. The restoration requires the demonstration of capacity through the success of the deployment and the maintenance of the order, because the confidence returns through the capacity the centre has demonstrated.

The reputational crisis checklist applies to the loss of confidence in the government's integrity or competence through scandal, failure, or exposure, and the elements are the diagnosis, the management of the disclosure, the accountability for the failure, and the restoration through the demonstration of reform. The reputational crisis differs from the other types in the centre's

vulnerability, because the conduct at issue is the conduct of the centre itself, and the centre's response is the conduct by which the centre distinguishes itself from the conduct at issue. The diagnosis requires the centre to establish the conduct at issue, the actors implicated, the actors whose confidence has been lost, and the channels through which the loss is propagating. The management of the disclosure requires the centre to engage the press, the parliament, and the public in the order the disclosure requires, and the accountability requires the resignation, the dismissal, or the prosecution of the actors implicated. The restoration requires the demonstration of the reform through the changes to the procedures, the personnel, and the structures that prevented the conduct's detection, because the confidence returns through the reform the centre has implemented.

The security and the reputational crises are the types in which the centre's conduct is most directly tested, because the security crisis requires the demonstration of the capacity the state claims and the reputational crisis requires the accountability of the centre's own. The running of the security checklist is the principal's and the security ministers' joint discipline, and the principal confirms the deployment and the communication before the action. The running of the reputational checklist is the principal's personal discipline, and the principal who defers the accountability or the reform has prolonged the loss. The two types converge in the conduct the centre demonstrates, because the security crisis is resolved by the capacity shown and the reputational crisis is resolved by the accountability shown. The restoration in each type is the work of the months and the years, and the centre that treats either crisis as a matter of the communication in place of the action has misunderstood the crisis and prolonged the loss.

E.5 Chapter Summary

The crisis response checklist comprises the common elements and the type-specific elements, and the centre that runs the common checklist and the type-specific checklist together has applied the discipline the crisis requires. The common checklist establishes the speed of the response, the clarity of the communication, the coherence of the posture, and the composure of the centre, and the four elements are the test the centre applies to its own conduct throughout the response. The type-specific checklists establish the diagnosis, the response, and the restoration appropriate to the fiscal, the political, the security, and the reputational types, and the four types together cover the crises through which the centre's dependencies are threatened. The checklist is the discipline the centre maintains regardless of the crisis's character, and the centre that runs the checklist from the first hour has applied the craft the crisis tests.

The standards for each element are concrete and observable, and the centre that maintains the standards through the crisis has passed the test the crisis has set. The fiscal crisis is resolved by the action the plan announced and the relationships the engagement secured, the political crisis is resolved by the leadership the principal demonstrated and the coalition the management held, the security crisis is resolved by the capacity the deployment showed and the order the forces maintained, and the reputational crisis is resolved by the accountability the centre delivered and the reform the centre implemented. The restoration is the work of the months and the years after the response, and the centre that treats the crisis as a matter of the announcement in place of the action has misunderstood the crisis and prolonged the loss. The crisis is a test of the centre; the centre that

maintains the common and the type-specific checklists through the crisis has passed the test, and the centre that has not has failed, regardless of the crisis's outcome.

Appendix F — The Centre's Reading List

The annotated reading list covering the foundational texts on statecraft, the comparative practice literature, and the historical studies that illustrate the operational craft of the centre.

F.1 Foundational Texts on Statecraft

The foundational texts on statecraft establish the analytical lineage of the centre's craft, and the lineage begins with Niccolò Machiavelli. *The Prince*, written in 1513 and published posthumously in 1532, sets out the proposition that the prince's hold on the state is a problem of means, and that the means are to be assessed by their effect on the preservation of the state, not by their conformity to moral principle. *The Discourses on Livy*, written in the same period and published in 1531, extends the analysis to the republic, and argues that the endurance of a republic rests on the management of the conflict between the orders, the cultivation of civic virtue, and the institutional forms that channel ambition into the public good. The contribution is the framing of statecraft as a discipline with its own criteria of judgment, and the separation of the discipline from moral theology. Cardin le Bret's *De la souveraineté du roi*, published in 1632, carries the discipline into the French absolutist tradition and provides the legal and the doctrinal formulation of sovereignty as the centre's indivisible and inalienable authority over the territory, the offices, and the dependencies, a formulation that became the foundation on which the subsequent French doctrine of the state rested.

Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet's *Politique tirée de l'Écriture sainte*, delivered as sermons to the dauphin and published posthumously in 1709, sets out the theological grounding of the royal authority and the limits the grounding imposes. Bossuet's contribution is the doctrine that the king is the image of God on earth, accountable to God alone, and bound by the law of God and the fundamental laws of the realm. The doctrine is the operational form of the recognition that the centre's authority requires a grounding, and that the grounding is the source of the limits the centre observes in the exercise of its authority. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, published in 1821, carries the analysis into the modern state and the constitutional tradition, treating the state as the rational actuality of the ethical idea, differentiating the civil society from the state, and formulating the civil service as the universal class whose function is the conduct of the state's business in the universal interest. The formulation is the doctrinal foundation of the modern official's vocation, and the separation of the official's judgment from the private interests of the civil society is the analytical move on which the modern centre's understanding of its own work depends.

Alexis de Tocqueville's *The Old Regime and the Revolution*, published in 1856, sets out the analysis of the centralisation of the French state across the centuries preceding the Revolution, and the argument that the centralisation was the cause of the Revolution's character. Tocqueville's contribution is the demonstration that the centre's reach into the territory, the suppression of the intermediate bodies, and the concentration of the public business in the capital produce the conditions of the revolutionary rupture, and that the centre's discipline is the management of the

dependence the centralisation creates. Max Weber's *Politics as a Vocation*, delivered as a lecture in 1919 and published in the same year, sets out the analysis of domination, the typology of the legitimate orders, and the treatment of the official's vocation and the politician's vocation as distinct. Weber's contribution is the formulation of the state as the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, the treatment of bureaucracy as the most rational form of domination, and the distinction between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility. The formulation is the analytical foundation of the modern centre's understanding of its own work, and the distinction between the official and the politician is the distinction the centre observes in its conduct of the public business.

F.2 Comparative Practice

The comparative practice literature on the centre of government is the documentation of how the centre's work is conducted across the mature jurisdictions, and the principal source is the United Kingdom's Cabinet Manual. The Cabinet Manual, first published in 2011 by the Cabinet Secretary, codifies the conventions governing the formation and the dissolution of the government, the conduct of the cabinet's business, the management of the executive-legislature relationship, and the conduct of the transitions between governments. The codification is the recognition that the conventions can be written down without being weakened, and the manual has been drawn on by other jurisdictions preparing comparable texts. The contribution is the demonstration that the centre's work is the product of conventions that can be made explicit, audited, and transmitted to the officials who must apply them, and the doctrine is the operational reference the officials consult when the conventions are tested.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has produced the most developed comparative work on the centre of government, through the reports of its public governance committee and the surveys of the centres of government conducted since 2014. The OECD's reports set out the institutional configurations of the centres across the member states, the functions the centres perform, and the challenges the centres face in the coordination of the line ministries, the management of the strategic priorities, and the response to the crises. The World Bank's public sector management studies, conducted through its governance practice, complement the OECD's work with the documentation of the centre's practice in the developing and the transitioning jurisdictions, and the treatment of the capacity-building challenges the centre faces in those contexts. The contribution of the two bodies is the comparative frame that allows a jurisdiction to assess its own practice against that of its peers, and the documentation of the range of institutional forms the centre's work takes across the constitutional traditions and the stages of development.

The comparative public administration literature completes the comparative perspective, and the literature is represented by the work of the scholars who have studied the centre across the jurisdictions. The literature on the Westminster tradition, the French administrative tradition, the German federal tradition, the Japanese administrative tradition, and the Singaporean whole-of-government tradition provides the doctrinal and the institutional analysis of the configurations the centre's work takes in each. The literature on policy coordination, on cabinet government, and on

the centre of government provides the analytical treatment of the functions the centre performs and the instruments the centre uses. The contribution is the analytical depth the comparative perspective requires, and the recognition that the centre's work is the same in its substance across the jurisdictions while the institutional forms are the product of the constitutional tradition, the political history, and the administrative culture.

F.3 Historical Studies

The historical studies that illustrate the operational craft of the centre are the biographies and the histories of the practitioners who exercised the craft. The biographies of Klemens von Metternich, drawn on the Metternich archives and the studies by Heinrich von Srbik and others, document the conduct of the Austrian centre across the four decades of Metternich's service as chancellor, the management of the multinational empire through the Congress system, and the cultivation of the personal relationships with the tsar and the British and the French ministers. The biographies of Otto von Bismarck, drawn on the Bismarck memoirs and the studies by Erich Eyck and Lothar Gall, document the construction of the German Empire between 1862 and 1890, the management of the constitutional conflict with the Prussian parliament, the conduct of the three wars, and the construction of the alliance system. The contribution is the demonstration of the operational craft in the practitioners' exercise of it, and the documentation of the conditions under which the craft succeeds and the conditions under which it fails.

The biographies of Charles de Gaulle, drawn on the de Gaulle memoirs and the studies by Jean Lacouture and others, document the construction of the Fifth Republic in 1958, the management of the colonial retreat, the conduct of the relationship with the allies, and the management of the 1968 crisis and the subsequent resignation. The contribution is the demonstration of the centre's craft in the construction of a constitutional order and in the management of the crises that test the order, and the documentation of the relationship between the personal authority of the principal and the institutional authority of the office. The biographies of Lee Kuan Yew, drawn on Lee's memoirs and the studies that have followed the Singaporean state's development, document the construction of the Singaporean centre across the six decades of Lee's service, the management of the separation from Malaysia, the construction of the whole-of-government approach, and the cultivation of the relationships with the foreign leaders. The contribution is the demonstration of the craft in the construction of a state and the management of its dependencies across the long arc of the principal's service.

The histories of the Meiji oligarchs, drawn on the studies by Marius Jansen and William Beasley, document the construction of the modern Japanese state between 1868 and 1912, the abolition of the domains, the conscription ordinance, the land tax revision, the constitution of 1889, and the revision of the unequal treaties. The contribution is the demonstration of the centre's craft exercised collectively by a group of principals, and the documentation of the institutional forms the collective exercise of the craft takes. The histories of the Venetian patriciate, drawn on the studies by Frederic Lane and Edward Muir, document the management of the Venetian Republic across the millennium of its endurance, the conduct of the councils, the management of the colonies and the mercantile communities, and the cultivation of the personal networks that sustained the patriciate's

authority. The contribution is the demonstration of the operational craft exercised through an institutional form that endured for a millennium, and the documentation of the conditions under which the craft sustains the state across the long duration.

F.4 Chapter Summary

The annotated reading list covers the foundational texts on statecraft, the comparative practice literature, and the historical studies that illustrate the operational craft of the centre. The foundational texts are Machiavelli's *The Prince* and *The Discourses*, Cardin le Bret's *De la souveraineté du roi*, Bossuet's *Politique tirée de l'Écriture sainte*, Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, Tocqueville's *The Old Regime and the Revolution*, and Weber's *Politics as a Vocation*, which together establish the analytical lineage of the operational craft from the Renaissance to the modern state. The readings on comparative practice are the United Kingdom's *Cabinet Manual*, the OECD's work on the centre of government, the World Bank's public sector management studies, and the comparative public administration literature, which together provide the comparative frame for the assessment of the centre's practice. The historical studies are the biographies and the histories of Metternich, Bismarck, de Gaulle, Lee Kuan Yew, the Meiji oligarchs, and the Venetian patriciate, which together document the conditions under which the craft succeeds and the conditions under which it fails.

The readings are to be read as the operational literature the craft has produced, and the literature is the corpus on which the centre's principals draw in the conduct of the public business. The foundational texts provide the analytical categories, the comparative practice literature provides the institutional reference points, and the historical studies provide the documented exercise of the craft across the range of conditions the centre faces. The readings inform the practice of the craft, and the practice is the working-out of the principles the readings establish. The principal who reads the corpus with attention recognises the centre's work in the categories the corpus provides, and the recognition is the preparation the readings supply.